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After a long period of neglect, emotions have become an important topic in 
literary studies, although literature is not the only field of interest when dealing 
with the question of emotion. Within the humanities, disciplines such as film 
studies, history, anthropology and philosophy have made influential contribu-
tions, while in the realm of the natural and social sciences the topic of emotions 
has been widely discussed in neurology, biology, sociology and psychology. 
This considerable involvement of such a great variety of disciplines led to the 
assumption of an “emotional turn” (Anz 2006). But one could also pose the 
challenging question of whether it is appropriate to speak rather of an “affective 
(re)turn” (Keen 2011), given the fact that emotions have been a topic in philoso-
phy and the arts since antiquity. Emotions were, for example, also broadly treat-
ed in the discourses on affect and passion in the 16th and 17th century, in the 
18th century’s aesthetic of sentiment or, with the concept of empathy (Einfüh-
lung), in the 19th and early 20th century.  
These observations provided the starting point for this volume and the inter-
national conference preceding it. The symposium “Writing Emotions. Literature 
as Practice (19th to 21st Century)” was held at the University of Graz from 18 to 
20 May 2016. It was organized by the Center for Cultural Studies and the doc-
toral programme “Culture – Text – Act(ion)” at the University of Graz in coop-
eration with the European PhDnet “Literary and Cultural Studies”. International 
PhD students, postdoc researchers and senior researchers from various disci-
plines, such as English and American Studies, German Studies, Slavic Studies 
and Comparative Literature, came together to present and discuss their newest 
findings and theoretical models concerning emotions and literature, with a spe-
cial focus on the practice of writing. In their papers, they drew on theoretical 
concepts and studies from fields such as philosophy and cognitive studies and 
transferred these to cultural and literary analyses. The conference opened up an 
interdisciplinary dialogue to pose questions and formulate theoretical models 
from which the various disciplines could then profit in turn. 
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The central questions addressed at the conference as well as in the contributions 
in this volume are the following:  
 
• Which roles do emotions play within writing as an aesthetic process?  
• Where and how do emotional moments of the practice of writing leave traces 
within the text?  
• How do authors play with this emotional impact?  
• Where and how do authors explicitly deal with emotion and writing or with 
writing as an emotional practice within the texts?  
• What kind of role do intermedial strategies play?  
• Where does intertextuality come in?  
• How is the topic and context of media devices incorporated (language, writing 
tools, photography, film, the digital etc.)?  
• What theoretical models do we have for analysing forms of emotion in modern 
literature?  
• What are the interfaces and borders between sociocultural and scientific con-
cepts of emotion and aesthetic emotions in the context of writing as agency?  
• Which types of emotion and which forms of literary emotions can be found in 
the context of writing as agency? 
 
The contributions, grouped into four thematic sections, ponder these questions 
and their implications. 
 
The first section is conceived as a theoretical introduction. In her programmatic 
proposal, Susanne Knaller presents the interconnections between emotions and 
the process of writing, summing up the core questions of the volume and estab-
lishing a theoretical basis for it. Drawing on recent scholarship on emotions and 
literature, she particularly highlights the complex role of literature/written texts 
as both the result of and the trigger for emotional patterns and as potentially 
enforcing and/or challenging norms. Based on these considerations, she proposes 
a number of relevant and previously neglected fields and questions for further 
research on the issue of writing as a process and its relations to the field of emo-
tions. Vera Nünning then addresses emotions encoded in literature and their 
effect on the reader. Using extensive textual examples from various periods and 
genres, she gives a wide-ranging overview of strategies of emotional expression 
in world literature, relating the results of her text-immanent and reception-
focused analysis to neuroscientific findings. Gesine Lenore Schiewer chooses an 
original empiric approach to the topic. In an interview with writer Michael 
Stavarič, she discusses the core questions of this volume exemplarily, thereby 
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providing a concrete and illustrative case study. With cognitive psychology and 
artificial intelligence as her point of departure, she draws on the theoretical and 
practical knowledge of the possibilities and limitations of technological process-
es to explore the interface between feeling, artificially generated emotional ex-
pression and the question of its authenticity. Finally, Angela Locatelli explores 
psychoanalytic discourses around religious feelings of ecstasy, thus highlighting 
another dimension of the spectrum of human emotions, and discusses them in a 
systematically comparative way. Aspects of depth-psychological views, central 
for the study of emotions, are thus made fruitful for theoretical deliberations, 
laying the groundwork for further studies. 
The ensuing sections present contributions and analyses on the themes of 
“Emotions Mediated”, “Emotions on Stage and in Literary Texts” and “Writing 
Wounds”. 
 
The contributions to “Emotions Mediated” address possible reciprocal effects 
between emotions and various media. Specific media such as letters (Marie 
Dücker), diaries (Julia Grillmayr), journalistic and artistic texts (Ingeborg Jandl), 
internet posts and YouTube videos (Silke Jandl), bodies, and vehicles (Nora 
Berning), as well as musical and artistic works in a broader sense, are analysed 
in regard to their potential for emotional expression. Discussions of these exam-
ples consider to what extent medial forms mediate or facilitate the expression of 
emotions, to what extent emotions are altered through these means of expression, 
and what implications different medial forms can have for emotional self-images 
and the image of others. Media imply specific discourses, sign systems and 
practices, and emotional expression necessitates the translation of emotion into 
these systems. The contributions to this section highlight potential obstacles to 
this undertaking. These impediments can stem both from a subject’s uncertain 
emotional state and from the process of textualization and the difficulties inher-
ent in translating feelings into a medium in order to make them accessible to 
others. Discussions and examples illustrate the complexity of emotions and offer 
suggestions for dealing with the potentially fraught issue of mediated emotions. 
The essays in this section show that writing, as an ‘external movement’, initiates 
and triggers internal as well as further external movements and consequently 
accompanies the construction of identities and personalities. 
 
The essays in the section “Emotions on Stage and in Literary Texts” point out 
techniques of inscribing emotions into written and spoken or performed texts, 
often with the explicit goal of directly affecting the recipients. The shifts and 
modifications of the concept of emotions become particularly apparent in the 
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two essays discussing early modern texts by Gudrun Tockner and Emanuel 
Stelzer, which highlight the categories of humoralism as important tenets of 
contemporaneous anthropological thought while also discussing other, less well-
known emotional categories of the time. Dialogue and stage directions from 
early modern plays illustrate that emotional frame settings and rhetorical means 
are carefully chosen in order to anchor spectators’ feelings to the emotions de-
picted on stage. Conventionalized postures and poses, as also developed in 18th 
and 19th century studies of physiognomy, play an important role in the artistic 
depiction of emotions not just in a theatrical context but also in the visual arts 
and, based on this, in literature (Yulia Marfutova). Contemporary literary texts 
and those of the 19th and 20th century, on the other hand, show a noticeably 
more individualized preoccupation with feelings, partly inspired by the idea of 
irrational patterns as an inherent part of the individual psyche (Pirjo 
Lyytikäinen). The limits of holding on to a singular identity as a human being 
overlap with the limits of feelings themselves, the limits of understanding feel-
ings, and the limits of being able experience them (Sabine Schönfellner). 
Through these reflections upon the subject of human emotion as something 
potentially elusive, something which cannot be entirely depicted or analysed, the 
enquiry into emotions gains some deeply ambivalent aspects. 
 
The difficulties emerging in the previous section are at the centre of the section 
“Writing Wounds”, in which contributions focus on internal psychological pro-
cesses on the part of literary characters and writing subjects. Here, wounds, 
identifiable as the starting point of writing (Elise Nykänen), are the core motif 
which pervades the texts under discussion in various guises (Riikka Rossi). 
Thematically, mental injuries, personal insecurities and inner conflicts initiate a 
desperate and often illusionary quest for change and development. The depth of 
some wounds seems to make it impossible to find adequate means of expression 
for them, as in the essay focusing on writing about the Shoah (Tom Vanassche), 
while other authors and characters recognize and utilize writing as the last an-
choring point in reality for desperate individuals experiencing psychosis (Anna 
Ovaska, Laura Oulanne). Despite rarely recovering in the long term, writing 
helps these individuals to continue a process of reflection and supports them in 
preserving a continuous sense of identity. The states of astonishment and insecu-
rity of literary subjects ultimately prove to be both productive on a literary level 
and demanded by audiences. Authors use psychotic states as artistically produc-
tive means, while the history of reception of the Twilight saga particularly high-
lights how readers experience the long-awaited liberation from uncertainty as 
ultimately dissatisfying (Heta Pyrhönen). 
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In this volume, contributions centring on theory and those with an analytic focus 
mesh and complement each other. Emotions seem to be immanent in any kind of 
writing, since they are missed if absent. Writing is consequently emphasized as a 
process in which emotions are always visible in some manner, and this concep-
tualisation in turn opens up diverse possibilities to produce, construct, modify, 























In recent years, the topic of emotion has been widely discussed in literary and 
cultural studies as well as in art theory.1 In the wake of more and more diverse 
and complex research in neuro- and cognitive science, psychology, biology, 
linguistics and philosophy, literary criticism has become increasingly interested 
in a subject which literature itself has, in fact, ever since been concerned with: 
emotions and feelings. On the level of text the actions of literary characters have 
always been motivated by emotions such as guilt, hatred, love, jealousy and fear. 
To identify these fictional emotions, which are informed by the lifeworld and its 
practices, is an important aspect of literary understanding. It proves difficult to 
decipher such emotions when they appear in the form of rhetorical images or 
topoi. In these instances, emotions such as jealousy or guilt serve as allegories, 
metaphors or symbols for concepts or values such as good and evil, mind and 
body, beautiful and ugly, or true and false. This is the case in texts of the pre-
modern period (e.g. in medieval love motifs) as well as in 20th-century literature 
(e.g. in Kafka’s motifs of fear and guilt). While in analysing fictional characters 
or concrete motifs and rhetorical techniques, one can at least draw on given 
empirical conditions (the text units) and on hermeneutical arguments (the corre-
lation between knowledge, context and poetics), on the level of reception or 
                                                             
1  Cf. Knaller/Rieger 2016. A selection of pivotal examples from the numerous publica-
tions includes: Nünning 2014; Palmier 2014; Schiewer 2014, 2009; Schneider 2013; 
Anz 2012, 2007; Frevert, et al. 2011; Hogan 2011; Keen 2011; Robinson 2010; Kop-
penfels 2007; Mellmann 2006; Meyer-Sickendieck 2005; Kappelhoff 2004; Voss 
2004; Winko 2003; Menninghaus 1999. 
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reader-response, feelings pose a much greater challenge for literary studies. As 
of late, this has been increasingly discussed in empirically-oriented studies 
which draw on approaches developed by experimental psychology and the neu-
rosciences as well as on models inspired by biology; the latter proceed from a 
stimulus-reaction scheme and take up evolutionary arguments, necessities of 
everyday life and psychophysical conditions.2 This interdisciplinary expansion 
into the natural sciences has kept the issue of emotional response in a field of 
tension between the artefact (i.e. textual triggers informed by the medium, rheto-
ric and motifs) on the one hand and real-life emotional actions and communica-
tion processes on the other.  
From these complex constellations follows the important question as to how 
different levels of emotion that are effective in literary texts interrelate. This 
includes the text levels on which emotions are explicitly or implicitly expressed 
and where text strategies are applied to trigger emotional responses. The aesthet-
ic context of (literary) texts, moreover, encompasses production-related emo-
tions which can be attributed to the author, but in part also relate to text strate-
gies. Finally, literary texts also generate actual, empirically and experimentally 
verifiable emotions. 
As shown above, emotions and feelings are never isolated phenomena, but 
multistratified and variously interrelated complexes. Hence, as a first definition, 
emotions are always bound to knowledge as well as to practical actions and 
conditions in the lifeworld. They are based in the conceptual and the abstract, yet 
also take practical effect. Moreover, it can be assumed that emotions portrayed 
in literature have strong inherent potential for steering emotional response. 
Therefore, the respective functions of emotions in the context of their potential 
reception and the related reciprocal relationship between aesthetic and non-
aesthetic determinants are of particular interest. Aesthetic emotions build on 
non-aesthetic emotional codes, formulas and patterns; in turn, they also con-
tribute to generating these very codes, while counteracting them at the same 
time. This warrants a renegotiation of emotions. From this perspective, emotions 
can, therefore, be defined as behavioural patterns closely linked to the acquisi-
tion of communicative and practical competencies within a social group. The 
expression of emotions is determined by social frameworks and the specific 
medium-related conditions.3 For literary studies, this demands an understanding 
                                                             
2  In this context cf. Mellmann 2006. Furthermore, the Max Planck Institute for Empiri-
cal Aesthetics in Frankfurt am Main should be mentioned in this context (Winfried 
Menninghaus). 
3  This definition is highly compatible with the approach of practical theories. For 
Andreas Reckwitz emotions are not considered as psychological or mental processes, 
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of the psychophysical, epistemological, practical and formal conditions of emo-
tions and how these are treated in the literary context. 
In recent years, a distinction between emotion and feeling has proved helpful 
for this purpose.4 While emotion refers to a neurologically, biologically, psycho-
logically, cognitively, culturally and medium-specifically (pre-)determined com-
plex, feelings are defined as reactions, i.e. as reflected states and as events of 
emotions. Emotions are linked to psychophysical conditions, such as knowledge, 
assessments and judgment, and to practical actions and determinants in the life-
world. In the context of literary texts, we are concerned with aesthetically re-
flected verbalizations of models and paradigms of emotion. What comes up for 
discussion via literature are the triggering, experiencing, naming, describing, 
understanding, regulating and codifying of models of emotion and feeling along 
with their respective practices. Since the 17th century, it has been agreed within 
western philosophy and science that emotions and feelings are a necessary foun-
dation for our self-understanding and for understanding others. Emotions and 
feelings determine the relationship between body, mind and actions; they influ-
ence our modern self-understanding and our understanding of others, our ap-
proach to self-representation and to the representation of others. Emotions de-
termine decisions and judgments as well as the values and relevance we ascribe 
to others. Already Descartes described emotion as a state which is experienced in 
terms of a certain quality. This state represents an external object through its 
effect on the mind and evaluates the object, thus establishing a representation 
pattern that can be applied to other objects, as Dominique Perler specifies.5 For 
Descartes, as later for Hume and in the concepts of moral sense (which are im-
portant for 18th-century aesthetic theories), emotions also contain a highly re-
flexive element deriving from the subject. Emotions can, therefore, become the 
basis for moral/ethical consequences. Thus, emotion is also a part of reason. 
However, there is little agreement on how big this part is, nor on the exact nature 
of the relationship between neurological dispositions, psychophysical perception, 
phenomenological feeling, reflection and moral insight, emotional experience 
and ethically correct actions. Likewise, there is still little consensus about 
                                                                                                                                  
but they “constitute an integral part of the practical activities within which human 
bodies relate to other objects and subjects. […] Affects/emotions are neither an inner 
possession of individuals nor are they mere outward signs, ‘expressive’ gestures made 
public. They are bodily reactions and they are enabled/restricted by interpretative 
schemes at the same time. This is to say, they are part of social practices […].” 
Reckwitz 2012, 251. 
4  Cf. Damasio 2011. 
5  Cf. Perler 2012: 282-283. 
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whether emotion is a universal, historical, physical, cognitive, psychological, 
neurological, independent, referential, intentional, constructive or passive phe-
nomenon. This list could be continued. 
This pluralism of perspectives notwithstanding, regarding the relation be-
tween emotions and literary studies there are basically four potential areas of 
interest: a) the (historical, systematic and/or analytical) investigation of emotion-
al concepts in aesthetic theories and in poetics; b) the (historical, systematic 
and/or immanent) analysis of emotion-related concepts and strategies in literary 
texts; c) the dimensions of emotional response and effect in reception; d) the 
(anthropologically, culturally, neurologically, phenomenologically, biologically 
and/or psychologically motivated) assumption of the presence of emotions in the 
production of artistic/literary works. Emotions on the level of production are 
among those least explored. They fall into two categories: specific emotions 
specifically generated and experienced during the writing process and general-
izable emotions. The former can be identified through direct empirical experi-
ments, documents, and via potentially very speculative conclusions based on 
generally valid social patterns, biographical circumstances, poetological features 
etc. The latter depend on the respective aesthetic models and epistemological 
presuppositions applied and entail distilling a “poetics of emotion”.6 However, 
regarding production-related emotions, it is essential to always keep in mind and 
methodologically clarify which notion of emotion is expressed in the respective 
artefacts and how this notion relates to the poetics pursued by the respective 
author. In the following, some suggestions will be made as to how patterns of 





The questions raised above illustrate the close relationship between aesthetic 
levels of reality and levels of reality in the lifeworld. Artistic objects also require 
the presupposition of conditions which make the emotional reactions of a novel’s 
protagonist comprehensible and/or trigger emotional reader response. These 
conditions resemble those of the empirical, everyday world: there must be para-
digms for generating fear, love, hatred, envy, guilt etc. and/or to make these 
recognisable. In philosophy, the distinction between concrete and formal objects 
has become prevalent in this context. Concrete objects designate the (empirical 
or abstract, material or intentional) triggers, while formal objects provide the (at 
                                                             
6  Andringa 2011: 152. 
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least for the emotional process) non-contingent evaluation and description of 
concrete objects. Ronald De Sousa defines formal objects as follows: “For each 
emotion, there is a second-order property that must be implicitly ascribed to the 
[emotion’s object] if the emotion is to be intelligible. This essential element in 
the structure of each emotion is its formal object.”7 Thus ‘truth’ is the formal 
object of ‘conviction’, ‘desire’ that of ‘wishing’. However, so-called “paradigm 
scenarios”8 are necessary to become acquainted with the vocabulary required to 
attribute emotion. They enable us to understand how emotions are classified and 
assessed and how they function; i.e., they essentially allow us to comprehend 
emotions as such, to put them into practice and to reproduce them. Regarding 
their experience, understanding and assessment, emotions are, thus, determined 
by their motivation, focus, causality and goal-orientedness.9  
The arts are instances of observing paradigm scenarios, while they, in turn, 
also depend on the conditions of their own observation. In this respect, we are 
not only concerned with emotions from real-life and cultural paradigm scenarios, 
but also with aesthetic paradigms. Furthermore, the arts are not merely con-
cerned with emotions as physical or cognitive experiences and assessments, or 
with self- and other-referential reactions. Aesthetic emotions are also bound to 
take a specific form, appear in a specific mode, and place themselves in a rela-
tionship to existing and possible aesthetic paradigms (of emotion). In methodo-
logical terms, this is the most difficult aspect to resolve, since aesthetic emo-
tions – contrary to real-life and cultural emotions – do not primarily answer the 
purposes of communication, gaining insight into the self and others, or coping 
with, reacting to and assessing certain situations. They observe scenarios and 
their vocabulary – i.e. the legitimizing discourses, the cultural, economic, politi-
cal, powerful, knowledge-governing conditions resulting from this complex, and 
the way in which those conditions are treated aesthetically. Therefore, the arts 
epistemologically and poetologically position themselves via the representations 
of emotions and feelings. 
                                                             
7  De Sousa 1987: 117. 
8  Ibid.: 72. 
9  Here, Christiane Voss’s approach (Voss 2004) ought to be mentioned. She defines the 
parameters for describing the notion of emotion in its full extent as containing inten-
tional (representations), behavioural (actions), physical-perceptual and hedonistic (in-
dividually subjective) components. In Voss’s understanding, these components are en-
twined in the narrative context which establishes their specific semantic, communica-
tive value. (Cf. ibid.: 185) Voss does not assume that emotions are always semantical-
ly charged, but perceives them as an interplay between pre-linguistic, physical experi-
ences and an embeddedness in narrative.  





In the following, the focus will be on the level of production, where paradigms 
of emotion, paradigm scenarios, and aesthetic patterns of emotion are applied. 
The respective backdrop of these applications is one of toying with what is rec-
ognized as normal/familiar, based on an affirmative or a dismissive attitude 
towards the norms. Aesthetically generated feelings in the arts and in literature 
are therefore never simple reflections or representations of lifeworld emotions. 
The specific quality of aesthetic emotions much rather lies in the juxtaposition of 
both the affirmative and dismissive attitude. This is to say that the arts affirm or 
reject and convey the perpetuation or a renegotiation of the discourses which 
relate to the notions of emotion and the related vocabulary. In moderate cases, 
this should entail purification, sensitization and clarification processes; in ex-
treme cases of dissolving the boundaries between the lifeworld and the arts it can 
result in direct interventions. Poetics of the former strand aim at intensification; 
those of the latter, on occasion, seek to vehemently disrupt common lifeworld 
and aesthetic standard scenarios. This often generates effects of immediacy or 
materially physical experiences which remain formally and narratively unseman-
ticized and unrelated, and which can be referred to as emotional events. Espe-
cially physical, phenomenal feelings often produce an effect of (artistic) provo-
cation by transgressing taboos and disrupting expectations. In this context, 
Thomas Anz rightly observes that in the case of artefacts both actions and reac-
tions can be triggered.10  
To adequately deal with these relationships between aesthetic and lifeworld 
levels of reality, the focus should be on that (very) aspect related to productive 
emotions: i.e. on writing, or more specifically, the process of writing. This ap-
proach allows literary production to be perceived as a process and therefore as a 
practice beyond the construction of a text, and moreover, allows production-
related emotions to be understood as an interface between cultural fields of ac-
tion, between the medium-determined elements of writing, of the body and of 
knowledge, and between psychophysical and social life.  
One can say that writing processes are inherently linked to emotions. As a 
psychophysical process, writing relates to emotions as a prerequisite for self- and 
other-experiences, judgments, evaluations, understanding and perception; as a 
cultural practice, it is tied to respective media, techniques and societal norms; as 
an aesthetic practice, it is determined by poetological models and its own aes-
thetic impulses; finally, as a lifeworld practice, writing ultimately depends on 
                                                             
10  Cf. Anz 2006. 
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environmental and economic conditions as well as on communication models. 
Writing is therefore to be perceived not only as a concrete process linked to 
verbal and textual media; it is also a process that can transcend text and language 
boundaries, as the avant-gardes have continuously proved. Here, emotions relat-
ed to the aesthetics of production play a decisive role and contribute to shaping 
works of art and texts which demonstrate a formally and, in terms of media, 
multi-faceted interplay between production practices, commentaries, or the cou-
pling of text and image. This permits a directness and simultaneity of emotions 
and feelings (also in the physical sense), i.e. the consistent involvement of the 
body and its motions in the private as well as the public sphere. Hence, ‘writing’ 
can also make apparent a modified, critical, or dismissive approach towards 
traditional concepts of author and work. This has recently been considered in the 
study of writing processes for which the notion of ‘work’ encompasses the pro-
cess of working on a text as well as everything that is produced during this pro-
cess. The theory of writing11 is concerned with the entire writing process and 
thus evidences that literariness cannot be reduced to traces in the text but is also 
attained through and remains inseparable from productive (real-life) actions and 
practices. This includes, for instance, intertextuality, processes of authors read-
ing and commenting on their own texts, and the concept of writing as reading.12 
Even though it stands to reason to synthesize writing, the writing processes and 
emotion, this nexus has rarely been systematically investigated. The following 





The first premise should be that emotions are equally relevant to the productive 
writing process as reception-sided strategies of generating emotion are to the 
                                                             
11  Besides Barthes’s écriture, Kittler’s ‘Aufschreibesysteme’ (Kittler 1985) can be 
quoted as a precursor; regarding the notion of ‘process’, the critique génealogique 
(Grésillon 1999, 1997; Hay 1984) has brought forth some findings. The researchers 
involved in Martin Stingelin’s project “Zur Genealogie des Schreibens” (‘On the Ge-
nealogy of Writing’), however, put an even stronger focus on the nexus between writ-
ing and life (or writing as life) than the other models. Besides the text itself, this pro-
cessual element also incorporates the (biographical, institutional, technical/material 
and poetological) conditions under which a text is produced. Cf. Stingelin 2012, 2004; 
Zanetti 2012. 
12  Cf. Giuriato/Stingelin/Zanetti 2004.  
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respective artefacts/texts. In the context of emotion and writing, Roland Barthes 
is a useful point of reference in theoretical terms, as he strongly emphasizes the 
emotional aspect of text production, i.e. the act of obtaining pathos and affect, as 
he terms it.13 He thereby also addresses the physical, corporeal elements of writ-
ing and of using writing utensils, thus setting himself apart from a purely meta-
phorical notion of writing (in the sense of style or a particular kind of form and 
work). Particularly Barthes’s concept of “écriture” has become prevalent in the 
study of writing processes.14 It allows one to discern and define the following 
aspects: 1) The explicitness of writing (as traces in the text, an element of con-
tent or as program) brings into play an aesthetic element which moves towards 
the boundaries of genres and texts, such that these boundaries are almost dis-
solved. 2) Writing refers to and evinces life as it surrounds the writing process. 
3) Writing determines the recording of what is present (language, the act). 4) The 
outcome of writing is, therefore, not the finished text (or several versions of it); 
rather, it encompasses the entire process and reveals the aesthetic potential of the 
entire complex. 5) Writing also leads to relinquishing the production of literature 
in favour of new texts concerned with writing (notebooks, diaries, essays etc.). 
6) Writing causes important notions such as those of author, work or text to be 
renegotiated. 7) Writing creates innovative aesthetic possibilities. 8) Writing 
exposes the writer in the act of writing (intransitive, as a medium).15  
Rüdiger Campe’s “Schreibszene” model (1991), which he developed for lit-
erary studies, builds on the notion of Barthes’s écriture. ‘Szene’ (‘scene’) de-
notes a movement between the body and tools/instruments/the medium, between 
literary genres, between text and commentary/critique, and describes the differ-
ential scope of the text (which is not a set product of the author).16 In his project 
concerned with investigating writing processes, Martin Stingelin takes up this 
notion and differentiates between “Schreibszene” and “Schreib-Szene”. The 
latter thematizes and problemizes, within the text, the ensemble of the 
‘Schreibszene’ in its heterogeneity and non-stability.17 This entails that the writ-
                                                             
13  Cf. Barthes 1984b. 
14  Cf., e.g., Stingelin 2004: 13; Campe 1991: 759; also Brink/Sollte-Gresser 2004: 18-
19. Campe recognizes the following aspects of modernism in Barthes’s notion of écri-
ture: that the boundaries of literary genres have been dissolved in that writing as a 
process and a practice has also penetrated into non-artistic areas; as a trace of a prac-
tice, and thus as a renegotiation of the author; as a differentiated game of the text it-
self. Barthes uses the term again and again, e.g. in Barthes 1984a, 1984b. 
15  Cf. Barthes 1984b: 344-345. 
16  Cf. Campe 1991: 759. 
17  Cf. Stingelin 2004: 15. 
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ing process is explicitly staged within itself. As constitutive elements of a text, 
which can be examined (in terms of distribution of roles, institutions involved, 
media, traces of the body or of media etc.), ‘Schreib-Szenen’ can be historized, 
analyzed and typologized. Thus, the relationship between an unconditionally 
necessary ‘Schreibszene’ and the respectively possible ‘Schreib-Szenen’ in their 
particular constellations becomes apparent. As per Stingelin, the ensemble of the 
‘Schreib-Szene’ consists of: language (semantics of writing), instrumentality 
(technology of writing), gesture (physical dimension), the frame, the distribution 
of roles and directing. Gesture/physical dimension, the distribution of roles, and 
directing can be linked to emotion paradigms, i.e. those discursive and psycho-
physical traces left at the very moment of productive and receptive activity.  
From this perspective of the inevitable coupling of writing and emotion, the 
following questions and areas for potential analysis are of interest for further 
methodological considerations: To what extent can both ‘Schreibszenen’ and 
‘Schreib-Szenen’ be provocative? How do they relate to one another? How does 
a ‘Schreibszene’/‘Schreib-Szene’ trigger emotional patterns? What are the reac-
tive consequences? When do certain ‘Schreibszenen’/‘Schreib-Szenen’ invali-
date emotional paradigm scenarios (and thus the traditional relationship between 
concrete and formal object) and vice versa? Where and due to which procedures 
do ‘Schreibszenen’ and scenarios of emotion form an interface of epistemologi-
cal and discursive observations? What are the contexts to which the individual 





In concluding, let us return to the concept of formal and concrete objects in the 
context of paradigms of emotion. Per the thesis pursued here, literary texts can 
be understood as concrete objects which are preceded by actions and reactions of 
different natures and trigger active as well as reactive actions. All concrete ob-
jects can be traced back to formal objects, and both their production and recep-
tion are only possible within the framework of generalized paradigms of emo-
tion. Literature is therefore based on general patterns of emotions and also acts 
as a singular trigger for those patterns. The specific trait of artistic texts is hence 
that they not only reproduce or repeat their underlying criteria or make them 
repeatable, but also shape, contradict and/or change them. In terms of aesthetic 
and lifeworld-related paradigms of emotion, artistic texts are thus both concrete 
and formal objects in an entangled process that cannot be disentangled. This is 
termed ‘writing as a process’, where writing scenarios and scenarios of emotion 
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intersect. Artistic texts are based on, and at the same time trigger, psychophysi-
cal as well as epistemologically and poetologically motivated reactions and 
practices. The texts do so via emotions and feelings, i.e. via assessments, judg-
ments, recognitions, and the activation as well as interpretation of physical and 
cognitive states. They are thus situated in a varyingly intense field of tension 
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The Affective Value of Fiction 





The study of emotions1 is a fascinating topic not just for literary scholars2 but 
also for philosophers, biologists, psychologists, and neuroscientists, who ap-
proach emotions from different angles.3 This diversity testifies to the interest in 
and the importance of emotions in various fields; however, the plethora of modes 
defining and analysing emotions renders the choice of an approach which fits the 
requirements for exploring the connection between emotion and literature any-
thing but straightforward. In the following, I will employ many insights from a 
cognitive approach to emotions – which is spelt out in more detail in the essay 
by Gesine Schiewer – and combine these with categories and observations from 
narrative studies. Moreover, instead of focusing on the author, I start from a 
premise that was of crucial importance to Virginia Woolf, and posit that “writing 
                                                             
1  This article draws on my book Reading Fictions, Changing Minds (2014), particularly 
chapter three. It is, however, adapted to the topic of the volume, revised, and supple-
mented by literary examples and insights from recent studies on emotions. 
2  See, for instance, Knaller/Rieger 2016: 7-24; Anz 2006; Breger/Breithaupt 2010; 
Hillebrandt 2011. For cognitive narratological studies, cf., in particular, Keen 2006, 
2007, 2011 and Schneider 2013.  
3  For a good overview of different approaches to the emotions see, for instance, Hogan 
2011: 42-54 (see also 30-41) and Palmier 2014, 49-66. Some well-known scientists 
distinguish emotions from feelings, with the former being characterised by physiolog-
ical processes and their observable expressions, while the latter are characterised by 
the conscious awareness of feeling an emotion; cf., for instance, Damasio 1999: 42. In 
the following, I will use the terms interchangeably. 
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is a method of communication”.4 This process of communication is based on 
knowledge, conventions and experiences shared by writers and readers. In order 
to communicate emotion, authors have to inspire the imagination of readers, who 
have to become the author’s “fellow-worker and accomplice”5 and take an active 
part in the process of literary communication. According to Woolf, readers have 
to become co-creators, willing and able to apply their knowledge and their imag-
ination in order to become immersed in the fictional world.6 Woolf’s notion of 
literature is thus based on an understanding of the reading process closely re-
sembling the bi-active reading model, which presupposes an interplay between 
textual cues and the reader’s attribution of meaning.7 
According to this premise of the importance of readers, the study of ‘writing 
emotions’ should not be pursued in isolation and focus solely on the author and 
the act of writing, but also needs to take into account the nexus between the text 
and the reader, between the presenting, thematising or alluding to emotions in 
the text on the one hand, and the evoking of the reader’s emotions on the other. 
To adopt such an approach to the topic has two advantages. First, it is possible to 
integrate the findings of emotion theorists, such as the psychologist Keith Oat-
ley, who has focussed on the relation between the reading of literary texts and 
the evocation of emotions. In addition, it is possible to combine the results of 
empirical studies on the emotions raised by reading literary texts with narrato-
logical categories in order to gain a deeper insight into the nexus between emo-
tions and literature.  
 
 
                                                             
4  Woolf 1984: 262. 
5  Ibid.: 259.  
6  In recent studies on Woolf’s essays, her notion of readers is explicated in terms of 
‘reader-response’ criticism and with reference to Wolfgang Iser’s concept of the ‘im-
plied reader’ and the process of filling of gaps or blanks in the text. See, for instance, 
Koutsantoni 2009: 58-59, 64-65, 69 et passim. 
7  Bottom-up processes are stimulated by textual characteristics, while top-down pro-
cesses involve the application of cognitive and generic schemata as well as the read-
ers’ knowledge and earlier emotional experiences. For this model, see, for instance, 
Holland 2009: 173-177 and Schreier 2009: 317: “It is one of the most robust results in 
psycholinguistics and cognitive psychology that the meaning that a reader assigns to a 
text is a function both of textual and of reader characteristics”. 
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1. INTRODUCTION: INTERFACES BETWEEN  
NARRATIVE AND EMOTION 
 
Since the term ‘emotion’ is understood in many different ways, it seems sensible 
to offer a working definition. The philosopher Jenefer Robinson provides a good 
starting point, since her definition is based on an analysis of common features of 
emotion definitions in biology and psychology. For Robinson, an  
 
emotion is a process at the core of which is a set of bodily responses activated by an 
affective appraisal that is “instinctive” and automatic. This automatic appraisal gives way 
to cognitive monitoring of the situation, which reflects back on the instinctive appraisal 
and modifies expressive, motor, and autonomic activity accordingly, as well as actions and 
action tendencies.8 
 
According to Robinson, the process of experiencing an emotion starts with an 
automatic appraisal of a stimulus that is held to be important, and which in-
volves, for instance, sweating or an accelerated heartbeat. This automatic re-
sponse can be followed and changed by a cognitive reflection on the stimulus 
and one’s own reaction, which can modify the automatic response and initiate 
verbal or non-verbal actions.  
Even though the last stage of the process can involve verbal expressions, this 
definition is seemingly remote not only from works of literature but also from 
language or stories. However, both words and stories become important when 
one tries to understand what one feels. In order to identify an emotion, one can-
not rely on the interpretation of physiological states of arousal alone: “No degree 
of bodily feeling can alone reveal to you what your emotion is about; […] if you do 
not know what your thoughts and feelings are directed towards, you cannot find out 
merely through introspection of your bodily feelings.”9 According to psychologists, 
this knowledge is important for making sense of one’s emotions and for expressing 
them.10 We need words and narratives when we try to understand our emotions. 
In order to comprehend the relation between narrative and emotions, it is im-
portant to remember that one’s emotions are shaped by the way the ‘eliciting 
situation’ is construed. What we feel depends not only on the stimulus but also 
on the situation in which we perceive this stimulus and on the causes which 
prompted the action or state evoking our emotions. As Patrick Hogan puts it, 
                                                             
8  Robinson 2010: 73. 
9  Goldie 2000: 58. 
10  Cf. Greenberg 2004: 4, 7. 
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referring to research in psychology, linguistics, and the neurosciences, “our 
affective response to a situation, real or fictional, is not a response to an isolated 
moment, but to the entire sequence of events in which that moment is located, 
whether explicitly or implicitly”.11 In an isolated moment, just seeing the expres-
sion of a sad face, one can automatically begin to share those feelings of sadness, 
but whether one continues to do so or not depends on the context and on the 
narrative of the preceding events. If the sadness and the tears of the other are 
caused by some anti-social impulse, such as a failed attempt to harm someone 
else, we might well react with anger rather than empathy. It is the construal and 
interpretation of the story preceding the situation that decides whether empathic 
feelings will be aroused and intensified or blocked and substituted by different 
responses.12 Our emotions are regulated by the story we attach to the stimulus 
which provoked them. Research by Keith Oatley shows that a particularly arous-
ing stimulus can involve extreme swings of emotions which may last for days 
and which depend on the retrospective interpretation of the stimulus.13  
Since emotions are part of a sequence and dependent on interpretations, 
many thinkers share the view “that emotions are embedded in stories”.14 Due to 
their narrative structure, emotions are often embedded in and remembered as 
‘emotion scripts’.15 Stimuli and emotions are not assessed and evaluated sepa-
rately, but as part of narrative patterns, in which different slots can be filled by 
different types of agents and places. Such scripts resemble series of scenes fol-
lowing preordained plotlines. Anger, for instance, is closely related to specific 
kinds of narratives; what is interpreted as an insult or retribution depends on a 
particular constellation, in which the status of those who are involved in the 
action – including their knowledge about the possible offensiveness of their 
                                                             
11  Hogan 2003: 5. 
12  This link between empathy and narrative is at least implicitly confirmed by a number 
of studies analysing empathic reactions under laboratory conditions, which emphasise 
the importance of ‘contextual appraisal’ and the personality – or history – of the ob-
ject of empathy. Cf. Singer/Seymour/O’Doherty et al. 2006: 467 and Decety 2011: 
101. By now the importance of the particular situation for the emergence (or blocking) 
of empathic sharing is well established. 
13  Cf. Oatley 2010: 29-35. 
14  Cf. Hogan 2003: 83: “the view shared by Oatley, Johnson-Laird, and the Sanskritists 
that emotions are embedded in stories”. 
15  Emotion scripts are defined as an “emotionally based sequence that guides actions” 
Angus/Greenberg 2011: 5; see also Greenberg 2006. For ‘emotion scripts’ see, for in-
stance, Ekman 2003: 41.  
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behaviour – plays an important role.16 Apparently, human beings need such 
narratives in order to make sense of their emotions and their lives.  
This finding by Angus and Greenberg already suggests that literary narra-
tives may help readers to become acquainted with unfamiliar and complex emo-
tions (and ‘emotion scripts’) and to understand them. Before elaborating on the 
affective value of fiction, however, I would like to briefly sketch some major 
ways of presenting and evoking emotions in and by narrative texts. Though the 
terms may suggest that there is a clear dividing line between representation and 
evocation, I want to conceptualise these two as poles on a sliding scale, with 
some overlap in between, since emotions presented in texts may at the same time 
evoke readers’ emotions. In addition, we should be aware of the fact that read-
ers’ inferences are necessary in order to imbue a given description with meaning.  
 
 
2. PRESENTING EMOTIONS IN FICTION 
 
The presentation of emotions in fictional texts seems to be a simple matter: an 
explicit description and/or thematisation of emotions should be easy enough to 
identify. However, if one acknowledges that biological processes and automatic 
responses are at the core of an emotion, then a description would, in a narrow 
sense, involve the description of these physiological processes – and this is prob-
ably not what most readers expect when they are reading an emotional narrative 
like a love story. 
A straightforward representation of such physiological processes can be il-
lustrated by a scene in Ian McEwan’s novel Saturday (2005). In this novel, the 
main focalizer, Henry Perowne, is a neuroscientist whose approach to the world 
is shaped by his scientific beliefs; he sees the world through the lens of the neu-
rosciences. This perspective also guides his understanding of the emotions of 
other characters, which he sees in terms of physiological processes. The follow-
ing quote shows how he perceives the aggression of a thug, Baxter, who is about 
to beat him. Perowne thinks that this man suffers from an incurable illness, Ko-
rea-Huntingdon-Syndrome, which is accompanied by extreme swings of emo-
tions, and he hopes to escape a fight by offering medical help to the criminal. 
However, it turns out differently: 
                                                             
16  Cf. Sarbin 1990: 49-65. Just as there are some narrative texts which have a higher 
degree of narrativity than others, some emotions are more intricately tied to narrative 
than others. 
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Even as he turns back towards Baxter in surprise, and even as he sees, or senses, what’s 
coming towards him at such speed, there remains in a portion of his thoughts a droning, 
pedestrian diagnostician who notes poor self-control, emotional liability, explosive tem-
per, suggestive of reduced levels of GABA among the appropriate binding sites on striatal 
neurons. This in turn is bound to imply the diminished presence of two enzymes in the 
striatum and lateral pallidum – glutamic acid decarboxylase and choline acetyl-
transferase.17 
 
On the one hand, this is a very adequate and precise description of an emotion. 
On the other hand, readers have to be very attentive or to have some background 
knowledge in order to make the correct inferences and recognise that this is the 
description of an emotion.  
Interestingly, this focus on the physical symptoms at the core of an emotion 
was already present in eighteenth century novels. At the time, handbooks of 
medicine spread the beliefs that finer emotions were due to finer nerves, that a 
humane and tender personality was connected to a particular physical constitu-
tion.18 It thus became fashionable to stress one’s “nervous” disposition, which 
seemed to be a proof of one’s finer feelings and virtue. In this vein, Yorick, the 
narrator of Laurence Sterne’s novel Sentimental Journey, emphasises right at the 
beginning of the novel that he is disposed to give alms and expresses his tender 
disposition by remarking that he is in a state of mind in which a man “pulls out 
his purse, and holding it airily and uncompressed, looks round him, as if he 
sought for an object to share it with – In doing this, I felt every vessel in my 
frame dilate – the arteries beat all chearily together”.19 Rather than naming the 
emotion, Yorick describes his physiological symptoms.  
Whereas McEwan and Sterne in these examples concentrate on the automatic 
physical response to a stimulus, other authors focus on the expression of emo-
tions by means of behaviour or action. My next example is informed by a scien-
tific understanding of emotion, but it also nods towards the importance of an 
awareness of and cognitive reflection on an emotion. In a dystopia by the re-
nowned neuroscientist Susan Greenfield, one of the characters, who belongs to a 
class of people who act purely on account of conscious deliberations and logic, 




                                                             
17  McEwan 2005: 91. 
18  Cf. Mullan 1988; Rousseau 1976. 
19  Sterne 1967: 28. This is the second page of the text. 
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[T]here was usually never anything to trouble my thought processes. But today was differ-
ent. Today my palms were wet, my breathing difficult and shallow, my heartbeat banging 
through my ribcage. I had to admit that this unpleasant though obvious sensation could 
only be called anxiety.20  
 
In the first part of this quote we find a common-sense description of some physi-
ological symptoms of the emotion; instead of a precise representation in terms of 
scientific vocabulary there is a depiction of symptoms that are within the reach 
of human awareness, such as wet palms or a shallow respiration. In addition, 
there is a precise naming (a description)21 of that “unpleasant” “sensation”, 
which is called “anxiety”.  
Providing a name for an emotion is the most obvious and more usual way of 
presenting feelings in fiction. I do not think, however, that this is the most com-
mon or interesting mode of presenting emotions. Even if one looks at British 
eighteenth century sentimental novels, which focus on feelings and which are 
meant to evoke the feelings of readers, it seems that such explicit naming of 
emotions is less frequent than one might assume, and soon gives way to a de-
scription of the physical expressions of emotions, particularly with regard to 
body language. 
The description of seemingly involuntary facial expressions and body lan-
guage is a mode of representation that became very popular in the second half of 
the eighteenth century, in the British novel of sensibility. Such novels often refer 
to emotions by presenting the expression of these emotions, particularly in two 
modes: They describe the body language of the characters, their blushes, their 
tears, and their falling down on their knees on the one hand, and their verbal 
exclamations of surprise or joy on the other. The following examples, excerpts 
from one of the letters of the young servant girl Pamela to her parents, serve to 
illustrate the focus on the (allegedly) involuntary expression of emotions: 
 
I screamed, ran to the bed, and Mrs. Jervis screamed too […].  
I found his hand in my bosom, and when my fright let me know it, I was ready to die; I 
sighed, screamed and fainted away. And still he had his arms about my neck; […] I knew 
nothing more of the matter, one fit followed another, till about three hours after, I found 
myself in bed, and Mrs. Jervis sitting up on one side […].22 
                                                             
20  Greenfield 2013: 68-69. 
21  For the difference between words describing emotions and words expressing them 
(i.e. words denoting the expressions of emotions such as body language or exclama-
tions), see Schwarz-Friesel 2007, chapter five. 
22  Richardson 1980: 49-50. 
36 | VERA NÜNNING 
 
 
There is a mention of her “fright”, but the expressions of her physical expres-
sions of emotions (screamed, sighed, fainted, fit) are more predominant. Such 
implicit descriptions of emotions become more intricate in later novels.  
In Henry Mackenzie’s The Man of Feeling (1771), or in Sterne’s novels, the 
focus is often on the description of the stimulus, such as a beautiful woman or a 
strange face, and on the effects this stimulus has on the character in question. 
This can be exemplified by the way Yorick, the narrator of Laurence Sterne’s 
Sentimental Journey (1768) and a typical and capricious man of feeling, reacts to 
an imagined blush of a woman: 
 
I thought she blushed – the idea of it made me blush myself – we were quite alone; and 
that super-induced a second blush, before the first could get off. […] There is a sort of a 
pleasing half-guilty blush, where the blood is more in fault than the man – ‘tis sent impet-
uous from the heart, and virtue flies after it – not to call it back, but to make the sensation 
of it more delicious to the nerves – ‘tis associated. –23 
 
The body language and the physical processes are in the foreground of this 
quote, while there is no cognitive evaluation or interpretation of these processes. 
The sensitive “nerves”, which were held to be the precondition of refined and 
tender feelings, and the blood that causes the blush seem to be more interesting 
to the narrator than any description or analysis of his emotions. This shying 
away from analysis is more pronounced in a second quote from this novel: “The 
poor monk blushed as red as scarlet […]. I blushed in my turn; but from what 
movements, I leave to the few who feel to analyse”.24 Which emotion gives rise 
to the blushes is deliberately left open; identifying and analysing the emotions is 
left to the reader.  
A preliminary word count of the three exemplary novels mentioned above 
seems to indicate that in later novels, such as The Sentimental Journey and The 
Man of Feeling, there is a surprising rise in the use of the word “emotion” or 
“feeling”, the exact meaning of which has to be gauged by the reader:25 
 
 
                                                             
23  Sterne 1967: 116. 
24  Ibid.: 43. 
25  The word count was conducted by Bernard Woodley and Marlene Günther: I want to 
thank both of them for this invaluable help. The numbers for the key words include all 
derivations (such as sad, sadly, sadness). 









Journey (1768)  
occurrence per 
10.000 words 




Emotion  0,11 0,73 1,91 
Feeling  0,32 10,73 9,81 
Tear 4,84 0,49 3,82 
Blush 0,63 3,17 1,64 
Tremble 2,63 0,98 0,55 
Anger 5,16 0,24 0,55 
Sadness 8,32 1,22 1,91 
Joy 2,42 2,2 2,18 
 
There is no overall tendency with regard to the number of occurrences describ-
ing bodily expressions of emotions – that there are more blushes than tears in 
The Sentimental Journey, in contrast to the situation in Pamela, might well be 
due to the particularities of the story in the latter: the incarcerated Pamela, who is 
in danger of being raped by Mr. B., has more reason to tremble and weep than 
the characters of The Sentimental Journey and The Man of Feeling.26 In spite of 
this, the word count seems to indicate two tendencies: comparing the earlier with 
the latter novels, there is a decline in the number of times emotions are explicitly 
named (as the numbers concerning the derivations of the terms ‘Anger’ and 
‘Sadness’ indicate). In contrast, there is a significant rise in frequency of the 
terms ‘emotion’ and ‘feeling’, which do not refer to a particular state; instead, 
they are open to readers’ inferences. A rather typical example of such a use of 
the term ‘emotion’ can be found when Yorick commiserates with the weeping 
Maria: 
 
I sat down close by her; and Maria let me wipe [her tears] away as they fell, with my 
handkerchief. – I then steep’d it in my own, – and then in hers, – and then in mine, – and 
                                                             
26  These are, however, just preliminary observations, which would have to be checked 
and analysed more thoroughly.  
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then I wip’d hers again; – and as I did it, I felt such undescribable emotions within me, as I 
am sure could not be accounted for from any combinations of matter and motion.27  
 
Arguably, the description of body language and gestures or the use of words like 
feeling or emotion allude to rather than describe particular emotions. The novels 
of sensibility also employ many other indirect modes of presenting emotions in 
fiction, such as interjections, exclamations, or the use of emotively valent words, 
images or symbols. There are, moreover, intertextual references to emotions of 
fictional characters or narrators; indeed, the name ‘Yorick’ is, as the narrator 
stresses, taken from Hamlet and the “grave-diggers scene”.28 Such indirect 
presentations of emotions leave a lot to the readers, who have to infer which 
feeling or emotion is alluded to. Even tears can, after all, be tears of joy as well 
as of misery.  
 
 
3. EVOKING EMOTIONS 
 
The importance of readers’ emotions in the reading process has by now been 
amply recognised. Even before psychological empirical studies were conducted, 
authors such as Virginia Woolf asserted that, when dealing with novels, “‘the 
book itself’ is not form which you see, but emotion which you feel”.29 This im-
portance of the emotions in the reading process can be understood quite literally: 
When readers engage with stories, be they factual or fictional, the body reacts.30 
Keith Oatley stresses, for instance, that “when people read words that indicate 
emotional expressions such as ‘smile,’ ‘cry,’ and ‘frown,’ they activate in them-
selves the facial muscles for making the corresponding expressions”.31 The same 
                                                             
27  Ibid.: 138. This example also shows that a mere word count can only provide a very 
tentative impression of the expression of emotions. The “tears” are referred to six 
times, but the word ‘tears’ is not explicitly mentioned in this quote. Since the novel 
encompasses roughly 40.000 words, the counting of these six times would raise the 
word count from 2,2 to 3,7. A similar use of emotion can be found in Sterne 1967: 83. 
28  Sterne 1967: 109. For possible ways of implicitly referring to emotions see Winko 
2003 and the overview of several typologies (including that of Winko) in Hillebrand 
2011: 36-81. 
29  Woolf 1947: 130. 
30  Cf. Mar 2011. 
31  Oatley 2011: 113; cf. also ibid.: 20 and Altmann et al. 2012.  
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results have been established with regard to sentences and even stories.32 Read-
ers’ responses are often emotional and physiological, and the more emotional 
stories are, the more they are read in a state of immersion.33  
Readers’ emotions and feelings of empathy with the characters are closely 
connected to the degree of immersion. The degree of empathy is also a salient 
feature of perspective taking, which is crucial for fostering affective abilities, 
since it enables readers not only to learn about the emotions of others but also to 
share them, too. In the following I will try to point out a few aspects on the af-
fective potential of literature, the functions of perceived realism, and its relation 
to empathy, perspective taking and persuasion.34 
Gauging and responding to the characters’ emotions is important for under-
standing the plots of novels, which are often driven by the conflicting desires of 
the characters. Readers’ emotions are also evoked by reading works in which 
there is no explicit depiction of the characters’ emotions. Empirical studies have 
demonstrated that readers supply the emotions implied in a story, irrespective of 
whether these are thematised or not.35 This has, again, been recognised by au-
thors and critics before it was empirically tested. Some of the short stories of 
Ernest Hemingway famously do not make any reference to the characters’ emo-
tions, but nonetheless succeed in evoking an atmosphere of danger and threat by 
focussing on the setting and the action. Hemingway himself apparently was 
aware of this: “If a writer of prose knows enough about what he is writing about, 
he may omit things that he knows and the reader, if the writer is writing truly 
enough, will have a feeling of those things as strongly as though the writer had 
stated them.”36 
There are a number of different typologies of the emotions involved in the 
reading process.37 One group is closely related to readers’ responses to the char-
                                                             
32  See also Jacobs 2013: 146 who stresses that the emotions raised by reading are based 
on the same neurological mechanisms as those activated in real life; those raised by 
reading may even be stronger. 
33  Cf. Altmann et al. 2012: 2, 8. That emotional stories lead to “increased processing 
activity in emotion related structures” has already been shown by Gallagher/Hutto 
2008: 32 and by other researchers. 
34  Cf. Nünning 2014. In the following, I will draw closely on several passages of this 
book, particularly chapters 5 and 3. 
35  Cf. Habermas/Diehl 2010. 
36  Hemingway 1954: 183. 
37  This rough typology draws on Keith Oatley and Raymond Mar, who created a typolo-
gy of five different kinds of emotions activated when reading fiction (cf. Mar et al. 
2011) and on Miall/Kuiken 2002. For a different classification, stressing ‘sympathy’ 
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acters and the story, such as empathy, sympathy and pity. These emotions can be 
regarded as narrative since they are intimately connected to the features of narra-
tive, such as plot, conflict, the characters’ attitudes and their experiences. Narra-
tive emotions can also be new emotions which readers did not feel in that way 
before. Another group of emotions which can be evoked by fiction is character-
ised by readers’ reliving of former (biographical) emotions, a process which can 
be therapeutically important and improve subsequent coping with these emo-
tions. A third group consists of aesthetic emotions, i.e. affective responses to 
aesthetic features such as the style or rhythm of the language. 
These aesthetic feelings are unique to the reading of literature and include 
“fascination, interest, or intrigue [as a response] to the formal components of liter-
ary texts (narrative, stylistic, or generic)”.38 Readers’ emotions are not stimulated 
merely by the thoughts, emotions and actions of characters or narrators on the 
levels of plot and discourse, but also by the relationships of contrast and corre-
spondence between different characters. In addition, readers’ emotions can be 
stimulated by linguistic and narrative devices on the surface structure of literary 
texts, by formal features and the choice of words. Moreover, nonconventional 
metaphors and innovations of generic conventions can evoke aesthetic feelings. 
Such metaphors require an increased cognitive effort from readers, which is evalu-
ated positively by readers, who feel “emotional-aesthetic pleasure” which is “the 
intended satisfactory result of the interpretation process”.39 Such aesthetic emo-
tions often imply a loss of the sense of immediacy and immersion in the story and 
a higher degree of defamiliarisation or surprise.  
The study of empathy and the means of inducing readers to feel empathy for 
– or even identify with – a protagonist is at the foreground of many literary 
studies.  
Narratological studies focussing on techniques likely to evoke empathy usu-
ally concentrate on two aspects: The first mode of inducing readers to feel empa-
thy includes narrative strategies which prompt readers to take the characters’ 
perspective, for instance by presenting their thoughts, impressions, beliefs, feel-
ings and opinions by means of techniques like free indirect discourse, interior 
monologue or psycho-narration, or the use of homodiegetic narrators. 40 The 
                                                                                                                                  
in two groups, see Habermas/Diehl 2010, 313. For Ekman’s initial conceptualisation 
of six ‘universal’ emotions, cf. Ekman/Friesen 1971, 124-129. 
38  Miall/Kuiken 2002: 221. 
39  Christmann/Wimmer/Groeben 2011: 206 (both quotes). 
40  In earlier works, the empathic engagement of readers was often called ‘identification’, 
which is now recognised to be a particular feeling; for definitions of identification cf. 
Cohen 2001. For narrative empathy see, for instance, Keen 2006 and 2007. However, 
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second main mode of encouraging readers to see the events from the point of 
view of characters consists in various kinds of explicit comments by the (often 
‘omniscient’) narrator, who addresses the reader, comments on and evaluates the 
events, and appeals to the sympathy and pity of readers. Cognitive literary stud-
ies also stress the importance of “situational empathy”, which “involves an 
openness to putting oneself in the place of the other person”.41 This mode of 
writing reinforces the interest of readers in the fate of the characters by creating 
a situation of potential harm. Characters have to be in situations which allow for 
multiple endings, since the resulting uncertainty is believed to engage not only 
the cognitive, but also the affective responses of readers. As Richard Gerrig 
concludes: “To a large extent, a theory of suspense must include within it a 
theory of empathy: Under what circumstances do we care sufficiently about 
other people to engage in active thought about their fates?”42  
In the following, I want to suggest some additional aspects which may serve 
to encourage readers’ feelings of empathy, beginning with two examples taken 
from eighteenth century novels. One means of evoking readers’ empathy and 
pity involves the presentation of stimuli that are believed to raise these emotions. 
Some of these responses to particular images and narratives may be universal, 
such as automatic reactions to seeing sad or happy faces. In the eighteenth centu-
ry, tender feelings and pity – and their results, virtuous actions such as giving 
alms – were held to be very important, and sentimental novels not only present 
(the physiological expressions of) such emotions, they also show a host of stimu-
li for the feeling of those highly appreciated emotions. Both in Sentimental Jour-
ney and in Henry Mackenzie’s The Man of Feeling, there are long descriptions 
of, for instance, the outward appearance of people who are to be pitied and who 
deserve charity and help, such as beggars or virtuous persons asking for contri-
butions to worthy causes. On the third page of the Sentimental Journey, a poor 
monk enters the scene, only a few sentences after Yorick has claimed that his 
“arteries” and “frame” are disposed to give alms: 
 
The monk [had a] break in his tonsure, a few scattered white hairs upon his temples […]. 
It was one of those heads, which Guido has often painted – mild, pale – penetrating, free 
                                                                                                                                  
one should not forget other narrative emotions, such as suspense or surprise, anger at 
the behaviour of villains or dumbness of the protagonists, and satisfaction if desired 
results seem within reach or villains are punished. 
41  Hogan 2003: 140 (first quote), 81 (second quote). 
42  Gerrig 1993: 80. The phrase “engage in active thought about their fates” indicates that 
Gerrig works with a broad definition of empathy, which encompasses analytical cog-
nitive processes. 
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from all commonplace ideas of fat contented ignorance looking downwards upon the earth 
– it looked forwards; but looked as if it looked at something beyond this world […]. The 
rest of his outline may be given in a few strokes […]: it was a thin, spare form, […] it was 
the attitude of Entreaty; and as it now stands presented to my imagination, it gained more 
than it lost by it […].43 
 
Such a dignified and at the same time thin and pitiful being should evoke feel-
ings of benevolence, of respect and pity, not only in Yorick but also in eight-
eenth century readers; especially when the monk then talks of the poverty of his 
order and, at least implicitly, asks for support. Passages such as these can en-
courage readers to feel the tender and refined emotions that were held in high 
esteem at the time. 
A similar, but more moving description of a stimulus for encouraging read-
ers’ emotions can be found in The Man of Feeling, in which Harley incidentally 
meets an  
 
old man, who from his dress seemed to have been a soldier […]. He was one of those 
figures which Salvator would have drawn [...]. His face had the marks of manly comeli-
ness impaired by time; his forehead was not altogether bald, but its hairs might have been 
numbered; while a few white locks behind crossed the brown of his neck […].44  
 
Again, there is an appeal to the reader to visually imagine the scene, by likening 
the face to the portraits of famous painters. Signs of age and poverty, attributed 
to respectable, dignified people, are present in both quotes and should, according 
to feeling rules of the late eighteenth century, evoke empathy and pity. In the 
latter quote, as in many others, readers are even shown how they should react to 
the description of such a figure. Harley, the protagonist, serves as a model recip-
ient of the stimulus; he appraises the situation of the man correctly and in an 
exemplary way: “‘Thou art old’, said [Harley] to himself, ‘but age has not 
brought thee rest for its infirmities; I fear those silver hairs have not found shel-
ter from thy country, though that neck has been bronzed in its service’”.45  
                                                             
43  Sterne 1967: 29-30. 
44  Mackenzie 1970: 85. 
45  Ibid. Later on the old man turns out to be an honest and upright victim of many vil-
lainous machinations and an object worthy of pity. Although Yorick himself does not 
always react in a model fashion, The Sentimental Journey contains many examples of 
such reactions, for instance with regard to “Santo’s lamentation” for the death of his 
ass (cf. Sterne: 1967: 62-64). 
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Since cognitive narratological studies have demonstrated the importance of a 
mode of representation that relies on implicitness and suggestiveness, such de-
scriptions of stimuli for or reactions to emotions may be more effective for rais-
ing readers’ empathy than straightforward presentations or thematisations. 
Moreover, modes of evoking emotions can strengthen readers’ feelings that the 
story corresponds to their own experiences and rings true. If a reader is invited to 
make his or her own inferences and to supply his or her own emotions and expe-
riences, he or she gets the feeling that the story is convincing and lifelike. Marisa 
Bortolussi and Peter Dixon have shown that readers identify with a character 
when they are able to make their own inferences about him or her. Bortolussi 
and Dixon stress that readers tend to relate to characters which leave enough 
room for readers to “use their own knowledge and experience”.46 This process 
depends on some blank spaces and ambivalence, which allow readers to project 
some of their own attitudes and behaviours onto the characters. This in turn 
makes them feel that they comprehend the characters on a more than just super-
ficial basis. 
Such a feeling of really understanding the characters, which can heighten 
empathic sharing of their emotions, is accompanied by a reduction of distance 
between reader and characters. It can also include feelings of what has been 
called ‘symhedonia’, which is an equivalent of the Spanish, Italian or German 
‘simpatía’ or ‘Sympathie’, denoting a positive feeling for others, which leads to 
rejoicing in their good luck. This feeling is rather rare in real life; it is “more 
partial, selective, and, consequently, less wide ranging than sympathy proper [i.e. 
pity]” and “inherently biased toward those whom people especially care about”.47 
In everyday situations, it is restricted to an interest in the good fortune of a few 
people who are close to us. By presenting likeable and attractive characters, fic-
tion often provides stimuli for feeling this positive counterpart to pity. Fictional 
works thus serve to generate a feeling which is arguably ethically valuable and 
may make it easier for readers to generate it in everyday situations. 
Although recent studies often highlight situations or narrative conventions 
which can initiate the reader’s empathic feeling with the characters48 and stress 
the positive aspects of empathy, the sharing of characters’ thoughts and feelings 
involves rather complex and ambivalent processes. In contrast to scholars like 
Keith Oatley, I think that there is a dual process involved in the sharing of char-
                                                             
46  Bortolussi/Dixon 2003: 94; for the relation to identification see ibid.: 91-94. 
47  Rozyman/Rozin 2006: 83 (first quote), 91 (second quote). 
48  See Breithaupt 2009 and Keen 2007, 2011. However, Keen as well as Hale 2007 and 
Nussbaum 1998 are wary of a kind of empathy that involves projections of one’s own 
attitudes and does not appreciate the alterity of others. 
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acters’ thoughts and feelings, which consists in an oscillation between two quite 
different cognitive activities on the part of readers: first, there is the process of 
“feeling like” the character in question.49 Depending on the particular context, 
this process shifts between a more emotional and a more cognitive simulation of 
the character’s thoughts and feelings; the latter would prevail, for instance, while 
following the thoughts of anti-heroes or villains. Second, empathic sharing is 
linked to the readers’ own appraisal of the situation in question. This is influ-
enced by their knowledge about the whole of the text they have read so far and 
can include information about events that is not available to the focalizer. It is 
also based on readers’ general knowledge and their wishes for the further devel-
opment of the story. This discrepant awareness can lead to a heightening of 
suspense, if readers see the hero unwittingly running into danger. The second 
process is intricately connected with an overall assessment of the situation, 
which involves questions of ethics. As James Phelan has pointed out with regard 
to the ethical positioning of readers, “[o]ur emotions and desires about both 
fictional and nonfictional characters are intimately tied to our judgments of 
them”,50 and according to recent psychological studies, inducing readers’ moral 
reasoning is one of the aspects that heighten their fascination with a given text.51 
Over and above this difference between an engaging and a detached mode of 
following the thoughts and feelings of characters, readers’ empathy is linked to 
their own appraisal of the situation in question. This evaluation of lifelike char-
acters is influenced by readers’ attitudes, values and wishes for preferred out-
comes. It is also informed by readers’ superior knowledge or their own interpre-
tations of the event, which can differ widely from that of the character whose 
perceptions and thoughts they follow. The affective value of fiction thus goes 







                                                             
49  For the raising of emotions of empathy and identification cf. Mar et al. 2011: 823-824. 
According to most theories (for an overview see Cohen 2001), identification “requires 
that we forget ourselves and become the other – that we assume for ourselves the 
identity of the target of our identification” (Ibid.: 247). 
50  Phelan 2005: 160. 
51  Cf. Raney 2002. 
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4. FICTION AS A TOOL FOR FEELING 
 
The affective value of fiction is based on the assumption that what we do, think 
and feel has repercussions on our minds and our brains. The plasticity of the 
human brain makes it possible for the emotions evoked by reading to leave their 
trace and modify and refine emotional skills: 
 
The emotions evoked by literary fiction also have an influence on our cognitive processing 
after the reading experience has ended. Novels can act as a powerful emotional prime, and 
once an emotional state has been induced we would expect to see differences in cognitive 
processing associated with this new emotional state. Effects on cognition, perception, and 
action would be expected […].52 
 
If the brain is a cultural, embedded organ shaped by the cognitive processes 
activated in the niches in which a human being lives, then the emotions raised by 
reading fiction can leave traces and shape readers’ affective responses in their 
daily life. 
There are several reasons for the potential of fictional stories to shed light on 
emotions and to serve as a privileged tool for feeling. The first is based on the 
specificity of the reading process. In a state of immersion and transportation, 
readers tend to temporarily forget their immediate surroundings and their own 
real-life concerns, goals and aims. Since the vicarious experiences offered by 
fiction do not pose any immediate threat to their goals or self-images, readers 
can come to know feelings, thoughts and experiences that they would be inclined 
to block off in real-life encounters.53 They are more open to new experiences 
while reading fiction, which cannot pose any threat or entail possible negative 
consequences. 
Secondly, reading a novel in a state of immersion fulfils conditions which, 
according to neurophysiologist Gerald Hüther, are ideal for establishing new 
synapses and for learning. Readers feel safe, they pay attention, spend time and 
cognitive effort, feel interest and even enthusiasm for what they encounter and 
discover in a work of fiction.54 The willing, affective engagement with the expe-
                                                             
52  Mar et al. 2011: 829. See also Robinson 2010: 74. As Tooby/Cosmides 2000: 24 
claim, fictionally triggered emotion can induce us to “reweight” our “motivational 
system”. 
53  This ‘safety argument’ is recognised by many scholars. The first to use it were, to my 
knowledge, Batson et al. 1997. 
54  Cf. Hüther 2006: 71, 80. 
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riences of characters offers the chance to learn and to change one’s attitudes and 
dispositions. As Thomas Fuchs stresses, dispositions “are only accessible to 
change by new and repeated subjective experiences, i.e. emotional, verbal and 
interpersonal processes of learning that stabilize new attractors of perception and 
behaviour in the brain”.55 A great part of the affective value of fiction resides in 
the fact that it opens up such new and repeated subjective experiences in a de-
contextualised space. 
Thirdly, the affective value of fiction is enhanced by the fact that the feelings 
evoked by fictional narratives are relatively intense and pure. Several scholars 
have hypothesised that fiction can evoke a higher intensity of emotions than real-
life situations, because the emotional experiences generated by reading fiction 
take place in safety. Readers do not have to worry about the potential impact of 
their emotions either with regard to themselves – for instance by feeling obliged 
to help victims in distress – or with regard to potentially negative consequences 
for others. While there seems to be no final answer concerning the differences in 
intensity between emotions evoked by fiction or by facts, Thalia Goldstein 
demonstrated that personal memories recalling very sad, or even traumatic 
events “were no greater than the levels felt when watching [fictional film] clips” 
depicting sad events.56 Her findings suggest that the emotions raised by fiction 
are “unadulterated” by anxiety, or, indeed, any other emotions which do not 
pertain to the feelings experienced during the immersion in the story, and that 
they may therefore be cathartic. 
Fourth, fiction can enable readers to make experiences which are beyond 
their reach in ordinary life. A life span is too short to make all the experiences 
that can broaden the mental horizon of readers – even disregarding the fact that 
many readers might not survive some of the more dangerous situations.57 Espe-
cially for adults who are caught in their daily routines and have little incentive to 
spend the cognitive effort and time to engage with unfamiliar people in strange 
situations, fiction can extend the scope of available experiences and enrich their 
knowledge about the way (unfamiliar) human minds work. In addition, fictional 
stories can allow readers to become aware of, observe, and share nuances of the 
feelings of narrators and characters. This exceeds the observation of body lan-
                                                             
55  Fuchs 2009: 231. 
56  Goldstein 2009: 237. See also ibid.: 233: “we are more likely to allow ourselves to 
feel powerfully in response to fiction than in everyday life”, where Goldstein refers to 
other studies supporting this hypothesis. For the phrase “unadulterated by anxiety”, 
see ibid.: 237. 
57  Tooby/Cosmides 2000: 21-22, 24 claim that art calibrates and improves individual 
mental organisation. 
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guage or exclamations, which can be observed in daily encounters. As the novel-
ist Ian McEwan stressed in an interview, the “resilience [of the novel] has pre-
cisely to do with the fact that we have not yet invented another art form that 
allows us such access to the minds of others and to the nature of conscious-
ness”.58 With access to the consciousness of characters, readers can also become 
aware of the simultaneity of different feelings within the same characters that are 
frequently torn between discrepant and even contradictory feelings. More often 
than not, readers get the chance to recognise feelings the respective characters 
are not even aware of. Fictional stories can shed light on feelings which, in daily 
life, remain obscure. 
Fifth, reading fiction encourages perspective taking, which is similar to what 
the psychologist Daniel Batson calls “‘sensitive’ understanding”,59 i.e. an under-
standing that involves not only knowledge about the thoughts and feelings of 
others, but also an affective sharing of their emotions. Particularly valuable is the 
‘imagine-other’ perspective, i.e. imagining how someone else thinks and feels at 
the moment. This kind of perspective taking has been linked to pro-social action. 
The imagine-other perspective has been shown to “reduce stereotyping and 
prejudice” and to enable readers “to know the other’s thoughts, desires, and 
intentions” and “even to understand and evaluate – even to create – the self”.60 
Arguably, this kind of perspective taking, i.e. imagining how the character or 
narrator feels at a given moment, is evoked by reading fictional stories. Reading 
fiction is valuable because it requires “spontaneous perspective taking”.61 
To set this process in motion is especially desirable because it is, unfortu-
nately, comparatively rare in real life. In daily situations, the necessity, the impe-
tus or even the time for taking the perspectives of others is often conspicuous by 
its absence. In many cases, we do not need it in order to act. In other cases, we 
might need it, but we do not know enough about the other in order to be able to 
accomplish it. And even if we could accomplish it, if we did know just how bad 
or hopeless the other feels at the moment, it might put us in an uncomfortable 
position: we might think that we should try to do something about it – and that is 
difficult and often impossible. There are many reasons why it is often easier not 
to invest too much cognitive effort in taking the perspectives of others. 
In fiction, the situation is different: The pleasure of reading, the interest in 
stories, and the necessity to take the perspectives of characters in order to under-
stand their actions provide incentives for readers to make this cognitive effort. 
                                                             
58  McEwan 2013: s.p. 
59  Batson 2009: 267. 
60  Ibid.: 267, 276-277. 
61  Johnson et al. 2013: 593. 
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As a rule, some kind of suspense is raised, which keeps readers interested in 
engaging with the characters. This is important, since interest and attention are 
among the conditions which are of crucial importance for learning, for building 
new synapses and neural pathways. Moreover, there is no danger involved in 
immersing oneself in the minds and views of fictional characters; readers can try 
out new roles without having to fear negative consequences. In addition, fiction-
al stories usually provide the knowledge that is needed to understand the major 
characters; even though the information may remain sketchy, salient facts are 
given – or at least expected to be given by readers. Possible barriers against 
perspective taking – particularly the lack of interest and the lack of knowledge –
are therefore removed. Fictional stories which present unfamiliar, complex or 
extreme characters can thus serve to broaden readers’ mental horizon, to refine 
their implicit knowledge about how the human mind works, and to practice 
perspective taking in a particular, safe situation. 
Sixth, since fictional stories frequently stage the interconnections and con-
flicts between the respective emotions of several characters, they require a bal-
anced and complex emotional response. In many novels, the ‘stimulus’ evoking 
emotions is not the state of mind of an isolated individual; rather, it consists of 
the personal interactions between several characters. The shift between focaliz-
ers often implies a shift between empathically following the characters’ thoughts 
and actions on the one hand, and a critical distance to the character on the other. 
Especially in multiperspective novels which show the events from the point of 
view of several characters, readers are induced to alternately take several – often 
contradictory – perspectives on the same situation. Reading fiction practices the 
ability to recognise affiliations and contrasts between different perspectives and 
to relate them to each other. To make sense of mutually exclusive perspectives 
on the same situation often requires the modulation and modification of empa-
thy. If a narrator compares and weighs the perspectives of others, ethically posi-
tions him- or herself towards others, and comes up with his or her own interpre-
tation, readers can simulate these cognitive processes. If they do not get such 
guidance, they are encouraged to arrive at their own conclusions. Readers have 
to position themselves to the heterogeneous characters and to decide which 
traits, opinions, and attitudes they like best and which ones correspond to the 
requirements of the particular situation. 
Seventh, complex fictional stories often highlight what Jerome Bruner calls 
breaches of the canonical expectations,62 and such breaches with regard to culturally 
condoned ways of dealing with emotions may be helpful in a variety of ways. Since 
norms become more explicit when the consequences of their violations are 
                                                             
62  Bruner 1991: 15. 
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shown, fictional stories can disseminate cultural norms concerning the emotions – 
for instance with regard to how much emotion a child, girl, boy, man, woman is 
allowed to display in private or in public. What may be even more important is that 
they can also highlight the characters’ struggles during such breaches of the ca-
nonical, delineating the problems of individuals who find themselves unable to 
conform to the rules and have to face the gap between what they should feel and 
want to feel on the one hand, and those annoying or frightening feelings they 
actually experience on the other hand. 
Eighth, in stories, readers are not given propositional knowledge which can 
be learned in an abstract way; instead, they experience the characters’ emotions, 
their origins, and the way they are regulated. This kind of learning can be of 
crucial importance as far as the understanding of emotions is concerned. Martha 
Nussbaum, for instance, claims that “emotions, unlike many of our beliefs, are 
not taught to us directly through propositional claims about the world, either 
abstract or concrete. They are taught, above all, through stories”.63 The same 
argument can be made with regard to ways of dealing with emotions, which 
readers are also taught through stories. By presenting a wide range of emotions and 
possible stories in which these can be embedded, fiction can enlarge readers’ 
knowledge of ways of narrativising and coping with emotions. Fictional stories pro-
vide patterns of how to deal with ‘unstoried emotions’ and can then help readers to 
create stories that provide meaning to such feelings. They can enable readers to iden-





Fictional stories can thus broaden our emotional horizon and expand the range of 
emotions which we can identify and understand. They can enable readers to 
empathically share feelings they have not experienced in their own lives and 
would not be able to identify in interactive encounters. By enlarging their feeling 
repertoire, fiction can also enhance readers’ understanding of their own emotions 
and of possible means to regulate their emotions. As Marcel Proust explained, 
his readers would be “the readers of their own selves, my book being merely a 
                                                             
63  Nussbaum 1998: 226. For the link between emotion and narrative see Goldie who 
stresses that, while trying to understand an emotion, “we seek to locate the person’s epi-
sodes of thought and feeling, which go to form part of his emotional experience, in the 
overall narrative which makes best sense of this part of his life”; Goldie 2000: 69; see also 
ibid.: 13, 102. 
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sort of magnifying glass like those which the optician at Combray used to offer 
his customers – […] I would furnish them with the means of reading what lay 
inside themselves.”64 Being confronted with intense scenes and with characters’ 
expressions of emotions that appear alien and strange at first can lead to mo-
ments of insight into one’s own feelings. 
At the basis of these opportunities that reading fictions may offer is a process 
which one could call a ‘meta-affective’ value of fiction. If we need to have 
words which allow us to identify and narrativise an emotion in order to be able 
to deal with it, an important part of the value of fiction lies in providing a nu-
anced language for understanding emotions and the complex scenarios in which 
they are embedded. Though many questions concerning the relation between 
emotions and the reading of particular literary genres and texts still remain open, 
there is overwhelming evidence that reading fiction can be a tool for feeling and 
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The Author – “Specialize[d] in Having Fun”?  
Cognitive Theories of Emotion and Literary Studies  
in the Context of Two Interviews with Michael Stavarič 




Why is the classic song by The Doors quoted in a paper that deals with theories 
of emotion and literature? One short answer may be that, as the main focus of 
this volume lies on the relationship between human emotions and the writing 
process, the position of the author deserves our special attention. Whether the 
writing process is “fun”, and how deep this connection to having fun is, is not 
covered in this article.  
What is, in sum, the objective of this paper? As the ten central questions 
raised as a basis for this volume are of great general interest and deserve to be 
studied intensively, and because a number of these questions closely touch on 
the process of literary writing, it seems reasonable to discuss them with an au-
thor. 
Michael Stavarič is a Viennese writer who has authored numerous books, 
amongst which are Brenntage (2011) (“Burning Days”) and Königreich der 
Schatten (2013) (“The Kingdom of Shadows”), as well as several children’s 
books such as Die kleine Sensenfrau (2010) (“The Little Reaper”). The 
Chamisso award winner and lecturer on poetry at the International Research 
Center of Chamisso-Literature of the Ludwig Maximilian University in Munich 
considers the role of emotions in his lectures and agreed to be interviewed on 
these questions. I have therefore conducted two detailed interviews with him on 
the subject of “writing emotions”. In the interviews, we managed to cover some 
selected aspects of the ten questions mentioned. In the second part of this paper, 
I shall provide an overview of some contemporary theories of emotion. 
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1. THE INTERVIEWS WITH MICHAEL STAVARIČ 
 
In the following part, I [GLS] am going to summarize my interviews with 
Michael Stavarič [MS] step by step. 
 
Which roles do emotions play within writing as an aesthetic 
process? 
 
MS:   As an author one has an emotional connection to the work as something 
which has been created. An author has no emotional connection to a 
commissioned task (such as reviews etc.), which he or she would not do 
without the need to do it. The decisive aspect is how much of autobiog-
raphy is involved. Autobiographical aspects are often linked to emotion-
ality and this may be stronger than in the case of pure fiction, also within 
the writing process.  
For example, personal childhood memories play an important role in the 
novel Brenntage. The reason is that personal autobiography is emotional-
ly experienced. This is different from the situation when, for example, a 
poem has been successfully created. Therefore, it is necessary to look for 
the autobiographical connections within literary works.  
GLS:  An author’s first work, especially, is often very autobiographical. Is there 
a decline of emotional involvement in later works? 
MS:   Yes, but renewed emotional involvement may occur through the catalyst 
of new formal possibilities which engender a kind of extended personal 
speech. Literary writing is often born when attempting to process emo-
tions, and the first creative steps often take the form of therapeutic writ-
ing (as with a diary). Emotions which are processed in literature often 
cause the birth of literary writing. Later, this impact is reduced. Self-
development takes place during the process of growing up and getting 
older, for example at the age of twenty years, forty years, and later. The 
degree of emotional involvement also differs when one is writing autobi-
ographically. Emotion as an aesthetic process is important, especially 
when one is just becoming an author.  
For example, Jaroslav Seifert becomes once again especially emotional in 
his later works (like a “life summary”). The question of which sort of 
language I can preserve becomes a highly emotional matter in old age. 
GLS:  Autobiography comprises various things, for example, What have I been 
through? What do I know? Which principles do I have? – Is there any 
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strong emotionality when important things like principles and attitudes 
are concerned? 
MS:   Yes, there is; for example, in the case of my new novel, which talks 
about faith. Where relevant social issues are concerned, one should take a 
clear position, show an attitude. Vital topics, which are important in the 
world, are also linked with emotional attitudes, although they must not 
necessarily have autobiographical involvement.  
Also, literary composition is emotional (for example, how the dialogues 
of the characters are structurally integrated in the scene). As an author, I 
am not an indifferent observer who designs characters like puppets. Even 
when the characters are passive (as in Kafka), an author should not be-
have in an indifferent manner. 
GLS:  A poetic concept of withdrawal or restraint (incarnated, for example, in 
the early Döblin’s so-called “Steinerner Stil”) can be further developed 
into a concept of involvement. I can imagine that you have various con-
nections to your characters at various working stages?  
MS:   Yes, that is so. When an author has written several books, he or she has 
different attitudes to the characters. An emotional connection with the 
character depends on how successful the production of the whole text is. 
GLS:  Well, there are examples, such as Jean Paul or Uwe Johnson, who resort 
to their characters several times. 
MS:   Perhaps there are only few literary characters created by an author that 
appear again and again in different manners. Certainly, there is an emo-
tional connection to such characters. In such cases, they could be part of 
an authorial identity. 
GLS:  Characters can then function as carriers of emotional connection through 
several texts, even though they bear different names, etc., right? 
MS:   That is right. 
 
Where and how do a writer’s emotional moments of writing leave 
their traces within the text? 
 
MS:   When connected with real emotions, autobiographical features leave their 
traces. Successful text passages are one hint of such traces. Emotional 
components can also be recognized by the conceptualization of literary 
characters (for example, the choice of occupation). Formal language as-
pects should be studied as well. 
GLS:  What about the constellation of characters and the emotional potential of 
this (for example, in your novel Böse Spiele)? 
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MS:   In Böse Spiele, where men and women have confrontations, the formal 
features of language are also relevant: how the dialogues are built, where 
the punctuation marks are placed etc. All of this reflects emotionality. 
Emotions in the writing process leave traces in this way. 
A highly important element of involvement (for example, fear) and an 
interesting illustration of emotional reactions are observable in literary 
animal characters. They allow a more powerful depiction of emotions 
and can be found in all my books. An example is the stallion in Stillborn. 
At the same time, an emotional area of tension can be created that can 
serve as a steering mechanism for sympathy. An example of this could be 
a serial killer and an animal torturer. In this case the violation of norms 
becomes an important instrument.  
 
How do authors play with the emotional impact? 
 
MS:   People should be touched. Readers should develop an emotional connec-
tion to the book. 
GLS:  Let us take the example of authorial readings: reading aloud as part of a 
productive process by continually fabricating new realizations of the text. 
MS:   The spoken word, the voice, can play a role. The emotionality of the 
spoken language is like a magic spell, because the attraction of various 
senses strengthens emotional involvement. The personal presence of the 
author enhances the emotional components and the reader’s relationship 
with the text. 
 
What kind of role do intermedial strategies play? 
 
GLS:  In books for both adults and children, pictures and illustrations play a 
vital role. 
MS:   Yes, because technical options (programs, apps, music etc., i.e. every-
thing which can be applied in the context of a book) can enhance the 
emotional connection. 
GLS:  These are aspects of emotionalizing on the reader’s part. Are cross-
medial forms also connected with a writer’s emotions? 
MS:   As an author, I partake in a visual depiction and, in this respect, I am 
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Where does intertextuality come in? 
 
MS:   All authors have their own artistic context and pieces of art that they 
know. It is a part of their autobiography. There are topics, artistic topics 
and motives which are memorable for an author and which have become 
a part of his personal memories and identity. 
GLS:  Arno Schmidt must have been, for example, of interest to you, because 
you referred to Schmidt’s Seelandschaft mit Pocahontas (1953) with 
your Déja-vu mit Pocahontas (2010). Is intertextuality relevant for the 
emotional components of writing? 
MS:   Yes, Schmidt created rather rude or aggressive metaphors. I studied his 
manner of writing and integrated it into my own style in this text, so that 
the corresponding emotions are preserved and transmitted. All in all, it is 
my way of showing appreciation for his work. 
 
Which kinds and types of emotion and which forms of literary 
emotions can be found in the context of writing as agency? 
 
GLS:  Is it possible that an author has an influence on the emotionality of the 
readership? 
MS:   In terms of authors such as, for example, Umberto Eco, who see them-
selves as a moral institution? The author-as-authority?  
Yes, there is indeed a wish to have influence. For example, the hope is 
not unknown to me that the government will notice us literary authors 
and recognize us as authorities. 
GLS:  What do you think of the idea that, for example, Goethe’s Wahlver-
wandtschaften can be seen as a model for a new and different attitude 
towards marriage and the corresponding emotions? Can you imagine be-
ing able to transmit such emotional models by means of your texts? 
MS:   Very often the relationships between men and women as well as between 
individuals and society are important. 
GLS:  A moment ago, when we were talking about animals as literary “charac-
ters”, that the author is able to steer the reader’s sympathies with animal 
characters, you also mentioned the violation of norms. I would like to 
discuss this issue in more detail. To which extent can the violation of 
norms influence the readers’ emotionality? 
MS:   The cliché as a simple form of understanding norms serves here as a 
starting point. The cliché in literature or as a literary motive is useful 
because it serves as a trigger (man–woman, good–evil, hero–antihero 
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etc.). In a literary text, the dialectic of clichés is reduced to an absurdity. 
This is the main point and this creates precisely the situations in which 
the violation of norms is required. The Persiflage as a genre is an exam-
ple.  
GLS:  Can this be specifically connected to playing with language? 
MS:   Take, for example, my children’s book, Die kleine Sensenfrau. The trans-
formation from the Sensenmann (“reaper man”) to Sensenfrau (“reaper 
woman”) is introduced by the grammatical gender of ‘death’ in the Czech 
language (‘smrt’), which is feminine. Generally, an emotional individual-
ization can be achieved through the violations of norms. 
GLS:  Nonetheless, in literature emotions are often perceived as private. 
MS:   This notwithstanding, an author has a sort of “moral leadership”. For 
example, in totalitarian systems literature is perceived ideologically. It is 
especially in restrictive countries that literature often serves not only to 
tell a well-written story but also to negate ideology. Prohibitions on writ-
ing as well as on non-conforming texts can suddenly be regarded as a 
political statement, whether explicitly or implicitly. In this new context 
literature can become a sort of stage. 
GLS:  Usually, in totalitarian countries the subversive potential of literature is 
acutely perceived. 
MS:   Yes. For example, The Satanic Verses by Salman Rushdie is meaningful 
in this context. Emotionality can partly be transmitted to literary works 
from the outside. 
GLS:  Is this important for you? Could the reader find a statement concerning 
totalitarian countries in your novels, for example, which forms a part of 
your own biography? 
MS:   No, but of course I would like my works to be noticed. Sometimes such 
attention is easier to achieve in tense environments. Publishing houses al-




2. THEORIES OF EMOTION AND LITERARY STUDIES 
 
In the following part of my contribution, some theoretical principles of emotion 
are presented, which may be appropriate aides in our attempts to describe the 
phenomenona surrounding the subject of “Literary works and emotions”. In this 
endeavour, I shall concentrate on the autobiographical aspect, which has been 
given special emphasis by Michael Stavarič. This aspect is linked to the emo-
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tional ontogeny of individuals. That ontogeny in turn implies a person’s emotion 
management as a lifelong development, a development which conditions person-
al preferences and subjective evaluations. 
I would like to begin the discussion by referring to a theoretical concept, a 
concept which in my opinion is important for understanding the subject. This is 
the concept of the cognitive theories of emotion. Here it may be necessary to 
provide some explanations, since the development of these theories within the 
academic disciplines was caused mainly by the rise of information technology 
and artificial intelligence within the academic disciplines.1 
Since Rosalind W. Picard published her studies on “Affective Computing” in 
1997, theories of emotion have held great importance in the fields of artificial 
intelligence, information technology and robotics. Cognitive theories of emotion 
are not only useful in this context, but they were themselves created by these 
technical disciplines.  
In my essay, the reasons for adopting cognitive theories of emotion in the 
context of literary analysis will be weighed. Furthermore, I shall make reference 
to the fact that only cognitively-based emotions result in individual, variable and 
relative emotionally-steered actions, whereas non-cognitive emotions result in 
inescapable consequences. This is because cognitive emotions can be defined as 
radically individual emotions, which permit deliberate choices. Therefore, the 
dimension of cognitive emotions is of special interest for the study of literature. 
After all, literary texts prefer to focus on the implications of actions which are 
deliberate, even though the ultimate consequences are often unforeseen. 
 
2.1 Emotional Agents and Theories of Emotion 
 
In information technology and robotics, ‘agent’ is a general term applied to 
intelligent programs. Normally, these are programs which work with a certain 
autonomy in the accomplishment of their tasks, carrying out an order in a man-
ner similar to a human agent. Hence artificial intelligence is concerned with 
‘agents’. 
Some agents feature a so-called BDI-architecture (belief, desire, intention). 
In this case, human actions, including decision-making processes, acquire spe-
cial importance as they serve as a template for the artificial intelligence which 
seeks to emulate them. This means that decision-making is no longer a sequence 
of computations along fixed algorithms; rather, it introduces a program which 
perpetually adapts to changing circumstances. In short, whereas the agent is not 
                                                             
1  Cf. Schiewer 2009; Schiewer 2014. 
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required to re-check its aims under static circumstances, it frequently does so 
under dynamic circumstances.  
The importance of emotions in decision-making processes has been recog-
nized increasingly in the humanities, in cognitive sciences and in artificial intel-
ligence. “Emotional agents” produce emotional behaviour. This means that 
emotions are implemented in agent-architectures as a component of decision-
making processes. The object of their inclusion is the improvement of man-
machine interactions on the one hand, and the steering of behaviours on the 
other.  
At present, important efforts are being made to develop “affective compu-
ting”, which was the subject of a fundamental study by Rosalind W. Picard in 
1997. Affective computing means computers which “understand” emotions 
(analysis) as well as computers which “express” emotions (synthesis) and even 
“have” emotions, which means that they are steered by so-called artificial emo-
tions. In this context, theories of emotion and computer emulations are closely 
intertwined.  
First, emotions comprise many different aspects, including physiological 
emanations, individual and subjective feelings, cognitive processes, verbal and 
physical expressions, social and cultural aspects and so on. Dieter Ulich, the 
German psychologist specializing in the research of emotions, stressed as early 
as the eighties that the decision for or against a specific model of emotions 
depends on what we are aiming at. Ulich is convinced that nobody is able to 
study emotions generally and that the model we choose depends on the purposes 
for which the model is to be used.2 Therefore, no authoritative definition and no 
exclusive notion of emotions exist, but a great number of models have been 
produced. 
In the field of affective computing, the predominant theories of emotions un-
der discussion are so-called cognitive and appraisal theories. The production of 
emotions is understood as a consequence of specific cognitions. In this frame-
work, cognitive appraisal is considered to be central to emotions. Hence, the core 
components of research based on these theories are the analysis of cognitive 
triggers of emotions and their consequences in expression, planning and acting.  
                                                             
2  Ulich 1989: 125. This is the corresponding passage in the German-language original: 
“Die Entscheidung für oder gegen ein bestimmtes Denkmodell hängt davon ab, was 
wir selbst wollen. Niemand kann Emotionen ‘überhaupt’ untersuchen; immer ist eine 
Präzisierung des Aspektes nötig, unter dem man sich für Emotionen interessiert. Um 
solche Entscheidungen treffen zu können, ist es darüber hinaus nötig, daß man sich 
begründet für ein bestimmtes Denkmodell entscheidet bzw. einen bestimmten Weg 
einschlägt”. 
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There are many different approaches of this kind; attention should be paid, 
for example, to those of Andrew Ortony, Gerald L. Clore and Allan Collins, Ira 
J. Roseman, Klaus R. Scherer, Nico H. Frijda, Keith Oatley and P.N. Johnson-
Laird amongst others. Let us look at some of these approaches. 
Cognitive theories of emotion began (according to contemporary interpreta-
tions) with Aristotle’s remarks about emotions in his Rhetoric, accompanied by 
some remarks in his De Anima and Nicomachean Ethics. There is an array of 
other philosophical classics whose analytical treatments may serve as sources for 
modern cognitive theories of emotion.3  
The cognitive turn in linguistics, anthropology and psychology, which dates 
back to the 1960s, was applied to the theory of emotions via an analysis of how 
appraisals of everyday situations conditioned emotional reactions.  
According to the latest variants of appraisal theory, human beings use a fixed 
number of dimensions or criteria when evaluating situations: 
 
1. Intrinsic characteristics of objects or events, such as novelty or agreea-
bleness. 
2. The significance of the event for the individual’s needs or goals.  
3. The individual’s ability to influence or cope with the consequences of the 
event, including the evaluation of ‘agency’. 
4. The compatibility of the event with social or personal standards, norms, 
or values.  
 
The concept ‘appraisal’ was first used in Magda Arnold’s (1960) Emotion and 
Personality, and has been expanded on in more detail in the work of Richard 
Lazarus and his colleagues.4 The latest in cognitive theories of emotion is reca-
                                                             
3  These are some of them: René Descartes’ Les passions de l’âme, Baruch de Spinoza’s 
Die Ethik und Kurze Abhandlung von Gott, dem Menschen und seinem Glück, David 
Hume’s A Treatise on Human Nature, Immanuel Kant’s Anthropologie in pragmati-
scher Hinsicht and Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments. Among early classics 
in psychology are Wilhelm Wundt’s Grundzüge der Physiologischen Psychologie and 
Völkerpsychologie, William James’s The Emotions and Carl Stumpf’s Gefühl und 
Gefühlsempfindung.  
4  Cf. Lazarus, Averill and Opton (1970) Toward a Cognitive Theory of Emotion, 
Lazarus, Averill and Opton (1977) Ansätze zu einer kognitiven Gefühlstheorie, 
Lazarus (1984) On the Primacy of Cognition, Smith and Lazarus (1993) Appraisal 
Components, Core Relation Themes, and the Emotions, Lazarus and Lazarus (1994), 
Passion and Reason. Making Sense of our Emotions in a Historical Perspective and 
Lazarus (1999), The Cognition-Emotion Debate. A Bit of History. 
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pitulated in Reisenzein (2000), Reisenzein, Meyer and Schützwohl (2003), and 
in Scherer (1999) from a historical perspective. A state of development concern-
ing all aspects and dimensions connected with cognitive theories of emotion, 
together with methodological questions and empirical research, is given in the 
volume edited by Scherer, Schorr and Johnstone (2001). Another proponent of 
the presently prominent theory of ‘structural’ access to emotions is Ortony, 
Clore and Collins (1988) “The Cognitive Structure of Emotions” (abbreviated: 
OCC-theory), with their ‘emotions-as-valenced-reactions’ claim, a claim based 
on the situational reactions of individuals, referring to how they process events, 
actors and objects.  
The approach taken by Ortony, Clore and Collins is currently considered to 
be the most elaborate and systematic.5 It is characterized by the general intention 
“to lay the foundation for a computationally tractable model of emotion. In other 
words, we would like an account of emotion that could in principle be used in an 
Artificial Intelligence (AI) system that would, for example, be able to reason 
about emotions.”6 Here we see a process in which the authors attempt to give an 
account of how cognitive appraisals are made as antecedents of emotional reac-
tions.  
This working model views emotions as “valenced reactions to events, agents, 
or objects, with their particular nature being determined by the way in which the 
eliciting situation is construed”.7 The most general issue concerns the question of 
emotional differentiation, that is, the question of what distinguishes one emotion 
from another. A basic distinction between reactions to events, agents and objects 
gives rise to three general classes of emotions:  
 
• being pleased vs. displeased (reactions to events),  
• approving vs. disapproving (reactions to agents), and  
• liking vs. disliking (reactions to objects).  
 
The authors make clear that these three basic classes of emotions can in turn be 
differentiated into a number of distinct typological groups.  
Reactions to events can be divided into three groups: the first, the Fortunes-
of-others group, focuses on how events affecting other people will have conse-
quences for oneself, whereas the other two, the Prospect-based and Well-being 
groups, focus only on the consequences for oneself. Reactions to agents are 
differentiated into four groups of emotions, one of which is the Attribution 
                                                             
5  Cf. Reisenzein/Meyer/Schützwohl 2003: 171. 
6  Ortony/Clore/Collins 1988: 2. 
7  Ibid.: 13. 
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group. Reactions to objects include the Attraction group of emotions. Beyond 
these, there is assumed to be a compounded group, the Well-being/Attribution 
compound, involving reactions to both events and agents simultaneously.8 
Taking these concepts further requires accounting for the variations of emo-
tional intensity both within and between people. To this end, Ortony, Clore and 
Collins attempt in their work to address the factors which determine intensity. 
Their general view is that the intensity of emotions is influenced by a number of 
variables, all of which are present in the construal of the situation which generat-
ed the emotions.  
Thus, in order to address the question of intensity, they consider the mecha-
nism whereby emotion-inducing stimuli are appraised. Ortony, Clore and Collins 
state that a person’s appraisal of an emotion-inducing situation is based on three 






These apply to, respectively, 
 
• event-based emotions, 
• agent-based emotions, 
• object-based emotions. 
 
Desirability is evaluated in terms of complex goal structures, wherein the focal 
goals govern the interpretation of any event. The desirability of the event is 
appraised in terms of how it facilitates or interferes with this focal goal and the 
sub-goals that support it.  
Similarly, the praiseworthiness of an agent’s actions is evaluated with respect 
to a hierarchy of standards, and the appeal of an Object is evaluated with respect 
to a person’s attitudes. 
Following this approach, goals are distinguished from standards in terms of 
what one wants vs. what one thinks the outcomes ought to be. Three kinds of 
goals are distinguished: 1) active-pursuit goals are goals that a person tries to 
obtain, such as becoming a concert pianist, 2) interest goals are goals that are 
usually not pursued, because one has little control over their realization, as with 
preserving one’s health or seeing one’s friends succeed, and 3) replenishment 
goals are goals that wax and wane over time, such as hunger and getting gas for 
                                                             
8  Cf. ibid.: 33. 
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one’s car. Whether a goal is partially fulfillable, like making a million dollars, or 
fulfillable only in all-or-none terms, like winning a Nobel Prize, is a further 
consideration considered to be orthogonal to these goal types.  
Ortony, Clore and Collins are convinced that all these distinctions play a role 
in determining the intensity with which people experience different emotions.9 
Amongst the factors that affect emotional intensity are global variables, which 
affect all emotions, and local variables, which affect particular groups of emo-
tions.10 
Beyond this rather static and structural explanation of emotions, the authors 
don’t exclude the possibility of emotion sequences, which are important contrib-
utors to the dynamic flow of emotional processes. 
Within such a framework, the ways in which one explains an action based on 
an actor’s internal traits or dispositions may contribute to the mediation of other 
affective reactions. Because of a pervasive impetus to attach causal attributions 
to significant events, experiencing an “event-based” emotion will often be the 
occasion for experiencing one of the “attribution” emotions. From the fact that 
people tend to seek causes for the significant events and actions that they experi-
ence, it may be inferred that there is a tendency within the human emotional 
experience to move from “event-focused” to “agent-focused”, and finally, to 
“object-focused” emotions.11 In other words, “there may be a cycle in which 
emotion-inducing situations lead not only to the emotions themselves, but also to 
a need to cope with the emotions to which they give rise”. The extent to which a 
person does cope, or thinks he can cope, sometimes forms the source of addi-
tional emotions, which in turn present new demands upon his coping mecha-
nisms.12 
This theoretical framework accentuates the hypothesis that in many cases, 
the function of emotion is that of a situational coping mechanism. Further 
attempts are made to explain why and under which conditions human beings are 
not able to cope with the emotion-inducing situation or the emotion itself. Here, 
the unexpectedness of an event is considered to be a factor of utmost relevance: 
“The result may be that there is a great deal of cognitive disorganization. This is 
true both for positive and negative emotions.”13 
This admittedly convincing explanation, however, does not cover any specif-
ic circumstances of the aforementioned disorganization. It was cognitive psy-
                                                             
9  Cf. ibid.: 58. 
10  Cf. ibid.: 83. 
11  Cf. ibid.: 169-170. 
12  Cf. ibid.: 181. 
13  Ibid.: 178-179. 
THE AUTHOR – “SPECIALIZE[D] IN HAVING FUN”? | 67 
 
 
chologist Jerome Bruner who raised this question in 1990 in his book Acts of 
Meaning:  
 
This reciprocal relation between perceived states of the world and one’s desires, each 
affecting the other, creates a subtle dramatism about human action which also informs the 
narrative structure of folk psychology.  
When anybody is seen to believe or desire or act in a way that fails to take the state of the 
world into account, to commit a truly gratuitous act, he is judged to be folk-psycho-
logically insane unless he as an agent can be narratively reconstrued as being in the grip of 
a mitigating quandary or of crushing circumstances.  
It may take a searching judicial trial in real life or a whole novel in fiction (as with André 
Gide’s “Lafcadio’s Adventure”) to effect such a reconstrual.14 
 
Bruner makes clear that folk psychology focuses upon what is expected and/or 
ordinary in the human condition. Naturally, this includes the expected and/or 
ordinary in the affective life. Although a culture must contain a set of norms, 
according to Bruner, it must also contain a set of interpretative procedures for 
rendering departures from those norms meaningful within established patterns of 
belief.  
Bruner says that it is narrative and narrative interpretation which achieve this 
kind of meaning in folk psychology. “Stories achieve their meanings by explicat-
ing deviations from the ordinary in a comprehensible form – by providing the 
‘impossible logic’ [...].”15 In Bruner’s view, the function of a story is to find an 
intentional state that mitigates or at least makes comprehensible a deviation from 
a canonical cultural pattern.16 Thus, Bruner encourages us to establish a connec-
tion between cognitive science, theories of emotion, and narratology. Following 
this rationale, it is henceforth essential for us to take a look at some current dis-
cussions about emotions in literary studies. 
 
2.2 On the reception of current emotion theories  
in literary studies 
 
Literature based on rhetoric, as well as the art of rhetoric itself, has always been 
concerned with emotion. Surprisingly enough, modern studies of literature seem 
to eschew any systematic discussion of the whole complex of affective aspects in 
                                                             
14  Bruner 1990: 40. 
15  Ibid.: 46. 
16  Cf. ibid.: 45-46. 
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literature and of literature. Meanwhile, however, an increasing interest in this 
topic is perceivable.17 With respect to literature, Simone Winko points to an 
essential division within theories of emotion: on the one hand, they concern 
wider conceptions of cognition that integrate thinking and feeling, and on the 
other, a narrow conception of cognition exclusively comprising cognition, and 
therefore excluding emotion as an independent aspect of the human mind. 
Winko argues for adopting the narrow conception of cognition in literary studies; 
thus, according to Winko, a broad conception of emotion is not favourable, 
which regards emotion as a mental phenomenon as well as a physiological, 
psychological, social and cultural occurrence. 
Within her work, she seems to advocate a so-called syndrome theory; how-
ever, upon closer inspection, she also raises several objections to such a focus. 
Winko believes that cognitive conceptions of emotions are not adaptable for 
literary studies because they do not allow for an account of emotions as they are 
subjectively perceived. In conclusion, she recommends a concept of emotions 
where they are regarded as emergent characteristics of the physical system of 
human beings.  
Despite the authority of Winko’s argument, a more thorough discussion of 
the topic is required. Therefore, I shall apply the cognitive model of emotions to 
the study of literature preferentially, albeit not exclusively, with the reservation 
that such models are part and parcel of a wider conception of cognition which 
integrates thinking and feeling. This is all the more necessary due to the fact that, 
in cognitive narratology, these aspects of emotions have not been touched upon 
for a long time.18 
 
2.3 Perspectives of cognitive emotion theories for  
literary analysis 
 
As mentioned above, Ortony, Clore and Collins take into account the differentia-
tion between positive and negative consequences of emotions, that is, the condi-
tion that emotions may result in a great deal of cognitive disorganization. Fur-
thermore, writers of literature in which the imagined emotions of fictional char-
acters play a central role recognize that emotions can cause dramatic disruptions 
in judgment and performance. 
Ortony, Clore and Collins think that the basic recipe is very simple:  
 
                                                             
17  I.e. Alfes 1995; Winko 2003. 
18  Cf. for instance Herman 2003. 
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The writer describes a situation that readers recognize as being important to a character in 
the sense that it has important implications with respect to the goals, standards, or attitudes 
that the character is known or assumed to have. Then, the character is portrayed as correct-
ly or incorrectly construing the situation as good or bad relative to these goals or standards 
or attitudes, and typically is described as having, or is assumed to have, a valenced – i.e. a 
positive or negative – reaction to the situation. Finally, the construal together with the 
reaction usually results in some sort of change in the character’s judgment or behaviour.19 
 
Further on, the authors express their view that descriptions of situations as they 
objectively exist are aesthetically undesirable, and that in writing from the point 
of view of an individual, the situation may be encoded in such a way as to pro-
vide readers with an awareness of a character’s affective state. They assume that 
the situations so described are sufficient to produce individual emotions. If the 
described situation contains the conditions for eliciting a particular emotion, the 
experience of that emotion can be inferred. According to Ortony, Clore and 
Collins, this assumption can be proven by the fact that millions of readers, often 
over decades or even centuries, all experience similar emotions when exposed to 
a single description of a particular situation. Thus, they assume that this view 
must bear general validity.20 
This rather general but nonetheless convincing perspective on the analysis of 
how emotions are described in literature, and which effects are produced there-
from, must be elaborated upon. 
First, it is clear to me that, contrary to Simone Winko’s position, cognitive 
theories of emotion are in general, albeit with some exceptions, extremely inter-
esting for literary analysis, considering the fact that only cognitive emotions 
result in individual, variable and relative emotionally-steered actions, whereas 
non-cognitive models result in inescapable consequences.  
Wolfgang Gessner discussed this problem in his book, Die kognitive Emer-
genz von Emotionen, in which he propounds a ‘radical cognitive emotion theo-
ry’. Gessner argues that because cognitive emotions can be defined as radically 
individual, they offer deliberate choices. In contrast, non-cognitive emotions, 
such as disgust, are not individual but constitutive for human beings. Therefore, 
the use of cognitive models of emotion is of special interest for the study of 
literature. As mentioned earlier, literature holds a preference for implications 
created by deliberate actions, even where the consequences are not foreseen. 
Secondly, Gessner provides the tools for analysing the inner perspective of 
human beings and the way in which they perceive situations via their emotions. 
                                                             
19  Ortony/Clore/Collins 1988: 3. 
20  Cf. ibid. 
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He analyses individual interpretation mechanisms when confronted with emo-
tion-inducing situations, whereas appraisal theories usually focus on standard 
situations involving emotional elicitation. Gessner says that a complete theory of 
emotions must explain the unique dispositions of individuals, whereby an indi-
vidual’s cognitive triggers provide him with a unique interpretation of an emo-
tion-inducing situation.21 
Allowing this basic assumption, it naturally follows that there is a need for a 
theory that focuses especially on the individual and on the subjective processing 
of a given situation, including erroneous interpretations of it. Such a theory 
would carry much promise from the point of view of literary analysis. 
Perhaps it is useful to provide a short example from a well-known text: 
Goethe’s Faust. This text is one of the most striking examples of a complex 
discussion of the problem of emotion. It shows not only the failure of individual 
decisions, but also the layers of emotion in the broader context of social and 
human realities. Already in the “Prologue in Heaven”, the Lord and Mephistoph-
eles talk about human error: 
 
Mephistopheles: 
 “What will you wager that you do not lose him,  
 Supposing always you will not demur 
 About my guiding him in paths I choose him?” 
The Lord: 
 “You shall have leave to do as you prefer. 
 So long as earth remains his mortal dwelling; 
 For man must strive, and striving he must err.”22 
 
Indeed, Faust errs. Let us take an example from the Gretchen episode. Even 
Mephistopheles tries to restrain him in the beginning: 
 
Faust: 
 “But, none the less, she must be turned fourteen.” 
Mephistopheles: 
 “There speaks the lad who plays the libertine, 
 And thinks he has the right to every flower, 
 Knowing no grace or honourable name 
 Beyond his reach, to pluck it and devour; 
 It often can’t be done, Sir, all the same. […] 
                                                             
21  Cf. Gessner 2004: 127. 
22  Goethe 1949: 41. 
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 Pray hear me now, Sir, pleasantry apart, 
 I tell you once for all, that lovely girl 
 Is never to be taken in a whirl. 
 We stand to lose by forcing of the pace, 
 When gentle subterfuge would meet our case.”23 
 
Corresponding to the dialogue in the “Prologue in Heaven” quoted above, 
Goethe writes in a letter on the 15th of September, 1804 to his confidant 
Eichstätt that what is justly called a wrong striving is an unavoidable detour on 
the path to the goal.24 This is because every return from an error forms the hu-
man being both in his individuality and his essential humanity. Therefore, it 
seems clear to him that God rejoices more for the one sinner who repents than 
for ninety-nine faithful who need not repentance. Faust’s behaviour driven by 
passion must be judged in this context. 
Nonetheless, the whole problem of emotions and the theories of their de-
scription have become even more complex than the theories which Ortony, Clore 
and Collins and Gessner were prepared to take into account. 
It concerns not only individual facets of situation appraisal as described by 
Ortony, Clore and Collins, and in a more complex manner by Gessner. There are 
dimensions of ontogenesis and self-development as well as social dimensions of 
“the human being as a whole” which must also be taken into account.  
David Herman hinted at this problem and its relevance with respect to cogni-
tive narratology, while Manfred Holodynski presented a complex ontogenetic 
approach in his study of emotions. Both Herman and Holodynski refer back to 
the work of Soviet psychologist Lev Vygotsky.25 
In light of all this, it becomes evident that a complete theory of emotions as 
they are treated in literary narratives requires an approach which accounts for 
individual, social and even normative or ethical dimensions of emotionally-
steered actions.  
                                                             
23  Ibid.: 121-122. 
24  Cf. Goethe WA 1895: 196-199: “Bey strenger Prüfung meines eignen und fremden 
Ganges im Leben und Kunst fand ich oft, daß das, was man mit Recht ein falsches 
Streben nennen kann, für das Individuum ein ganz unentbehrlicher Umweg zum Ziele 
sey. Jede Rückkehr vom Irrthum bildet mächtig den Menschen im einzelnen und Gan-
zen aus, so daß man wohl begreifen kann, wie dem Herzensforscher ein reuiger Sün-
der lieber seyn kann, als neunundneunzig Gerechte. Ja, man strebt oft mit Bewußtseyn 
zu einem scheinbar falschen Ziel, wie der Fährmann gegen den Fluß arbeitet, da ihm 
doch nur darum zu thun ist gerade auf dem entgegengesetzten Ufer anzulanden”. 
25  Cf. Herman 2003: 163-192; Holodynski 2006: 122. 
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 Here I return to the autobiography and its impact upon emotional involve-
ment on the part of the author, as highlighted by Michael Stavarič. Again: as 
Stavarič says, traces of authorial emotions may be particularly pronounced in his 
animal characters. Animal characters not only enhance emotional intensity, they 
are also used for breaking norms and clichés, which Stavarič identifies as one of 
his central objectives. Thus, a starting point for influencing common patterns of 
social thinking may, under certain circumstances, be produced.  
This outline of a theoretical approach offers, in my opinion, important view-
points on autobiography, particularly on the genesis of the author’s emotions 
with its individual preferences and subjective evaluations. At the same time, this 
approach explains why inappropriate forms of behaviour, actions and emotional-
ity play such important roles in literary texts. 
Although the approach of Manfred Holodynski would not alone be sufficient 
as a theoretical basis, integrating cognitive theories of emotions with the investi-
gation of emotional ontogenesis provides novel theoretical possibilities which 
invite for further analysis.  
 
 
3. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
In spite of the far-reaching results already achieved by research into the theory of 
emotion (particularly in general and cognitive theories of emotion), no serious 
attempts have been made to integrate the multitudinous theories describing the 
manifold aspects of emotions as they contribute to human behaviour as a whole, 
with the limited exceptions, perhaps, of the work done by the Centre Interfacul-
taire en Science Affectives (Swiss Center for Affective Sciences), and by Klaus 
R. Scherer, father of the Component Process Model of emotion (CPM).  
Emotions are not solely based on anatomy, biology, psychology or culture. 
Thus, the study of emotions cannot be confined to individual disciplines, wheth-
er psychology, philosophy, ethnology, sociology or linguistics. Emotions in 
human interaction must be appraised with respect to the particular situation, or to 
the content of what is being communicated. Equally, their appraisal ought not to 
minimize the complex and isolating individual aspects inherent in emotions, as 
analysed from such angles as psychology.26 
Only via interdisciplinary approaches can researchers hope to arrive at really 
innovative results which can comprehensively cover the broadest idea of emo-
tions. In such a project, the need to construct efficient communication tools and 
                                                             
26  Cf. Weigand 2004. 
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action devices is especially pronounced. Therefore, a broad scientific horizon 
encompassing psychology, linguistics, information science, image and signal 
processing, philosophy and, last but not least, literary studies, must be chan-
nelled to create an integrated approach, in order to avoid the reproach of psy-
chologism.27 
Further, there are not only systematic approaches to be taken into account, 
but historical ones, too. For example, Karl Bühler supplies an outstanding meth-
odological principle in the subtitle of his book on Ausdruckstheorie from 1933: a 
system must be presented by writing the history of the thoughts concerned. It is 
even Bühler’s assumption that a systematic concept must be highlighted and 
completed by an account of its historical development. He gives several reasons 
for this scientific principle, one of which is very simple but nonetheless funda-
mental: familiar knowledge is in danger of being forgotten by reliance on a 
systematic approach. In fact, structures, incidents and continuities have to be 
correlated in a constructive manner. Bühler’s propositions make an interesting 
reappearance in his last writings, featured in Das Gestaltprinzip im Leben des 
Menschen und der Tiere (1960). Here, Bühler deals with cybernetics. He makes 
a comparison between the steering of computers or machines on the one hand 
and human thinking on the other. At that time, computer storage systems had to 
be wiped clean completely before the memory could be reused. Human creativi-
ty in operation is entirely different: human thinking is inventive or “gestaltis-
tisch” only when it is based on pre-existing knowledge, even if this knowledge is 
not systematized. Therefore, human thinking must be regarded as systematic and 
historical at the same time and not just as systematic. 
With this in mind, there exists great research potential in applying theories of 
emotion in general, and cognitive theories of emotion in particular, to the field of 
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Emotions and/in Religion 





1. A BRIEF THEORETICAL PREMISE ON AESTHETIC AND 
RELIGIOUS EMOTIONS  
 
The idea that emotions are harmful to reason, detrimental to both judgment and 
moral conduct, has been widely held for centuries in the Western mainstream 
philosophical tradition (particularly by Platonists, the Stoics, Descartes and their 
followers), and it has also been promoted by Christian theologians of different 
persuasions. Several contemporary philosophers and cognitive scientists (Robert 
C. Solomon, Antonio Damasio, Martha Nussbaum, Jenefer Robinson and oth-
ers)1 have challenged, and even reversed the traditionally negative view of emo-
tions, and have made the topic culturally respectable and relevant. However, 
religious emotion has been largely neglected in their work (as opposed, for ex-
ample, to aesthetic emotion), so that the time seems to have come to explore this 
aspect in depth. One may start to do so by connecting recent theories on emo-
tions in general to those of three authors whose works have been crucial in the 
field of the Comparative Study of Religions since the early decades of the twen-
tieth century: i.e. Sigmund Freud, Rudolph Otto and William James. In fact, the 
issue of emotions in religion plays a prominent part in their research, which is 
articulated according to obviously different disciplinary methodologies and 
protocols, but which is similarly cognizant of the central role of emotions in 
religion. The role of literature, and specifically of its unique contribution in 
terms of “writing emotions”, has certainly been relevant for both Freud and 
James, and it must be mentioned here as a premise to the discussion of their 
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theories. Freud’s deep interest in and fascination with Greek tragedy and Shake-
speare is well known, and can be shown to have been instrumental, and even 
decisive, to the Freudian elaboration of the “Oedipus complex”. Freud even 
applied the literary knowledge of emotions to the understanding of his own 
“family romance” and personal vicissitudes, while the multifaceted rendering of 
emotions in the novels of Henry James must have been more than familiar to his 
brother William. Freud and James build their psychological theories in relation 
to the articulation of emotions in literature, but, of course, they transpose and 
transform the literary writing of emotions into their own disciplines and theoreti-
cal concerns. They “write emotion” with an obviously different purpose and 
style from that of the artistic literature to which they often allude. 
The following discussion intends to focus on their writings, and will address 
these points and questions:  
 
• The personal significance and the cultural role of religious emotions. 
• Is there an original “religious feeling”? 
• Cognition in/and Religious Emotions. 
• (How) Do religious emotions differ from secular emotions? Is there a speci-
ficity of religious emotions?  
 
Before addressing these issues directly, a few more brief theoretical remarks are 
necessary. Contemporary literature on the emotions essentially suggests, despite 
a great variety of approaches, that emotions are intrinsically cognitive,2 and that, 
instead of being blind or capricious forces, they constitute meaningful evaluative 
strategies. Emotions are increasingly seen as intrinsically cognitive because they 
are always, de facto, acts of appraisal. Moreover, emotions undoubtedly trans-
form our attitude(s) towards the world, towards its meaning and worth, and are 
also transformative of the self, of our judgments and choices, which means that 
they are “functionally” intelligent. Martha Nussbaum convincingly argues that 
emotions enter evaluative thought in relation to the subject’s important long-
term (as opposed to immediate) goals and projects. She also emphasizes the 
individual meaning of emotions. One of her main propositions is that emotions 
are “singular”, i.e. highly individualized and “localized”: “Emotions contain an 
ineliminable reference to me, to the fact that it is my scheme of goals and pro-
jects. They see the world from my point of view”.3 As I have said, Nussbaum 
focuses mostly on aesthetic emotions and proposes that they are valuable be-
cause they help humans to cope with their finitude and help them in the struggle 
                                                             
2  Cf. Lyons 1980; de Sousa 1987; Gordon 1987; Greenspan 1988; Green 1992. 
3  Nussbaum 2001: 52. 
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with ambivalence and helplessness. Jenefer Robinson similarly suggests that we 
are in need of a renewed “sentimental education”, which the arts can fruitfully 
provide. I have elsewhere suggested that artistic literature, due to its unique form 
and intrinsic complexity, can increase our capacity to address the plurality of our 
world, and foster a meta-ethical attitude of respect through the dynamics of 
interpretation,4 as well as providing a special knowledge of human emotions.  
Given these premises, I now wish to address the specific focus of this com-
munication, i.e. religious emotions, by suggesting that religion, like art, but 
through different means, can contribute to a “sentimental education” and pro-
mote compassion, generosity, gratitude and a sense of responsibility (which is 
the basis of ethics). Of course, and unfortunately, there is more than a mere risk 
of ideological indoctrination, intolerance and hate speech in both religion and 
literature, but dealing with complexity (a common experience in literary inter-
pretation and religious exegesis) remains an excellent means of hearing different 
voices, acknowledging different perspectives, and, as a consequence, of recog-
nizing the importance of creating a respectful dialogue. In the next section of my 
paper I will argue that religious emotions are endowed with an empowering 
force that is, in part, similar to the that provided by aesthetic emotions, and that 
such emotional force had already been attributed to religion by Sigmund Freud, 
Rudolph Otto and William James. 
 
 
2. THE PERSONAL SIGNIFICANCE AND  
THE CULTURAL ROLE OF RELIGIOUS EMOTIONS 
  
I have chosen to examine Freud, Otto and James together because in these three 
authors we find a common interest in the personal and social impact of religion, 
in which emotion plays a relevant role. Their attention to feelings is not periph-
eral, but concerns their respective objects and methods of study, and the epis-
temic import of their theories. Freud, Otto and James write about religion across 
an overlapping time span, i.e. the first three decades of the twentieth century, and 
they often display a familiarity with the same texts and with the same cultural 
issues of their age, to which, of course, each of them contributes in highly origi-
nal terms. They are all drawn to the relatively new disciplines of ethnology and 
anthropology, which they appropriate in the interest of their specific concerns 
(i.e. psychoanalysis, psychology, and the study of religion respectively). They 
also share a common interest in etymology. This is why it is possible to envisage 
                                                             
4  Cf. Locatelli 2007, 2009, 2015b. 
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a sort of “dialogue” while reading these authors together, a dialogue which de-
velops precisely around a semantic core that can be called “the religious feel-
ing”. 
It is important to remember that William James explicitly declares that his 
focus is not “the object” of religion (i.e. definitions of the divine, which he 
leaves to the philosophers and to the theologians), but “the subject of religion”, 
i.e. the subject having a great “variety of experiences” that may be called “reli-
gious”. I would therefore define James’s approach, and the result of his research, 
as an “experiential phenomenology of religion”. 
Attention to the non-rational, or not purely rational, element in religion is al-
so manifest in Rudolph Otto. He takes a less pragmatic, less utilitarian and more 
theological approach to religious experience than either James or Freud, and 
indeed he does not limit the study of the religious field to emotions and their 
social and personal impact. The subtitle of The Idea of the Holy is highly indica-
tive: “An Inquiry into the non-rational factor in the idea of the divine and its 
relation to the rational”. With an important epistemological premise, Otto quali-
fies his approach as grounded in the twofold aspect of the “supreme Reality” we 
call “God”: i.e. the “Ratio aeterna” and the “Numen Ineffabile”. Elements of 
both the rational (i.e. what is theo-logically predicated of “God”) and the non-
rational (i.e. the emotional and experiential element of the divine) are the two 
complementary halves of Otto’s studies.  
Freud consistently views religion as one of the central aspects of civilization, 
and frequently discusses it in this key, as well as, of course, in relation to the 
unconscious, human drives, instincts, complexes, neuroses, obsessive behaviour 
and different pathologies. In Totem and Taboo (1913) he writes: “At the bottom, 
God is nothing more than an exalted father”, 5 a statement which should not be 
taken in theological terms, of course, but an eloquent and unequivocal proposi-
tion on the powerful emotional grip that religion has for humans. Incidentally, 
we may recall that mothers or goddesses are essentially absent in Freud’s discus-
sion of religion, and our postmodern cultural sensibility obviously holds several 
ideological reservations about strictly orthodox Freudian theories. But this is not 
the main point here. The point here is emotion in religion, and to that I will im-
mediately return. In the New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis (1933), 
Freud speaks of a “religious instinct” in which the emotional component of 
religion is firmly rooted. He writes: “Religion is an illusion and it derives its 
strength from the fact that it falls in with our instinctual desires.” This statement 
suggests that Freud sees emotional needs as the true spring (in the double sense 
of “source” and “driving force”) of religion. In the New Introductory Lectures on 
                                                             
5  Freud 1913: 147. 
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Psychoanalysis (1933), he expands this view into three main points, which can 
be paraphrased as follows: 
 
If one wishes to form a true estimate of the full grandeur of religion, one must 
keep in mind what it undertakes to do for men. 
 
• It gives them information about the source and origin of the universe. 
• It assures them of protection and final happiness amid the changing vicissi-
tudes of life.  
• And it guides their thoughts and motions by means of precepts which are 
backed by  the whole force of its authority.  
 
Between 1927 and 1933, Freud often returns to the human “instinctual” need of 
“consolation” as a crucial factor in adopting religion. Even in his most anti-
religious work, The Future of an Illusion (1927), he lucidly outlines the psychic 
results of forsaking religion in terms of a great emotional loss for humankind:  
 
They [humans] can no longer be the center of creation [a narcissistic wound!], no longer 
the object of tender care on the part of a beneficent Providence. They will be in the same 
position as a child who has left the parental house where he was so warm and comfortable. 
But surely infantilism is destined to be surmounted. Men cannot remain children forever.6  
 
In The Future of an Illusion, Freud’s thesis was, in fact, that civilization would 
progressively evolve through three main stages, from animism to religions to 
scientific thought. He sees these three stages as inevitable, but his wrong predic-
tion on the evolution of cultures can easily be ascribed to a residual neo-
positivistic attitude, and the concomitant blind faith in the widespread triumph of 
scientific thought. Freud had assumed that people would choose a scientific 
“mythology of rational despair” over the comforts of religion, but he had clearly 
underestimated his own judgments on the human instinct for happiness. He had 
also, and perhaps more importantly, ignored the compelling force on others of 
the religious emotions which he was unable to experience in himself (the famous 
“oceanic feeling” to which I will soon come), and which would definitely con-
tradict his thesis on the acceptance of religion in a sort of bad faith (i.e. prefer-
ring a comfortable “illusion” over the cold and hard truth).  
In Freud’s opinion, a second relevant emotional factor in adopting religion is 
cultural (parental) transmission. In Totem and Taboo (1913), a seminal text 
whose many implications on Freud’s understanding of religion and civilization 
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transcend by far the scope of this text, he suggests that the infant is bound to the 
parent by powerful ties that make it impossible for him to reject certain prohibi-
tions (on a larger scale this applies to indoctrination and education as such). The 
force of parental prohibition is made clear in relation to the motiveless veto of 
the taboo and its irrefutable force. Freud was explicit on this point: desire (to 
touch) comes up against an external prohibition, which is accepted because of an 
internal force (the child’s gratifying and loving relation to the author of the pro-
hibition). The instinct is then not abolished but repressed. It produces an ambiva-
lent attitude towards the object and the act in connection with that object. The 
conflict between the instinct and the prohibition is in the subject’s mind, and 
thus they cannot come up against each other. The motives of the prohibition 
remain unknown. This is always the case with taboos, which concern activities 
towards which there was an earlier strong inclination. The forbidden impulse 
leads to the performance of obsessive acts, which are both evidence of remorse 
and expiation, but also substitutive acts of what has been prohibited. In this sense 
it is easy to see why Freud would associate obsessive neurosis with religion, and 
suggest that both result from an introjected veto.  
These dynamics come to mind when one considers the blind obedience to the 
hardest religious prescriptions, and the self-effacing conduct of saints and her-
mits in different traditions. In order to avoid anachronism or disrespect, let me 
add that certain behaviours which we tend, after Freud, to consider “pathologi-
cal”, were obviously not deemed such in earlier times, and may still be deemed 
sane in different regions of the globe. On the contrary, extreme gestures, like 
self-flagellation, prolonged fasting, walking on burning coals, driving needles 
through the flesh etc. were/are not only accepted, but receive(d) a full admiring 
social endorsement in different cultures and times. This demonstrates that reli-
gious emotions, just like any others, are time and culture specific. 
Moreover, we also need to distinguish the self-torturing behaviour of rigor-
ous saints from the saintly renunciations motivated by compassion and charitable 
purposes (St. Francis of Assisi comes to mind). While the former are perhaps 
motivated by a conception of the deity modeled on that of an overpowering and 
tyrannical father-figure, and by an ensuing desire for submission or expiation, 
the latter can be seen as grounded in the opposite conception of a benevolent 
deity or compassionate superior being, inviting a similar attitude of generous 
self-denial in the believers. In Upheavals of Thought, Martha Nussbaum valua-
bly suggests (in a secular, rather than religious context) that “surrendering om-
nipotence is essential to compassion”.7 In a religious context, Christ’s incarna-
                                                             
7  Nussbaum 2001: 250. 
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tion and crucifixion and the Bodhisattva’s reincarnation for the sake of human-
kind are religious expressions of the highest compassion.  
An important aspect in Freud’s approach to religion is the fact that, in his 
theory, religious belief seems inextricably bound up with the crucial emotion of 
happiness (in the various forms of: a sense of security, protection, consolation, 
gratification). This is also true for William James in his The Varieties of Reli-
gious Experience. In Lecture II James, like Freud, attributes an intrinsic special 
power to religion vis à vis the human condition of helplessness. He writes: 
 
Religious feeling is thus an absolute addition to the Subject’s range of life. It gives him a 
new sphere of power. When the outer battle is lost, and the outer world disowns him, it 
redeems and vivifies an interior world which otherwise would be an empty waste.8  
 
Given James’s strong pragmatism, the emotional significance he attributes to 
religion can hardly be underestimated, both as a personal and as a sociocultural 
force. He maintains that assent to a doctrine follows upon an individual positive 
emotion evoked by it. Such assent is never purely abstract or intellectual: “It is 
perhaps not surprising that men come to regard the happiness which a religious 
belief affords as proof of its truth. If a creed makes a man feel happy, he almost 
inevitably adopts it”.9 James gives a vivid picture of the emotional impact of 
religious belief:  
 
We shall see how infinitely passionate a thing religion at its highest flights can be. Like 
love, like wrath, like hope, ambition, jealousy, like every other instinctive eagerness and 
impulse, it adds to life an enchantment which is not rationally or logically deducible from 
anything else. This enchantment, coming as a gift when it does come – a gift of our organ-
ism, the physiologists will tell us, a gift of God’s grace, the theologians say – is either 
there or not there for us, and there are persons who can no more be possessed by it than 
they can fall in love with a given woman by mere word of command.10 
 
Having suggested above that emotions in general are means of appraisal, and 
forms of evaluative thought, we can appreciate how, more than once in his 
Gifford Lectures, James suggests that religious emotion provides a positive 
appraisal of the world.11 He most clearly illustrates this fact in the pages devoted 
to the experience of conversion or, as in Tolstoy’s well known case, of conver-
                                                             
8  James 2002: 55. 
9  Ibid.: 90-91. 
10  Ibid.: 54-55. 
11  Ibid.: 54-55, 167-168. 
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sion as involving the overcoming of a state of personal crisis, or anhedonia: “a 
passive joylessness and dreariness, discouragement, dejection, lack of taste and 
zest and spring”.12  
The gamut of religious emotions is indeed far reaching: for James it includes 
happiness, gratitude, confidence, piety (empathy), tenderness for others, but also 
humility and severity towards oneself.13 In a different context, Rudolph Otto also 
connects several emotions to worship, and in particular he mentions “feelings of 
gratitude, trust, love, reliance, humble submission, and dedication”, but he also 
hastens to add that “these do not exhaust the content of religious worship”,14 
something which is for him connoted by complex attitudes, both rational and 
emotional.  
From what has been argued so far, we can confirm the thesis that the impact 
of the emotions on religion is demonstrably pervasive. Guilt and reparation 
versus compassion and gratitude, oppression and fear versus a liberating elation 
are indeed strong emotions in all religious traditions. I would add that religious 
emotion is often connected to or tinged with a more or less legalistic sense of 
personal “desert” and of “merit” (which is both an intellectual and emotional act 
of self-appraisal); in this case happiness is often disturbed or even destroyed by a 
sense of undeserving, of guilt, and even of despair (all of them very strong nega-
tive emotions). Such a sense of undeserving may, on the other hand, promote 
positive emotions, such as a joyful trust and hope in the boundless benevolence 
of God (Luther comes immediately to mind in this sense). 
Not surprisingly, James’s Lectures XVIII and XIX deal with “The primacy 
of feeling in religion” and “Aesthetic elements in religion”. In lecture XVIII he 
writes: “I do believe feeling is the deeper source of religion, and that philosophic 
and theological formulas are secondary products, like translations”.15 The word 
“translation” is fascinating in this context. If we agree that “poetry” is “what gets 
lost in translation” we could say that the original religious feeling is what gets 
lost in the rational religion of theological formula(tion)s. In other words, what-
ever is predicated in religion is perhaps, always and already, an (inadequate) 
approximation of the original “religious feeling”. What is it then, this original 




                                                             
12  Ibid.: 163. 
13  Ibid.: 286. 
14  Otto 1958 [1917]: 8. 
15  James 2002: 470. 
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3. FREUD’S “OCEANIC FEELING”, JAMES’S “COSMIC 
EMOTION” AND OTTO’S “NUMINOUS STATE OF MIND”  
  
Freud’s opinion on the source of religious sentiments is best expounded in Civi-
lization and its Discontents, where he recalls sending the French philosopher and 
novelist Romain Rolland his recent book The Future of an Illusion and receiving 
the following answer from him. Freud writes: 
 
He was sorry I had not properly appreciated the true source of religious sentiments. This, 
he says, consists in a peculiar feeling, which he himself is never without, which he finds 
confirmed by many others, and which he may suppose is present in millions of people. It 
is a feeling which he would like to call a sensation of “eternity”, a feeling as of something 
limitless, unbounded – as it were, “oceanic”.  
This feeling, he adds, is a purely subjective fact, not an article of faith; it brings with it no 
assurance of personal immortality, but it is the source of the religious energy which is 
seized upon by the various Churches and religious systems, directed by them into particu-
lar channels, and doubtless also exhausted by them. One may, he thinks, rightly call one-
self religious on the ground of this oceanic feeling alone, even if one rejects every belief 
and every illusion. […] I cannot discover this “oceanic” feeling in myself. It is not easy to 
deal scientifically with feelings.16 
 
Freud seems aware of the inevitable epistemological reduction that is implicit in 
any general scientific explanation vis à vis the particularity and variety of “feel-
ings” and “forms of life”,17 and yet what he does in order “to deal scientifically 
with feelings” is to provide a “translation”, in rigorous psychoanalytic terms, of 
the poetical terminology of Rolland’s concept of “oceanic feeling”. He proceeds 
to trace the source of “the oceanic feeling” in the depths of the psychic life. He 
finds it in the infant condition of primary narcissism, when the infant’s bounda-
ries of the ego are not yet defined, a condition that repeats itself in certain pa-
thologies, and in the climax of erotic passion, when the boundaries between self 
and other are blurred and suspended.18 Not surprisingly, several other aspects of 
religion are reinterpreted by Freud in strictly psychoanalytical terms, including 
his view of religion itself as a sort of distorted obsessional neurosis, and in the 
reverse view of obsessional neurosis in terms of a “taboo sickness”. Let me 
                                                             
16  Freud 1999: 10-11. 
17  Cf. Locatelli 2015a.  
18  Freud 1999: 12-13. 
86 | ANGELA LOCATELLI 
 
 
briefly digress from the discussion of the “oceanic feeling”, to further develop 
this point. In Totem and Taboo Freud writes:  
 
Anyone approaching the problem of taboo from the angle of psycho-analysis, that is to 
say, of the investigation of the unconscious portion of the individual mind, will recognize, 
after a moment’s reflection, that these phenomena are far from unfamiliar to him. He has 
come across people who have created for themselves individual taboo prohibitions of this 
very kind and who obey them just as strictly as savages obey the communal taboos of their 
tribe or society. If he were not already accustomed to describing such people as ‘obses-
sional’ patients, he would find ‘taboo sickness’ a most appropriate name for their condi-
tion.19 
 
A passage just above this one in Totem and Taboo proposes a connection be-
tween the apparently divergent emotions of fear and veneration: 
 
According to Wundt, this original characteristic of taboo – the belief in a ‘demonic’ power 
which lies hidden in an object and which, if the object is touched or used unlawfully, takes 
its vengeance by casting a spell over the wrong-doer – is still wholly and solely ‘objecti-
fied fear’. That fear has not yet split up into the two forms into which it later develops: 
veneration and horror. 
But how did this split take place? Through the transplanting, so Wundt tells us, of the 
taboo ordinances from the sphere of demons into the sphere of the belief in gods. The 
contrast between ‘sacred’ and ‘unclean’ coincides with a succession of two stages of 
mythology.20 
 
Along these lines, an interesting analogy concerning religious awe emerges in 
Freud and Otto, not surprisingly both of them readers and commentators of 
Wundt’s work on myth and religion. On this ground, one can make sense of the 
ambivalent experience of the “mysterium tremendum”, a cardinal point in 
Rudolph Otto’s discussion of “the holy”: 
 
Let us consider the deepest and most fundamental element in all strong and sincerely felt 
religious emotion. Faith unto salvation, trust, love – all these are there. But over and above 
these is an element which may also on occasion, quite apart from them profoundly affect 
us and occupy the mind with a wellnigh bewildering strength. […] The feeling of it may at 
times come sweeping like a gentle tide, pervading the mind with a tranquil mood of deep-
est worship. […] It may burst in sudden eruption up from the depth of the soul with 
                                                             
19  Ibid.: 26. 
20  Ibid.: 25. 
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spasms and convulsions, or lead to the strangest excitements, to intoxicated frenzy, to 
transport, and to ecstasy. It has its wild and demonic forms and can sink to an almost 
grisly horror and shuddering.21 
 
The “panic” in its sense of the terrifying, ecstatic or orgiastic emotions usually 
connected to the rituals of the Greek god Pan, may be seen as the equivalent of 
the psychoanalytical “uncanny”, with the unsettling return of the repressed: 
“Conceptually mysterium denotes merely that which is hidden and esoteric, that 
which is beyond conception or understanding, extraordinary and unfamiliar.”22  
Otto discusses the implications of tremendum in several languages (Latin, 
Hebrew, German and English) and finds in them the common “feeling of a pecu-
liar dread”, i.e. of religious awe.  
This once more confirms the deep and strong link between veneration and 
horror, between religion and powerful emotions. One is then tempted to specu-
late on the pervasive fascination with horror in the most secularized societies, 
but this is clearly beyond the scope of my discussion.  
Let me then return to the above mentioned distinction between the institu-
tional, doctrinal, rational, ideological aspects of religion versus the purely sub-
jective experience of the holy in the sense of a “mystical state”. It is a distinction 
which, perhaps not surprisingly, is relevant for Freud, for Rudolph Otto and for 
William James. In this respect, James does not entirely ignore the institutional 
aspect of religion, but rather explores how the “cosmic emotion” is inflected in 
different traditions. He explicitly refers to “Christian mysticism, transcendental 
idealism, vedantism, and the modern psychology of the subliminal self” and 
proposes that a mystical state either happens or it doesn’t, but if it does, it may 
become the cornerstone of religion, in various subsequent institutionalized 
forms. In order to describe the mystical experience, and its jubilant mood, James 
quotes from R.W. Trine (In Tune with the Infinite, 1899), a passage that closely 
recalls the Freudian observations on the oceanic feeling:  
 
The great central fact of human life is the coming into a conscious vital realization of our 
oneness with this Infinite Life, and the opening of ourselves fully to this divine inflow. 
[…] We actualize in ourselves the qualities and powers of the Infinite Life, we make 
ourselves the channels through which the Infinite Intelligence and Power can work.23 
 
                                                             
21  Otto 1958 [1917]: 12-13. 
22  Ibid.: 13. 
23  James 2002: 115. 
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In this quotation “divine inflow” seems the literal etymological equivalent of 
“enthusiasm”, a state which is often, in different religious traditions, associated 
with a sense of inspiration, uplifting, elation, liberation from oppressive moods, 
limits, and constraints, and above all of participation in, or merging with the 
divine. With reference to the “Religion of Healthy-mindedness” James writes 
that cosmic emotion “inevitably takes in them the form of enthusiasm and free-
dom”.24 
For James, a “mystical state of consciousness” has four distinctive features: 
 
• Ineffability: “it defies expression.”25 
• Noetic Quality: “Mystical states seem to those who experience them to be also 
states of knowledge.”26  
• Transiency: “Mystical states cannot be sustained for long.”27 
• Passivity: “the mystic feels as if he […] were grasped and held by a superior 
power.”28 
 
Borrowing Shakespeare’s phrase concerning Cleopatra’s beauty, one could say 
that “ineffability” means that a mystical state “beggars all description”. “Noetic 
quality” I understand as the experience of insight, illumination, revelation. This 
is highly significant, and even compelling, for the subject experiencing it, but 
this knowledge often remains something inarticulate and incommunicable. 
“Transiency” means that mystical states do not last forever; but they return, may 
be recurrent, and, most importantly, they can be recollected through memory 
(albeit only imperfectly). The “passivity” of the mystical states has clear affini-
ties with the notion of “enthusiasm” discussed above.  
James’s “cosmic emotion” is clearly an experience, not an article of faith. A 
consciously emotional hue tinges the experience, and makes it unique, so much 
so that it cannot be enforced on those who have not experienced it. James, as we 
have seen, draws an interesting parallel between this situation and the ineffectual 
order to fall in love with a specific woman. 
Otto suggests that “feeling a Presence” is the sine qua non and the very 
premise of any religious experience, and of all subsequent religious emotions: 
“the ‘numen’ must be experienced as present, a numen praesens, as in the case 
                                                             
24  Ibid.: 91. 
25  Ibid.: 414. 
26  Ibid. 
27  Ibid.: 415. 
28  Ibid. 
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of Abraham”.29 One is here reminded of a reference in Genesis xviii.27, where 
Abraham pleads for the people of Sodom and says: “Behold now, I have taken 
upon me to speak unto the Lord, which am but dust and ashes”. Not only does 
Rudolph Otto build his seminal concept of “creature-feeling” on this reference, 
but, in this context, he suggests (in a footnote that is relevant for our purposes) 
that  
 
the feeling of a “numinous” object objectively given, must be posited as a primary imme-
diate datum of consciousness, and the “feeling of dependence” is then a consequence, 
following very closely upon it, viz. a depreciation of the subject in his own eyes. The latter 
presupposes the former.30 
 
Rudolph Otto’s concept of the “numinous”, with its closeness to both “the inef-
fable” and “a sense of presence” clearly recalls aspects of both Rolland’s “oce-
anic feeling” and James’s “cosmic emotion”. When Otto points out that in Se-
mitic religions “the holy” (Hebrew Qādôsh, the Greek άγιος, the Latin sanc-
tus/sacer) is “pre-eminently a living force”,31 we may again surmise that what he 
means resembles James’s “vital realization of the Infinite Life”. 
 
 
4. COGNITION IN/AND RELIGIOUS EMOTIONS  
 
Are religious emotions cognitive? In a first and basic sense they are, being acts 
of appraisal, like any and all emotions as such (sensu Damasio, De Sousa, 
Greenspan, Gordon, Lyons, Nussbaum, Robinson, et al.). But I wish to add that 
the original religious feeling related to mystical states is ‘cognitive’ in a special 
sense. I will do so by recalling Bertrand Russell’s important epistemological 
distinction (in Chapter V of The Problems of Philosophy 1912)32 between 
“knowledge by acquaintance” and “knowledge by description”. I propose that 
some religious emotions, particularly those related to mystical states, constitute a 
particular case of “knowledge by acquaintance”, in the sense that they imply “a 
direct awareness […] without the intermediary of any process of inference or 
any knowledge of truths”.33 In this they have a somehow paradoxical affinity 
                                                             
29  Otto 1958 [1917]: 11. 
30  Ibid. 
31  Ibid.: 6. 
32  Cf. Russell 1996: 243-294. 
33  Ibid.: 256. 
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with sense-data, which, in Russell’s words, “make up the appearance” of objects. 
The mystics’ “conscious vital realization” seems a near synonym of “direct 
awareness” of “the Infinite Life”. Other religious emotions, i.e. the ones generat-
ed by cultural transmission, can be seen, instead, as forms of ‘knowledge by 
description’.  
Russell’s distinction can be effectively illustrated in a quotation (cited by W. 
James) from the eleventh century Persian philosopher and theologian Al-Ghazz-
ali:  
 
I understood all that can be learned by study and hearsay [that is clearly ‘knowledge by 
description’]. Then I recognized that what pertains most exclusively to their method [the 
Sufis] is just what no study can grasp, but only transport, ecstasy, and the transformation 
of the soul. How great, for example is the difference between knowing the definitions of 
health, of satiety, with their causes and conditions and being really healthy or filled.34  
 
Al-Ghazzali provides another example of knowledge by acquaintance: the condi-
tion of being drunk as distinct from the medical diagnosis of drunkenness, and 
he indicates two important forms of religious knowledge by acquaintance “ecsta-
sy and leading a pious life”. Freud’s “oceanic feeling”, but even more clearly 
“the numinous” in Rudolph Otto and James’s “direct awareness” qualify ecstatic 
emotions as a form of knowledge that is proper and peculiar to the religious 
realm, something totally irrefutable for the one experiencing the emotional state, 
and yet radically subjective, verging on solipsism, since the content of the emo-
tional experience remains mostly inarticulate, and no verifiable propositional 
content can be provided about it. The non-religious (one, like Freud, who has 
never experienced the “oceanic feeling”) would simply dispute this knowledge 
of the ineffable, and dismiss it as flatus vocis, “thin air”. S/he might 
acknowledge the reality of the experience (while still ignoring its cognitive 
content) purely out of trust towards the person claiming it (as Freud seems to do 
towards Romain Rolland). A non-believer may certainly be tempted to call the 
mystic’s “vital realization” a case of “mistaken emotion” in Nussbaum’s termi-
nology. The American philosopher speaks of “mistaken emotions” mostly with 
reference to a wrong belief or assumption, and to a false propositional content 
(for example, experiencing grief for a disgrace that one eventually discovers 
never to have happened). A mistaken emotion, let me point out, does not make 
the emotion any less “real” for the subject experiencing it. But, let us notice that 
it is difficult to conclude that there are mistaken emotions in mystical states, 
given the paradox of their compelling evidence and unverifiability; in fact, the 
                                                             
34  Ibid.: 439, italics A.L. 
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emotional experience is real and its content true for the subject experiencing it. 
The non-religious has to remain in a sceptical position and suspend judgment on 
the “truth” of the mystical experience, since the propositional content cannot be 
(fully or adequately) articulated, let alone verified, and cannot therefore be de-
clared either “false” or “true” with certainty.  
Nussbaum also acknowledges the possibility of “fraudulent” or “feigned” 
emotions, but this is not the case if we assume the honesty and good faith of the 
subject experiencing the religious emotion and articulating it, however imper-
fectly. It goes without saying that religious charlatans, no less than the mundane, 
can, of course, be the histrionic purveyors of what Nussbaum calls ‘fraudulent 
emotions’.  
Before I conclude this section let me point out that both the “truth” of reli-
gion and the “reality” of the emotions enhanced by it are not exclusively a matter 
of intellectual apprehension, but of an existential sense of (willing or assenting) 
participation in a higher realm or ‘reality’. The phenomenology of the religious 
experience is most fruitfully approached through “the subject”, as William James 
valuably reminds us, and it is not entirely or solely defined in intellectual terms, 
as Otto convincingly suggests. 
 
 
5. IS THERE A SPECIFICITY OF “RELIGIOUS EMOTION”? 
 
Philosophers, theologians, poets and ordinary people have answered the question 
of the singularity of religious emotion along two main lines, and have argued 
either that there is no essential difference between religious emotion and any 
other, or they have maintained that there is a qualitative difference, a uniqueness 
to religious emotion. 
While Freud, Otto and James are, as we have seen, all three in agreement on 
the fundamental emotional component in religion, on its enormous social and 
individual meaning, and on its impact on civilization, they clearly differ on the 
issue of the specificity of religious emotion. 
When Freud interprets religion in terms of the emotional dynamics of ordi-
nary family life, he clearly denies a specificity of religious emotions; however, 
he admits a specifically “religious feeling”, i.e. the “oceanic feeling”, even while 
stating that he has never experienced it. Freud is prepared to acknowledge this 
special feeling in others (in Rolland, for example). 
 William James takes a nuanced and apparently contradictory position on the 
issue of the uniqueness and qualitative difference of religious emotion. On the 
one hand, he suggests that religious emotion is not different from any other:  
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We are willing to treat the term “religious sentiment” as a collective name for the many 
sentiments which religious objects may arouse in alternation, we see it probably contains 
nothing whatever of a psychologically specific nature. There is religious fear, religious 
love, religious awe, religious joy, and so forth. But religious love is only man’s natural 
emotion of love directed to a religious object; religious fear is only the ordinary fear of 
commerce, so to speak, the common quaking of the human breast, insofar as the notion of 
divine retribution may arouse it; religious awe is the same organic thrill which we feel in a 
forest at twilight, only this time it comes over us at the thought of our supernatural rela-
tions […] but there is no ground for assuming a simple abstract “religious emotion” to 
exist as a distinct elementary mental affection by itself present in every religious experi-
ence without exception.35  
 
But James seems to change his mind on this point more than once throughout his 
Lectures, so that he makes several disclaimers on his own statement that reli-
gious emotion is identical to any other ordinary emotion. It is interesting to see 
that a pragmatist and pluralist like James suggests that a specific religious atti-
tude or receptivity is a human “faculty”, with which some people are endowed 
and others are not. In this sense, religious emotion would then be grounded in a 
particular temperament, so that different individuals experience a variety of 
quintessentially different religious emotions, or none at all: “So the nature which 
is spiritually barren may admire and envy faith in others, but can never compass 
the enthusiasm and peace which those who are temperamentally qualified for 
faith enjoy”.36 
Not surprisingly, James’s Lectures IV and V are devoted respectively to 
“The Religion of Healthy-Mindedness” and Lectures VI and VII to “The Sick 
Soul”. But James also speaks of a peculiar and intrinsic “happiness” in religion, 
“parted off from mere animal happiness” by an element of “solemnity”. All of 
this seems to suggest a specificity of religious emotion. The same applies to his 
treatment of the “mystical state of consciousness” and its unique “cosmic emo-
tion”. James seems therefore to take up a middle position between Freud and 
Otto. In fact, Rudolph Otto strongly defends the thesis that religious emotion is 
highly specific and qualitatively different from any other. He bases his argument 
on the notion of “a feeling of the numinous”, discussed above, which is proper to 
religion alone. Otto also defends the sui generis nature of religious emotion on 
the ground of its “intimate personal knowledge”,37 the knowledge provided by 
mystical states. Moreover, recalling Schleiermacher’s well known notion of 
                                                             
35  James 2002: 32-33. 
36  Ibid., 227, italics A.L. 
37  Otto 1958 [1917]: 8. 
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“feeling of dependence” as the basis of a religious attitude and religious devo-
tion, Otto elaborates on it, in order to argue in favour of a quintessentially reli-
gious form of dependence, different from other forms, not only in degree (as 
Schleiermacher himself had already suggested in the distinction between “abso-
lute” and “relative” dependence), but also because of an “intrinsic quality”.38 
This religious dependence is different, Otto argues, from that of father and son, 
or from that of any mundane relationship. As in the case of Abraham already 
mentioned, there exists a sense of dependence which is specifically “religious”, 
and Otto calls it the “Creature-Feeling”. 
Even if the issue of the unique and specific quality of religious emotion can-
not be said to be resolved once and for all, I believe that the three concepts I 
have dealt with, i.e. the “oceanic feeling” in Freud, “the feeling of the numinous” 
in Rudolph Otto and the “cosmic emotion” in William James are crucial contri-
butions to the ongoing debate,39 necessary elements to better understand the 
complexity of the “religious” nature of religious emotions. 
As I conclude, I need to propose another thesis: religious emotion differs 
from others in terms of the individual’s conception of the divine, both as ‘object’ 
and as ‘addressee’. It does not matter greatly if such conception is learned 
through cultural transmission, or if it stems from a personal experience. The 
object of the emotion and its addressee are equally important. But I also wish to 
suggest that, given the highly individual, localized and situated nature of emo-
tions (sensu Nussbaum given above), we can posit a singularity of religious 
emotion related to the ‘subject of the emotion’. The uniqueness of religious 
emotion is then determined within a triangular relationship, centred in the feeling 
and sentient subject, and branching out towards the imagined/posited object and 
towards the addressee of the emotion. Various conceptions of the object and 
addressee open up the possibility of different emotions within different religious 
traditions, through the respective ideas of the deity, and according to the differ-
ent cultural practices and notions of worship. I wish therefore to emphasize that 






                                                             
38  Cf. Schleiermacher 1963. 
39  Cf. Lemmens/Van Herck 2008; Roberts 2014. 
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Autism, Love, and Writing in and around  
Russian Literature 
On Feeling, Non-Feeling and Writing as a  







In Russian literature, the discussion on autism1 appears in the 19th century with 
the topos of the ‘superfluous man’, which will continue to be a crucial but not 
exclusive point of reference for further reflections on this topic up to the present 
day. A fundamental connection to writing is already given in Aleksandr 
Pushkin’s Eugene Onegin (Evgeniĭ Onegin, 1823-1830) and Mikhail 
Lermontov’s A Hero of Our Time (Geroĭ nashego vremeni, 1841). In these initial 
texts, writing is a means of intimate communication and self-reflection, symp-
tomatic of an emergence of feelings of love even in characters with an autistic 
disposition. Later on, this context will be opened to aesthetics, providing the 
                                                             
1  The term ‘autism’ was introduced in 1911 to describe the negative symptoms of 
schizophrenia. Cf. Bleuler 2014: 304-305. In this paper it is used according to the cri-
teria in contemporary diagnostics, where these symptoms are classified as a separate 
concept. Irrespective of the late introduction of the term and the shifts within its defi-
nitions it is equally used for the analysis of characters in novels of the 19th and 20th 
century. Literary studies on the ‘superfluous man’ usually name the respective charac-
teristics separately, talking e.g. of ‘inability to love’ (cf. Göbler 1999: 84), ‘indiffer-
ence against society’, ‘cold intellect’, ‘individualism’, ‘repugnance against re-
strictions’, ‘arrogance and arrogation’, ‘egoism’, ‘unsociable characters’ and ‘danger-
ous eccentrics’ (cf. Wedel 1961: 357-358). 
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question of whether literary writing is possible for an autistic author. Gaĭto 
Gazdanov, for example, responds in the negative to this question in some of his 
stories, rejecting the idea that feelings could be invented, whereas in others, as 
an antithesis, he connects autism to the notion of artistic genius. Vladimir 
Sorokin will use the same topic in the later Soviet and post-Soviet context for 
provocation, emphasising that he is an autistic writer.  
Theoretically, neither autism nor love is the main focus of this paper. These 
two categories serve rather the purpose of examining two other structuralistic 
problems: firstly, the opposition between feeling and non-feeling and, secondly, 
the connection between the inside and the outside of the individual, assuming 
that inside is where emotions originate and outside is where they are expressed 
and shared with others. The impact of autism on this topic consists of the separa-
tion of the feelings inside the individual from their connection to an outside 
object, which autism entails. 
This disconnection reflects the symptomatology of autism described in the 
international diagnostic manuals ICD-10 and DSM-5, which primarily mention 
personal deficits in social interaction and communication, especially in building 
and maintaining relationships, recognising feelings expressed by others, an ab-
sence of emotional reciprocity and a challenge in dissimulating feelings.2 The 
symptom-oriented description of diagnostic manuals reveals little about the inner 
reasons for autistic behaviour, which, besides the functional priority of symp-
toms in this context, seems also to be due to the difficulty of ‘seeing inside’ an 
autistic subject. Given that facial expressions and body language often reveal 
little about thoughts or possible affects and that emotional situations as well as 
intimate dialogues are avoided, much of this stays unknown.  
Within the psychology of perception, autism is related to a specific focus on 
details without connecting them to the social situation of their occurrence. This 
seems to explain how affected persons can have a cognitive and exceedingly 
detailed overview, while at the same time emotional and social components 
might remain entirely unconsidered.3 The origin of a focus of perception exclud-
ing emotional information is assumed to lie in a high level of sensitivity, due to 
the fact that the individual is emotionally affected more easily, as well as more 
strongly and persistently, within various contexts. This can harm vital resources, 
particularly in connection with negative emotions, and affected persons might 
therefore learn to protect themselves.4 A further observation within psychology 
and psychoanalysis is that autism is often accompanied by an intense longing for 
                                                             
2  Cf. ICD-10 2015: 344-345; DSM-5 2015: 34-39. 
3  Cf. Goldstein 2015: 146-147. 
4  Cf. Behrmann 2006: 258-264. 
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being loved by others, which seems to constitute one important reason for the 
correlation with a high motivation for creative achievements.5 
The contrast between feeling and non-feeling, however, is a more general 
one than the contrast between love and non-love. These two binary extremes are 
not meant to be confused in the following. Love has been chosen as point of 
reference because it is a strong emotion that establishes a persistent connection 
to another person. A second reason is that, in the literary examples, love often 
constitutes the main link between feeling and writing. Concerning the literary 
representation of autistic characters, the possibilities seem to range, maybe 
among other possibilities, from non-transparent or impulsive characters to others 
with a very rational world view and a third group with a perception-focus on 
arbitrary details and deficits in the interpretation of social situations. Literature 
can go beyond diagnostics by interpreting specific settings and contexts from 
more than one perspective and by giving insights into an unknown world view. 
Through mode, style and content, writing reveals characteristics of the emotional 
pattern of the literary subject, which seems to be the case in personal writing as 
well as writing in literary or journalistic contexts. The texts within existentialist, 
aesthetic and ethical discourses in particular are shown in the following to turn to 
writing in order to reflect emotional dynamics between individuals and society. 
Reactions of addressees or readers show that with a continual shift according to 
cultural contexts, feeling and non-feeling remain essential categories in literary 




2. THE ‘SUPERFLUOUS MAN’ AND  
EMOTIONAL ATTACHMENT THROUGH WRITING 
 
Motivated by the success of Molière’s Misanthrope (1666) on the Russian stag-
es, the topos of the ‘superfluous man’ was instantly established within Russian 
literature, where it has remained in use since the 19th century.6 Emotional re-
serve, avoiding personal attachment, provocative disrespect of social graces, 
independence, unforeseen decisions and condescension towards others represent 
some of the traits typical of these characters that may be linked to autism, too. 
Writing is not necessarily linked to this discourse, but it plays an important part 
                                                             
5  Riemann 2013: 61. 
6  Cf. Wedel 1961: 355-367. 
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in Pushkin’s Eugene Onegin and Lermontov’s A Hero of Our Time, which will 
therefore be discussed in the following. 
The plot of Pushkin’s Eugene Onegin is constructed around two love letters, 
each of them being answered with rejection. Beyond their specific content, these 
documents reveal the emotional patterns of the two main characters also through 
styles of world literature. Tatyana’s letter stylistically reflects French sentimental 
love-literature, whereas Onegin’s reproduces characteristics of English seduc-
tion-novels. These allusions reflect the readings of each of the characters, and 
will serve as a basis for their mutual understanding of their later discourse, after 
having already missed the chance of being together, irreversibly.7 This paper 
focuses on the situational components and implications of writing. 
Having read Tatyana’s naive writing, Onegin rejects her, outlining his inabil-
ity to love. 
 
“[…] Without romance, or false insistence, 
I’ll say: with past ideals in view 
I would have chosen none but you […]! 
XIV 
But I was simply not intended 
for happiness – that alien role. 
Should your perfections be expended 
in vain on my unworthy soul? 
Believe (as conscience is my warrant), 
wedlock for us would be abhorrent. 
I’d love you, but inside a day, 
with custom, love would fade away; 
your tears would flow – but your emotion, 
your grief would fail to touch my heart, 
they’d just enrage it with their dart.”8 
 
Onegin’s autistic traits are already depicted earlier in his general dissatisfaction 
and feeling of boredom, in his contempt of society, in his unsteady and affection-
less relationships with women and in his non-committal comradeship with the 
neighbour. Being aware of his emotional instability and dislike of commitment 
he rejects the simple, gracious and slightly melancholic Tatyana, even though he 
would have preferred her to other women. 
                                                             
7  Cf. Ebbinghaus 2004: 156, 214-222, 413-417. 
8  Pushkin 1977: 112-113. Pushkin 1960: 79. 
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The connection between Tatyana’s feelings and Onegin’s lack of feelings is 
here represented by writing. Tatyana writes a letter but the male character does 
not answer in written form, he explains the reasons for his rejection to her orally. 
This relation is paralleled in the course of their second meeting, taking place 
later, when Onegin’s desire for the by then well-situated, married Tatyana arises, 
so that it is his turn to write a love letter to her. The fact that he even writes two 
more letters when her answer fails to appear shows again the strength of his 
awakened feelings. But the heroine does not answer at all, abiding with her 
husband. Her decision not to write illustrates the fact that she is suppressing her 
persistent feelings for Onegin, which she admits later. 
Failing to engage in direct interaction, he falls ill, as Tatyana does after One-
gin’s rejection of her. Writing is a symptom of lovesickness, which makes even 
Onegin write, who generally attributes as little sense to writing as to feeling. 
 
[H]is illness lends him courage and 
to the princess, in his weak hand, 
he sends a letter, penned with passion. 
He deemed, in general, letters vain, 
and rightly so, but now his pain 
had gone in no uncertain fashion 
past all endurance.9 
 
A similar storm of uncontrollable feelings has already been the reason for 
Tatyana’s writing. Even though she is not, in contrast to her neighbour, emotion-
ally cold in general, writing overcomes her as a wave of previously unknown 
desire. The narrator subsequently even constructs the scene as a metaphor of 
Tatyana losing her innocence through writing, by accentuating corporal signs of 
arousal: 
 
Now Tanya’s groaning, now she’s sighing; 
the letter trembles in her grip; 
the rosy sealing-wafer’s drying 
upon her feverish tongue; the slip 
from off her charming shoulder's drooping.10 
 
A second parallel between the two letters is that both of them include a vow. 
Tatyana writes: 
                                                             
9  Pushkin 1977: 221. Pushkin 1960: 168. 
10  Pushkin 1977: 103. Pushkin 1960: 70. 




Decreed in highest court for ever... 
heaven’s will – for you I’m set apart; 
and my whole life has been directed 
and pledged to you […].”11 
 
Having read the letter, Onegin even insists on this irreversible bond to one’s 
words through writing: 
 
“You wrote to me, and nothing spoken 
can disavow that. [...]”12 
 
In his own letter he renews Tatyana’s vow of fate and fidelity. 
 
“[...] 
But so it is: I’m in no state 
to battle further with my passion; 
I’m yours, in a predestined fashion, 
and I surrender to my fate.”13 
 
The letters show that Pushkin’s characters believe in a magical love they are 
obliged to enact, having revealed their feelings in a written form. Given that 
these feelings will remain in spite of the circumstances prohibiting their coming 
together, the superstition is fulfilled, proving that writing establishes a binding 
emotional attachment to the addressee. 
Another important aspect of writing is its character of intimate communica-
tion. This intimate character stimulates not only confession but also self-
reflection, which becomes especially important in Mikhail Lermontov’s novel A 
Hero of Our Time. Pechorin, the main character, is the second famous ‘superflu-
ous man’ of Russia’s 19th century literature, often compared to Onegin, with 
whom he shares his autistic traits. In the first chapters, Lermontov’s narrator 
depicts how Pechorin disappoints especially those who feel close to him. The 
Circassian girl Bėla only falls in love with him due to his insistency, but when 
she agrees to follow him, he soon loses interest in her and even her approaching 
death does not touch him. 
 
                                                             
11  Pushkin 1977: 101. Pushkin 1960: 69. 
12  Pushkin 1977: 112. Pushkin 1960: 78. 
13  Pushkin 1977: 223. Pushkin 1960: 170. 
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At night she became delirious [...] then she spoke of Pechorin also, called him various 
fond names [...]. He listened to her in silence, his head sunk in his hands; but yet, during 
the whole time, I did not notice a single tear-drop on his lashes. I do not know whether he 
was actually unable to weep or was mastering himself [...].14 
 
In spite of the tragic moments around Bėla’s death, Maksim Maksimych, a travel 
acquaintance, affectionately remembers Pechorin as a dear friend because of his 
open honesty. He is the second person to experience a great disappointment, 
when, during their second encounter, Pechorin shows indifference to their un-
foreseen reunion and remains reserved. What is hardly apparent from external 
observation of the eccentric becomes clearer through his diary entries, which 
lend more human traits to him. Descriptions of key situations in society and in 
private life disclose his emotional instability, often accompanied by dissatisfac-
tion, ennui and remorse. 
 
To none has my love brought happiness, because I have never sacrificed anything for the 
sake of those I have loved: for myself alone I have loved for my own pleasure. I have only 
satisfied the strange craving of my heart, greedily draining their feelings, their tenderness, 
their joys, their sufferings – and I have never been able to sate myself.15 
 
Pechorin’s emotional spectrum is not limited to distain, regret, nostalgia and 
amusement, but contains also feelings like fear and even love for Vera, a bygone 
liaison. Although she still loves him, she no longer believes in his feelings for 
her. However, the longer she refuses herself to him, the stronger becomes not 
only his desire but also his consciousness of tender feelings for her, so that when 
he finally loses her, he is bowed down with grief.  
In Lermontov’s novel, writing is clearly limited to mono-directional commu-
nication. Writing is Pechorin’s way of self-reflection and, as his notes show, 
writing is also a way of concentrating his sensibility, stimulating him to express 
feelings. Moreover, this novel also contains a love letter written by Vera, which 
can be classified as a devoted and emotional piece of text. In the same way as 
Onegin, Pechorin does not answer, in spite of his feelings for Vera expressed in 
his diary. The barrier of strong feelings, which stay enclosed within an individu-
al without being shown to the addressee, is also counted among the typical 
symptoms of autism.16 
 
                                                             
14  Lermontov 1947: 78. Lermontov 2000: 337. 
15  Lermontov 1947: 294-295. Lermontov 2000: 418-419. 
16  Cf. Riemann 2013: 59-60. 
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3. EXISTENTIALISM AND ETHICS: THE AUTISTIC SAVANT 
AND THE THERAPEUTIC VALUE OF WRITING 
 
Gaĭto Gazdanov’s poetics include intertextual connections to Pushkin’s Onegin17 
as well as to Lermontov’s Pechorin, but autistic characters appear even more 
multifaceted, e.g. through references to Lev Tolstoĭ’s realist novel Anna 
Karenina (1877-78). In Gazdanov’s earlier texts, the plot connected with unre-
quited love in the context of the ‘superfluous man’ and the Karenin-text remain 
the main focus. His later works provide two new dimensions to this topic: firstly, 
the background of French existentialism and, secondly, the connection of the 
topic to aesthetics. Gazdanov’s common denomination as the ‘Russian Camus’ 
seems closely connected to the influence of Camus’ The Outsider (L’Étranger) 
and The Myth of Sisyphus (Le Mythe de Sisyphe), both of which appeared in 
1942, since similarities with both works subsequently appear in Gazdanov’s 
poetics.18  
In order to illustrate the nuances of autistic characters, it seems important to 
also mention the main difference between the representatives of the ‘superfluous 
man’ and other key-characters. Focussing on the level of writing, this difference 
lies for Karenin in the intransparency of his feelings, which are not moderated by 
his written expression. On the contrary, Karenin’s writings characterize him as 
an ambitious workaholic and do-gooder, who sanctimoniously answers to re-
quests19 and his letter to his wife Anna reveals his purely rational approach even 
within close relationships. Addressing her formally in French, Karenin forgives 
her for her infidelity and he even adds some financial support to this letter. As 
outlined by the character’s further reflections, this choice is not motivated by 
empathy, but by Karenin’s wish to force Anna to stay as well as to stress his own 
generosity and even to humiliate her. “He went through the letter, entirely satis-
fied, especially because of the fact that he had not forgotten to add the money; 
and that the letter contained neither a hard-hearted word nor a reproach, but no 
forbearance, yet. But most important he estimated the golden bridge for her 
return.”20 While the representatives of the ‘superfluous man’, in spite of their 
inapproachability, can be qualified as well respected heroes due to their honesty 
and their often justified criticism of society, Karenin represents a purely negative 
                                                             
17  Cf. Göbler 1999: 83-84. 
18  For a more detailed outline cf. Yandl’ 2014: 168. 
19  Cf. Tolstoĭ 1934: 116. 
20 All translations by I.J. unless indicated otherwise. Ibid.: 300. 
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character. He does not overcome his disposition of non-feeling towards others 
and, through his writing, egoistically and aggressively acts against them. 
In a different way to Karenin, the stoic, distant and apathetic characters typi-
cal of existentialism, together with their very general feelings of alienation, 
present an autistic world view, too. Already in Camus’ Outsider, these emotional 
experiences are reflected in situations connected to writing. “Today my mother 
has died. It might have been yesterday as well, I don’t know. I have received a 
telegram from the retirement home: ‘Mother died. Funeral tomorrow. Deepest 
sympathy.’ That means nothing.”21 Just as Karenin’s uncomfortably formal 
writing of commonplaces unconnected to his feelings reveals his autistic disposi-
tion in Tolstoĭ’s novel, Camus’ character Meursault is not emotionally affected 
by this telegram about his mother’s death; thus, the discourse around his lack of 
emotionality that finally will entail his execution is introduced right at the begin-
ning. Furthermore, the novel reveals the arbitrariness of feelings for Meursault’s 
own writing, which is interpreted as symptomatic for his indifference towards 
others. Consenting to compose a letter of revenge for his neighbour Raymond, 
he does not care about the exact content, nor about Raymond’s cordial feelings. 
Indeed, he makes this decision in pure indifference and guided by the wish to 
stay alone. 
 
I have written the letter. I have written it a bit by chance, but I have made an effort to 
satisfy Raymond, because I had no reason not to satisfy him. [...] Only when he declared: 
“Now, you are a real friend,” it scandalised me. He has repeated his phrase and I have said 
“Yes.” I did not care about being his friend and he really seemed to want it.22 
 
Meursault’s difficulty in coping with emotions becomes obvious in his feeling 
“scandalised” by Raymond’s enthusiastic declaration of friendship. At the same 
time, the existentialist context does not concentrate on an autistic individual – 
which would mean condemning Meursault with the judgement of not being 
emotionally affected by his mother’s death – but on careless non-feeling within 
society. Describing the trial as “a quick reading of the indictment, in which I 
                                                             
21  “Aujourd’hui, maman est morte. Ou peut-être hier, je ne sais pas. J’ai reçu un télé-
gramme de l’asile: ‘Mère décédée. Enterrement demain. Sentiments distingués.’ Cela 
ne veut rien dire.” Camus 2013b: 179. 
22  “J’ai fait la lettre. Je l’ai écrite un peu au hasard, mais je me suis appliqué à contenter 
Raymond parce que je n’avais pas de raison de ne pas le contenter. [...] C’est seule-
ment quand il m’a déclaré: ‘Maintenant, tu es un vrai copain’, que cela m’a frappé. Il 
a répété sa phrase et j’ai dit: ‘Oui.’ Cela m’était égal d’être son copain et il avait vrai-
ment l’air d’en avoir envie.” Ibid.: 194-195. 
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[Meursault] recognized some names of places and persons”,23 outlines the lack 
of respect towards a single life. Non-feeling is exemplified at this level through 
writing, too: firstly, in terms of the indictment, which is no more than a formality 
connected to the judge’s career-making, and secondly, in terms of the journalists 
waiting for the process as an exciting spectacle. 
 
The journalists already held their pens in their hands. They had all the same indifferent 
and slightly sneering expression. However, one of them, a lot younger, vested in grey 
flannel with a blue tie, had kept his pen lying in front of him and watched me. In his 
slightly asymmetric face I saw nothing but his two eyes, attentively regarding me, with an 
indefinable expression.24 
 
In both cases writing is directly connected to judging, and in the given contexts 
the mode is a clearly non-empathic one. ‘Writing non-feeling’ therefore marks a 
social deficit that is, in contrast to personal non-feeling, neither condemned nor 
reflected upon.  
Narrating from Meursault’s perspective, Camus gives a close insight into au-
tistic perception. Meursault is not able to empathize with those who will decide 
his fate and therefore is not able to adapt the categories of their discourse in 
order to defend himself. Less specifically, his autistic perception within the 
whole book becomes apparent in fragmentized perceptions, which he is not able 
to interpret emotionally, like the “two eyes [of the younger journalist], attentive-
ly regarding me [him], with an indefinable expression”. As mentioned initially, 
autism is an important topic within Gazdanov’s poetics already before Camus’ 
Outsider. Characteristic of his early main characters is their discomfort or 
nonunderstanding within emotional situations and, vice versa, frequent individu-
alistic reactions hardly understood by other characters. Gazdanov’s characters 
furthermore share with Meursault the focus on the perception of arbitrary details, 
and constantly describe a highly emotional reaction to music and the visual arts, 
i.e. in non-social contexts.25  
                                                             
23  “une lecture rapide de l’acte d’accusation, où je reconnaissais des noms de lieux et de 
personnes” Ibid.: 220. 
24  “Les journalistes tenaient déjà leur stylo en main. Ils avaient tous le même air indiffé-
rent et un peu narquois. Pourtant, l’un d’entre eux, beaucoup plus jeune, habillé en 
flanelle grise avec une cravate bleue, avait laissé son stylo devant lui et me regardait. 
Dans son visage un peu asymétrique, je ne voyais que ses deux yeux, très clairs, qui 
m’examinaient attentivement, sans rien exprimer qui fût définissable.” Ibid. 
25  These specifics also touch the plot-level, which might be perceived as not sufficiently 
motivated, as has been portrayed in negative critiques. Cf. e.g. Khodasevich 1938: 9. 
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The Outsider especially influences Gazdanov’s works, and, e.g. in the novel 
Evelyn and Her Friends (Ėvelina i ee druz’ya, 1968), the character of the novel-
ist engages with the obviously erroneous writings of judges and journalists, 
trying to defend the defendant. Considering the diachronic development, 
Gazdanov’s texts increasingly reflect autism also from an external perspective, 
which is accompanied by the perception of emotional indifference as a deficit. 
While the texts focussing on the Onegin plot are concerned with the internal 
longing for a distant and unspecific female ideal, those referring to Karenin 
judge the respective character for his lack of empathy from the outside perspec-
tive. With the influence of existentialism these two conflicts are subsequently 
brought together. 
Since Gazdanov’s earliest works, the topic of writing is continually repre-
sented in his texts, but not initially linked to autism. It first serves as a satiric 
device for the imitation of fatuitous or mawkish journalists and untalented novel-
ists. A connection between writing and autism becomes crucial in his late poetics 
where Gazdanov poses the question of whether literary writing is possible for an 
autistic author. Rejecting the idea that feelings could be invented, he answers in 
the negative for example in the story “The Homeless” (“Nishchiĭ”, 1962), where 
a well-situated man with educational achievement leaves his family, to live, poor 
and homeless, in the streets of Paris. The reason for this decision is his identifi-
cation with the psychological state of homelessness, which will persist during his 
whole life.  
 
Afterwards he had a couple of lovers, compliantly undressing when he visited them in the 
evenings. He knew that none of them really loved him and this was understandable, be-
cause neither did he ever feel an irresistible attraction to a woman himself nor these feel-
ings of love he had so much read about in books. He felt instead something like a physical 
craving, discomforting, exhausting and setting his nerves on edge; and when this craving 
was satisfied, all this left only a sour taste, and nothing more. Later he understood that he 
was too poor emotionally to perceive real feelings [...].26 
 
The character realizes his lack of emotional commitment by comparing his own 
feelings to those of the heroes in literary texts. Reading here becomes the link 
between feeling and writing, because it provides an insight into the emotions of 
others. At this point Gazdanov’s link between emotions and artistry also begins.  
 
He [...] had a lot of interests – music, painting, literature, philosophy. [...] He wanted to 
become a writer; it seemed to him that just this was his calling, and he kept searching for a 
                                                             
26  Gazdanov 2009b: 575. 
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story for his first novel – only later, considerably later, he understood that under no cir-
cumstances would he become a writer, – exactly because he was looking for a story.27 
 
His searching for a story demonstrates to Gazdanov’s hero a lack of his own 
affections and emotional states, which would serve him as the material for artis-
tic creation. 
Not all of Gazdanov’s characters end up as desperate. The poet George in the 
novel Evelyn and Her Friends is an example of an autistic savant. 
 
This miserable and unruly insipid man obviously had a poetic talent, and more than any-
thing in the world, he loved poetry, in which he was inerrably versed. [...] More than any 
of us, George in every poem could feel the motion of vowels, the rearrangement of accen-
tuations and all shades of meaning. Everything that he wrote himself always seemed to me 
wonderful. I remembered his dark eyes becoming ardent at once and the verses he read to 
us in his soundless voice. Nobody who had heard him could ever forget it.28 
 
At the same time, Gazdanov does not content himself with an autistic savant for 
his concept of the artist. Motivated by references to the Bakhtinian ethics, where 
the novelist is regarded as a dialogic partner of his characters and as being re-
sponsible for them,29 this novel is to be interpreted rather as an attempt to over-
come autism. George is killed, and the novelist rewrites his story, developing 
deep feelings of empathy for this character. 
Beyond this, he becomes his advocate, not only, as mentioned above, by mis-
trusting the legislative when his character is accused of murder, but also in con-
versations with the other characters, who unanimously distrust and reject 
George. Their antipathy is well motivated by his obvious social deficits of ego-
centrism, meanness, ignorance and disrespect towards others. The novelist dis-
cusses ethical questions around George and the justification for condemnation 
especially regarding his brother Andrej, who has directly suffered from his autis-
tic traits, and therefore rejects him the most. 
 
– You know, Andrej, I believe that nature has given to each of us a limited amount of 
feelings, outside of which we react to what happens in a considerably weaker way than 
one might expect. Not because we are good or bad, but because we have not enough inner 
fortitudes that do not suffice. [...] [W]hat does George mean to you, although he was your 
brother? – Yes, it is indeed strange, the whole thing has moved you more deeply than me. 
                                                             
27  Ibid.: 574. 
28  Gazdanov 2009a: 183.  
29  Cf. e.g. Bakhtin 2002: 74-75. 
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– Maybe because of my sometimes disastrous strong leaning towards dark thoughts and 
generalisations. [...] It would be better to move away from all that as far as possible, for 
example to Sicily. In this respect you are right. I am going to visit you there somehow. All 
right? 30 
 
The novelist resolves the ambivalences around autism for his characters and for 
himself. Stating that emotional patterns in any case are individually different 
allows him to plead for tolerance towards other emotional dispositions and thus 
for autism, too. At the same time he experiences that empathy can be emotional-
ly exhausting, and deduces the necessity to distance oneself at the right moment 
from negative emotions. In some way, keeping emotional distance means the 
conscious decision for non-feeling, i.e. the rapprochement towards an autistic 
state of non-affectedness. As a high sensibility for negative emotions, which the 
novelist attributes to himself, often correlates with an autistic disposition, this 
second part of the statement is as important for resolving the ambivalences 
around non-feeling as the proclamation of tolerance towards other emotional 
patterns. Only the ability to distance oneself allows finding the right balance 
between high sensibility and a disturbing emotional overload. 
Evelyn and Her Friends is Gazdanov’s last novel, in which he reconciles his 
ambivalent thoughts on the dependency between literature and feelings, admit-




4. THE AESTHETICS OF AUTISM AS A  
POLITICAL STATEMENT 
 
Autism remains an important topic also in contemporary literature, where it is 
often linked to political activism. Vladimir Sorokin for example uses it for prov-
ocation, declaring himself an autistic writer. Speaking of his “innate immodes-
ty”, he links this self-characterising statement to his personality as well as to his 
literary ambitions.31 His artistic self-concept closely combines the notions of the 
author as ‘individual’, ‘innovative’, ‘intellectual’, ‘provocative’ and ‘political’. 
The last two of these components are obvious in his open political statements 
and in the undisguised political allusions in his novels. The former are more 
complex and subtle, considering that Sorokin’s artistic vision in the title quote of 
                                                             
30  Gazdanov 2009a: 349. 
31  Sorokin 2013a: 360. 
112 | INGEBORG JANDL 
 
 
the interview – “I wanted to fill Russian literature with shit”32 – implies not only 
a provocative reference to his literary ancestors in Russian literature, but – via 
Rabelais33 – also his clear positioning as an author of world literature. 
Within Sorokin’s literary oeuvre, connections to autism can be drawn on 
several levels. The approach to political topics in his dystopias stays distanced 
and rational, deducing and rejecting possible developments without pleading for 
one ethical point of view. Nadezhda Grigoryeva states that his Ice Trilogy (2002-
2005), “marks the end of cardiocentric culture”. Connecting the “speaking of the 
heart” to eugenics by referring to the physical source of a metaphoric concept, 
the original mystical notions of “thought, memory, mind, soul and spirit” are 
destroyed in a twofold way: firstly, literally as a linguistic picture and, secondly, 
on the plot level as an ethical concept.34 On the level of language, Sorokin’s 
skilful pastiche of different styles from the classics of Russian literature and 
postmodern self-constructed languages furthermore encourages a loss of authen-
ticity when it comes to personal interaction, because intimate speech is thereby 
connected to imitation, too. This becomes especially true within emotional con-
texts, like the love-letters in Blue Lard (Goluboe salo, 1999) and Telluria (Tellu-
riya, 2013), where exceedingly emotional phrases contrast with profane, sexual-
ized content and post-human neologisms that further reinforce the impression of 
artificiality.35  
Genre and style always imply a specific emotional perspective. For the post-
human dystopia, such an emotional perspective characteristically seems to ap-
proach an autistic world view. Vera Nünning quotes a contemporary dystopia, 
where characters “act purely on account of conscious deliberations and logic”,36 
i.e. according to the categories of autistic thinking. Michel Houllebecq’s oeuvre, 
closely connected to Sorokin’s, constitutes a further example of a post-human 
approach to emotions involving a distanced and analytical view by introducing 
intermediate layers – that is to say, clones – to original feelings in order to reflect 
upon them.37 Sorokin and Houllebecq use both the imitation of written genres 
and explicit reflexion on emotions as a barely known subject as devices that 
effect an estrangement of feelings. Given that, usually, most corporal arousals, 
                                                             
32  Sorokin 2002.  
33  In this interview Sorokin’s point of reference is Antonin Artaud. Rabelais too, howev-
er, plays a major role for Sorokin’s poetics, for example in the novel Roman (1989). 
Cf. ibid. 
34  Grigoryeva 2013: 109. 
35  Sorokin 2012a: 669-693; Sorokin 2013b: 12-19. 
36  Cf. Vera Nünning’s contribution in this volume. 
37  Cf. Sabine Schönfellner’s contribution in this volume. 
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individually interpreted as feelings, remain unconscious, the examples reveal 
how a too detailed, rational description of corporal signs, leading to the deduc-
tive consciousness of an emotion, counteracts the perception of situative emo-
tionality, even if the symptoms can be qualified as appropriate. 
Already before Sorokin turns towards the post-human dystopia as his cur-
rently preferred genre, autism is prominently reflected in his works. Comparable 
to his later poetics, his early texts already reveal the author’s genius for very 
detailed observation and its cognitive description, typical of autistic perception. 
In Marina’s Thirtieth Love Affair (Tridtsataya lyubov’ Mariny, 1984) he focuses 
this ability especially on social constellations. Non-feeling becomes a key cate-
gory on the structural level of this novel and is therefore approached explicitly as 
well as more seriously than in the later contexts. Valentin, one of Marina’s lov-
ers, is a genius pianist, who elicits tremendous emotions in her not through their 
sexual relations but through his music.38 Throughout this novel, autism consti-
tutes the major philosophical problem that Sorokin introduces right at the begin-
ning, where Valentin complains about his lack of feelings. 
 
– My whole life, I have dreamt of loving somebody, [...] to be head over heels in love. 
Such as to agonize, to sob with passion, to turn grey out of jealousy. [...] Only one thing I 
cannot understand: Either it is because of our Soviet conditions that we cannot develop 
this feeling, or I simply haven’t met the right person yet. – Maybe you have just dissipated 
your energies and that’s the end of it? – I’m not sure about that. Here deep inside myself, 
– he tenderly touched his breast with his fingertips, – there is something locked up. No 
one has ever affected it.39 
 
Valentin describes the typical state of non-shared feelings enclosed inside him. 
Still, music provides, like writing in the previous examples, a way of self-
expression and of touching someone through the arts. 
In this novel, Sorokin connects autism to private relationships and to the arts, 
but also to the political circumstances, which he blames for the coldness of indi-
viduals born into an authoritarian system. Valentin appears only in the initial 
scene but this opening seems to shed light on a crucial point of the plot, con-
structed around the non-autistic main character Marina and her meanders 
through various sexual relationships within the dissident milieu. Only her ‘thirti-
eth love affair’ provokes her first orgasm in a heterosexual constellation and this 
happens with a secretary of the communist party, while the Soviet anthem is 
playing on the radio. 
                                                             
38  Cf. Sorokin 2012b: 392-394. 
39  Ibid.: 387. 
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– Just hurry up... I want to sleep... [...] [H]e lay down on her – heavily, hotly, kissed and 
immediately penetrated her – roughly and uncomfortably. [...] And the unbearable, sweet, 
maddening. Oh... my God... The orgasm, and what an orgasm, – in an unprecedented force 
and continuation. [...]  
UNITED FOREVER IN FRIENDSHIP AND LABOUR   
OUR MIGHTY REPUBLICS WILL EVER ENDURE.  
Marina wept, her heart burst with the new, unexplainable feeling, and the words, the 
words... exhilarating, bright, solemn and joyous, – they are more comprehensible than 
ever, and directly reach her heart [...]. Marina feels that joy that for her whole life was not 
bestowed on her. [...] In her body sounded still the words of the marvellous song, her lips 
kept trembling, while the tears on her cheeks were drying. [...] Never had she felt as de-
lighted and calm as now.40 
 
Marina’s orgasm is depicted throughout a dozen pages, portraying her tremen-
dous emotions as a combination of bodily reactions, feelings and associations 
evoked by the Soviet anthem. This episode parallels the initial encounter with 
Valentin, where sexual actions are emphasized in order to stay disconnected 
from Marina’s orgasmic soaring that she owes to his playing Chopin. Marina’s 
orgasm with the secretary of the communist party brings together these two 
separated levels of feeling and sexual abandon. Illustrating her first acceptance 
of losing control, Marina’s orgasm is metonymically extended to a figurative 
level and represents her loss of her political consciousness, i.e. an assimilation of 
the dissident to a patriot. Marina’s enthusiasm is henceforward focused on the 
idea of communism, including all her feelings, needs, ideas, expectations and her 
whole personality. 
That feelings play a major part in the liaison with the secretary of the com-
munist party is outlined already in the scene in which he tries to seduce her, 
which includes not only critical remarks on her alternative lifestyle but also his 
claiming of her ‘love’ for the nation: “The skirt she loves! With dissidents she 
messes around! [...] You live apart from the nation, you see? This is what causes 
all these turbulences. You’d better be together with the nation, together. This 
would be easier for you and better for the nation. One has to love one’s own 
nation, Marina. To love!”41 Consequently, after her orgasm, Marina enacts this 
‘love’ for the nation. Her feeling “delighted and calm” indicates that in this new 
state nothing stirs her up personally. Revolutionary activism, the reading of 
forbidden books, hidden in the drawer, and homosexual love represent the affec-
                                                             
40  Ibid.: 557-562. 
41  Ibid.: 553. 
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tive content of her life so far, which she, on the spur of the moment, decides to 
leave behind.  
 
Marina quietly looked at this man, who knew nothing whatsoever of WHAT he had re-
vealed to her during the previous night. [...] [O]nly now, she felt that something was 
disturbing her pleasure. [...] [I]ncreasing with every movement of freedom, [Marina] 
withdrew the drawer from the commode. [...] The Bible, Chukovskaya, GULAG, – all this 
stirred up with photographs and cuttings. Marina smiled: – So it is... I have to burn... the 
useless past. [...] The books burst into flames. The photograph contracted, the triangular 
face twinkled with a repulsive grimace and disappeared forever. [...] Vika... Natasha... 
Nina... [...] – That’s it... – whispered Marina, feeling on her face the heat of the flames.42 
 
The personal and political passions shaping Marina’s previous character are 
closely linked to written artefacts and pictures, preserving her feelings as a dif-
ferentiated spectrum. Personal writings and photographs give proof of her at-
tachment to friends and lovers, while books reflect her respect for cultural values 
– disregarded in the Soviet Union – like religion, underground literature and 
non-conformist political thinking. Burning these objects is reminiscent of the 
historical book burnings during the Inquisition and in the Third Reich, so that the 
act by which Marina irreversibly eliminates her passionate critical thinking and 
personal attachments is designated as a cruel act against cultural and social val-
ues.  
As predicted by her first politically conformist orgasm, Marina’s new identi-
ty is emotionally shaped by the feelings of calm and delight. “Marina delightedly 
cleaned the work bench, brushing away the grey swarf.”43 Through this and 
similar sentences, the final third of the novel illustrates Marina’s digression. In 
addition to her conformist behaviour and feelings, the insights into her personal 
thinking gradually disappear until she, as an individual, becomes fully absorbed 
by the collective identity of the ‘nation’. The narrator even stops calling her 
Marina, switching to her last name, Alekseeva.44 Furthermore, the novel stylisti-
cally devolves into an extensive article of the central communist Russian news-
paper Pravda and thus performatively writes the end of individual emotions.45 
In view of Marina’s disinterest in personalized affectivity and her untying of 
former attachments, this new identity shows obvious emotional affinities with 
                                                             
42  Sorokin Ibid.: 565-568. 
43  Ibid.: 605. 
44  Cf. Ibid.: 611. 
45  Sorokin will revisit such a performative writing in later novels, such as to mark in 
Roman the end of language and in Blue Lard the end of literary culture. 
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autism. Still, the systematic is more complex than this, because Marina is a pa-
triot, which proves that she does love and moreover has an unspecific but even 
very strong social attachment to the collective, i.e. to others. While the enthusi-
astic Marina wholly renounces her own position, the autistic Valentin, at the 
beginning of the novel, neither loves nor sacrifices anything of himself for oth-
ers. 
 
– And do you understand the dilemma? I am not able to love, as much as I try. And I 
really want to. [...] I want to! I want it instantly! You will say that love is a sacrifice in the 
first place, and that of a sacrifice the old snob is not capable. I am! I am ready to give 
everything, to spend and burn everything, if only I could truly love somebody. That’s what 
I envy you. Really!46 
 
In contrast to this, Marina’s new affectivity might therefore be interpreted rather 
as misdirected than as inexistent. Her fate sheds a new light on the critically 
introduced concept of autism, too, because a similar political misleading could 
not happen to Valentin, who is protected by his inability to love and therefore to 
sacrifice himself. Non-feeling is therefore also outlined positively as a basis for 
independence and logical deductive decision-making.  
Although envying Marina’s ability to love, the autistic genius anticipates her 
vulnerability due to her feelings. He reflects about this in terms of a discourse on 
art, when he qualifies her playing of Chopin as accurate, explaining this with her 
emotional understanding of the composer’s music. Valentin’s compliment in-
cludes the earnest indication that the emotional component of artistic creation 
has to be well tempered. 
 
– Seriously, for Chopin you precisely strike the cord. You feel it. – Thank you. – One only 
mustn’t fall from feelings into sentimentality, always be aware of the limit. Nowadays 
many aren’t. Either academism, a dry typing on the typewriter, or sobbing and mawkish-
ness. Chopin, dear Marina, in the first place was an urbane man. You have to play him 
with elegance.47 
 
Within this novel, reflections on literature and music occur interchangeably and 
refer to the arts in general. Valentin’s comment on Chopin, who had “in the first 
place” been an urbane man, shows that he understands arts in terms of the Rus-
sian intelligentsia as interconnected with integrity and nobility of feeling. His 
reflection on artistic techniques may also be applied to writing, where ‘dry acad-
                                                             
46  Ibid.: 388. 
47  Ibid.: 391. 
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emism’ of Marxist doctrines and ‘mawkish bootlicking’ in the dictated poetics of 
socialist realism and the writings of opportunist party officials appear closely 
linked.48 The warning to follow neither the former nor the latter becomes clear 
only when Marina, infected by the national anthem, loses control over her affects 
and indiscriminately adopts both, forfeiting her sensitivity for the ‘elegance’ of 





The very different literary examples show that autism, love and the arts may 
mutually influence each other. Unexpectedly, tremendous feelings of attraction 
to the unattainable Tatyana lead Onegin, the convinced sceptic of love and writ-
ing, to write. For Lermontov’s Pechorin, writing is a way of self-reflection and 
shows that even the cold dandy possesses feelings of love. In contrast, non-
feeling can be reflected in writing, too, as has been exemplified by Tolstoĭ’s 
Karenin and Camus’ Meursault. Even though their reflection-based letters also 
occur in contexts that could motivate a high emotionality, the writings do not 
express feelings but fulfil necessities. 
The novels mentioned illustrate the personal and social failure of autistic 
characters because of their inability to harbour affections. Gazdanov’s manifold 
addressing of this topic becomes, especially in his late works, linked to literary 
writing, because not succeeding in this area would mean the worst kind of failure 
for his solitary but intellectual characters. The gap between two extremes elabo-
rated in earlier texts, such as failure on the one hand and the idea of a literarily 
productive autistic savant on the other, can be surmounted in the author’s last 
novel. Inspired by the Bakhtinian concept of a dialogic relation between the 
novelist and his characters, he claims tolerance regarding the emotional disposi-
tions of others and illustrates his view on the arts as a medium of authentic emo-
tions which may furthermore advance personal development. 
In contrast to the outlined focus on the therapeutic character inherent in writ-
ing, politically inspired critical texts concertedly reflect on autism and writing to 
illustrate social deficits in society. This is true within the existentialist context, 
where Camus as well as Gazdanov reveal and accentuate the irrational decisions 
of legislative authorities by non-reflected remorseless writings of journalists and 
judges. A further genre that in another way appropriates the combination of 
autistic characters and a focus on emotional shades in writing is the dystopia. 
                                                             
48  Kneip 1995. 
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Stylistically as well as in interactions within plots about generations beyond 
emotions, non-feeling becomes an important indicator of a problematic devel-
opment society could possibly undergo. At this point, written reflection on emo-
tions is used also as a pastiche outlining how little is still left of humanity. 
Before Sorokin commits to the post-human dystopia where feelings are re-
duced to an irrational object of often cruel satire, he examines them as structural 
categories. Connecting feeling and non-feeling to personal relationships and to 
the arts he outlines the irrational and potentially dangerous force of emotions 
that can easily be misdirected. Losing one’s political consciousness by assimila-
tion to an authoritarian system is illustrated as entailing a successive disintegra-
tion of aesthetic taste, attachment to beloved persons, empathy and one’s proper 
identity. Sorokin thereby blames totalitarian politics for destroying the individual 
and at the same time sheds a new light on the non-feeling that protects his isolat-
ed autistic character Valentin from such a digression. Through performative 
strategies in writing and public self-performing, Sorokin allows his critical 
statements to go beyond literature.  
Not only in his case, the reception of the texts under discussion also shows a 
change of public opinion on autism, where readers feel sympathy for and identi-
fication with the eccentrics of the 19th century, disapproval of or indifference to 
Gazdanovs’s apathetic characters and worship or disgust for the autistic writer 
Sorokin and his heroes who resemble him. 
At least the Russian text examples reveal writing as a means for surpassing 
the gap between the feelings inside a subject and non-feeling for others. Even the 
passage around Karenin’s formal letter to Anna, in which he does not express 
feelings, gives one of the rare insights into his emotional state through his reflec-
tion on his writing. The importance of building a “golden bridge for her return” 
shows Karenin’s fear of losing Anna and thus some form of attachment to her. 
Such a potential of writing as a communicative medium for emotional expres-
sion that involves attachment to others is shown in a similar way as being inher-
ent to personal and to literary writing and to artistic creation in general.  
In this context, one important factor favouring emotional expression over di-
rect interaction might be owed to the reserved characters’ setting that allows 
them to keep their distance. An addressee usually will, like Tatyana, read the 
letter in the absence of its embarrassed writer and, as Karenin’s reflection shows, 
what is more, writing allows the content to be reconsidered, which also means 
that the message might even not be transmitted to an addressee at all, as in the 
case of Pechorin’s diary. Regarding literary writing and the arts, the meta-level 
allows Gazdanov’s heroes a distant view of their own feelings, such as in the 
case of his autistic savants who even fully exclude personal emotions from the 
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writing process, which can in a similar way be stated for Valentin’s piano-
playing.  
These reasons might seem to diminish the emotional content of writing and 
the arts, but on the contrary they also allow and demand the selection of what is 
precious and dear to be more precise. Such a personal basis allows attachments 
to be more exclusive and special, such as for artistic expression to concentrate on 
what is of prior importance and therefore to develop a higher quality, both of 
which are alluded to in Valentin’s statement that Chopin has to be played with 
elegance. The impact of writing and the arts on emotional attachment seems to 
be closely linked to their materiality, through which they preserve what is, what 
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The Motorcycle as a Vehicle of Political E/Motions in  
Rachel Kushner’s Novel The Flamethrowers 
NORA BERNING 
 
From zero to two hundred, turn right to go right. 
From two hundred to three hundred, turn left to 
go right. 
Faster than three hundred, turn right to go right. 
R. KUSHNER, THE FLAMETHROWERS, 125. 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION:  
EMOTION, LITERATURE AND MOVEMENT 
 
Originally denoting a public disturbance in the 16th century, the word ‘emotion’ 
(from French émotion, from émouvoir ‘excite’ based on Latin emovere) has, 
since the 1980s, celebrated its comeback in a wide range of academic disci-
plines, including psychology, philosophy, medicine, neuroscience, cognitive 
literary theory and the arts, to name but a few. Consequently, Thomas Anz 
(2006) speaks – in analogy to the turns mentioned in Doris Bachmann-Medick’s 
seminal work Cultural Turns (2016) – of an “emotional turn”, which has left any 
number of traces in literary theory in recent years.  
Emotions are at the very heart of the production and reception of literature, 
as one of the main functions of literature is to evoke and impart emotions.1 
Moreover, literature in general and travel writing in particular is predicated on 
the intimate link between emotion and movement. For the purpose of this paper 
and with a focus on the processual side of writing, I will conceive of motorcycle 
                                                             
1  Cf. Winko 2003. 
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literature, understood as a specific type of travel literature, not as a fictional 
thought experiment, nor as the depiction of a certain worldview or Weltanschau-
ung, but rather, following Patrick Colm Hogan, “as a human activity”,2 i.e. as 
“something people do”.3 
Such a processual approach to (travel) literature has the advantage that the 
relationship between writing, emotion and movement is foregrounded. In order 
to clarify this relationship it is necessary to first of all disentangle the triad of 
writing, emotion and movement by defining each individual notion as well as its 
rapport with the other two. In Reading Fictions, Changing Minds (2014), Vera 
Nünning convincingly shows in which ways fictional stories serve as a “tool for 
feeling”.4 The cognitive value of fiction, she argues, is that it “provides a second-
order representation and interpretation of emotions”.5 While the capacity of 
fiction to change people’s minds is a topic that Claudia Hillebrandt (2011) has 
explored in-depth in relation to works by Kafka, Perutz and Werfel, reader-
oriented studies in reception theory or empirical studies in discourse processing 
only give us half the picture. Hogan’s story-oriented account provides a glimpse 
into the complexity of the topic at hand. His argument that stories “are structured 
and animated by emotions”6 stresses the production side of literature.  
The process of writing a story is anything but a neutral endeavour. Whereas 
John Hayes and Linda Flower in their 1980s model of the writing process have 
largely ignored the role of emotions, research on the cognitive processes in writ-
ing has more and more come to attend to the subjective aspects of language 
production: one of the results of Alice G. Brand’s research7 is that the writing 
process is by and large motivated by emotions. She argues that writers have an 
affective long-term memory in which they store past writing experiences. Emo-
tions can have, at the same time, a facilitating and an inhibiting influence on the 
cognitive selection processes. They shape the emplotment and the revision pro-
cesses in writing. This seems intuitively right, especially when one considers that 
narrative is the main format in which human beings make sense of their emo-
tions.  
                                                             
2  Hogan 2003: 3. 
3  Ibid., emphasis N.B. 
4  Nünning 2014: 109. 
5  Ibid.: 117. 
6  Hogan 2003: 5. 
7  Brand 1987: 436-443. 
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In light of this, and taking Rachel Kushner’s motorcycle narrative as an ex-
ample, I argue that The Flamethrowers (TF)8 is the result of a premediated pro-
cess: The novel is premediated or prefigured in manifold ways by a number of 
paradigmatic scripts, scenarios and stories by which Kushner-the-author has 
come to learn, remember, process and share emotions. TF is thus formed by the 
author’s emotions (or “emotion systems”9), which have informed her choice of 
specific narrative patterns. Emotions organize not only individual stories but 
even whole genres, as Birgit Neumann demonstrates in terms of the 18th-century 
sentimental travelogue.10 For instance, considering the title of Laurence Sterne’s 
1768 travelogue, A Sentimental Journey, it is hardly surprising that it is primarily 
guided by affection. What is remarkable, however, is how closely linked the 
narrative portrayal of emotions is to the choice of the means of transportation. 
Sterne’s travelogue is a particularly interesting case of “emotion work”, as it 
powerfully associates emotions with movement. It illustrates that the ways in 
which stories of movement are structured depends on two things: our emotion 
systems and our means of motion. Sterne’s work is, furthermore, evidence of the 
fact that emotions and means of motion are not only intimately bound up with 
one another but that the development of the means of transportation not only 
affects how people travel but also how they write about their journeys. Tim 
Youngs (2015) has sketched this interrelation between literature, emotion and 
movement in narratives of early motorcycle travel. Narrative portrayals of the 
experience of riding are often narratives of the self, where self-making implies 
emotion-making. As per Moritz Holfelder (2000), riding a motorcycle is essen-
tially about emotion and movement.11 Thus, the motorcycle is a perfect vehicle 
of e/motions, i.e. a driving force of intense feelings and also political themes, as 
I will demonstrate in this paper. 
 
 
                                                             
8  All subsequent references to this novel will be cited parenthetically in the text with 
page numbers in parentheses.  
9  Cf. Hogan 2011: 1. 
10  Cf. Neumann 2011: 155-176. 
11  Motorcycle lore is based to a large extent on how different types of engines elicit 
different emotional states. “ T he assumption that different motorcycle engines pro-
duce vibration different enough to be at least potentially influential in creating an 
emotional state is itself subject to experimental analysis.” Thompson 2008: 38. 
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2. “RIDING EMOTIONS”:  
THE MOTORCYCLE AS A “TOOL FOR FEELING”  
 
Just as emotions have for a long time been “perceived as part of the animal, i.e. 
lower, side of human nature”,12 the motorcycle has always had a bad press; par-
ticularly, the portrayal of so-called ‘outlaw’ motorcycle clubs (e.g. the Hells 
Angels) in mainstream media is, as William L. Dulaney (2005) has shown, high-
ly biased and predicated on stereotypes. Hollywood filmmakers were quick to 
perpetuate the distorted image in movies like Wild Angels (1966) or Hells Angels 
on Wheels (1967). In literature, too, the motorcycle serves as a metaphor for all 
sorts of e/motions and values: it stands simultaneously for subversion, discontent 
and freedom, for instance, in so-called ‘roadlogues’, i.e. “non-fiction road trip 
narratives”.13  
What is striking in almost all examples of motorcycle literature is that “the 
emotional trip”14 the rider makes and that is narrated in these texts is grounded in 
his or her emotional rapport with the machine, as the following example illus-
trates: Recounting how she was almost killed in an accident, Clare Sheridan, in 
Across Europe with Satanella (1925), writes: “I do not blame Satanella, she 
always seemed to me a human thing, full of temperament and tact.”15 The an-
thropomorphism, i.e. the attribution of human traits, emotions and intentions to 
nonhuman entities, is characteristic of many motorcycle narratives. From the 
beginning, the genre of motorcycle literature was preoccupied with emotional 
selves – both human and nonhuman.  
For example, the first motorcycle narrative, Victor Appleton’s Tom Swift and 
His Motor-Cycle, published in 1910, describes an emotional road trip to Albany, 
where Tom is supposed to deliver his father’s revolutionary turbine design plans. 
“Tom”, the narrator recounts, “had a natural love for machinery”, and when he 
saw how a man smashed his motorcycle, “it hurt him almost as much to see a 
piece of fine apparatus abused as it did to see an animal mistreated”.16 The mo-
torcycle, in this example, is not just a vehicle of e/motions and certain themes. 
Rather, it is a “tool for feeling”.17 As the concept of the “semanticization of 
                                                             
12  Schlaeger 1999: 9. 
13  Jennings 2004: 98. 
14  Potter 2013: 356. 
15  Sheridan 1925: 215; emphasis N.B. 
16  Appleton 2006: 16. 
17  Nünning 2014: 109. 
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literary forms”18 suggests, narrative means of representation serve as carriers of 
meaning and, in this context, of e/motions. 
In travel literature in general and motorcycle narratives in particular, the so-
cial relations of travel and travel narrating in the 20th and 21st centuries are 
almost always mediated by nonhuman objects, i.e. technologies of motion (e.g. 
animal, plane, ship, automobile, train). Vehicles of motion  
 
organize the entire sensorium differently and thus affect the conditions, the focalizing 
range, and the position of the perceiving subject, differently connecting and disconnecting 
her to and from the terrain of travel, differently organizing her ways of negotiating unfa-
miliar territory, and differently affecting systems of behavior.19 
 
Following from this logic, the motorcycle is a mode of thought, feeling, percep-
tion and meaning: in a nutshell, it is a vehicle of e/motions, precisely because it 
shapes the affective dynamics of travel and storytelling. In motorcycle narra-
tives, the affective dynamics of travel are in profound ways about the unmaking 
of the borders between the human (the motorcyclist) and the nonhuman (the 
machine) and about the silent undoing of the borders between corporeality and 
technology. Kris Lackey, the author of RoadFrames (1997), refers to the auto-
mobile as a prosthesis, i.e. an extension of the body, because it fulfils the indi-
vidual drivers’ desires. The same could be said about the motorcycle, which, 
ever since Donna Haraway’s (1991) cyborg theory found its way into motorcycle 
literature studies,20 has been said to obliterate the slippery boundaries between 
machine and organism.  
In this context, the destabilization of gendered and sexualized patterns of 
mobility plays a central role as well as the opening up of a political space in 
which identities can be reorganized ad infinitum. Instead of conceiving of the 
machine and the organism as a cyborg and likening the newly emerging hybrid 
to a closed identity, the connection between the two has, as of late, been theo-
rized by Esperanza Miyake (2015), drawing on the works of Gilles Deleuze and 
Felix Guattari, as a “connective union”, i.e. “as the productive process leading 
up to the cyborg product”.21 Following Miyake, it is not so much the merging of 
organism and machine that scholars of motorcycle literature should pay attention 
to, but rather the question of how different connections create different meanings 
in different contexts of production.  
                                                             
18  Nünning 2001: 579-580. 
19  Smith 2001: 23. 
20  Cf., e.g. Malone 2013. 
21  Miyake 2015.  
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Taking Steven L. Thompson’s claim that what drives the social dimensions 
of the motorcycle is “the actual and perceived nature of the motorcycle in mo-
tion, and the bodies thus in motion on it”22 as the starting point for a reflection 
on gender, genre and identity in motorcycle literature, it is immediately apparent 
that Kushner, with her novel TF, revises a very masculine genre by bringing a 
woman, who encroaches upon two domains of masculine territory – that of the 
motorcycle and that of motorcycle racing – straight into the core of the narrative. 
The female protagonist Reno is a subject in motion through male territory. As 
“nomadic subject”,23 she resists the masculinist logic of travel, calling for a new 
female aesthetics of the road and for understanding movement not as linear 
mobility, but as transgressive and disruptive. Moving her bike, “the woman 
traveller assumes a place in the history of that technology of motion, even if she 
remains oblivious to it”.24 The travel narrator in Kushner’s novel entices us to 
reimagine woman’s relationship to technology and to rethink the history of the 
motorcycle as ‘herstory’ and the motorcycle itself as a political vehicle of 
e/motions in that story.  
 
 
3. THE FLAMETHROWERS, OR: THE MOTORCYCLE AS A  
VEHICLE OF POLITICAL E/MOTIONS 
 
An emotion-focused approach to motorcycle literature that starts from the as-
sumption that the machine functions simultaneously as content and form is con-
cerned with the construction of fictional emotions on different levels of narra-
tion. Thus, in order to provide at least a provisional answer to the question of 
how Kushner’s narrative gives shape to the protagonist’s emotional road trip, I 
will analyze the role of political e/motions in the conception of characters and 
demonstrate how affectivity is represented through events and political action. 
Since e/motions play a role not only on the story level but also on the discourse 
level, an analysis of the motorcycle as form is particularly fruitful: In TF, it is 
striking that questions of both political and gender identity are brought forth by 
Reno’s road trip and the mode of travel, and that the discursive elements of the 
novel force a reflection on the close alliance between emotion, movement, poli-
tics and identity. 
                                                             
22  Thompson 2008: 34. 
23  Paes de Barros 2004. 
24  Smith 2001: 27. 
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Kushner’s motorcycle narrative revolves around three main characters: 
‘Reno’ (named after a city in Nevada where she grew up), a young art school 
graduate who moves to New York City to become an artist, T.P. Valera, an 
Italian Fordist industrial magnate who founded the Valera Company, which is 
the premier Italian company selling motorcycles and tires, and Sandro Valera, 
his son. Valera is a past Italian futurist and fascist and a stand-in for Henry Ford. 
The fictional company can be thought of as a combination of Ducati motorcycles 
and Pirelli tires. When Reno moves to New York, the young working class mo-
torcycle-riding-artist-narrator becomes infatuated with Sandro Valera, the 
wealthy grandson who decided to cut all ties with his family’s business. Sandro 
is a prominent figure in New York’s rising art scene of the 1970s who gives 
Reno access to networks of artists and galleries. He introduces her to his entou-
rage of apolitical friends, who almost all make a living as post-minimalist artists 
in SoHo’s empty factories. 
From the very beginning of the story, the human bonds are relegated to the 
background, as most of the artists in Sandro’s network are ‘flat’ characters any-
way, whereas the triangular relationship, i.e. the special bond between Reno, 
Sandro and the Valera company, is mediated and propelled by a Fordist object – 
a 1977 Valera motorcycle. Reno, who has ridden motorcycles since she was 
fourteen and has brothers who also race and repair motorcycles, is extremely 
proud of her “brand-new 650 supersport” (12), which was a gift from her boy-
friend. Back in those days, the model with the unmodified 650 cc twins had not 
yet been released and so no one in the United States but her was able to ride it. 
With her Moto Valera GT650, Reno heads to Bonneville Speed Week at the Salt 
Flats, where she was “the only woman on a motorcycle” (25). Having been 
interested in land speed records for a long time, Reno not only wants to set a new 
record, but she is also eager to capture the experience of speed.  
Self-making in the narrative is implicated in an emotional road trip that has 
political overtones, as Reno is the only woman on the speedway. With her risk-
ready attitude and her appropriation of a set of character traits and qualities tradi-
tionally viewed as masculine, Reno undermines the traditional motorcycle narra-
tive of the “spermatic journey”25 predicated upon the model of male mobility. It 
seems no coincidence that Kushner, like the protagonist, knows how to ride 
motorcycles at high speed. Writing about the experience of riding is thus also a 
form of writing the self; it is part of a process of self-making, in which both 
riding (a motorcycle) and writing (a novel about motorcycles) are politically 
charged in two ways: the act of “ w riting the female body through motorcycles 
                                                             
25  Leed 1991: 113. 
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is part of a political language”26 in the same way that “writing the motorcycle 
through the female body is part of politicising the discourse of motorcycles”,27 
which is arguably the case in TF.  
Kushner’s novel is thus best understood as a counter-narrative about a female 
motorcyclist written by a woman, dismantling “the long-standing belief that it 
the motorcycle, N.B.  is a ‘man’s machine’”.28 In TF, the “connective union”29 
between the human body and the motorcycle not only destabilizes “the norma-
tive matrix of the motorcycle as masculine and the gazed upon body as femi-
nine”,30 but it depicts moreover the process of becoming as an ongoing process 
in which the body and the machine constantly connect, disconnect and reconnect 
in an infinite series of momentary encounters, movements and frictions rather 
than a finished product (cyborg). 
 
I moved through the gears and into fifth. The wind pushed against me, threatening to rip 
my helmet off, as though I were tilting my face into a waterfall. I hit 110 on my speedom-
eter and went low. The salt did not feel like a road. I seemed to be moving around a lot, as 
if I were riding on ice, and yet I had traction, a slightly loose traction that had to be taken 
on faith. I was going 120. Then 125. I felt alert to every granule of time. Each granule was 
time, the single pertinent image, the other moment-images, before and after, lost, uncon-
sidered. All I knew was my hand on the throttle grip, its tingling vibration in my gloved 
fingers: 130, 138. (29) 
 
Riding a Valera motorcycle, which serves as the epitome of speed, clearly en-
tails, as this quote shows, a transformative aspect that is linked to fun factors in 
motion at the biochemical level. Candace B. Pert has shown that “what we expe-
rience as an emotion or a feeling is also a mechanism for activating a particular 
neuronal circuit – simultaneously throughout the brain and body – which gener-
ates a behavior involving the whole creature, with all the necessary physiological 
changes that behavior would require”.31 In that sense, the motorcycle is literally 
a vehicle of e/motion, for it makes Reno “feel the size of this place” (30, empha-
sis N.B.), and yet it is not Reno herself who feels it, “but the cycle, whose tires 
marked its size with each turn” and she “felt a tenderness for them” (30).  
                                                             
26  Miyake 2015. 
27  Ibid. 
28  Koerner 2007: 2. 
29  Sensu Miyake 2015. 
30  Malone 2013: 5. 
31  Pert 1997: 145. 
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Reno’s crash at 140 miles an hour happens at a moment of almost fatal dis-
connection of body and mind.  
 
When we arrived at the crash site, I saw that I’d broken through. What seemed like end-
less perfect white on white was only a very thin crust of salt. Where the crust had been 
broken by the force of the impact, mud seeped up. I photographed all this, a Rorschach of 
my crash. (114) 
 
Reno wants to come to terms with speed, with “a thing not signifying history, 
but merely a physical thing connected to a network whose very contingency 
signals the mutable nature of such networks”.32 Despite or perhaps because of 
the fact that the motorcycle connotes the propensity to fail for Reno from the 
very beginning, it has the potential for disruption in that it works against teleo-
logical closure and (narrative) progress. 
Whereas the motorcycle racing passages in the novel can be interpreted as an 
engendered example of a political process of self-making and as a remaking of 
the ‘history’ of the motorcycle, the historical passages in the novel can be seen 
as a negotiation of political identities with the Valera motorcycle as a foil, and 
set against the backdrop of two disparate cultural contexts and time periods. 
Kushner projects the political tensions in 1970s Italy onto the reunion of Reno 
and Sandro at his family’s villa on Lake Como, which culminates in a sudden 
U-turn on the part of Reno, leading her down an entirely different road. Her 
overt enthusiasm for Valera motorcycles gradually fading away, Reno’s affec-
tion for Sandro is also on the brink of extinction. She realizes that his whole 
lifestyle is a product of the Valera motorcycle and thus ultimately of the factory 
workers’ slave labour. If the family’s villa is a metonym for Fordism and the 
motorcycle a metaphor for the powerful association of emotion with mobility, it 
becomes clear by superimposing the two strands of the novel that as a catalyst of 
political e/motions the machine is a highly ambivalent means of transportation. 
As much as it can be the multiplier of success and upward mobility, it can also 
be a source of downright failure and downward mobility. 
Mobility has thus more than one function in the motorcycle narrative, open-
ing up personalized and political spaces in which movement refers not so much 
to the number of miles travelled, but rather to the feeling of being moved. Back 
in New York, a city that after the 1977 blackout had a Detroit-like feel to it, 
Reno keeps her distance from Sandro, whom she had caught in the act in front of 
the Valera factory when he cheated on her with his cousin Talia. Although her 
emotional ‘heat map’ is again that of an average New York artist displaying 
                                                             
32  Strombeck 2015: 471; emphasis N.B. 
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indifference toward the end of Keynesian policies and the emergent cultural 
logic of post-Fordist capitalism, it would be wrong to conclude that Reno is the 
same person as before she had been tear-gassed and was in the march with Gian-
ni. She has regained her strength, and a corollary of her political awakening is 
that she finally knows where she belongs: “I was a girl on a motorcycle” (344). 
Never before has Reno so decidedly called herself a motorcyclist as in the final 
chapters of the novel. Kushner presents an emotionally stable female protagonist 
who has mastered the chauvinist world of the novel she is part and parcel of. 
When she picks up the repaired Valera motorcycle from Sandro’s place and rides 
through the streets of New York City, she feels 
 
separate, gliding, untouchable. A group of winos in front of a Bowery hotel gave me the 
thumbs-up. At a stoplight, a man in the backseat of a cab, a cigarette hanging from his 
lips, rolled down his window and complimented the bike. He wasn’t coming on to me. He 
was envious. He wanted what I had like a man might want something another man has. 
There was a performance in riding the Moto Valera through the streets of New York that 
felt pure. It made the city a stage, my stage, while I was simply getting from one place to 
the next. Ronnie said that certain women were best viewed from the window of a speeding 
car, the exaggeration of their makeup and their tight clothes. But maybe women were 
meant to speed past, just a blur. Like China girls. Flash, and then gone. It was only a 
motorcycle but it felt like a mode of being. (297) 
 
In this quote, the Valera motorcycle is framed exclusively positively: not just as 
a mode of transportation, nor as a symbol for exploitation and slave labour. Reno 
literally owns it and there is nothing in her way that could potentially change 
that. In contrast to the earlier chapters where the motorcycle had shifting associa-
tions, the image that stays with the reader is that of the motorcycle as a driving 
force or vehicle of political e/motions in the sense of feminine empowerment 
and identity politics. 
 
 
4. CONCLUSION:  
MOTORCYCLE “LITERATURE ON THE MOVE” 
 
As my reading of Kushner’s novel The Flamethrowers (2013) has shown, there 
are at least three good reasons why motorcycle literature is a promising object of 
research for coming to terms with the complex interfaces of writing, emotion and 
movement. Firstly, emotions play a key role both in the production of motorcy-
cle literature and in the narrative itself. In TF, the Valera motorcycle serves as “a 
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tool for feeling”33 and, more concretely, as a vehicle of political e/motions, be-
cause it mediates political movements and shapes identities. Secondly, motorcy-
cle literature stresses the processual side of writing, because it foregrounds such 
concepts as writing the self, emplotment and genre. Last but certainly not least, 
in highlighting the bond between the human (organism) and the nonhuman (ma-
chine), motorcycle narratives open up new vistas for emotion-focused approach-
es to literature that go beyond the analysis of characters, intrapersonal feelings 
and interaffectivity, i.e. emotions emerging from social interaction. 
In TF, affectivity is depicted as a result of the second nervous system that 
links mind and body, organism and machine. Reno ‘feels’ with the Valera mo-
torcycle. It affects the pace at which she drifts, and it also “affects the repertoire 
of identities available to her”.34 These identities, as I have demonstrated, are 
“mobile identities”35 that subvert the “spermatic journey”,36 i.e. the masculinist 
logic of travel. In addition to identities, the motorcycle affects the emotional 
economy of the characters. The emotional make-up of the narrator shapes, for 
instance, what Reno knows and how she comes to know. Reno’s consciousness 
is a site of political and epistemological resistance. She resists the fourfold struc-
ture of parting, climax, arrival, and return. The moment that Reno gets on the 
motorcycle, she begins to negotiate the affective dynamics of travel and interro-
gates the cultural construction of femininity and her relationship to technology. 
The motorcycle, furthermore, shapes Reno’s itinerary and her perception of 
spatiality and temporal coordinates. Ette (2003) distinguishes between five spa-
tial figures of travel movement. These figures of the journey as a movement of 
understanding include the circular, the discontinuous-jumping, and the star- and 
pendulum-like readings. In TF, the spatial movement of understanding echoes 
the discontinuous-jumping figure. Reno’s itinerary has neither a definite starting 
point nor a destination. She drifts rather than travels across Italy. Digressions 
and transgressions are an integral element of her “emotional trip”.37 One could 
infer a radical openness towards the future and life in general from this, which is 
reflected in the ending: “The answer is not coming. I have to find an arbitrary 
point inside the spell of waiting, the open absence, and tear myself away. Leave, 
with no answer. Move on to the next question” (383). These sentences imply that 
Reno’s meandering and drifting will continue and that there is no point of arri-
val, rest or closure. The hermeneutic movement of the jump, where “the linear 
                                                             
33  Nünning 2014: 109. 
34  Smith 2001: 26. 
35  Ibid.: 27. 
36  Leed 1991: 113. 
37  Potter 2013: 356. 
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mobility of the conventional road”38 is disrupted, calls the narrative’s legibility 
into question and implies a reading that is also non-linear but not necessarily 
undirected. 
In light of this, Kushner’s motorcycle narrative is a pertinent example of “lit-
erature on the move”. I have argued that with their reference to emotion and 
movement, motorcycle narratives can expand our knowledge about writing- and 
reading-specific aspects of motorcycle literature. The latter (i.e. reading-specific 
aspects), though, are beyond the scope of this paper. The nexus between the 
narrative construction of emotions and movement in motorcycle literature is in 
dire need of further research. Ette’s (2003) spatial figures of travel movement 
(circle, pendulum, linear journey, star, jump) are a good starting point for future 
research on the links between motorcycle literature, emotion and movement. 
Motorcycle literature is, as the incredible rise in narratives over the last three 
decades has shown, a flourishing genre: whereas thirteen motorcycle narratives 
were published before 1974, most of which were written by men (with few ex-
ceptions such as Lady Warren’s Through Algeria and Tunisia on a Motor-
Bicycle, (2009) 1922 , Clare Sheridan’s Across Europe with Satanella, 1925, 
and Peggy Iris Thomas’ A Ride in the Sun, or: Gasoline Gypsy, (2012) 1954 , 
with the release of Robert M. Pirsig’s Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Mainte-
nance: An Inquiry Into Values in 1974, the number of motorcycle narratives that 
have been published has exploded, with 115 works coming out between 1990 
and 2015. Judging from these figures, motorcycle narratives are a lively form of 
expression that draws its fascination from the ways in which it moves its read-
ers – emotionally, politically or otherwise – “with real velocity” (297).  
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“[…] which approximates ‘I love you’.” 
Jonathan Safran Foer’s Punctuation of Emotions 
JULIA GRILLMAYR 
 
To tell the truth we have to trap the appearances 
with quotation marks.  
HÉLÈNE CIXOUS 
 
Denn die Welt bietet soviel Probleme an, als die 
Sprache Lücken, Elastizitäten, Neuschaffungs-




“A Primer for the Punctuation of Heart Disease” by Jonathan Safran Foer is a 
short story without an actual plot. Being a primer, it constitutes a manual that 
provides a system of signs which can be applied to conversations in order to 
clarify the meaning and context of words, expressions and silences. 
There is, e.g. , the “silence mark”, which “signifies an absence of lan-
guage”, a painful kind of silence that is caused mostly by the incapability of 
expressing feelings or reacting to strong emotions.1 In contrast, there is the 
“willed silence mark” , which “signifies an intentional silence” and is a strate-
gy to protect oneself and withdraw from the conversation; it is “the conversa-
tional equivalent of building a wall over which you can’t climb, through which 
you can’t see”.2 Further, there are signs that constitute “Barely Tolerable Substi-
tutes” for desired emotional expressions that can’t possibly be spoken out loud.3 
                                                             
1  Foer 2005a: 1. 
2  Ibid. 
3  Cf. ibid.: 7. 
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The Primer suggests, e.g. the use of such punctuation in place of the all-time 










                       Figure 1: Barely Tolerable Substitutes 
 
The underlying principle of this sign system seems to be the insight that as soon 
as people communicate, there is misunderstanding and thus pain: “Familial 
communication always has to do with failures to communicate.”4 Especially 
when it comes to the articulation of feelings, there is necessarily something left 
unspoken. This inexpressible remainder calls for the help of these signs to at 
least “approximate” the feeling.  
In the Primer we find descriptions of about twenty signs. Because they are 
created for the expression of something that cannot be put into words, they are 
not simply translatable but have to be explained in context: the narrator of the 
short story explains every sign and tries them out in dialogues with his family. In 
the course of the story, the signs add up and are weaved into more and more 
complex and long conversations. Even if there is no plot per se, we get to meet 
the inventor of the sign language and learn a lot about his family. Thus, the short 
story is of course more than a manual.  
The quoted dialogues between the family members make explicit that the 
narrator, his parents and his brothers are extremely sensitive people. They are 
portrayed as insecure, introverted and overly thin-skinned. Thus, the proposed 
sign language, intended for situations in which strong emotional experiences 
literally leave them speechless, seems to be needed constantly. 
This observation is true for the whole oeuvre of Jonathan Safran Foer.5 The 
author states concerning “A Primer for the Punctuation of Heart Disease”: “[...] I 
                                                             
4  Ibid.: 8. 
5  Foer, born 1977 in Washington, is a contemporary, bestselling American writer. His 
first two novels Everything is Illuminated (2002) and Extremely Loud & Incredibly 
Close (2015) were also adapted for the screen in successful Hollywood productions. 
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think it [this short story] is fairly representative of my concerns as a writer: the 
difficulties of expression, family and love.”6 If I wanted to characterise the pro-
tagonists of Foer’s books in one sentence, I would cite Ms. Schmidt, one of the 
protagonists in Extremely Loud & Incredibly Close, saying: “I spent my life 
learning to feel less.”7 All of Foer’s protagonists feel too much and are constant-
ly busy protecting themselves from being overwhelmed by their emotions. In 
this early short story we find, highly compressed, the main questions, or rather 
the main quest of Foer’s novels: the capability of putting the right words to 
things and especially to feelings.  
To explore this idea, first a comparative close reading of the short story and 
certain passages from Foer’s novels will give insight into the fundamental prob-
lems of language that these books commonly address. Then, I will investigate 
the exact nature of the sign system established in “A Primer for the Punctuation 
of Heart Disease” and, based on this insight, conclude on the utopian potential of 
this sign language of emotions. Consequently, this article on the one hand ana-
lyzes the motif and the role of emotional expression in Foer’s oeuvre and, on the 
other hand, reflects from a more general perspective upon the representation of 
feelings in writing and speech as a very basic problem of semiotics.8 
 
 
                                                                                                                                  
With Eating Animals (2009) he published a non-fiction book in favour of vegetarian-
ism and with the die-cut novel Tree of Code (2010) an art book. In 2016 his most re-
cent novel Here I Am was published. 
6  Foer 2005a: viii. 
7  Foer 2005b: 180. 
8  In this article, I’ll not refer to a specific theory of emotions, but rather show in which 
way this short story itself contains a theory or at least a thesis on how our language is 
connected to our outer and inner life. Therefore, the terms emotion and feeling are of-
ten used colloquially and interchangeably. Nevertheless, for a basic understanding, I 
refer to the prominent distinction of the neuroscientist Antonio Damasio, who de-
scribes emotions as unconscious, immediate and bodily reactions to certain stimuli. 
Feelings, on the other hand, in his definition occur when a person becomes aware of 
her or his emotions and can put a more general and conventional name to them. See 
further explanation in an interview with the Scientific American: “[…] for neurosci-
ence, emotions are more or less the complex reactions the body has to certain stimuli. 
When we are afraid of something, our hearts begin to race, our mouths become dry, 
our skin turns pale and our muscles contract. This emotional reaction occurs automati-
cally and unconsciously. Feelings occur after we become aware in our brain of such 
physical changes; only then do we experience the feeling of fear.” Lenzen 2013. 
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DEALING WITH CONTAMINATED LANGUAGE 
 
The name of the sign system ‒ Punctuation of Heart Disease ‒ goes back to the 
fact that several members of the narrator’s family suffer from a weak heart: “we 
have forty-one heart attacks between us, and counting.”9 This malady and other 
dangers to loved ones as well as unnamed dreadful experiences of this originally 
European Jewish family during World War II seem to be the source of their 
fearfulness and extreme sensitivity. The Holocaust as well as a more general fear 
of loss of love are constantly on the horizon and demand new ways of expres-
sion.  
The statement that all of Foer’s protagonists feel too much means that every-
thing in the world affects them; everything comes incredibly close: “There was 
no such thing as a safe distance, then. Everything was either too close or too 
far.”10 The main problem seems to be to find a healthy place in reference to their 
environment. They are not able to shield themselves and their emotional life 
from the outside. 
It is a catastrophe that makes these people lose their “safe distance”, which 
manifests itself mostly in the problem of finding the right language to express 
emotions. One aspect of this problem is what I’d like to call the inevitable con-
tamination of language. Two passages from Foer’s oeuvre show, in a playful but 
very explicit way, that the insufficiency language is accused of in “A Primer for 
the Punctuation of Heart Disease” is due to the fact that our words are contami-
nated with past meaning that is ever present while speaking: In Everything Is 
Illuminated, two lovers communicate through cut-up messages from articles 
taken from current newspapers. In order to, e.g. simply arrange a meeting, they 
have to go through the daily horror of the Second World War being evoked with 
every word. 
 
The “M” was taken from the army that would take his mother’s life: GERMAN FRONT 
ADVANCES ON SOVIET BORDER; the “eet” from their approaching warships: NAZI 
FLEET DEFEATS FRENCH AT LESACS; the “me” from the peninsula they were blue-
eyeing: GERMANS SURROUND CRIMEA; the “und” from too little, too late: AMERI-
CAN WAR FUNDS REACH ENGLAND; the “er” from the dog of dogs: HITLER REN-
DERS NONAGGRESSION PACT INOPERATIVE . . . and so on, and so on, each note a 
collage of love that could never be, and war that could.11  
                                                             
9  Foer 2005a: 1. 
10  Foer 2002a: 130. 
11  Ibid.: 233. 
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In Extremely Loud & Incredibly Close there is a very similar passage. Thomas 
Schell, who is originally from Dresden in Germany, has lost his speech in the 
course of World War II. He communicates only through writing; he writes 
phrases in little notebooks and shows the pages to people. Having fled to Ameri-
ca and finally settling in New York, he meets a girl there from his past ‒ Ms. 
Schmidt, who later becomes his wife. They have a very special but also very 
strange relationship, because there is always the traumatic past that casts its 
shadow over them. Soon after their reunion, she writes on the last page of his 
current notebook: “Please marry me.” Because there are no pages left to write 
on, Thomas Schell has to answer by flipping back and forth through the existing 
pages, reusing the phrases that have been written in the course of the day. 
 
I flipped back and pointed at, “Ha ha ha!” She flipped forward and pointed at, “Please 
marry me.” I flipped back and pointed at, “I’m sorry, this is the smallest I’ve got.” She 
flipped forward and pointed at, “Please marry me.” I flipped back and pointed at, “I’m not 
sure, but it’s late.” She flipped forward and pointed at, “Please marry me,” and this time 
put her finger on “Please,” as if to hold down the page and end the conversation, or as if 
she were trying to push through the word and into what she really wanted to say.12 
 
This somewhat absurd dialogue emphasizes the calamitous diagnosis that every-
thing spoken and everything written is contaminated with unwanted past mean-
ing. Every word and sentence has always already been contextualized and inter-
preted and in this sense always comes too late for what we “really wanted to 
say”. The only solution is to invent a new language that would, on the one hand, 
have a more subtle way of carrying meaning and, on the other hand, could thus 
subvert the old language and escape its imprints. This is what the narrator of “A 
Primer for the Punctuation of Heart Disease” is trying to do by introducing his 




WRITING VERSUS LIVING 
 
Besides contamination, another language issue haunts the protagonists of Foer’s 
oeuvre. While language, and especially the practice of writing, has an unmistak-
ably important and productive character for these people, it also occupies too 
much space: the text ‒ in a figurative sense also designating reflection, self- 
                                                             
12  Foer 2005b: 33. 
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consciousness and tradition ‒ seems often to come between the characters and 
their lives; their textual practice seems to keep them from living. This aspect is 
closely linked to the Jewish tradition of text exegesis, as will be examined at the 
end of this chapter.  
In Extremely Loud & Incredibly Close this opposition between life and text 
is brought to the fore in the odd lifestyle of Thomas Schell and Ms. Schmidt. 
Struggling with living together, they invent a complex system of rules which 
they in fact map out on the blueprints of their apartment.13 “Home is the place 
with the most rules.”14 These rules, being virtually imprinted on all the surfaces 
of their home, create a textual layer that at first helps them to orient and root 
themselves in the apartment but, in the end, separates them from their home. In 
addition, Thomas Schell starts to take photographs of every detail of the flat: 
“He took pictures of everything. […] He could have rebuilt the apartment by 
taping together the pictures.”15 These photographs create a visual simulacrum of 
a home in addition to the rules, which are a textual simulation of a functioning 
relationship. Both are expressions of the artificiality of their living together; the 
text and the images are a barrier that separates the couple from a relationship 
dynamics that is more organically grown and based on authentic desires rather 
than on arrangements.16 
Furthermore, text becomes a barrier in the most literal sense here: in the form 
of Thomas Schell’s daybooks. Using them for daily communication, they add up 
to hundreds of books, occupying the whole apartment.17 His space-consuming 
way of communicating symbolizes once again the insufficiency of language to 
designate what ought to be expressed when it comes to feelings:  
 
                                                             
13  Cf. ibid.: 111. 
14  Ibid.: 185. 
15  Foer 2005b: 175. 
16  This formulation is of course problematic. My intention here is not to define one 
lifestyle as more authentic, natural or normal than any other. Rather, I want to shed 
light on the fact that this relationship is portrayed as obsessively constructed and gov-
erned necessarily by artificial rules and regulations. This again expresses the charac-
ters’ trauma of WWII. 
 In contrast, Extremely Loud & Incredibly Close tells the story of Thomas Schell’s first 
love, before the war, an easy and uncomplicated relationship in the sense that there is 
no over-analysis and constant self-reflection. 
17  “I went through a hundred of books, thousands of them, they were all over the apart-
ment, I used them as doorstops and paperweights, I stacked them if I needed to reach 
something, I slid them under the legs of wobbly tables, […].” Foer 2005b: 28. 
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I have so much to tell you, the problem isn’t that I’m running out of time, I’m running out 
of room, this book is filling up, there couldn’t be enough pages, I looked around the 
apartment this morning for one last time and there was writing everywhere, filling the 
walls and mirrors, I’d rolled up the rugs so I could write on the floors, I’d written on the 
windows and around the bottles of wine we were given but never drank, I wear only short 
sleeves, even when it’s cold, because my arms are books, too. But there’s too much to 
express.18 
 
Even if everything is covered with text, something crucial always remains inex-
pressible. Rather, this textual layer ‒ here literally a layer of letters ‒ blocks the 
way to an uncomplicated social interaction. This insight is stressed by Oskar’s 
habits of writing. After the loss of his father, who died in the attacks on the 
World Trade Center on the 11th September 2011, the nine-year-old boy ‒ grand-
son of Thomas Schell and Ms. Schmidt ‒ starts writing application letters to 
various prominent scientists and rock stars in order to reassert his future plans.19  
Besides this positive way of writing, which helps him to cope with the situa-
tion, he keeps a notebook entitled Stuff That Happened to Me.20 In this scrap-
book he collects articles and images from the internet that concern him. Here 
once again, the problem of not finding a “safe distance” to one’s surroundings 
expresses itself, because Oskar includes basically everything he stumbles upon, 
like “a shark attacking a girl, someone walking on a tightrope between the Twin 
Towers, that actress getting a blowjob from her normal boyfriend, a soldier 
getting his head cut off in Iraq […]”.21 Everything he observes happens to him. 
In his scrapbook he tries to outsource the fears and pains he connects with these 
images and texts. This time, it is intended to create a barrier; the book should 
shield him from the cruelty in the world by miniaturizing and arranging it. When 
Oskar decides at the end of the novel that he won’t start a new volume of Stuff 
That Happened to Me, this indicates that he, in contrast to his grandparents, is 
ready to leave the sphere of self-reflection and over-analysis represented by the 
text, and to go on living.22 In overcoming this obsessional everyday chronicling 
lies the subtle happy ending of Extremely Loud & Incredibly Close. Oskar is 
finally able to draw the right conclusion from his grandmother’s insight: “You 
cannot protect yourself from sadness without protecting yourself from happi-
                                                             
18  Ibid.: 132. 
19  Cf. ibid.: 11. 
20  For a detailed analysis of this aspect of the novel cf. Siegel 2009. 
21  Foer 2005b: 42. 
22  Cf. ibid.: 325. 
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ness.”23 Writing is the characters’ strategy of protection, but then again, too 
much text cuts them off from an untroubled, more immediate life experience. 
In Everything Is Illuminated, this oppositional relation between text and life 
is brought to the fore with recourse to the Jewish tradition of text exegesis. One 
strand of the novel tells the story of the village Trachimbrod before the Second 
World War.24 Foer draws a caricature of the often very detailed and strict rules 
of the Jewish religion, myth and tradition. He portrays Jewishness as life in an 
all-encompassing text that needs to be deciphered. In this image of the book 
religion, we can observe once again this double character of text: the written 
word is the basis of the Jewish religion; the word or name is at the origin of all 
creation and thus life is not only understood through text but brought into exist-
ence by it.25 All the same, in practice, this text-oriented existence seems to cut 
off its adherents from their earthly life, as becomes clear in the following pas-
sage of Everything Is Illuminated. 
 
The Well-Regarded Rabbi was exceedingly knowledgeable about the large, extra-large, 
and extra-extra-large matters of the Jewish faith, and was able to draw upon the most 
obscure and indecipherable texts to reason seemingly impossible religious quandaries, but 
he knew hardly anything about life itself, and for this reason, because the baby’s birth had 
no textual precedents, […] because the baby was about life, and was life, he found himself 
to be quite stuck.26 
                                                             
23  Foer 2005b: 180. 
24  Trachimbrod, or Trochenbrod, is a village in today’s Ukraine, former Poland. In the 
course of WWII, the Nazis turned the shtetl into a Jewish ghetto whose population 
was almost completely liquidated in 1942. Everything Is Illuminated is fiction and 
does not claim to be of historical value. Still, it is clearly of autobiographical nature: 
Foer has undertaken a journey to Ukraine to research the history of his grandfather 
and the people who helped him survive the Holocaust just as in the novel the narrator 
called Jonathan Safran Foer does. Regarding the fictionalization of this experience, 
the author stated that the “novel is much more a response to my trip than a recounting 
of it”. Cf. Foer 2002b. A historical account of Trachimbrod as well as a critique of 
Foer’s fictionalization can be found in Ivan Katchanovski’s article “NOT Everything 
is Illuminated”. Katchanovski 2004. 
25  This accounts especially for the mystical reading of the Torah by the Kabbalists, who 
“regarded creation itself as a linguistic phenomenon”. Eco 1995: 25. In On the Kabba-
lah and Its Symbolism, Gershom Scholem gives a detailed account of this aspect of the 
Kabbala. Cf. Scholem 1965: 36. For a semiotic approach to this tradition cf. Assmann 
2004: 718-719. 
26  Foer 2002a: 21. 
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 In a well reflected and nevertheless witty manner, Foer mingles this ontological 
dimension of the word as the origin of creation with a pragmatic understanding 
of text. Consequently, rabbinic scribes become bibliomaniac bookworms, unfit 
for everyday life, while in the most ordinary situations, the mystic-magical, 
generative dimension of text comes into play. This paradoxical and ambivalent 
relationship to writing and text ‒ as barrier on the one hand and the chance of 
“building the world anew”27 on the other ‒ is at the core of Foer’s work. This can 
be proven by an analysis of the short story “A Primer for the Punctuation of 
Heart Disease”, as I will show in the following. 
 
 
THE NATURE OF THE SIGN SYSTEM 
 
As with many aspects of Foer’s books, this punctuation provides more food for 
thought than one might think at first sight. These signs can be defined as symbol-
ic as well as performative.28 Firstly, because they are conventional: they need an 
agreed code to be understood. Secondly, because they can be meant as calls for 
action ‒ this is the case, e.g. with the “willed silence mark”, which tries to 
silence the conversation partner, and also the converse, the “insistent question 
mark”, which wants the conversation partner to break his or her silence.  
For a further examination, it is useful to explore these signs in two very dif-
ferent contexts: they can be compared to Egyptian hieroglyphs as well as to 
social media emoticons. Regarding the typeface of the short story, the contempo-
rary reader, no doubt, thinks first and foremost of emoticons. Text-based internet 
communication has grown enormously in the last decade, as has the need for 
visual support to express emotions in chatting and text messaging.29 For in-
                                                             
27  These are Thomas Schell’s words, who writes about Ms. Schmidt’s project of writing 
her life story: “[…] I heard from behind the door the sounds of creation, the letters 
pressing into the paper, the pages being pulled from the machine, everything being, 
for once, better than it was and as good as it could be, everything full of meaning 
[…].” Foer 2005b: 119-120.  
28  This terminology refers to Aleida Assmann’s additions to Charles S. Pierce’s sign 
system. Cf. Assmann 2015: 54-56. 
29  “Emoticons (a contraction of the words ‘emotional icons’) are glyphs used in comput-
er-mediated communications, meant to represent facial expressions. When the Internet 
was entirely text-based, emoticons were rendered in ASCII, and read by tilting one’s 
head to the left, as the ‘smiley’ indicates :-). While more sophisticated methods to 
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stance, you might want to put :) or ;) after an ironic statement to ensure the in-
tended interpretation. Emoticons are considered to add the information that 
gesture and facial expression provide in face-to-face communication; they serve 
as equivalents to nonverbal cues in spoken dialogue.30 
Like emoticons in chat conversation, the Punctuation of Heart Disease adds 
“a paralinguistic component to a message”.31 After being introduced to the sys-
tem, the signs enable the reader of the short story to interpret the intonation and 
the silences in the quoted dialogues more accurately. However, a more thorough 
reading of the short story at least partly dismisses this comparison. While emoti-
cons ‒ in their primary, simple usage32 ‒ transmit collective and generally reada-
ble “social cues”33 like a smile or a wink, the signs in Foer’s book mostly desig-
nate feelings that are very individual and have no conventional expression. Es-
pecially in the description of the “corroboration mark”, which looks exactly like 












                 Figure 2: The corroboration mark 
                                                                                                                                  
display emoticons exist today, their purpose has remained the same: They are used to 
communicate the emotional state of the author.” Senft 2003: 177. 
 For a useful summary of research on emoticons as well as empirical surveys cf. Derks 
et al. 2007. 
30  Cf. Derks et al. 2007: 29. 
31  Derks et al. 2007: 843. 
32  By stating this, I want to stress the difference between the sign system of the short 
story and the pragmatic usage of simple emoticons like the winking smiley. Still, I 
acknowledge the more and more sophisticated and subtle functions that emoticons and 
especially their stylized form, emojis, are gaining. Cf. Albert 2015: 16 (translation 
J.G.). 
33  Derks et al. 2007: 843. 
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Here, the sign adds meaning not only to the written word but to language in 
general. An iconic usage is suggested ‒ the sign “is more or less what it looks 
like”34 ‒ but all the same, this is not a representation of a smiling person. It does 
not mimic the bodily reaction to emotional states, like raising the corners of the 
mouth, shivering or freezing. Neither does it hint at intonation, gesture or facial 
expression. Rather, this sign seeks to designate the feeling itself, which has not 
taken any visible form. 
In this sense, the sign brings something into language that was not expressi-
ble before at all; it thus adds vocabulary. Bearing this in mind, the sign system of 
“A Primer for the Punctuation of Heart Disease” can rather be compared to 
Egyptian hieroglyphs. In the hieroglyphic system there are signs that carry con-
text information but have no vocal equivalent. These determinatives define, for 
instance, if the neighbour sign is to be read as a verb or as a noun, or, e.g. if it 
designates a single event or a reoccurring generality. Consequently, a written 
text can convey much more meaning than speech.35 On this basis, the Egyptolo-
gist Jan Assmann has analysed the hieroglyphic determinatives as signs “beyond 
language”.36 They are extraordinary because here, against our habit, the written 
word emancipates itself from speech.37 It is rather in writing than in speaking 
that new meaning is created.38 
                                                             
34  Foer 2005a: 5. 
35  Cf. Assmann, Jan 2003: 52. In this function, hieroglyphs and emoticons can be com-
pared, as Aleida Assmann suggests. Assmann, Aleida 2015: 99-100. For another 
semiotic account that draws on this comparison cf. Albert 2015: 14-15. 
36  Cf. Assmann, Jan 2003: 41. 
37  Even if this article cannot consider it in detail, one must mention Jacques Derrida’s 
Grammatology at this point. The French philosopher examines the relationship be-
tween the written and the spoken word and the hegemony of the latter over the former. 
In this respect, he discusses various thinkers’ interpretation of hieroglyphs; regarding 
the writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, he states that hieroglyphs constitute a “lan-
guage of passion”: “La langue hiéroglyphique est une langue passionnée.” Derrida 
1967: 337. Furthermore, in Writing and Difference (1967) he discusses Sigmund 
Freud’s reference to the hieroglyphs in his dream interpretation as well as the im-
portance of hieroglyphs for Antonin Artaud’s understanding of theatre. Derrida’s phi-
losophy of language is of great importance for the issue of this article, not only in re-
gard to hieroglyphs but for a general consideration of the relationship between text 
and speech. A more deconstructivist account of Foer’s work and especially of this 
short story would be an interesting topic for another article. 
38  Jan Assmann speaks in this respect of “etymography” as an equivalent to “etymolo-
gy”; while the latter observes the origin and the formation of words, etymography ex-
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Aleida and Jan Assmann explain the profound and timeless fascination with 
the hieroglyph in terms of its hybridity: “It represents a visual notion that cannot 
be translated into language completely.”39 It thus undermines the clear distinc-
tion between signifier and signified that has dominated modern thinking:40 “The 
hieroglyph is a holistic sign that exceeds the logic of the dualistic sign structure, 
including the hierarchy of values it implies.”41 This is why, the hieroglyphic 
system has fed the imagination since its beginnings. It has been considered a 
material articulation of creation in opposition to a mere representation of the 
world.42  
Comparing the punctuation to hieroglyphs, the intention of the narrator 
comes to the fore: his signs do not represent other, non-verbal signs ‒ they do 
not, e.g. stand for a smile ‒, but they aim at creating new realities.  
 
 
THE SEARCH FOR THE PERFECT LANGUAGE 
 
As already pointed out, the central issues of Foer’s protagonists are the unavoid-
able contamination of language with past meaning and too great a distance be-
tween word and world. These problems take place in the infamous space 
between the referent, the signifier, and the signified. It is this gap between les 
mots et les choses where the contamination takes hold, the misunderstanding 
happens and the distance to life is created ‒ the order of things is never naturally 
                                                                                                                                  
amines similar metaphors of visual representation in different iconic languages, such 
as Hebrew script, Egyptian hieroglyphs and Japanese kanjis. Cf. Assmann, Jan 2003: 
40. 
39  “Die Hieroglyphe ist ein Zwitter: Sie verkörpert einen bildlichen Begriff, der nicht 
gänzlich in Sprache zu übersetzen ist.” Assmann, Aleida/Assmann, Jan 2003a: 20 
(translation J.G.). 
40  They refer to the famous dyadic semiotic model that Ferdinand de Saussure defines in 
his Cours de linguistique générale (Course in General Linguistics) from 1916. Fol-
lowing Saussure, the sign is composed of the signifier (the sound-image/the word) and 
the signified (the concept; the idea of what the speaker wants to express). The actual 
object the sign refers to he terms referent. 
41  “Die Hieroglyphe ist ein holistisches Zeichen, das die Logik der dualen Zeichenstruk-
tur samt der damit verbundenen Werthierarchie sprengt.” Assmann, Aleida/Assmann, 
Jan 2003b: 268 (translation J.G.). 
42  Cf. ibid.: 269. 
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given to us, but always mediated through language.43 “In its original form, when 
it was given to men by God himself, language was an absolutely certain and 
transparent sign for things, because it resembled them. […] This transparency 
was destroyed at Babel as a punishment for men.”44  
Foer’s protagonists dream the dream of a pre-Babylonian language that 
doesn’t have this gap, because it is primarily and naturally connected to the 
things it designates. However, as “A Primer for the Punctuation of Heart Dis-
ease” shows, they don’t waste their time lamenting Babel. Rather they actively 
struggle to at least approximate this utopian, pre-Babylonian language usage – a 
non-representational, genuine and non-arbitrary expression: they engage in a 
search for the perfect language.45 
To understand this search, we must come back to the fascination for hiero-
glyphs and to the hermeneutic tradition of Judaism. In The Order of Things 
Foucault hints at the particular role of Hebrew in the utopia of a perfect, original 
language: 
 
There is only one language that retains a memory of that similitude, because it derives in 
direct descent from that first vocabulary which is now forgotten […]. Hebrew therefore 
contains, as if in the form of fragments, the marks of that original name-giving. And those 
words pronounced by Adam as he imposed them upon the various animals have endured, 
in part at least, and still carry with them in their density, like an embedded fragment of 
silent knowledge, the unchanging properties of beings […].46 
 
In Everything Is Illuminated this primal link between language and life is a 
recurrent motif. For instance, there is The Book of Antecedents, a detailed report 
the villagers of Trachimbrod keep of their everyday life. At the same time, they 
seem to adhere to the idea that their life only comes into existence with this 
writing. When the narrator imagines a future report of this nature, its fatalistic 
context comes to the fore: 
                                                             
43  In Les Mots et les Choses (The Order of Things) from 1966, Michel Foucault tries to 
grasp the relationship between words and things and how it changed in the course of 
history. 
44  Foucault 2005 [1966]: 40. 
45  La Ricerca della Lingua Perfetta nella Cultura Europea (The Search for the Perfect 
Language) is the title of Umberto Eco’s insightful book on religious, mystical and 
sociopolitical efforts to find or create a perfect language that bears the promise to 
breach the barrier of mediation and thus is envisioned to be immediate and insepara-
bly connected to what it expresses. Cf. Eco 1995. 
46  Foucault 2005 [1966]: 40. 
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Even the most delinquent students read The Book of Antecedents without skipping a word, 
for they knew that they too would one day inhabit its pages, that if they could only get 
hold of a future edition, they would be able to read of their mistakes (and perhaps avoid 
them), and the mistakes of their children (and ensure that they would never happen), and 
the outcome of future wars (and prepare for the death of loved ones).47 
 
Especially in the Kabbalistic tradition, we find the strong belief that words bear 
an immediate connection to their signification and that a single letter could 
change the whole world.48 In this view, the divine dimension of language is 
hidden or even lost to humans. However, since the word of God is the origin of 
the material world, the cosmologic meaning is still contained in the letters, even 
when used in an ignorant, pragmatic, everyday communicational way. 
 
Since every letter represents a concentration of divine energy, it may be inferred from the 
deficiency of its present visible form that the power of severe judgment, which sets its 
stamp on our world, impedes the activity of the hidden lights and forces and prevents them 
from being fully manifested. The limitations of our life under the rule of the visible Torah 
show that something is missing in it which will be made good only in another state of 
being.49 
 
Foer’s most recent novel Here I Am (2016) reinforces this approach to his work: 
“Judaism has a special relationship with words. Giving a word to a thing is to 
give it life. […] No magic. No raised hands and thunder. The articulation made it 
possible. It is perhaps the most powerful of all Jewish ideas: expression is gener-
ative.”50 This defines what has been called the “building the world anew”-




                                                             
47  Foer 2002a: 196. 
48  Cf. Scholem 1965: 38-39. 
49  Ibid.: 80. 
50  Foer 2016: 350. This can be said, once again, especially for Kabbalistic practices. Cf. 
Eco 1995: 31. 
51  Foer 2005b: 119-120 (Cf. footnote 29 in this article). 
52  Extremely Loud & Incredibly Close, too, is highly interesting to read in this respect. 
Even though it does not deal with this aspect of Jewish hermeneutics, the reading of 
signs and signals is at the core of the story. Cf. Grillmayr 2016. 
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THE PUNCTUATION IN PRACTICE 
 
That the Punctuation of Heart Disease wants to be one step towards the perfect 
language, which would have this generative power, becomes clear when thinking 
more thoroughly about the title of the short story. It describes itself as a primer 
introducing a punctuation. Taking this title seriously, it must be recognized 
ultimately that the sign system sketched here is of a very paradoxical nature. As 
has been stated for the hieroglyphic system, the additional information that it 
promises is produced in written language only; the icon or symbol has no 
equivalent in spoken language.53 Thus, the system really is what it promises to 
be: punctuation. Equivalent to emoticons, it might help the reader of the short 
story to better understand the quoted dialogues. Moreover, if there were other 
books using these signs, this short text surely would qualify as a helpful primer.  
However, only this short story draws on these specific signs and also, in the 
way the narrator uses and describes them, one rather gains the impression that 
they are intended for spoken conversations. This evidently does not make any 
sense, since the signs can’t be communicated verbally. This paradox, which 
exposes this sophisticatedly described punctuation as useless, emphasizes the 
reading of the short story as a utopia of immediate language usage. Against the 
background of the Jewish tradition – that is ever present in Foer’s literature – 
and its idea of a generative expression, it is valid to read these signs as kinds of 
speech acts.  
While emoticons want to stimulate and increase communication, the Punctu-
ation of Heart Disease, in contrast, seems rather to have the end of the conversa-
tion as a goal. Take for instance the “willed silence mark”: having called upon 
this sign, it should create a “wall over which you can’t climb” – ideally not in a 
figurative sense, but literally. The narrator does not use “willed silence marks”, 
but he inflicts them upon his mother.54 This is similarly the case for the converse, 
the expression of positive feelings; e.g. the “Barely Tolerable Substitutes” for the 
phrase “I love you” have the aim of transmitting the message with as little lin-
guistic ballast as possible. In this case, the conversation ends because an under-
standing is reached.  
Bearing in mind what has been stated about the idea of a generative dimen-
sion of hieroglyphs as well as letters in the tradition of the Kabbalah, these signs 
have to be considered as speech acts in a mystic-magical realm, where they 
                                                             
53  With Jan Assmann, we could say the language produces meaning in an “etymograph-
ical” way. Cf. Assmann, Jan 2003: 40. 
54  Foer 2005a: 1. 
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really could create walls, but also transmit feelings directly without any mediat-
ing role of language. This is the case, e.g. for the sign , the “low point”, which 
is “used either in place – or for accentuation at the end – of such phrases as ‘This 
is terrible,’ ‘This is irremediable,’ ‘It couldn’t possibly be worse’”.55 The narra-
tor explains that the “low point” only comes in pairs in his familial communica-
tion, because the sadness it hints at is itself produced and augmented by the 
expression of sadness: “her sadness then makes me sad. Thus is created a ‘low-
point chain’:  . . . ∞.”56 Another example of a speech act is , the sign 
for “backup”. It seems to allow the turning back of time, or at least its slowing 
down, in order to accurately comprehend and interpret what has been said by the 
conversation partner: “we start again at the beginning, we replay what was 
missed and make an effort to hear what was meant instead of what was said”.57 
 
 
CONCLUSION: WRITING THE WORLD ANEW 
 
In conclusion, I can state that Foer’s books portray a love–hate relationship with 
language. They show the arbitrariness of language as a curse on the one hand 
and a blessing on the other: because everything we share in communication is 
always mediated through language, text can be considered a barrier between the 
speaker/the writer and life; at the same time, not only contamination and misun-
derstanding is created in this infamous gap between the word and the world, but 
also life itself. Writing bears the chance of “building the world anew”.58 
“A Primer for the Punctuation of Heart Disease” can give us some leads on 
how to interpret Foer’s novels not only from a psychological perspective, but as 
a kind of laboratory in which one can approach very carefully the idea of a 
fundamental link between words and the world. In his reflection on the relation-
ship between conservative religious practices and the mystical beliefs of the 
Kabbalah, Gershom Scholem points out that the creation of new symbols has the 
effect of a necessary renovation. He points out the social aspect of symbol build-
ing: 
 
Symbols, by their very nature, are a means of expressing an experience that is in itself 
expressionless. But this psychological aspect is not the whole story. They also have a 
                                                             
55  Ibid.: 4. 
56  Ibid.: 5. 
57  Ibid.: 8. 
58  Foer 2005b: 119-120 (Cf. footnote 29 in this article). 
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function in the human community. We may indeed go so far as to say that it is one of the 
main functions of religious symbols to preserve the vitality of religious experience in a 
traditional, conservative milieu. The richness of meaning that they seem to emanate lends 
new life to tradition, which is always in danger of freezing into dead forms and this pro-
cess continues until the symbols themselves die or change.59 
 
This accounts also for the effort of the narrator to create symbols for a more 
accurate language of feelings. In the laboratory of “A Primer for the Punctuation 
of Heart Disease”, we are not in denial about the arbitrariness of language; how-
ever, the short story gives a taste of a kind of pre-Babylonian relation to lan-
guage that is comforting. It can therefore give an understanding of what Umberto 
Eco calls the “consolation for the curse of Babel”:60 “The story of the search for 
the perfect language is the story of a dream and of a series of failures. Yet that is 
not to say that a story of failures must itself be a failure.”61 Because, concludes 
Eco, “[…] through examining the defects of the perfect languages, conceived in 
order to eliminate the defects of the natural ones, we shall end up by discovering 
that these natural languages of ours contain some unexpected virtues”.62 
“With writing, we have second chances”63 is the premise of Foer’s books. 
The “unexpected virtue” of our imperfect language is its very own creational 
character that is based on its arbitrariness, which makes it playful and every 
communicational act necessarily “full of meaning”.64 These books leave us with 
the impression of text and life as ever entwined and at the same time ever sepa-
rated – and the insight that this relationship can be hurtful as well as vital. Even 
if the quest of Foer’s protagonists seems to be the abolishment of language in 
favour of an immediate expression of their feelings, this search, which happens 
first and foremost through language, is the very motor of their lives. “The key 
itself may be lost, but an immense desire to look for it remains alive”65 – and 
thus keeps them alive.  
As has been pointed out, this love–hate relationship with language in the 
work of Jonathan Safran Foer is tightly linked to how he experiences Jewish text 
exegesis. Its hair-splitting, extremely detailed and severe dimension intensifies 
                                                             
59  Scholem 1965: 22. 
60  Eco 1995: 20. 
61  Ibid.: 19. 
62  Ibid.: 20. 
63  Foer 2002a: 144. 
64  Foer 2005b: 119-120.  
65  Scholem writes this with regard to the mystical exegesis; “mystical exegesis, this new 
revelation imparted to the mystic, has the character of a key”. Scholem 1965: 12. 
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the impression of being caught in text while life passes by. All the same, this 
practice of course implies a high valuing and appreciation of text. In Here I Am 
there is a short passage considering a better translation of the word ‘Jew’ into 
sign language for deaf-mutes: “‘Maybe palms open like a book?’ […] / ‘I wasn’t 
thinking that it was reading a book, but the book itself. The Torah, maybe. Or the 
Book of Life’.”66 
Foer’s books are themselves love letters to literature and to the nature of 
literary expression that evades exact definitions and can preserve paradoxes and 
inconsistencies – which in the end seems to be the one and only accurate way to 
approximate the expression of feelings. In the hieroglyphic language there is one 
determinative that defines abstract notions that cannot possibly be pictured: it 
features a book.67 
The very last sign of the Punctuation of Heart Disease supports this comfort-
ing, conciliatory reading that has been presented in conclusion to this article: {}, 
the “should-have brackets”, which “signify words that were not spoken but 
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                    Figure 3: Dialogue 
 
Finally, the signs take over the conversation and there is hope that not all silenc-
es were actual silences, but “silence marks”, “low points”, “corroboration 
marks”, “Barely Tolerable Substitutes” and various “should-have brackets”. 
There is the hope that one can understand the other’s feelings and in turn, be 
understood by the other. In this sense, the “should-have brackets” are the ulti-
mate speech act. What separates us from this genuine understanding of one 
another is just a little rewriting: “Of course, my sense of the should-have is un-
likely to be the same as my brothers’, or my mother’s, or my father’s. Sometimes 
[…] I imagine their should-have versions. I sew them together into a new life, 
leaving out everything that actually happened and was said.”69 
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Form and Emotion in Stephen Chbosky’s  







The fifteen-year-old protagonist Charlie, who is “both happy and sad” and “still 
trying to figure out how that could be” in Stephen Chbosky’s The Perks of Being 
a Wallflower (1999), finds himself in an emotional dilemma typical for adoles-
cents and frequently presented in coming-of-age novels.1 Not only is Charlie 
scared of starting high school but he also struggles to understand why his best 
friend Michael committed suicide without leaving a note for Charlie to read. 
Despair, sadness, self-doubt, occasional glimpses of hope and a deep longing for 
love are only some of the emotions dominating Charlie’s coming of age. Charlie, 
an underdog at his school and classified as the wallflower of his group of friends, 
starts letter writing over the course of one year to help him battle his fear of 
starting high school without having friends. His epistles record his own position 
within his social context as much as they establish a space in which Charlie 
learns to reflect critically on his role in life.2 While Charlie’s epistles show a 
growing sense of self-reflexivity, Charlie eventually succeeds in fulfilling a 
number of promises he discusses in his epistles, such as attaining friendships 
with like-minded people at his school, growing closer to his family members, as 
well as falling in love with someone who cherishes him for who he is. Moreover, 
writing allows Charlie to remember his past of having been sexually molested by 
his late Aunt Helen, whom he praises as his favourite person of all time despite 
                                                             
1  Chbosky 1999: 3. 
2  Cf. Matos 2013: 86. 
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what she did to him. Thus, the epistolary form constitutes a vital tool in Charlie’s 
learning about his idenity formation and initiation into the adult world. 
This essay asks how Chbosky employs the epistolary form as a means of 
demonstrating the protagonist’s ability to assess his struggles with what he re-
gards as his identity and self in a crucial phase of development. It will argue that 
Charlie’s writing encourages his self-scrutiny, which helps in his understanding 
of how he can become more emotionally stable. Therefore, his attachment to 
writing letters figures as the central solution in Charlie’s struggle: He succeeds 
in coming to terms with his repressed past of having been molested by his aunt, 
whom he thinks of as his best childhood friend, and ultimately learns what it 
means to be loved, while evolving “from a passive observer of life to an active 
participant”.3 
While the first section of this paper will focus on situating Chbosky’s novel 
within the context of the epistolary Young Adult novel, the second section will 
utilize Lauren Berlant’s concept of “cruel optimism” in order to analyse Char-
lie’s inner emotional upheaval. This latter section will address the cluster of 
promises he has constructed for himself, consisting of his hope to make friends, 
being able to enter a romantic relationship and accepting love, and freeing him-
self from letting the absent presence of his deceased aunt Helen hover over every 
decision he makes. Berlant’s theory of “cruel optimism” focuses on affective and 
social belonging.4 She argues that the individual forms bonds to various objects, 
hoping that these objects will make their fantasies a reality but which ultimately 
fail to do so. In Perks, Charlie faces a struggle in which he questions the reasons 
why he has been positioned into the role of the outsider, unable to express his 
feelings and find people to share his social life with and to ultimately attain what 
Berlant calls the “good life”. Berlant’s concept of “cruel optimism” shall help in 
the analysis of this inner struggle of overcoming his attachment to his aunt, 
whose presence hinders him in attaining happiness. Her concept shall help in 
understanding how letter writing eventually helps Charlie succeed in coming to 
terms with his past and implications for his future. 
 
 
2. CHBOSKY’S NOVEL AND EPISTOLARY FORM 
 
When trying to determine the novel’s genre, two factors need to be considered: 
first, the characteristics of the epistolary form and of the diary; second, the narra-
                                                             
3  Ibid. 
4  Berlant 2011. 
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tive situation and communicative set-up implied by Perks. Regarding the first 
issue, it is central that Charlie is the only character writing the epistles. The 
novel thus lacks the communication character, as communication is one-sided in 
the novel. This begs the question as to why Charlie writes letters instead of diary 
entries. Regarding the second issue, the addressee of Charlie’s epistles seems to 
be a stranger who Charlie does not know personally or, if at all, only superficial-
ly. The person’s name is kept a secret and so is that of the writer, who uses 
‘Charlie’ as his pseudonym, for he points out in his first letter that he would 
prefer to remain anonymous in order to be utterly candid in his writing. 
 
2.1 The Epistolary Novel  
 
Generally speaking, epistolary novels comprise a series of letters. These epistles 
present communication between two or more correspondents who are physically 
separated; hence, the letter serves “as a bridge between sender and receiver”.5 
Altman claims that the epistolary form either draws the letter writers closer to 
each other or emphasizes their physical distance.6 Concerning the unique form of 
any epistolary fiction, Altman regards their composition as an “epistolary mosa-
ic” which evolves out of individual subunits, as each “letter retains its own unity 
while remaining a unit within a larger configuration”.7  
Despite retaining their own unity, there is a narrative continuity to be detect-
ed in the sum of the epistles comprising the epistolary novel. Narrative continui-
ty is, according to Altman, “largely limited to novels dominated by a single 
correspondent”.8 When a single plot line starts to dominate the series of epistles, 
“narrative continuity frequently overrides epistolary discontinuity”.9 This devel-
opment is seen when plot development becomes more important than identifying 
the narrator. When continuity is emphasized, the epistolary form limits the story 
to one single plot line as constituted by one letter writer and one addressee, 
whose letter exchange is then presented in a chronological manner.10 On the 
other hand, foregrounding the epistolary form’s discontinuity can be emphasized 
by the instalment of various plot lines or the disruption of the temporal line. 
Moreover, variously coloured writing styles can emphasize the illusion of read-
ing sets of epistles written by a number of different correspondents. The serial 
                                                             
5  Altman 1982: 13.  
6  Ibid.: 14-15. 
7  Ibid.: 169.  
8  Ibid.: 170. 
9  Ibid.  
10  Cf. ibid.: 169.  
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nature of epistles can instal cliffhangers or suspense between the epistles, which, 
too, contribute to the employing of discontinuity of the epistolary form.  
As far as the role of the reader of the epistolary novel is concerned, he or she 
is given the role of the “detective-collector”, piecing together parts from the 
epistles to establish a certain continuity in plot that allows an understanding of 
the fragmentary narrative as a whole.11 While the epistolary form usually serves 
as a means of communication between two or more physically dislocated corre-
spondents and is thus frequently utilized to tell stories of love, it can also serve 
the purpose of assessing and reevaluating repressed emotions. In Saul Bellow’s 
1964 epistolary novel Herzog, the protagonist writes to people from his past, 
some of whom are already dead. “Herzog’s epistolary style of free association 
enables him to recall his past, to bring to the conscious level repressed emo-
tions”, Altman claims.12 In Bellow’s novel, the epistle can be thought of as the 
“medium through which he [Herzog] resurrects and reconstructs his past. […] 
Only after the past has been conquered and classified as past can Herzog begin 
anew”, Altman points out.13 Thus, epistolary communication does not necessari-
ly need to take place between two correspondents in different locations. In the 
case of Bellow’s Herzog, epistolary mediation takes on the role of connecting 
the subconscious with the past of the protagonist. “Herzog’s abandonment of his 
scribbling at the end of his novel constitutes a declaration of mental stability”.14  
To sum up, not only does the epistolary novel offer a narrative, but each of 
its subunits, the letters, do the same, and can therefore be considered separate 
narratives. While narrative continuity is more common in monologic epistolary 
works, narrative discontinuity occurs more easily when the epistolary work is of 
a dialogic or polylogic character, containing the epistles of two or more corre-
spondents. The reader is given the role of the detective, who is encouraged to 
piece together the epistles despite possible discontinuity due to narrative and 
spatial distribution. While the epistolary form generally serves the purpose of 
communication between two or more correspondents who are separated in loca-
tion, the writing of letters can, moreover, fulfil a psychotherapeutic purpose and 
help the writer face suppressed emotions of the past, as is the case in Perks, 
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13  Ibid.: 42. 
14  Ibid.  
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2.2 The Epistolary Form vs. Diary Fiction 
 
In the distinction between the epistolary form and diary fiction, a crucial facet 
characterizing and intrinsic to the epistolary form is the desire for exchange. “In 
epistolary writing the reader is called upon to respond as a writer and to contrib-
ute as such to the narrative”.15 Altman suggests that what distinguishes the two 
forms is the “existence of a real addressee”, who is perceived as “other” than the 
writer of the epistles.16 Just like Altman, Abbott is of the opinion that “letters 
require an addressee and a diary does not”.17 The central idea of the letter ena-
bling a means of communication stands in stark contrast to the characteristics 
intrinsic to diary fiction as well as the diary novel.  
 
The term ‘diary’ evokes an intensity of privacy, cloistering, isolation, that the term ‘letter’ 
does not. From our point of view, the strategic decision that the author makes is not the 
decision to have periodic entries in letter form or diary form, but the decision to create 
cumulatively the effect of a conscious thrown back on its own resources, abetted only by 
its pen. This effect is enabled by a proportional suppression of other writing, writing by 
narrators or correspondents.18 
 
In diary fiction, Abbot claims, correspondence with other narrators is sup-
pressed, causing the writer of the journal entries to reflect without any influence 
from the outside. Abbott, moreover, discusses the letter-journal strategy, or 
“échange unilateral”. Richardson’s Pamela; or: Virtue Rewarded of 1740 quali-
fies as such a letter-journal, being made up of both epistles as well as journal 
entries, which allow the protagonist Pamela “to reflect and improve upon her 
psychological well-being”.19  
The boundaries between the letter and diary are, however, often blurred. Fic-
tive diaries sometimes have an addressee, which leads to the question of whether 
they are disqualified as diaries. “Fictive diarists commonly address their remarks 
to someone – friend, lover, God, the diary itself”, which is the case in well-
known diary novels such as Anne Frank’s The Diary of Anne Frank, in which 
Anne addresses her diary as ‘Kitty’; it is also the case in several Young Adult 
novels which entail letters to God, such as Judy Blume’s Are You There God? 
                                                             
15  Ibid.: 89.  
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17  Abbott 1984: 9. 
18  Ibid.: 11.  
19  Dale 2000: 53. 
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It’s Me, Margaret (1970) or Sydney Hopkins’ Dear Mister God, This Is Anna 
(1974).  
Abbott, moreover, suggests that it is not only the existence or nonexistence 
of an addressee that distinguishes diary from epistolary fiction, but to which 
extent that addressee “is given an independent life and an active textual role in 
the work”.20 In contrast to the traditional correspondence novel as discussed 
earlier, sometimes the addressee is merely given the role of the listener. In Goe-
the’s The Sorrows of Young Werther (1774), the addressee is “the silent friend, 
real or invented” whom fictive diarists frequently address.21 Abbott points out 
that because the character of the addressee is constructed through Werther’s 
words only, “he is easily conceived as Werther’s other self, the solid rational self 
that Werther seeks to override”.22 
As has been shown, the epistolary form distinguishes itself from the diary in 
the sense that the diarist lacks the need for exchange. The diarist does not intend 
for his writing to be shared or commented upon. Instead, the diary serves a re-
flective purpose, allowing for its writer to reconsider their positioning in the 
diegetic reality in isolation, while the author of the letter intends for his epistles 
to be (usually) answered by an addressee other than himself or herself. 
 
2.3 The Young Adult Epistolary Novel 
 
The epistolary form has been frequently employed within Young Adult fiction 
over the past years. Wasserman claims that “even though there seems to be more 
works written by, for, and about young adults in diary form, such as Anne 
Frank’s seminal The Diary of a Young Girl” or Sherman Alexie’s The Absolutely 
True Diary of a Part-Time Indian (2007), “there are many examples of adoles-
cent fiction that use the epistolary style”.23 While novels such as John Marsden’s 
Letters from the Inside (1994), Christ Crutcher’s Chinese Handcuffs (1996), 
Gary Crew and Libby Harthorn’s Dear Venny, Dear Saffron (2000), and Megan 
McCafferty's Sloppy Firsts (2001) all use the epistolary form in its traditional 
sense, works like Rainbow Rowell’s Attachments (2011), Maria Semple’s 
Where’d You Go, Bernadette (2012), or Lauren Myracle’s “The Internet Girls 
trilogy”, including TTYL (2004), TTFN (2006), and L8TER, G8TER (2008) 
among others, are told in emails, scripts of online chats, instant messages, snip-
                                                             
20  Abbott 1984: 10.  
21  Ibid.: 11. 
22  Ibid.  
23  Wasserman 2003: 48. 
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pets from journal entries, or other web based means of communications, which 
mimic epistolary communication to a certain degree.  
Wasserman points out that the epistolary form is a well fitted means to mir-
ror how the protagonist “is trapped within his or her own world and within his or 
her own skin”.24 Because adolescence marks a time in the individual’s life that is 
generally characterized as rocky, the “epistolary is well suited to adolescent 
literature, for young adult literature describes how the interior monologue can 
lead to constructive change”.25 Moreover, it is in particular the interior mono-
logue of the protagonist that allows the reader to enter the young protagonist’s 
mind and diegetic reality he or she writes about in his or her epistles.26 
 
2.4 Perks as an Epistolary Novel 
 
In Chbosky’s novel, Charlie is the only letter writer. While an actual narrating 
instance is presented by the role of the narrator, “the reader has the impression 
that he is confronted by a personalized narrator, as opposed to direct or immedi-
ate presentation, that is, the reflection of the fictional reality in the consciousness 
of a character”.27 As a narrator, Charlie seems personalized, as he actively dis-
cusses his daily experiences in his epistles and thus appears to be tangible as a 
narrating instance. Moreover, the character of Charlie inhabits the diegetic reali-
ty he writes about in his series of epistles. Thus, the novel can be classified as 
first-person narration in the traditional sense. As far as perspective in the novel is 
concerned, Charlie is the hero of the story he tells through his epistles. He pro-
vides the reader with an internal perspective of his story. The narrating and expe-
riencing self in Chbosky’s novel can be considered almost identical. Because 
there is little time to reflect on his experiences, Charlie narrates from a more 
immediate perspective, usually composing his letters on the days the incidents he 
writes about happen. There is no time for maturation to take place between expe-
riencing and narrating. Nevertheless, the novel illustrates Charlie’s maturing 
over time. While his individual epistles might show his inability to reflect effec-
tively on his own person, Charlie is obviously working on improving his self-
awareness: “Also, when I write letters, I spend the next two days thinking about 
what I figured out in my letters”.28 
                                                             
24  Ibid. 
25  Stringer quoted in Wasserman 2003: 48. 
26  Cf. Wasserman 2003: 48-49. 
27  Stanzel 1984: 48. 
28  Chbosky 1999: 31. 
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While Perks fulfills most of Stanzel’s prerequisites for a first-person narra-
tive and can be considered an epistolary novel as pointed out above, the novel’s 
structure also resembles that of a diary to a certain degree. As pointed out earlier, 
however, Charlie’s addressee is part of the novel’s diegetic world. In his series 
of epistles, Charlie addresses his recipient as “dear friend” and gives the reason 
why he chose that person to address his letters to: “I am writing to you because 
she said you listen and understand and didn’t try to sleep with that person at that 
party even though you could have”.29 Charlie thus seems to have chosen his 
recipient because he thinks she or he is non-judgmental. Therefore, Charlie is not 
afraid to be honest in his writing. While Charlie shares not only his achieve-
ments with the addressee of his epistles but also the unpleasant truths he discov-
ers through writing, such as remembering being molested by his aunt and realiz-
ing how lonely he is, Charlie feels inclined to keep his own identity a secret as 
well. Charlie points out in his first letter: 
 
Please don’t try to figure out who she is because then you might figure out who I am, and 
I really don’t want you to do that. I will call people by different names or generic names 
because I don’t want you to find me. […] I just need to know that someone out there 
listens and understands […].30 
 
As far as the role of the addressee of Charlie’s epistles is concerned, he or she 
cannot be introduced as Charlie keeps his or her identity a secret. Charlie does 
mention, however, that his addressee is older and more experienced than him. 
“Do you know what ‘masturbation’ is? I think you probably do because you are 
older than me”, Charlie assumes of his addressee.31 At other times, Charlie 
shares his most intimate thoughts, telling his addressee of his love for his friend 
Sam or of his sister’s abortion, which “[n]ot anyone […] not ever” can learn 
about, which again emphasizes the addressee as being a stranger to Charlie and 
his family.32 Even though the reader of Chbosky’s novel is given little infor-
mation about the anonymous recipient of Charlie’s epistles, we do know that 
Charlie sends them off and thus experiences a sense of closure. In one of his 
epistles he writes, “I knew that if I didn’t put it in a mailbox that I couldn’t get it 
back from, I would never mail the letter”.33 Wasserman claims that “Charlie 
needs to feel as though someone is listening to him, and these letters are his 
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chosen medium for being heard”.34 The addressee offers his presence in the form 
of mute responsiveness by “listening” to what Charlie has to say.35  
To conclude, The Perks of Being a Wallflower can be classified as an episto-
lary novel rather than a diary novel for the following reasons: despite lacking a 
need for exchange, Charlie sends off the epistles, which provides closure and at 
the same time suggests that his addressee is a real person whose address Charlie 
has. By sending them off, Charlie is given the impression that he is heard and 
has made the friend he lacks in real life in the recipient of his epistles. I claim 
that the epistolary form seems to have been chosen carefully in that it makes 
clear the message that the act of writing functions as a means of accepting the 
past Charlie has struggled to come to terms with. Only during the course of the 
novel does he find a real-life listener in his friends Patrick and Sam. This realiza-
tion would not have been possible if Charlie wrote down his fears, wishes, 
hopes, and dreams in a diary without having to trust that there are people like his 
addressee who are, according to Charlie, genuinely good people willing to listen 
to what he has to share. 
 
 
3. CRUEL OPTIMISM 
 
Charlie, a loner and outsider at his new school, observes instead participates in 
social events and is deeply hurt by the fact that his best friend, Michael, commits 
suicide without leaving a note for Charlie to explain this atrocious act. Only 
through writing does Charlie gradually regain emotional stability. Moreover, 
Charlie hopes not only to come to terms with his past, but also to fulfil a number 
of promises he has made to himself which he thinks will help him to eventually 
attain happiness, such as crafting a closer bond with his family, making new 
friends, as well as improving his writing and language skills. Repeatedly, he 
refers to his dead Aunt Helen, who, he claims, was the only person to ever love 
him unconditionally: “My Aunt Helen was my favorite person in the whole 
world”, he says of her.36 However, his attachment to his aunt, for whose death he 
blames himself – she died in a car accident when about to buy Charlie’s birthday 
present – keeps him from obtaining a level of mental stability that would allow 
him to have hope for his future and trust in reaching the goals he has set for 
himself. Reading Charlie’s emotional struggle of suppressing the memory of his 
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unhealthy relationship with and distorted image of his aunt through Berlant’s 
concept of “cruel optimism”, offers the possibility of contextualizing Charlie’s 
journey over the span of a year in which he writes to his “dear friend”, eventual-
ly remembering having been molested as a child and finding closure with his 
past. As he lets go of allowing his aunt’s legacy to control his everyday life, he 
ultimately forgives her and understands that she is only one of the people who 
have made him the person he is by the end of the novel.  
 
Gaining a Sense of Self 
 
Berlant claims that “all attachments are optimistic”.37 So are Charlie’s, as he is 
sure that letter writing will help him in his personal development. The catch is 
that people tend to be attached to attaining something that turns out to be an 
obstacle to personal fulfilment. Instead of attaining a single object, whether it 
may be tangible or intangible, it is much rather a cluster of promises “we want 
someone or something make to us and make possible for us”.38 Only when those 
expectations are fulfilled does an individual consider himself or herself capable 
of being happy and attaining the so-called “good life”. While Berlant does not 
define this idea of the good life, she claims that, for many, it turns into a “bad 
life that wears out the subjects who nonetheless, and at the same time, find their 
conditions of possibility within it”.39 Charlie hopes to be able to live his own 
idea of the good life once he has fulfilled the following promises comprising his 
own personal cluster.  
First, Charlie’s aim is to acquire a group of like-minded people with whom 
he can share his life. “It would be very nice to have a friend again. I would like 
that even more than a date”, Charlie writes.40 Second, Charlie repeatedly men-
tions how he wishes to be closer to his family members. Just as in school, Char-
lie embodies the role of the outsider in his family. When his best friend Sam tells 
Charlie she loves him, he writes, “it was the third time since my Aunt Helen died 
that I heard it from anyone”, which also suggests that he urges to hear such af-
firmations in the social space of his family.41 Third, Charlie longs to find love 
and enter a romantic relationship with Sam. He is, however, hindered from being 
with her, as his memory of being molested by his aunt when Sam touches him in 
a sexual way stops him from enjoying it. Cruel optimism can in this discussion 
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be thought of as a “model for encountering scenes where object loss appears to 
entail the loss of an entire world and therefore a loss of confidence about how to 
live on, even at the microlevel of bodily comportment”.42 Letting go of the 
memory of his aunt in the setting of a sexual encounter would allow Charlie to 
be with Sam and freely live his sexuality. Because his aunt is the only one who 
has ever hugged Charlie throughout his childhood, he clings to the memory of 
her: “Sam then gave me a hug, and it was strange because my family doesn’t hug 
a lot except my Aunt Helen”.43 Fourth, Charlie wishes to turn his passion for 
writing into a profession one day. Through writing additional assignments for his 
English class teacher, Bill, Charlie develops a love for writing outside the space 
of his series of letters and his style gradually develops from being descriptive to 
lively. 
Charlie’s inability to detach himself from letting his memory of his aunt in-
fluence his daily life is also due to Charlie blaming himself for his aunt’s death: 
“And I know that my aunt Helen would still be alive today if she just bought me 
one present like everybody else. I miss her terribly”.44 That feeling of guilt keeps 
Charlie from letting go of his past and his memories of Aunt Helen. “[A] poetics 
of attachment always involves some splitting off of the story I can tell about 
wanting to be near x (as though x has autonomous qualities) from the activity of 
the emotional habitus I have constructed, as a function of having x in my life”, 
explains Berlant.45 In the novel, x is embodied by Charlie’s memories of his 
aunt. Having constructed a habituated emotional reality around his belief that his 
aunt was the only person to ever love him, Charlie keeps her memory in close 
proximity in his mind and is thus unable to detach himself from the memories he 
has of her, nor from feeling responsible for her death.  
In the course of writing his epistles, however, Charlie realizes that there is no 
vast change when he attains some of his goals. Berlant offers the following ex-
planation for why optimism turns cruel: “optimism is cruel when the ob-
ject/scene that ignites a sense of possibility actually makes it impossible to attain 
the expansive transformation” an individual is hoping to attain by reaching a 
certain goal.46 As far as his cluster of promises is concerned, Charlie does suc-
ceed in acquiring a group of people around him whom he feels comfortable with 
and enjoys being around. Moreover, he notices that they care about him, too, in 
the way his aunt did. As far as his hope of feeling closer to his parents and sib-
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44  Ibid.: 98. 
45  Berlant 2011: 25. 
46  Ibid.: 2.  
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lings is concerned, he does mention that his relationship with his sister in partic-
ular progresses over time. Towards the end of the novel he mentions how much 
he loves his sister, who has hugged him twice that day: “Two in one day! I really 
do love my sister. Especially when she’s nice”, he tells his addressee.47 Addi-
tionally, he enters a relationship with Sam, who makes Charlie believe that he 
does matter and is in fact loveable. The reader does not learn whether or not he 
succeeds in becoming a writer, as the novel ends when Charlie is still a teenager.  
In the epilogue of the novel, Charlie has a central realization, understanding 
how he has come to terms with living, with what Berlant discusses as a life 
shaped by crisis at all times.48 After suffering from a nervous breakdown before 
having sex with Sam and slowly but surely remembering his aunt molesting him, 
“Charlie begins to come to grips with his repressed past, and he proposes to 
move on and change the direction of his life”.49 “When I fell asleep, I had this 
dream. My brother and my sister and I were watching television with my Aunt 
Helen. Everything was in slow motion. The sound was thick. And she was doing 
what Sam was doing. That’s when I woke up. And I didn’t know what the hell 
was going on.”50 Despite remembering that he was sexually abused as a child, 
Charlie is not defeated by his realization about his Aunt Helen, as indicated 
when he comes to the following conclusion: 
 
It’s like if I blamed my aunt Helen, I would have to blame her dad for hitting her and the 
friend of the family that fooled around with her when she was little. And the person that 
fooled around with him. […] I’m not the way I am because of what I dreamt and remem-
bered about my aunt Helen. That’s what I figured out when things got quiet.51 
 
In addition to understanding that it is not Aunt Helen’s fault that he has had 
trouble fitting in and finding people like his aunt who express their love towards 
him, Charlie comments on having been unaware of other people’s struggles 
influencing the attaining of their own happiness, as he was too focused on his 
own problems. Despite feeling unable to accept the love he has been given by 
the people around him, such as Sam, his outlook sounds positive and optimistic: 
“So, I guess we are who we are for a lot of reasons. And maybe we’ll never 
know most of them. But even if we don’t have the power to choose where we 
come from, we can still choose where we go from there. We can still do things. 
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49  Matos 2013: 94. 
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51  Ibid.: 228. 
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And we can try to feel okay about them.”52 That realization proves that Charlie 
has matured in the course of the novel and has gained an understanding of his 
surroundings, which has been primarily made possible through the act of writing. 
Berlant offers the following explanation, which also applies to Charlie’s realiza-
tion: 
 
Even when it turns out to involve a cruel relation, it would be wrong to see optimism’s 
negativity as a symptom of an error, a perversion, damage, or dark truth: optimism is, 
instead, a scene of negotiated sustenance that makes life bearable as it presents itself 
ambivalently, unevenly, incoherently.53 
 
Having suppressed the memory of his aunt molesting him as a child ultimately 
does not cause Charlie to lose hope altogether. Cruel optimism can, according to 
Berlant, be thought of as a “mode of lived immanence” by people who “ride the 
wave of the system of attachment that they are used to, to syncopate with it, or to 
be held in a relation of reciprocity, reconciliation, or resignation that does not 
mean defeat by it”.54 Because he has become so accustomed to clinging to his 
aunt’s memory, he is only able to detach himself when the shocking moment of 
remembering her sexual touching takes place and reveals the true nature of the 
relationship between himself and his aunt. In Charlie’s journey of letting go of 
his past and disregarding the fact that he has been molested, the character of 
Aunt Helen takes on the role of Berlant’s “powerful mute placeholder”, who is 
“a silent, affectively present but physically displaced interlocutor”, whose “con-
venient absence” has prevented Charlie from living the life he so desperately 
longs to live.55 However, having reflected on the role of his aunt in his life, Char-
lie’s conclusion proves the maturation he has experienced through addressing his 
personal development. Enduring that critical stage of learning about what his 
aunt did to him as well as surviving his first year of high school, which, as stated 
in his first letter, he was so afraid of, has made the flourishing of Charlie’s new 
friendships and relationship with Sam possible. As Berlant sums up: “Any object 
of optimism promises to guarantee the endurance of something, the survival of 
something, the flourishing of something, and above all the protection of the 
desire that made this object or scene powerful enough to have magnetized an 
attachment to it.”56 In the end, Charlie tells his addressee of his unconditional 
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53  Berlant 2011: 14. 
54  Ibid.: 28.  
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56  Chbosky 1999: 48. 
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love for his aunt, whose memory is discussed as powerful enough for Charlie to 
keep a magnetized attachment to. He forgives his aunt for what she did to him, 
as she is only one of the people who has made him the person he has become 
when he closes his last letter. 
With aborting letter writing, Charlie furthermore lets go of the fear that made 
him start writing to his “dear friend” in the beginning of the novel: “And believe 
it or not, I’m really not that afraid of going”, he says about starting his next year 
of school in the epilogue.57 By that point, Charlie seems to have understood that 
the ordinary is “an impasse shaped by crisis in which people find themselves 
developing skills for adjusting to newly proliferating pressures to scramble for 
modes of living on”.58 “It is through the reflection in his letters, however, that 
Charlie finally comes to recognize that no one can live his life for him”, 
Wasserman suggests.59 “I think the idea is that every person has to live for his or 
her own life and then make the choice to share it with other people”, Charlie 
concludes in one of his letters.60. In his last epistle he writes the following: “So, 
if this does end up being my last letter, please believe that things are good with 
me, and even when they’re not, they will be soon enough. And I will believe the 
same about you.”61 Optimistic and having found the ability to believe in his 
ability to face his life from now on by himself, he lets go of writing to his “dear 





The novel ends with the climactic reawakening of Charlie’s repressed past, with 
Charlie finally understanding why he has struggled with being the outsider and 
wallflower he has been characterized as throughout the novel. Matos claims that 
such moments of insight are a prominent characteristic of the Bildungsroman or 
coming-of-age novel. It is when “[the protagonist] feels a responsibility for 
change of heart and conduct” that characterizes the young hero’s journey coming 
to an end.62 The burden of his past is lifted from Charlie in a time that could be 
characterized as an impasse. While writing about having stayed at a mental insti-
                                                             
57  Ibid.: 231. 
58  Berlant 2011: 8. 
59  Wasserman 2003: 51. 
60  Chbosky 1999: 169. 
61  Ibid.: 231. 
62  Buckley quoted in Matos 2013: 94. 
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tution for a while, Charlie’s last letter can be, according to Matos, thought of as 
the most emotionally charged in his series of epistles.63 “A substantive change of 
heart […] does not generate on its own the better good life, though, and never 
without an equally threatening experience of loss”, Berlant points out.64 Clinging 
to his memory of his aunt is what ultimately kept Charlie from enjoying his life 
as a teenager, actively engaging in the social spheres he is part of. As the cruel 
notion of failing to understand why he feels so out of place outweighs his opti-
mism for the greater part of his series of epistles, his clinging to his past is what 
Berlant discusses as the “survival scenario” that was the problem keeping him 
from attaining happiness in the first place.65 By accepting this, while he is 
shaped by his suppressed childhood memories of his aunt, he understands that it 
is his choice to decide where to go from there, letting go of his past and having 
“the power to steer his life in another direction if he so desires”.66  
Eventually, the emotional sphere of the optimistic overshadows the cruel in 
Charlie’s journey, characterizing his development as a shift typical for the com-
ing-of-age novel. Matos claims that the passage of Charlie’s realization as com-
mented on above “marks a moment in which Charlie develops an awareness of 
his own Bildung [sic!] process”.67 This affirmative ending, a typical characteris-
tic of the Young Adult novel, is made possible through Charlie’s attachment to 
writing, which aids in the regaining of his emotional stability as well as his un-
derstanding of why he is both happy and sad, as he wonders in his first letter. 
The epistolary form serves as a crucial means of illustrating Charlie’s personal 
growth and transformation from his point of view, which is only made possible 
through his continuous writing as well as reflecting on that writing and the effect 
it has had on him as a person. Charlie aborts his attachment to letter writing 
because he is no longer afraid to face his fears. While he claims that he is moti-
vated to start writing out of fear of what his first year of high school will bring in 
his first letter, some of his wishes from his cluster of promises have been ful-
filled: for instance, he has found the listener he lacks in his first letter in his 
group of friends. He affirms to the recipient of his epistles that even though he 
might not be where he wants to be just yet, he is optimistic that his development 
and growing sense of self-understanding will aid him in continuing his journey 
of selfhood. 
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The Intermediality of Emotion 
Representations of Emotionality and Fear in  







Showing emotions is a core component of successful YouTube vloggers’ ca-
reers. The overt expression of emotions, i.e. emotionality that suggests to view-
ers that the expression of emotion is an outburst of authentic feelings, is a pre-
condition for the intricate relationships viewers develop with YouTubers. Thus, 
conveying genuineness in displaying emotions in vlogs is a highly effective tool. 
Emotionality regarded as genuine in YouTube vlogs elicits higher view counts 
and generates an increased number of sympathetic as well as accusatory com-
ments. Appreciative as well as derogatory comments ultimately translate into 
financial gain; this is especially the case on channels that normally produce 
content that is not centred on emotional outbursts. Perceived emotional authen-
ticity aids in the fostering of loyal fanbases that are keen on consuming their 
content as well as building communities. The communities centred around 
YouTube personalities are often based on the emotionality that is frequently 
implied in vlogs, and as David Matsumoto claims, emotional expressions are 
fundamental building blocks of social interaction.1 Even though bursts of emo-
tion “[…] are often produced in a spontaneous and unintentional fashion, some-
times defying efforts of expression control or emotion regulations, they can be 
produced intentionally and strategically, often with the aim of bestowing greater 
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authenticity or naturalness to one’s emotional display”.2 Encouraging the notion 
of authenticity certainly is of key importance and can determine a YouTube 
vlogger’s professional success. However, the debate about whether or not emo-
tions presented in a YouTube video are “authentic” or staged can already lead to 
the viral success of a video. Chris Crocker, for example, who became a meme 
after uploading an exceptionally emotional video defending Britney Spears,3 
gained fame and notoriety and continues to generate the ongoing interest of 
notable news outlets4 following the viral and controversial success of his video. 
Given the importance of displaying and/or eliciting emotions in building an 
online audience, I will investigate two separate areas of emotion(ality) in order 
to give an insight into the complexity of the issue in two interconnected media: 
YouTube videos and YouTuber books. Firstly, I will examine the emotions and 
emotionality linked to coming out publicly to an established audience on 
YouTube. Emotionality, as I will use the term in connection to coming out pro-
cesses, refers to the overt expression of one or more “higher cognitive emo-
tions”.5 Higher cognitive emotions, as outlined by Paul E. Griffiths, include, for 
example nervousness, embarrassment, pride, shame and excitement. As an illus-
tration of how these emotions are depicted in vlog and book form, I will have a 
closer look at YouTuber Connor Franta. So called “basic” emotions, however, 
and how they are handled intermedially compared to higher cognitive emotions 
will be examined in a second focus, namely, on the specific basic emotion of 
fear. This will be illustrated with an analysis of British YouTubers’ The Amazing 
Book is Not on Fire: The World of Dan and Phil and Jenn McAllister’s Really 
Professional Internet Person, as well as their respective audiobooks. Distin-
guishing between higher cognitive emotions and basic emotions is of course only 
one attempt at better understanding emotions. When writing about emotions, the 
examples discussed below show that both kinds of emotion transform somewhat 
when transposed from the audiovisual to the written medium. Discussing basic 
emotions in written text, however, seems to invite plurimedial representations to 
a significantly greater extent than writing about higher cognitive emotions. 
 
                                                             
2  Scherer 2009: 11. 
3  Chris Crocker closed his YouTube account in 2015; however, a re-upload of the 
“Leave Britney Alone” video is still available on YouTube here: https://www.you 
tube.com/watch?v=WqSTXuJeTks (30.01.2016). 
4  Cf. for example, the Daily Mail’s article from February 23, 2016 (Jackson-Edwards 
2016); or the Independent’s article published a day later (Blair 2016). 
5  Griffiths 2004: 237. 
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2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The intermediality of emotions and emotionality in YouTube videos and in the 
books that YouTubers have published in 2015 will be tackled. Since late 2014, 
there has been a wave of YouTuber book publications that still continues. Signif-
icantly, almost all of the books written by “Big YouTubers”6 have become in-
stant bestsellers, nationally as well as internationally. Broadly defined, the theory 
of intermediality is used in contexts where the boundaries between two or more 
conventionally distinct media are transgressed.7 In Werner Wolf’s typology of 
intermediality, he distinguishes between several forms of either intracomposi-
tional or extracompositional intermedialitiy. Adaptation, or “intermedial transpo-
sition”, a form of extracompositional intermediality that deals with the transfer 
of meaning-making elements between media, will be a primary focus in the 
discussion below. “Plurimediality”, on the other hand, is a form of intracomposi-
tional intermediality and allows the examination of the interactive meaning 
making of several media within a video or book. Plurimediality has been termed 
differently by various scholars: e.g. media combination by Irina O. Rajewsky or 
multimodality by Lars Elleström. These terms all denote a media artefact that 
combines two or more semiotic systems to make meaning. Both intermedial 
transposition and plurimediality are integral parts of virtually all book publica-
tions by YouTubers and therefore warrant closer inspection. This tendency, 
furthermore, begs the question as to whether the visual design and the written 
text have equal capacity for meaning-making in contemporary book publications 
and whether authors will increasingly be required to consider paratextual ele-
ments when writing books. 
The YouTuber books that will be of interest for this paper are primarily 
works of autobiographical non-fiction. Rather than independent artefacts, I argue 
that these books are adaptations, or intermedial transpositions, of the respective 
writer’s YouTube channel. In some cases, chapters in these books are in fact 
directly adapted from individual videos.8 The omnipresence of adaptations that 
Linda Hutcheon sees in the contemporary cultural landscape, and which she 
asserts is “increasing steadily in numbers”, seems to be especially pertinent in 
the YouTuber book context and might well have to do with YouTube establish-
                                                             
6  “Big YouTubers” are the best known, most visible, most influential because of their 
large number of subscribers, as opposed to the vast majority of creators with a mid-
range subscriber base but more tightly knit community. 
7  Cf. Rajewsky 2002 and Wolf 2011. 
8  Cf. Franta 2015: 206-208. 
178 | SILKE JANDL 
 
ing itself as a new medium.9 The new media that have evolved recently, Hutch-
eon argues, “have clearly fuelled an enormous demand for all kinds of stories.”10 
YouTube, and especially the vlog, have accordingly fuelled the need to tell and 
consume highly personal stories in particular. 
A YouTuber’s main channel is typically intricately linked with their book in 
terms of content, style, narrative voice and aesthetics. While YouTubers’ chan-
nels or books can stand alone, the books’ content and success depend to some 
extent on the respective YouTube channel. Thus, the books YouTubers have 
published recently are perhaps best described as examples of transmedia story-
telling. This concept, as popularized by Henry Jenkins, studies how narratives 
can be told via more than one medium and “[…] transmedia storytelling has 
been celebrated by media scholars as a narrative model that promotes collabora-
tive authorship and participatory spectatorship”.11 While transmedia storytelling 
in Jenkins’ sense12 disperses parts of a story across several media platforms, with 
no hierarchy between the media, it seems more appropriate to look at YouTu-
bers’ books as transmedia expansions, a branch of transmedia storytelling. Henry 
Jenkins emphasises the role of transmedia expansions when he says that “[t]he 
current configuration of the entertainment industry makes transmedia expansion 
an economic imperative […]”.13 Even though the books are for the most part 
effective publications in their own right, the frequent implicit and explicit inter-
medial references to YouTube videos and the writers’ channels, as well as nu-
merous “insider jokes” that have been established between vlogger and audience 
over the years, essentially make the books transmedia expansions of the 
YouTube channels they have grown out of. These non-fictional books can, thus, 
be seen as examples of this understanding of transmedia storytelling, as they also 
expand the personality brands that YouTubers have been building over the years 
through their videos (e.g. by trying to keep in tone with the videos and providing 
more – and frequently intimate stories – that have not yet been discussed on 
YouTube). 
Given that portraying emotion(ality) is a central element in conveying 
authenticity in YouTube vlogs, it will be of interest to explore how emotion 
transcends media boundaries. Are emotions at the core of YouTubers’ book 
publications? Can the portrayal of emotionality translate into the written 
medium? Has the discussion of emotionality the potential to elicit the perception 
                                                             
9  Cf. Hutcheon 2006: 4. 
10  Ibid. 
11  Scott 2013: 101. 
12  As outlined in Jenkins 2006: Convergence Culture. 
13  Jenkins 2007: “Transmedia Storytelling 101”. 
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of authenticity? In order to investigate these questions, I will be looking at an-
glophone YouTubers who vlog on a regular basis, and who have published an – 
at least partly – autobiographical non-fiction book in 2015. 
 
 
3. YOUTUBERS COMING OUT: CONNOR FRANTA 
 
2015 saw numerous “Big YouTubers” discussing their sexuality and coming out 
to their millions of subscribers. Since potential repercussions of coming out 
remain problematic, the stakes of doing so publicly are high. This, in turn, fre-
quently results in an array of emotions being overtly shown on screen when a 
YouTuber comes out to their audience. Therefore, the emotionality depicted in 
coming out videos will be examined and compared to that in the book chapters 
on the topic, in order to illustrate how YouTubers present a myriad of emotions 
in either medium. This will be done by having a closer look at the example of 
American YouTuber Connor Franta. 
Coming out videos have been an integral part of YouTube almost since its 
inception. This development has significantly increased recently, as was pointed 
out on the official YouTube blog in February 2015: 
 
Coming out videos are a large and important part of YouTube culture: there are more than 
36,000 videos related to the subject on the platform today, the sum of which have received 
more than 300m views. Last year alone, we saw ~9,600 coming out stories shared on 
YouTube – a 20% increase from the year before.14  
 
Coming out on YouTube is extremely popular, as the number of views and 
comment responses clearly demonstrate, which consequently makes these videos 
financially lucrative. The obvious popularity of coming out videos has given rise 
to a rather problematic trend as well: gay-baiting. Especially around the time 
several Big YouTubers came out on the platform, others sought to emulate their 
success by insinuating, via misleading titles and suggestive thumbnails, that their 
videos might also reveal details about their own potentially non-hetero sexuality. 
Despite the increased attention and the financial benefits a coming out video 
promises, coming out publicly on the platform often entails a negative impact on 
the safety of YouTubers. Not only do openly gay YouTubers receive a larger 
number of negative, homophobic and offensive comments, but they often also 
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have to deal with an increased number of threats.15 Nevertheless, those who have 
come out on YouTube usually describe the positive reactions they received, the 
affirmations of support and the gratitude of those who feel heard and represented 
because of the video. Joey Graceffa, for example, claimed that 99% of the com-
ments on his coming out music video were positive and even encouraged any-
body who needed support to turn to the comment section on either his coming 
out music video or his vlog.16 However, the gender divide that most definitely 
exists on YouTube seems to favour male gay YouTubers over female gay 
YouTubers in this respect. As YouTube user MimiKitty Art observed in a com-
ment on Franta’s “Coming out” video:17 
 
   Figure 1: Screenshot of comment on Franta’s “Coming out” video 
 
Even if the comments are overwhelmingly positive and supportive, coming out 
publicly is always an emotional endeavour. The emotionality of the process is 
clearly discernible in Connor Franta’s “Coming out” video. Connor Franta has 
been a YouTube vlogger since 2010. In five years of sharing personal stories and 
anecdotes about his life, however, Franta has only once addressed his sexuality. 
Because of the numerous accusatory and derogatory comments suggesting he 
was gay, in 2011 Franta uploaded a rather defensive video claiming, as the title 
said, “I’m not gay”.18 Only in December 2014 did Franta19 come out to his more 
than 5 million subscribers. The video has since garnered well over 11 million 
views and seems to have encouraged other creators of the YouTube community 
to also come out to their audiences. In April 2015 he published his autobiograph-
                                                             
15  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=afaNnZKe2ZU (2:24) (31.01.2017). 
16  Graceffa, Joey 2015a: “Don’t Wait” and Graceffa 2015b: “YES I’M GAY”. 
17  “You know, looking through this comment section, I find that most people are really 
supportive of Connor (I am too) and almost everyone is saying positive stuff. That’s 
cool and all, but when I watched ingrid nilsen’s coming out video nearly every single 
comment was a butthurt 12 year old! They were all saying how she was faking it, how 
those were ‘some fake tears !1!1!!’ And how hers was all for attention. Pretty much 
all negative, horrid things. Now, idk what that says…. But think about it :/”. 
18  Franta 2012: “I’m not gay”.  
19  Franta 2014: “Coming Out”. 
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ical book A Work in Progress: A Memoir in which Franta specifically discusses 
his coming out story. 
The video “Coming out” and the book chapter “The Long Road to Me” 
basically relate the same situation and circumstances. Even though the coming 
out video preceded the book publication by several months, it is likely that the 
discussion of Franta’s coming out in both media was conceived almost simulta-
neously. This is highlighted especially if the temporal delay resulting from edit-
ing, revising, printing and distributing books is compared to the virtual immedia-
cy of uploading videos to YouTube.  
Despite the very clear similarities in content, medium specific affordances 
and limits certainly contribute to significant differences between the video and 
the chapter. One consequential difference between a vlog, which is presented as 
unscripted, spontaneous and immediate, and a published book, which is by ne-
cessity scripted and carefully planned out, is the level of sophistication. While 
elliptic sentences and mistakes are a common and accepted feature of vlogs, 
there is an expectation for published books to be more complex and to avoid 
including any orthographic errors. This increase in complexity can, for example, 
manifest in the inclusion of metaphoric language, as the following juxtaposition 
of a scene relating the confusion and anxiety triggered by unresolved issues with 
homosexuality shows: 
 
“Coming out” A Work in Progress 
“I was up all night, for I can’t tell you 
how many nights, just thinking. Like 
looking at the ceiling, just thinking 
about this. And I was so scared of it, 
that I never told anybody.” 
“Sleepless nights became frequent, and 
would carry on for years. I cast all my 
confusion up to the ceiling, staring, 
wide awake. Worse than that, the self-
judgement and self-hatred kicked in 
for daring to think such taboo 
things.”20 
 
As can clearly be seen, the same content is related, but with added metaphors in 
the book version. Thus, “looking at the ceiling” is transformed into “I cast all my 
confusion up to the ceiling”, thereby creating stronger imagery that seems less 
pertinent in a medium that is already dependent on visuality.  
Moreover, the quote illustrates the refinement in emotional self-analysis. 
While Franta states that he was “scared” to reach out in the video, the book 
presents a more precise analysis of Franta’s emotional state by attributing the 
suppression of his sexuality to “self-judgement” and “self-hatred.” In a material 
                                                             
20  Franta 2015: 153. 
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sense, the increase in sophisticated, metaphorical language in the written medi-
um is not only possible and expected, but also more easily included; after all, a 
vlog is typically between two and eight minutes long, as opposed to the average 
length of memoirs.  
There are other changes that also occur due to medium specificity. When 
Franta talks about admitting his sexuality to himself in his coming out video, he 
says “one year ago, I kept trying to get myself to look in the mirror and say it.” 
The same struggle is also related in the book, but in the written medium it comes 
with a very specific time reference: “then on the evening of January 3, 2014, I 
actually said it.”21 Due to the conventions of YouTube, “one year ago,” as op-
posed to “January 3, 2014”, is not significantly less specific, since audiences 
tend to consume YouTube vlogs immediately, i.e. within 24 hours of their re-
lease, and because the date when a video was uploaded is easily accessible as it 
is always visible right underneath every video. 
Besides a more metaphoric way of expression and a higher degree of speci-
ficity in the book, one major difference between the media is that the audio-
visual medium allows for the illusion of a face-to-face conversation. This results 
in immediacy as well as perceived authenticity and intimacy. As in actual face-
to-face conversations, the viewer hears and sees the effects of emotion in voice, 
facial expressions and posture: 
 
 
                                                             
21  Ibid.: 157. 












           Figure 2-4: Screenshots of Connor Franta’s “Coming out” video 
 
These screenshots illustrate how a moderate outburst of emotionality in Franta’s 
video – beginning with the pensive gaze down to one side, the composing glance 
down the other side, ultimately culminating in the revelation of teary eyes when 
he looks directly at the camera – adds to the emotional impact the video has on 
its viewers. David Matsumoto calls these bodily signs “emotional communica-
tion” and states that it “helps individuals in relationships – parent and child, 
mates, boss and subordinates – respond to the demands and opportunities of their 
social environment. They are basic elements of social interaction […]”.22 Seeing 
how particular emotions affect a YouTuber’s body, and especially their face, 
also works as a warrant for authenticity and as an invitation for sympathetic 
responses. As Mark J.P. Wolf stresses: 
                                                             
22  Matsumoto 2009: 175-176. 
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Images can do many things that mere words cannot; they are sensually richer and more 
immersive, they can present a great deal of detail or information simultaneously and use 
complex compositions, and they have a more immediate effect on the audience’s emo-
tions, from foregrounded dramatic action to subtle effects involving atmosphere and 
mood.23  
 
The effect on the audience is evidenced in the innumerable comments on the 
“Coming out” videos that express similar reactions to YouTube user Ello Ell:24 
 
      Figure 5: Screenshot of comment on Connor Franta’s “Coming out” video 
 
The commenter describes a profound emotional reaction that mirrors Franta’s 
when he opines that fear of discrimination on the basis of race, gender, religion 
or sexuality are “not OK” in his video.25 Franta’s own teary eyes at this exclama-
tion, as well as the rather inclusive statement, which most viewers will agree 
with, aids in eliciting such intense emotional responses. These emotions then, 
seemingly, need to be expressed immediately in the form of written commentary 
that addresses the impact the video had on the recipient (I/he) as well as a testi-
mony of support aimed at the YouTuber directly (I/you). 
Comments that exhibit the emotional reaction to a video or to other com-
menters are numerous. Writing comments most often means writing down im-
mediate reactions, including emotionality that is often expressed mimetically in 
the form of emojis or emoticons. Such responses are in part due to the set-up of 
vlogs: vloggers typically film themselves talking to a camera, which means that 
what we see in vlogs is, so to speak, a permanent close-up of their face. Even 
though there are innumerable differences between television and vlogs, conven-
tions derived from television have certainly also shaped how vlogs are per-
ceived. Close-ups of faces are, thus, traditionally associated with the inner self. 
As Joanne Finkelstein says,  
 
                                                             
23  Wolf 2012: 253. 
24   “I'm crying so bad when I watch this! Especially the part when he tears up and says 
‘it's not ok! It's not!’! I LOVE YOU SO MUCH CONNOR!!
” 
25  Franta 2014: “Coming Out”. 
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Through the close-up, thoughts are made visible. […] facial expressions transport the 
audience into the deep interior of the mind. The close-up uses the eyes as “the windows” 
to the concealed personality. Suddenly the interior becomes exteriorized; certain gestures 
and subtle movements – a tear, quiver of the lip, a slight smile – are signs from the interior 
of unmeditated, true emotion. These fine facial movements caught by the close-up camera 
shot suggest authenticity […].26 
 
Given that the conventional association of the close-up is with the representation 
of “unmediated, true emotion”, and given the simulation of face-to-face conver-
sation in vlogs, YouTubers’ emotional outbursts are often taken at face value. 
Audience members consequently tend to uncritically and vigorously defend their 
favourite YouTubers against those who question the sincerity of an emotional 
expression. 
This need to defend a YouTuber against haters stems from the intimate con-
nection many viewers feel they have with those YouTubers. Over the course of 
several years they have witnessed the YouTuber growing up, mature personally 
and professionally, go through relationships and share personal stories and feel-
ings about a variety of subjects. This, in combination with the vlog format, pro-
vides viewers with a wealth of information and insight into the YouTuber’s life, 
which gives them the impression that they know them intimately. When she 
discusses emotionality and immersion, Marie-Laure Ryan states that “[…] we 
are also more likely to be affected by what happens to people we know than by 
the fate of strangers”,27 and YouTubers who have shared their lives with their 
subscribers for several years in hundreds or, in some cases, thousands of videos 
have become more familiar than real-life acquaintances. 
The emotions associated with coming out on YouTube – nervousness, 
embarrassment, pride, shame, excitement – are all “higher cognitive emotions” 
in Paul E. Griffiths’ sense. And as Dylan Evans explains, higher cognitive emo-
tions “are fundamentally social in a way that basic emotions are not”28 and they 
“have been designed by natural selection precisely to help our ancestors cope 
with an increasingly complex social environment. […] [T]hese emotions may 
well be the cement that binds human society together”.29 The overwhelming 
response to and popularity of coming out videos suggests that there is a need, 
especially amongst teenagers, to observe and react to emotional content, which is 
why even the promise of emotionality draws a large number of people to certain 
                                                             
26  Finkelstein 2007: 4. 
27  Ryan 2001: 149-150. 
28  Evans 2001: 20, original emphasis. 
29  Ibid.: 21. 
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YouTube videos: through emotionality they offer a platform and, arguably, also 
an incentive to engage with one another socially and join the communities that 
might already have formed around the YouTuber in question.  
 
 
4. WRITING AND DEPICTING FEAR: PLURIMEDIALITY 
 
While higher cognitive emotions are clearly connected to coming out videos and 
also partly conveyed in book chapters, basic emotions, such as fear, also play a 
central role in YouTubers’ content on- and offline. In this second part, medium-
specific and media transcending strategies will be investigated that convey fear 
across different media, in order to show that writing about basic emotions, more 
so than than higher cognitive emotions, seems to invite the engagement of visual 
elements to augment the meaning-making process. The emotion of fear, as Evans 
points out: “is even older than this particular physiological expression [hairs 
standing on end]. In fact, fear is probably one of the first emotions ever to have 
evolved. It is likely to have been present in the first vertebrates, which appeared 
some 500 million years ago or more.”30 
 
4.1 Plurimedial Fear: Jennxpenn aka Jenn McAllister 
 
Nineteen-year-old Jenn McAllister’s autobiographical book Really Professional 
Internet Person relates a number of anecdotes – positive and negative – that she 
claims she was not prepared to share in vlogs. Among bullying and panic at-
tacks, she relates the story of how she was doxxed.31 Doxxing is an area of cy-
bercrime in which hackers steal personal information and make it publicly avail-
able on the Internet. In McAllister’s case, there were severe consequences as her 
and her family’s credit card information, their address, their social media ac-
count passwords and their telephone numbers were all freely accessible online. 
This meant that all her family had to cancel cards, phones and eventually move 
to a different address. Many YouTubers have had to deal with doxxing incidents 
and threats. The fact that millions of subscribers are interested in their lives and 
seek a personal connection, for example by showing up at their homes or talking 
to them on the phone, makes them interesting and sometimes lucrative targets for 
hackers. Moreover, prosecution for doxxing and those who make personal in-
                                                             
30  Ibid.: 31. 
31  McAllister 2015: 117. 
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formation available online is often impossible, especially since law enforcement 
is often struggling to understand the crime at all. 
Even though doxxing severely affects the lives of those attacked, many 
YouTubers who seem to share so much of themselves and their lives online have 
chosen not to discuss actual threats that result from doxxing. McAllister, accord-
ingly, introduces the topic by explaining that she did not address the incident in 
her vlog, “because it was a really upsetting and terrifying period of my life. Of 
course, part of me wanted to share this with the Internet, but the other part of me 
was too afraid to even talk about it”.32 Serious negative experiences, in fact, are 
often not discussed in YouTube videos at all. Most YouTubers expressly pro-
duce positive content on their channel because they are aware of their status as 
role models for very young viewers and because their explicit goal is to make 
their viewers’ day better with the content they put out. The transmedial approach 
to promoting the personality brand of a YouTuber via social media websites 
such as Twitter, Tumblr, Snapchat and Instragram creates the impression that 
YouTubers, and especially daily vloggers, share every little detail of their lives, 
and most of it is cheerful, uplifting and positive. Consequently, being a YouTu-
ber has become the dream job most teenagers now aspire to33 because the lives 
of Youtubers are often perceived as perfect and ideal, exactly because they often 
steer clear of negatively connoted incidents.  
When Jenn McAllister talks about the fear she felt after being doxxed in her 
book, it is not only explicitly verbalized but visualized as well. The whole dis-
cussion of the incident is printed on a black background. The rest of the book is 
printed on a light grey, pastel pink or cork background, so that the white font on 
black makes the chapter “Life Hacked” a visually striking contrast. Consequent-
ly, McAllister’s autobiographical book utilizes a range of visual as well as writ-
ten elements to convey a message, e.g. the differing backgrounds, the inclusion 
of numerous photographs, charts, screenshots and fonts. Because of the mean-
ingfulness of visual aspects in the book, it can be categorized as plurimedial. 
Plurimediality is quite common in all YouTubers’ book publications, which is 
most likely due to the fact that multiple media are necessarily involved in mak-
ing YouTube videos. The visual and the verbal, music, sound effects and written 
text superimposed on the image are the important media that characterize 
YouTube videos.  
Deliberately foregrounding colour, or lack thereof, can be a significant 
marker intended by the YouTuber to trigger emotional responses in viewers. In 
fact, YouTuber Charlie McDonnell started a trend in 2012 when he uploaded a 
                                                             
32  Ibid.: 118.  
33  Cf. London 2014: Daily Mail Online. 
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black and white video entitled “I’m Scared”,34 which sparked innumerable video 
responses – by fans as well as fellow YouTubers – on the same topic, and also in 
black and white. Intuitively, the colour black as a visual marker for a frightening 
episode and fear in general seems appropriate: particularly bad days are often 
referred to as a “black day” in the news, and it is common to describe momen-
tous and frightening events idiomatically, such as the initiation of the Great 
Depression historically being named Black Friday. On the other hand, black is of 
course also an iconic representation of a very common human fear that most 
humans have probably experienced at some point in their life: the fear of dark-
ness and the unknown dangers that might be hidden therein. 
 
4.2 Plurimedial Fear: Dan Howell and Phil Lester 
 
The iconic representation of darkness through the colour black and the implica-
tion of unseen dangers is the predominant reason why Dan Howell and Phil 
Lester have chosen a black background for a chapter in their book. The two 
British YouTubers wrote the book The Amazing Book Is Not on Fire: the World 
of Dan and Phil together and it includes two chapters dealing individually with 
the two writers’ fears: “Dan’s Fears”,35 and “Phil’s Phears”.36 The visual concept 
of these chapters is different from McAllister’s simple black backdrop, as visual 
representations of some of their fears and phobias are embedded in the black 
background. In Howell’s chapter, for example, trees are visible in the back-
ground, which is an item on his list of fears. In Lester’s chapter the outlines of 
horses are distinguishable in the darkness, representing the first item on his list. 
Similarly to Connor Franta, Howell also discussed these fears in a video pri-
or to the publication of the book. Given the timing – the video was uploaded on 
29 Oct 2014 while the book was released almost a year later – it is likely Howell 
was already working on the book when he decided to make the video. However, 
even if the video preceded the conception of the book’s chapter, the intricate 
intermedial links between them are undeniable. In the video “My Greatest 
Fear”37 he partially rationalizes his fear of the dark by explaining that it is an 
evolutionary fear of the unknown and the once very real danger of nocturnal 
predators. As Dylan Evans points out in Emotion: A Very Short Introduction, 
                                                             
34  Cf. McDonnell 2012: “I’m Scared”. 
35  Cf. Howell 2015: 160-161. 
36  Cf. Ibid. 162-163. 
37  Cf. Howell 2014: “My Greatest Fear”.  
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“[t]he capacity for fear is very useful in a world where hungry predators lurk in 
every shadow”.38 Lyons affirms Howell’s assessment when he says, 
 
Thus fear of the dark may not be fear of the absence of light but fear of the absence of 
knowledge or, to put it more exactly, fear arising because one does not know what might 
be out there in the dark and because one thinks that there might be something to injure or 
startle one.39 
 
Contrary to the comparison between Franta’s coming out video and book chapter 
on the topic, Howell’s video is more complex and sophisticated than the print 
version. In the book, fear is presented in a compact list of specific phobias, 
whereas the video engages with research on fears and phobias. When he explains 
the distinction between learned and genetic fears, for example, the video is rather 
analytical and presents a compelling and ultimately convincing argument. The 
list in the book, by contrast, is much shorter, light-hearted, and even sarcastic. 
This can be illustrated by the manner in which the fear of the supernatural is 
explained: “Poltergeists, witches, demons – you name it, if it’s a magically pow-
ered evil being that defies the rules of reality, I’m terrified of it. Which is funny 
because I do not believe that any of those things actually exist. 100%. Go fig-
ure.”40 The aim of this clearly sarcastic exploration of this particular fear does 
not point to research on the topic. In part this is probably due to the fact that 
Howell and Lester anticipated the book would primarily be consumed by their 
fans, who would likely already be familiar with the theories presented in the 
video, in which Howell even attempts a scientific explanation of where his per-
sonal fears originate. This leads him to advise his viewers that analysing fears 
and where they come from “can help you overcome them”. He thus merges his 
research with his personal anecdotes in order to be helpful, which is a common 
feature not only of YouTube but quite clearly also of YouTubers’ autobiograph-
ical and advice books.  
Almost all of the books YouTubers have published so far can also be experi-
enced as audiobooks read by the author(s). Even though the physical books are 
often innovative and experiment with various forms of intermediality, the major-
ity of these audiobooks are rather straightforward readings of, exclusively, the 
written text. This means that the plurimedial character of these books is not 
reflected in any way in their audio version. In their audiobook, Howell and 
Lester, however, have taken a different approach to incorporate the added mean-
                                                             
38  Evans 2001: 25. 
39  Lyons 1980: 75. 
40  Howell 2015: 160. 
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ing conveyed via visual modes. The numerous photographs, collages, drawing 
etc. are adapted into the audiobook, either via dialogue or verbal description and 
commentary. Since not all of the visually based content could be adapted into an 
exclusively auditive medium, Howell and Lester have also made a pdf document 
available to those who purchased the audiobook. Thus, this audiobook exempli-
fies the direction audiobooks might take when dealing with the increasingly 





Showing emotion on YouTube has an authenticating effect that suggests intima-
cy, immediacy and honesty. The combination of these features is expressed in a 
plurimedial way in YouTube videos but also in YouTubers’ books. As adapta-
tion of the YouTube content, these YouTubers seek to translate emotions, at 
least partially, into their print books. In accordance with medium specific af-
fordances, Connor Franta’s “Coming out” video shows bodily responses to emo-
tion. The book, on the other hand, conveys the emotions connected to his coming 
out via elaboration on context and background. 
As these books are also transmedia expansions, the upholding of a unified 
and coherent personality, voice and visual style are imperative to their success. 
Books by YouTubers are marketed and consumed largely as extensions of a pre-
existing YouTube channel and thus the two media are inextricably linked. A 
YouTuber’s personality and mannerisms thus become crucial components for the 
success and effectivity of the book. Key features of voice, style and video aes-
thetic are often deliberately transposed into the book medium to enhance the 
unity of the YouTuber’s brand and to create an experience of familiarity for 
readers. 
Intermedial strategies contribute to the experience of the books as transmedia 
expansions and adaptations. Plurimediality is often a way to link the aesthetics of 
the YouTube channel with the book, but can also serve to mirror the emotionali-
ty of a certain passage or story. Plurimediality can also be a key factor in making 
a traditionally monomedial medium like the audiobook into a more effective 
intermedial transposition of both the physical book and the online content. Thus, 
I hope to have shown how intra- and extracompositional forms of intermediality 
and transmedia storytelling can aid in the exploration of how emotion(ality) 
transcends the audio-visual medium. 
In conclusion, the earnestness and honesty of a public display of emotions on 
the part of the YouTuber is to a great extent dependent upon the audio-visual 
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possibilities of vlogs: quivering lips, shaky voices, flushed faces and watery eyes 
all contribute to the perception of authenticity that is so essential for a vlogger’s 
career. Viewers, on the other hand, make use of the written commentary feature 
to immediately express their emotional reactions and share them with the 
YouTuber and their community. Transmedia expansions, such as books and 
audiobooks, however, can contribute to the coherence of these personality 
brands by providing additional information surrounding emotional biographical 
episodes or presenting problematic and negative incidents, thereby adding to the 
complexity of the YouTube personality in question. Beyond the coherence and 
complexity which the written content is advertised as providing, many YouTu-
bers seem to value the design of their book – as a physical object for their fans to 
cherish and engage with but also as a lasting memento of their achievements – 
equally or higher than the written content. Nevertheless, the enthusiasm of 
YouTubers for writing and publishing books, as well as their viewers, zeal to 
buy, read and respond to them, attests to the continued importance of writing in 





Blair, Olivia (2016): “Chris Crocker, star of ‘Leave Britney Alone’ video, re-




Evans, Dylan (2001): Emotion. A Very Short Introduction, Oxford/New York. 
Finkelstein, Joanne (2007): The Art of Self Invention. Image and Identity in 
Popular Visual Culture, London/New York. 
Franta, Connor (2015): A Work in Progress. A Memoir, New York. 
Franta, Connor (2014): “Coming Out”, in: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v= 
WYodBfRxKWI (30.10.2016). 
Franta, Connor (2012): “I’m not gay”, in: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o 
4VvLJffmRA (30.10.2016). 
Graceffa, Joey (2015a): “Don’t Wait”, in: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K 
cwo_mhyqTw (30.10.2016). 
Graceffa, Joey (2015b): “YES I’M GAY”, in: https://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=z1PoNhYb3K4 (30.10.2016). 
192 | SILKE JANDL 
 
Griffiths, Paul E. (2004): “Is Emotion a Natural Kind?”, in: Solomon, Robert C. 
(ed): Thinking about Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotion, New 
York, 233-249. 
Howell, Dan (2015): “The Dan and Phil 3D AUDIO EXPERIENCE (Audiobook 
Trailer!)”, in: https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=audio+book+ 
trailer+dan+and+phil (30.10.2016). 
Howell, Dan (2014): “My Greatest Fear”, in: YouTube: https://www.youtube.co 
m/watch?v=7BlRcLhUGkE (30.10.2016). 
Howell, Dan/Lester, Phil (2015). The Amazing Book is Not on Fire. The World 
of Dan and Phil, London. 
Hutcheon, Linda (2006): A Theory of Adaptation, New York. 
Jackson-Edwards, Phoebe (2016): “What the ‘leave Britney alone’ star looks like 
NOW: Photos of a ‘hot and muscly’ Chris Crocker sweep the web nine years 
after that very emotional video went viral”, in: Daily Mail 23.02.2016,  
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/femail/article-3459979/What-leave-Britney-star-
looks-like-NOW.html (21.11.2016). 
Jenkins, Henry (2007): “Transmedia Storytelling 101”, in: Confessions of an 
ACA Fan. The Official Weblog of Henry Jenkins. Blog: http://henryjen 
kins.org/2011/08/defining_transmedia_further_re.html. (30.10.2016). 
Jenkins, Henry (2006): Convergence Culture. Where Old and New Media Col-
lide, New York/London. 
Lanning, Carly/Huang, Christine (2015): “YouTube Trends Explainer. Coming 
Out on YouTube”, in: YouTube Trends Blogspot, http://youtube-
trends.blogspot.co.at/2015/02/youtube-trends-explainer-coming-out-on.html 
(30.10.2016). 
London, Bianca (2014): “Forget footballer or actress, young Brits’ dream job is a 
YouTube star (and judging by the teen vloggers’ success, it’s hardly surpris-
ing)”, in: Daily Mail, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/femail/article-2777511/ 
Forget-footballer-actress-young-Brits-dream-job-YouTube-star-judging-teen 
-vloggers-success-s-hardly-surprising.html (30.10.2016). 
Lyons, William (1980): Emotion. Cambridge Studies in Philosophy, New York.  
Matsumoto, David (2009): “Facial Expression of Emotion”, in: Sander, David/ 
Scherer, Klaus R. (eds): The Oxford Companion to Emotion and the Affective 
Sciences, Oxford/New York, 175-176. 
McAllister, Jenn (2015): Really Professional Internet Person, New York.  
McDonnell, Charlie (2012): “I’m scared”, in: https://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=_56nx3eHK4c (30.10.2016). 
Rajewsky, Irina O. (2002): Intermedialität, Tübingen. 
THE INTERMEDIALITY OF EMOTION | 193 
 
 
Ryan, Marie-Laure (2001): Narrative as Virtual Reality. Immersion and Interac-
tivity in Literature and Electronic Media, Baltimore.  
Scherer, Klaus R. (2009): “Affect Bursts”, in: Sander, David/Scherer, Klaus R. 
(eds): The Oxford Companion to Emotion and the Affective Sciences, Ox-
ford/New York, 11. 
Scott, Suzanne (2013): “Who’s Steering the Mothership? The Role of the 
Fanboy Auteur in Transmedia Storytelling”, in: Delwiche, Aaron/Jacobs 
Henderson, Jennifer (eds): The Participatory Cultures Handbook, New York, 
43-52. 
Wolf, Mark J.P. (2012). Building Imaginary Worlds. The Theory and History of 
Subcreation, New York.  
Wolf, Werner (2011): “(Inter)mediality and the Study of Literature”, in: 




LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 1: Screenshot of comment on Franta’s “Coming out” video. in: https:// 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=WYodBfRxKWI (30.10.2016). 
Figure 2: Screenshots of Connor Franta’s “Coming out” video. in: https:// 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=WYodBfRxKWI (5:35) (30.10.2016). 
Figure 3: Screenshots of Connor Franta’s “Coming out” video. in: https:// 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=WYodBfRxKWI (5:35) (30.10.2016). 
Figure 4: Screenshots of Connor Franta’s “Coming out” video. in: https:// 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=WYodBfRxKWI (5:40) (30.10.2016). 













“’Tis Magic, Magic that Hath Ravished Me” 
Passionate Conjuring in  





Magic on the early modern English stage was a cause of strong feeling, from the 
disapproval of anti-theatrical writers, who found it doubly reprehensible that the 
sinful theatre would depict magic, to alleged outbreaks of panic among actors 
and audience alike when there were rumours of the devil himself appearing on 
stage during a magical scene.1 But feelings play a role not only in the reception 
of plays: they are an integral part of dramatic action and theatrical performance. 
This paper will focus on the depiction of one particular kind of early modern 
magic, learned ritual magic involving the evocation of spirits, or in this case, 
devils. It will then situate it both within the early modern dramatic tradition of 
writing emotions into texts for the stage and within the wider discourses sur-
rounding emotions at the time. At the core of the analysis are two plays centred 
entirely on characters who practice ritual magic: Christopher Marlowe’s Doctor 
Faustus (published first in 1604 and in a longer version, the so-called B-text, in 
1616 but assumed to have been written around 1590) and Barnabe Barnes’s The 
Devil’s Charter, first published in 1607, and in particular the scenes in which the 





                                                             
1  Cf. Chambers 1974: 423-424. 
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INTRODUCTION: EARLY MODERN PASSIONS 
 
In the course of what has been termed the emotional or affective turn, early 
modern concepts and representations of emotions have come increasingly into 
focus in the past two decades.2 In addition to studies on religion and philosophy,3 
much recent scholarship has centred on the interface of feeling and early modern 
literature and theatre. As Emanuel Stelzer points out in his essay in this collec-
tion, in keeping with the recent focus on the body of the actor, the audience, and 
the theatre as an affective and collaborative space, some of this scholarship has 
focused especially on the emotional engagement of the audience;4 but that is not 
to say that textual strategies fall by the wayside. Emotions are inscribed in texts 
and in particular in dramatic texts, where actors were supposed to recognize and 
appropriately represent feelings; and these strategies can be traced. 
When reading early modern texts in terms of their emotional content and 
strategies, one is once again reminded of the often invoked ‘radical otherness’ of 
the past. The way feelings are spoken of and conceptualized has changed signifi-
cantly, although enough superficial similarity remains to make it challenging to 
appropriately historicize these texts. Recent scholarship has done much to tease 
apart these terminological and epistemological shifts, although early modern 
terminologies and theories relating to passions, emotions and humours, like 
modern theories of emotions, seem not to have been a unified, coherent whole. 
To start with the question of terminology, ‘affection’ and ‘passion’ have been 
suggested as the closest terms describing what we would now conceptualize as 
emotions, but these words were not used consistently or even always differenti-
ated.5 In addition to this, almost all the words connected to emotions (or affec-
tions and passions), despite still being used today, have undergone a semantic 
shift – including the word “emotion” itself. For the researcher, this means careful 
philological study to avoid what Robert White, following David Crystal, has 
called “false friends”.6 
                                                             
2  For an overview of the field cf. Broomhall 2017.  
3  On religion cf. e.g. Ryrie 2013, on philosophy cf. e.g. James 1997, Dixon 2003. 
4  Cf. e.g. Lopez 2003, Steggle 2016, Hobgood 2014. 
5  Cf. Paster/Rowe/Floyd-Wilson 2004: 2. 
6  White 2017: 89-93, cf. also White 2012: 286-296. White’s insistence on literal physio-
logical readings of what look like emotional metaphors in early modern plays, based 
on Paster’s theories about humoralism, might overstate the matter slightly, but it is 
certainly important to highlight the semantic drift and the interdependence of language 
use and early modern conceptions of the emotions. 
“’TIS MAGIC, MAGIC THAT HATH RAVISHED ME” | 199 
 
 
The conceptual differences between early modern and modern understand-
ings of emotions have most importantly been highlighted by Gail Kern Paster’s 
influential research on the humoral system underlying the use and expression of 
passions in Shakespeare and his contemporaries.7 In a pre-Cartesian worldview, 
she argues, “the psychological had not yet become divorced from the physiolog-
ical”.8 Instead, feelings were supposed to stem from physiological processes 
based on the four “humours”, blood, bile, yellow bile, and black bile. In this 
system, “melancholy”, for instance, was not just a mental state – it was literally 
the melancholic humour or liquid of black bile coursing through the bloodstream 
and affecting physical and psychological symptoms. The neural analogy to hu-
mours, and “distilled” from them, were so-called animal spirits, which moved 
between the physical body and the immaterial soul. Emotion was thus seen as 
embodied, and the system as one of constant flux – the balance of the humours 
and spirits affecting and being affected in turn – in which human emotion is seen 
as essentially passive.  
This focus on an entirely physiological model of early modern emotion in 
literary studies has recently come under some criticism, however. While ac-
knowledging the importance of the humoral model, recent works have drawn 
attention to the importance of the plurality of early modern discourses on the 
passions and their importance for literary analysis, including political thought, 
religion and theology, and rhetoric and style.9 For the purpose of this paper, to 
analyse the passions in scenes of magic in plays, two of these are especially 
important: religion, especially as it relates to magic, and rhetoric, especially as it 
relates to the theatre. Taking an active role in the management of the passions, 
both those of oneself and others, is a central idea in both discourses. In the 
Protestant philosophy of the time, the passions are seen as both something to be 
ruled and disciplined and something that is integral to spiritual life. Unlike the 
popular image of emotionless Puritans, strong spiritual passions were highly 
prized by British Protestants and thought of as a means to salvation.10  
Similar importance was ascribed to the passions in the art of rhetoric, taught 
to every schoolboy and unsurprisingly important for early modern playwrights. 
Thomas Wilson, in his 1560 textbook, for instance, writes that after teaching and 
delighting his audience, an orator must “moue the affections of his hearers”, a 
                                                             
7  Cf. Paster 2004, Paster/Rowe/Floyd-Wilson 2004. 
8  Paster 2004: 7. 
9  Cf. esp. Cummings/Siehuis 2013, Meek/Sullivan 2015.  
10  This is the argument of the first part of Alec Ryrie’s excellent Being Protestant in 
Reformation Britain (2013). For the passions and religious experience cf. also Bagchi 
2015. 
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phrase he uses synonymously with persuading them.11 The skilful orator, Wilson 
argues for much of the second book of this work, moves his audience’s passions 
particularly through the rhetorical figure of amplification, but has to be aware of 
how human passions work before he can amuse his listeners, or move them to 
pity, envy or laughter.12 He defines affections (which he uses synonymously 
with passions) as “a stirring or forsing of the minde, either to desire, or els to 
detest and loth any thing, more vehemently then by nature we are commonly 
wont to doe”13 and explains that we “desire those things […] that appeare in our 
iudgement to be godly: wee hate and abhorre those things that seeme naught, 
vngodly, or harmefull vnto vs”, not just for ourselves but also for other people.14 
However, he cautions, listeners’ affections also depend on whether they like or 
dislike someone (they will feel pity for an innocent person but joy at the sight of 
an evildoer punished), unless that person has better luck than them, in which 
case the human reaction is envy.15 
Informed by humoralism, theology and rhetoric, how can passions then be 
read in early modern plays apart from their explicit thematization and the strate-
gies of classical rhetoric? Simon Palfrey’s and Tiffany Sterne’s Shakespeare in 
Parts provides particularly valuable tools in this respect.16 In addition to fore-
grounding the importance of the passions in the early modern theatre for play-
wrights, actors and audiences alike, they also trace how passions structure the 
texts themselves. Since a “snappy and seemingly spontaneous change from one 
passion to another […] was one of the qualities for which an audience looked 
when judging a performance”,17 and since actors only received their individual 
‘parts’ rather than the entire text, playwrights had to ensure that their actors 
knew which passion they were supposed to be presenting and include textual 
signals accordingly. These include “short lines, complete and incomplete pen-
tameters, and shifts between prose, blank verse, and rhyme” and “help the actor 
to pace and measure the ‘units’ of his speech: they indicate a change in the tone 
or direction of acting; they single out transitions from one passion or humour to 
another, often within a single speech; and they direct stresses and enunciation, 
for instance by implicitly ‘pointing’ pauses”.18 
                                                             
11  Wilson 1909: 4. 
12  Ibid.: 116-156. 
13  Ibid.: 130. 
14  Ibid. 
15  Ibid. 
16  Palfrey/Sterne 2007: 311-389. 
17  Ibid.: 312. 
18  Ibid.: 329. 
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MAGIC AND THE PASSIONS 
 
Defining and categorising magic in early modern England, like defining and 
categorising the passions, is not as neat and straightforward as one might wish. A 
number of different discourses and practices existed concurrently at the time: 
one of them was the belief in witches, strongly influenced by continental ideas 
but with several English peculiarities.19 At the same time, all strata of society 
made use of the services of so-called “cunning folk” or “white witches”: folk 
practitioners of magic offering help in all areas of life, from health to love to lost 
property.20 And, on the learned end of the spectrum, scholars became interested 
in the hermetic and Neoplatonic philosophy espoused by writers such as Ficino 
and Pico. In addition to propagating ‘natural magic’, based on an intricate sys-
tem of sympathy and antipathy between every part of the world, this school 
postulated that there were two kinds of ritual magic, one illicit, one licit: goëthia, 
the calling up of evil spirits, and theurgy, operations calling on the help of angels 
and good spirits and ultimately aiming at a vision of God.21  
However, clear differentiations between good and bad, popular and scholar-
ly, illiterate and literate magic are difficult to sustain when looking at the histori-
cal record, let alone the depiction of magical practice in the theatre. Cunning folk 
ran the risk of being accused of witchcraft,22 and scholars like Doctor John Dee, 
who was employed by Elizabeth I, were regularly suspected of dealing with the 
devil as the differentiations between natural, theurgic and goëthic magic became 
blurred;23 and while the importance of Renaissance philosophy is apparent in the 
rituals of some English practitioners like Dee, research has recently stressed the 
continuing influence of medieval ritual magic.24 Consequently, a number of 
different discourses can be found in texts concerning magic from the period. The 
following is a brief discussion of the views on magic and the passions found in 
the two most common kinds of texts: those condemning magic (as illusionary, as 
                                                             
19  The defining work on popular magical beliefs in sixteenth and seventeenth century 
England is still Keith Thomas’s Religion and the Decline of Magic (1971), and a still 
influential study of witchcraft in particular is MacFarlane’s Witchcraft in Tudor and 
Stuart England (1970).  
20  Cf. Davies 2007, Wilby 2005. 
21  Cf. e.g. Yates 2001. 
22  Cf. e.g. Davies 2007: 29-65. 
23  Cf. Thomas 1991: 264-274. 
24  Cf. Klaassen 2013: 187-218 et passim. 
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harmful or as diabolical) and those featuring instructions on how to conduct 
magical ceremonies and to what end.  
A humoral view that especially links magic to the melancholic humour can 
be found, for instance, in one of the most striking 16th century works on magic: 
Reginald Scot’s The Discoverie of Witchcraft (originally published in 1584). 
Perhaps surprisingly, this book is not concerned with the reality of witchcraft but 
with its refutation. Scot argues that witchcraft and magic “being contrarie to 
nature, probabilitie and reason” simply do not exist,25 attributing the belief in 
such phenomena to superstition, Catholicism, legerdemain and psycho-
physiological conditions.26 Scot explains confessions by alleged witches with the 
natural propensity of old women (who are most commonly suspected) to melan-
choly and therefore to imagining things “which are both false and impossible”.27 
Rather than using ‘melancholy’ as a synonym for depression, Scot explicitly 
describes it as a fluid. Post-menopausal women suffer from a build-up of melan-
cholic humour because their menses have stopped28 and “this humor, which is 
the verie dregs of bloud” produces the psychological consequences, since “these 
affections, though they appear in the mind of man, yet are they bred in the 
body”.29  
Melancholy and magic were also linked by the most prolific author on this 
particular humour, Richard Burton. Burton, in his encyclopaedic work The Anat-
omy of Melancholy, reiterates that melancholy can lead to fantastical imaginings: 
not only that one is a witch30 but also that one is bewitched or witnessing an act 
of magic.31 However, while cautious, he does not deny the reality of magic and 
witchcraft, listing “Witches and Magitians” [sic] as one of the possible supernat-
ural causes of melancholy and their help in combating this “disease” as one of its 
“Unlawfull Cures”.32  
An entirely different approach to magic and the passions can be found in a 
text on witchcraft first published in 1597 by the then James VI of Scotland, who 
                                                             
25  Scot 1972: 280. 
26  Scot uses the term witchcraft to include ritual magic and spirit conjurations, although 
he does make allowance for some kinds of “naturall magicke” based on a system of 
analogy and sympathy, like the influence of precious stones. Cf. ibid.: 164-174. 
27  Ibid.: 31. 
28  Cf. ibid.: 30-33. 
29  Ibid.: 33. 
30  Cf. Burton 1989/1: 204 
31  Cf. Ibid.: 386-387, 424-426. 
32  Ibid.: 195-199; vol. 2: 1-4. It has to be stressed, however, that for Burton magic is 
only one among a vast number of possible causes and cures for the condition.  
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would ascend the English Throne as James I in 1603. In the form of a learned 
dialogue, James vehemently denies Scot’s argument that melancholy can be a 
factor in the unreliability of witness testaments.33 Instead, he offers a different 
link between affections, passions and magic: human passions, he argues, allow 
the devil to ensnare his prey. He starts by differentiating between “Magie or 
Necromancie” and “Sorcerie or Witch-craft” and then poses the question, “What, 
I pray you, and how many, are the means whereby the Devil allures persons into 
any of these snares?”34 The answer is as follows: 
 
Even by these three passiones that are within our selues: Curiositie in great ingines: thrist 
of revenge, for some tortes deeply apprehended: or greedie appetite of geare, caused 
through great pouerty. As to the first of these, Curiosity, it is onelie the inticement of 
Magiciens, or Necromanciers: and the other two are the allureres of the Sorcerers, or 
Witches, for that olde and craftie Serpent, being a spirite, hee easilie spyes our affections, 
and so conformes himselfe thereto, to deceaue vs to our wracke.35 
 
James, using “passions” and “affections” synonymously like Thomas Wilson 
before him and applying the terms to a wide variety of emotions, argues that it is 
curiosity which leads men to become “necromancers”, while (male or female) 
witches are driven by a desire for revenge or by personal hardship. According to 
James, practitioners are led “vpon the slipperie and vncertaine scale of curiosi-
tie” by certain aspects of science, in particular by astrology.36 While today the 
focus on curiosity might sound like a wholesale condemnation of intellectual 
inquiry, the word carried different connotations at the time. Under the definition 
“Desire to know or learn”, the OED lists the obsolete pejorative meaning of 
“[t]he disposition to inquire too minutely into anything; undue or inquisitive 
desire to know or learn” as earlier than the neutral or positive meaning common 
today, which seems to have taken hold in the course of the seventeenth century.  
Magic books of the time, so-called grimoires, put special emphasis on ritual 
fasting and purification but say little about the affects and passions of the practi-
tioner during the ritual. The Clavicula Salomonis or Key of Solomon, in an Eng-
lish manuscript of the mid- to late-sixteenth century, for instance, prescribes 
                                                             
33  James I 1924: 30-31. 
34  Ibid.: 8. James differentiates between “necromancy”, or ritual magic focused on 
summoning spirits, and witchcraft, but finds both equally deplorable. 
35  Ibid.: 9. As evident in grimoires and in Doctor Faustus and The Devil’s Charter, 
greed (with or without actual poverty) can of course also be a factor in the conjura-
tions of magicians using ritual magic for their own gain. 
36  Ibid.: 10-12. 
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confession (to god, not to a priest), fasting and baths before attempting magical 
operations.37 Similarly, the Heptameron, a grimoire (spuriously) ascribed to the 
medieval philosopher Pietro D’Abano, advises that “[t]he Operator ought to be 
clean and purified by the space of nine daies” before making preparations for an 
invocation “and to be confessed, and receive the holy Communion”, and then 
purified again “with fasting, chastity, and abstinency from all luxury the space of 
three whole dayes” before undertaking the actual invocation.38 In the same vein, 
the Liber Iuratus Honorii, or Sworn Book of Honorius, advises to “let the worker 
be clean, not polluted” and to “[l]et him not eat nor drink till he has done his 
work”.39  
While many grimoires stress the importance of spiritual cleanliness, the 
Liber Iuratus is one of the few texts to also hint at the state of mind of the practi-
tioner: “and let him do it [i.e. consecrate the magic seal] with devotion, not de-
ceitfully”.40 Passions on the part of the practitioner described in grimoires are 
twofold: firstly, the orations, especially in theurgic works like the Ars Notoria, 
make much of the love of God, and secondly, the magus is advised to be free of 
negatively connoted passions. “Banish wrath: yt was the first[…] and greatest 
Commanndment”, reads a manuscript written by John Dee.41 The Fourth Book of 
Occult Philosophy states that “the chiefest thing that ought to be observed, is, 
constancy of minde, and boldness, free, and alienated from fear”.42 Magic, in 
some instances, was even supposed to be able to help adepts understand the 
nature of their affections: “But the man that is ignorant of Magick, is carried to 
                                                             
37  Cf. Anonymous: 1999. 
38  Abano 2008: s.p. 
39  Anonymous 2009: IV. 
40  Ibid. 
41  Dee 1997: Liber Primus, cap. 2; in a note on this passage, Dee explains that he is 
referring to a commandment he supposedly received from the angel Annael, not the 
first of the Ten Commandments. 
42  Agrippa 1655: 69. First printed in English in 1655, the original Latin version was 
published in 1559. The attribution of this book to Agrippa is spurious. Cf. Klaassen 
2013: 176-177. 
 The potential fear of the practitioner is also highlighted by James’s Daemonology, in 
which he claims that “if they [i.e. magicians] haue missed one iote of all their rites; or 
if any of their feete once slyd ouer the circle through terror of [the devil’s] feareful 
apparition, […] hee carries them with him bodie and soule”. James I 1924: 18. 
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and fro, as it were in war with his affections; he knoweth not when they issue out 
of his own minde, or are impressed by the assisting essence”.43 
While works of ‘high’ theurgic magic like the Liber Iuratus and the Ars No-
toria seem relatively orthodox in their treatment of passions (however blasphe-
mous they might have seemed otherwise), other works of ceremonial magic add 
a different aspect: the supposed ability of magic to move the passions of others. 
Not all grimoires are content with celestial knowledge and aim for more prosaic 
gains: apart from money, this is often the favour of both women and wealthy 
patrons. The rituals to achieve these ends or “experiments” are very often acts of 
sympathetic image magic rather than involving the help of spirits,44 although 
there is a comment in the Heptameron that “[t]he Spirits of the Air of Thursday 
[…] procure the love of woman” and “pacifie strife and contentions”.45  
 
 
PASSIONATE CONJURING: EVOCATION SCENES 
 
On the stage, ritual magic (in addition to witchcraft) occurs with some frequen-
cy, especially between 1590 and 1620.46 The following section will analyse the 
way passions are written into the text in two scenes of the ritual evocation of 
demons: Marlowe’s Doctor Faustus and Barnes’s The Devil’s Charter. 
Studies of Christopher Marlowe’s Doctor Faustus have long remarked that, 
while the play shows thorough engagement with contemporary books of magic, 
Faustus goes about the ritual in precisely the wrong way from the start.47 He 
does not follow the instructions to ritually cleanse himself and he does not fast; 
he has “prayed and sacrificed” to the demons he is about to invoke, and, in his 
detailed Latin invocation, he does not call upon the power of god but on Beelze-
                                                             
43  Agrippa 1655: 213. This quote comes from the Arbatel, a grimoire included in 
Turner’s English translation of Agrippa’s Fourth Book. This translation was published 
in 1655, later than any of the plays discussed here, but the original Latin edition was 
printed in Basel in 1575. Cf. Davies 2009: 52-3. The translation follows the original 
Latin text which reads “Ad homo Magiæ imperitus tanquam bellua affectibus sursum 
& deorsum fertur”. Anonymous 1997: XLIII, emphasis G.T. 
44  See for instance Anonymous 1999: book 1, chs. 8-11. 
45  Abano 2008: Considerations of Thursday.  
46  For a good overview of the ‘types’ and development of magicians on the early modern 
stage cf. Traister 1984, Traister 2014. 
47  Cf e.g. Kocher 1962.  
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bub (I.iii.1-22).48 When Mephistopheles later informs Faustus that his conjuring 
has only made the devil appear because he has “rack[ed] the name of God”, 
rather than because the ritual had inherent magical power (43-51), it becomes 
clear that Faustus, despite his learning, is little better than any other blasphemer.  
Faustus, however, is undaunted and makes much of his own strength of char-
acter, harping on his absence of fear: “This word ‘damnation’ terrifies not me” 
(I.iii.56), he claims, and even berates Mephistopheles for showing an excess of 
feeling. When asked how, if he is damned to be in hell, he can be out of it, 
Mephistopheles famously claims, “Why, this is hell, nor am I out of it”, and 
passionately asks Faustus to stop this line of enquiry: 
 
Think’st thou that I, that saw the face of God 
And tasted the eternal joys of heaven, 
Am not tormented with ten thousand hells 
In being deprived of everlasting bliss? 
O Faustus, leave these frivolous demands, 
Which strike a terror to my fainting soul! (74-80) 
 
Faustus has nothing but contempt for this, quipping, “What, is great Mephi-
stopheles so passionate / For being deprivèd of the joys of heaven?”, and even 
admonishing the devil to learn from his own “manly fortitude” in rejecting fear 
and despair (81-84). Fear and despair, as opposed to the joys of heaven and the 
short-lived delights of magic, will of course reappear in the course of the play; 
but Faustus also forgets that it was passion of a different kind that led him to 
practice magic in the first place. 
In Faustus’s famous opening soliloquy, he quickly dismisses the traditional 
scholarly pursuits of logic, medicine, law and theology, before lighting on mag-
ic. In the space of six lines he goes from exclaiming, “[s]weet Analytics, ’tis thou 
hast ravished me!” (I.i.5)49 to concluding that “[a] greater subject fitteth Faustus’ 
wit” (11). This economy of space and Faustus’s abridged and sometimes faulty 
arguments for his rejections have led to numerous critical readings concerning 
Faustus’s learning and the effect the scene would have had on the audience’s 
judgement of the character,50 but it also showcases what Palfrey and Sterne have 
highlighted in terms of the text’s performative potential: the “snappy and seem-
ingly spontaneous change from one passion to another”, from admiration to 
distain. This is repeated for each of the disciplines, and Faustus’s short quotation 
                                                             
48  All quotations are from the B-Text, Marlowe 2008, unless otherwise noted. 
49  Original emphasis. 
50  For an overview of critical reactions cf. Brandt 2015: 31-32. 
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from Romans 6:23 seems particularly cynical, punctuated by a mocking laugh 
and a sarcastic comment: “‘Stipendium peccati mors est.’ Ha! / ‘Stipendium’, 
etc. / The reward of sin is death? That’s hard.” (I.i.37-39).51  
His language changes into something euphoric when he finally takes up a 
book on magic. The diagrams and shapes he finds in necromantic books are 
suddenly “those that Faustus most desires” (I.i.51-52), and his desire is at the 
centre of his excitement about magic: “O, what a world of profit and delight, / Of 
power, of honour, and omnipotence / Is promised to the studious artisan!” 
(53-55). The word delight, first introduced here, will continually reappear 
throughout the play, always connected to the potential of magic to not just enter-
tain but also to distract. And Faustus, goaded on by the Bad Angel, positively 
raves about the possibilities of magic, starting with rhetorical questions (“Shall I 
make spirits fetch me what I please?”), but soon eschewing questions for state-
ments: “I’ll have”, “I’ll levy”, “I’ll make” (77-95). Joined by the magician-
scholars Valdes and Cornelius, he sums up his state of mind, subverting his 
initial statement on Aristotle: “Philosophy is odious and obscure / Both law and 
physics are for petty wits; ’Tis magic, magic that hath ravished me” (103-104). 
Faustus’s last line in the scene (“This night I’ll conjure, though I die therefore”, 
160) makes clear that the ensuing conjuration scene (I.iii.) takes place very soon 
after, and Faustus’s renewed exclamations about what he will do through magic 
(I.iii.102-109) tie these two scenes together not just temporally but also emotion-
ally. In the evocation scene, Faustus might not feel fear or despair (yet), but he is 
anything but dispassionate. 
Passions are much more overt in an invocation scene from a later play, 
Barnabe Barnes’s The Devil’s Charter. Much indebted to Marlowe’s Doctor 
Faustus and usually dismissed in terms of its quality,52 it is nevertheless an inter-
esting example of the depiction of magic on the early modern stage, and it fea-
tures one of the most detailed conjuring scenes in the canon. The play centres on 
the life of Pope Alexander VI, formerly Rodrigo Borgia, and the diabolical cor-
ruption of his court and family. A dumb show in the prologue already shows the 
pact made between Borgia and the devil, who crowns him pope, although 
Alexander prefers to use poison rather than magic to dispatch anyone who stands 
in his way in the rest of the play. He does, however, call up demons when he 
views the murder of his son, the Duke of Candy, in his magic glass.53 
                                                             
51  Original emphasis. 
52  Cf. e.g. Cox 1998: 934. 
53  For similar scenes of a magician showing far-off scenes happening simultaneously 
(like an early modern security camera), see e.g. Robert Greene’s Friar Bacon and 
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The scene begins with Alexander already distracted to the point of incoher-
ency: “’Fore God, ’tis Candy, ’tis Candy, ’tis Candy, I know ’tis Candy” 
(IV.i.1).54 He quickly gives instructions for the magic ritual,55 interspersing 
astrological details and the instruments of conjuration with outbursts in which he 
repetitively harps on his dead son:  
 
Candy my son is murder’d, Candy my son, 
Candy my son is murder’d. I will raise 
All the great devils to show the murderer. 
Even as thou lov’dst my son, haste and dispatch, 
Haste and dispatch it as thou lov’st my soul. (IV.i.22-26) 
 
He seems entirely overcome by emotion when the devils he has raised finally 
show him in a dumb show that Candy’s murderer is Alexander’s other son, 
Caesar, demanding the dumb show be stopped and even (untypically) invoking 
the saints: “Hold, hold, hold, hold, hold! Per todos santos, now no more!” (78, 
original emphasis). Yet despite this, he is not yet finished with the devils, asking 
them to also show him who murdered his daughter Lucretia’s husband. As the 
dumb show reveals that it was Lucretia herself, he again raves, calling for “no 
more” and claiming that his “soul dissolves” (84).  
Yet the continuous protestations of his misery are double edged. There is a 
dark pun in the “cureless wounds” he has received in discovering these truths, 
which at first seem to refer only to his wounded feelings. They are “of my body: 
/ Wounds both of my soul and body” (90-91), i.e. both injuring his humoral 
constitution and begotten by him, his son and daughter themselves. And indeed, 
Alexander immediately comforts himself – by giving detailed instructions to 
have his daughter poisoned, a far cry from the confused rhetoric employed in the 
beginning of the scene. As with Faustus, this rapid shift illustrates the changes 
between passions that showcase the ability of the actor; but in this case, it also 
calls into question the veracity of the passion of the character. 
Passions continue to be invoked after the revelation that Caesar is Candy’s 
murderer has the pleasant side effect of giving the father unprecedented power 
over the son: Alexander can now blackmail Caesar to ensure his loyalty, and 
                                                                                                                                  
Friar Bungay (which also features a magic glass for this purpose), and John Webster’s 
The White Devil. 
54  All quotes from Barnes 1999. 
55  As Robert West has shown, the details of the scene echo the Heptameron (quoted in 
Traister 1984: 59). 
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indeed he does so in the scene following the conjuration.56 Seeing his remaining 
son firmly in his power, Alexander forgives Caesar for the murder and advises 
him to continue to dissemble grief for his brother: “Look sullen and demure, 
hold down thy head / Like one swoll’n up with sorrow” (IV.ii.135-136). This 
affectation of passion fits well with Alexander’s diabolical Machiavellianism, 
which makes even the devil seem more truthful than the supposedly grieving 
father, but it also touches on the dissembling of passions that an actor must do – 
whether he is playing Faustus or Alexander. 
 
 
THE WAGES OF SIN:  
SCENAE ULTIMAE OF SPIRITUAL DESPAIR 
 
Both characters thus exhibit and utilize different passions when calling up devils 
and in their interactions with them. Yet in the final hours before their grisly ends, 
both reflect on their spiritual state and both have extended scenes in which faint 
hope, fear, and despair are played out on stage.57 In The Devil’s Charter, the 
titular contract is fulfilled and the devil claims Alexander by thwarting yet an-
other attempt at poisoning a political enemy, leading to Alexander and his son 
drinking the fatal wine themselves. In a final confrontation with the devil, he 
finds himself outmanoeuvred and taunted by the Devil for his inevitable damna-
tion. For the first time, Alexander shows his knowledge of the doctrines of di-
vine salvation, arguing that God will have mercy on him – but it is his incapabil-
ity to be moved, to wholeheartedly ask for forgiveness, that seals his fate. “Stir, 
stubborn, stony, stiff, indurate heart! Not yet up? Why? What? Wilt thou not, 
foul traitor to my soul?” he cries in a panic (V.vi.163-165). The very words he 
uses harken back not only to humoral discourses on the passions,58 but to a 
common Protestant concept described by Alec Ryrie: the stony, cold, dry and 
insensible heart, an affliction thought worse than spiritual pain.59 
                                                             
56  Cox 1998: 940 even reads Candy’s murder by Caesar as purposefully instigated by 
Alexander to effect this situation. 
57  The ensuing discussion of passions in the two final scenes is only partial due to spatial 
constraints; much more could be said about the interaction of humoral and theological 
concepts and their rhetorical expressions, and especially on the masterful use of rheto-
ric in the depiction of Faustus’s mounting panic. 
58  Alexander imagines his heart “clogg’d with sin / Oppressed with damnation”, mixing 
spiritual and humoral concepts, V.vi.166-167. 
59  Ryrie 2013: 20-26. 
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Faustus’s deeds are nowhere near as heinous as Alexander’s, and it has often 
been noted that his magic ultimately gains him little of the riches and power he 
originally craved. Magic has brought transient “delight”, in the form of dancing 
spirits and a pageant of the Seven Deadly Sins,60 both called in by the devil to 
distract Faustus from his doubts (II.i. and II.iii.), a trip to Rome and Italy (III.i.), 
and in the form of magical demonstrations for the Emperor of Germany (IV.i.) 
and the Duke of Vanholt (IV.vi); but throughout the play, Faustus struggles with 
the fact that the “joys” he originally expected to gain from magic (I.i.146) are 
denied to him, as they are to Mephistopheles. “Joy”, apart from Faustus’s one 
mistaken assumption in the first scene, is a word only ever associated with God. 
When Faustus finally finds himself confronted with the inevitability of his 
end, despair wins out over the stale delights of magic. His melancholic mood is 
interpreted by his fellow scholars as a humoral affliction that can be cured by 
physicians. They assume it to be a result of him being “over-solitary”, but he 
corrects them: the “surfeit” he suffers from is not an excess of solitude but one of 
sin. His despair is spiritual, not physical (V.ii.31-40). Faustus, like Alexander, is 
unable to access the kind of passion that will mollify his heart and allow him to 
repent, a state of spiritual paralysis he has already encountered in earlier attempts 
to regain God’s favour (cf. II.iii.17-18).61 Instead, images of a different kind of 
passion enter into his speech: in the last two scenes, his meditations on blood 
finally bring him to the Passion of Christ.  
Mephistopheles, waiting unseen with other devils for Faustus to appear for 
his final scene, is the first to link blood to Faustus’s heart of stone in an image 
that can be read literally in the context of humoralism: “now his heart-blood 
dries with grief; / His conscience kills it” (V.ii.12-13). But Faustus takes up the 
image of blood and expands it further. Recognising his inability to feel true 
contrition and to show it with tears, he wishes that blood would gush forth in-
stead (56-57),62 and finally, in his last hour, he returns to the image of gushing 
blood in a more symbolic vein. In a beautiful instance of word scenery, he 
evokes the sunset with “See, see where Christ’s blood streams in the firma-
                                                             
60  Themselves associated with the passions: cf. Gaukroger 1998: 2. 
61  “My heart is hardened; I cannot repent” (II.iii.18). Marlowe’s influence on Barnes is 
of course very apparent here, but both writers draw on established theological 
Protestant discourse as noted above. 
62  This macabre foreshadowing of Faustus’s grisly end also harkens back to the diaboli-
cal contract signed in blood which he finally divulges to his associates (V.ii.61-66). 
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ment!”63 and hopes for salvation through even a drop of it. However, when he 
calls on Christ he seems to suffer immediate physical consequences: “Rend not 
my heart for naming of my Christ”, he begs the devil (V.ii.146). But in the con-
text of the multiple passions in this scene, is this really the devil torturing Faust-
us’s heart, or finally a trace of the true feeling that could conceivable save him? 
The complex relationship of hearts, blood, and passion retains its typically Mar-
lovian ambiguity when the light disappears and Faustus is left fearing the wrath, 





The treatment of passions in Doctor Faustus and The Devil’s Charter is un-
doubtedly deeply influenced by the concept of the four humours and the physio-
logical basis of early modern emotions. But both plays enrich this physiology 
with conceptions of the passions that echo other discourses, especially the theo-
logical and moralistic ones that can also be found in contemporaneous texts on 
magic. Human feelings have a basis in bodily states, but beyond that, these texts 
portray their proper management as integral to both the efficacy of ritual and the 
spiritual grace of the soul. In Doctor Faustus and The Devil’s Charter, the pas-
sions are both dangerous and the only path to salvation. As greed, pride, or un-
due curiosity, they can lead to damnation; as sincere feelings of repentance and 
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The Rhythms of Jealousy in  





The aim of this contribution is to discuss a notion of “passionate writing” in 
relation to the rhetorical strategies employed by early modern English authors to 
write jealousy.1 Early modern texts can be understood as potentially inscribed 
with emotional content since they were designed to evoke and stimulate the 
transaction of passions between author, text and reader, as entailed in the phe-
nomenological discourses of humoralism. While paying particular attention to 
drama (and especially to Shakespeare’s Othello and The Winter’s Tale), this 
contribution will also use, as case studies, passages from poems and both fic-
tional and non-fictional prose texts, in keeping with the early modern conception 
of literature, which comprised poetry as well as sermons and treatises. It will be 
demonstrated that, when reading or listening to these texts, form should not be 
disjoined from content, since they are both implicated in an inscribed ecology of 
emotion. Moreover, it is important to historicize the emotional transaction pro-
duced, since the literary evocation of jealousy would notably resonate in a cul-
ture that was constructed on and was heavily marked by male jealousy and what 





                                                             
1  For a general study on “writing jealousy”, see Monneyron 1997.  
2  Cf. Breitenberg 1996. 




DANCING JEALOUSY AND JEALOUS CHEMICALS 
 
The year 2014 saw the debut of a much acclaimed ballet adaptation of Shake-
speare’s The Winter’s Tale, a co-production of The Royal Ballet and the Nation-
al Ballet of Canada. The Royal Opera House has uploaded a video on Youtube 
of Edward Watson playing Leontes, the king of Sicily who becomes monstrously 
jealous of his wife, Hermione. The dancer’s expressions, his frenzied movements 
and the harrowing music have led a Youtube user, “Steemdup”, to comment: “is 
Leontes a tortured character? Ed is magnificent and a joy to watch. so [sic] pas-
sionate”.3 Obviously, “Steemdup” is not familiar with the story of The Winter’s 
Tale; but what is striking is that s/he says that the dancer is “passionate”. This 
response shows that the ballet has achieved to convey the king’s emotion 
through movement only. This may indicate that those scholars who have recently 
focused on the role of the actor’s body to express emotions rather than the lan-
guage used have a point. The last two decades have produced a spate of studies 
related to what Keir Elam has called “the corporeal turn”.4 With the decline of 
New Critical taboos on “affective fallacy”, as well as of Structuralism’s logocen-
trism, the discourses of corporeality and its connections with emotion have be-
come one of the most active and fascinating hermeneutic movements in studies 
of early modern drama and literature.5 This shift has many positive assets. For 
instance, it foregrounds the multiplicity of media and of the sensorial channels 
making up theatre: theatre is not only made of words, but also of bodies, music, 
lighting, costumes etc.  
The dancer has then been able to express jealousy without verbal aid. This is 
what had preoccupied Joby Talbot, the composer, who recalls his reaction on 
first hearing that he should compose a score for a ballet adaptation of The Win-
ter’s Tale: “My first thought was, ‘how do you tell the story through music and 
dance of a jealousy?’ Jealousy being the least kinetic, the least active, the least 
constructive emotion that kind of is.”6 We could compare Talbot’s statement and 
                                                             
3  The Royal Opera House 2015b. 
4  Elam 1996: 143. 
5  Just a sample: Roach 1985; Hillman/Mazzio 1997; Paster/Rowe/Floyd-Wilson 2004; 
Paster 2004; Smith 2009; id. 2010; Cummings/Sierhuis 2013; Craik/Pollard 2013; 
Hobgood 2014; Johnson/Sutton/Tribble 2014. For a concise discussion of what can be 
gained from a study of emotions and passions in literature and linguistics, see Elam 
1993. 
6  The Royal Opera House 2015a. 
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predicament with the performances of commedia dell’arte players who would 
travel across Europe, occasionally not speaking the local language, and whose 
plots often revolved around jealousy. This could be explained considering that 
the experience of jealousy seems to have some universal, cross-cultural qualities 
which can be perceived by anyone. Indeed, although the majority of scientists 
argue that jealousy is a secondary, non-basic emotion7 involving blends of other 
emotions, “anthropologists have so far failed to uncover a single culture that is 
free of this affliction”.8 
Yet, when reading the aforementioned comment of the Youtube user or lis-
tening to the interviews with the producers of the ballet, something very interest-
ing can be noticed. Christopher Wheeldon, the choreographer, recalls having 
said to the Leontes dancer: “perhaps that movement looks like it might start to 
suggest a slow flushing through of the body of […] all these dreadful jealous 
chemicals we all have the ability to release”.9 The dancer is thus “passionate” 
and releases “jealous chemicals”. It can be argued that these pronouncements are 
vestigial tokens of a now obsolete medical discourse, humoralism, or humor-
ism.10 According to humoralism, all human beings are characterized by their 
“temperament”, a unique mixture of bodily fluids, called humors (blood, 
phlegm, black bile and yellow bile). The humors course through and across 
bodies which were believed to be highly porous; Helkiah Crooke famously de-
scribed the human body as “Transpirable and Trans-fluxible”.11 Humors could 
be easily excited or perturbed (for instance, by change of climate, diet, age etc.), 
and could in turn alter the temperament. What is important to understand is that 
pre-Cartesian passions crossed physiology and psychology: they were not inter-
nal objects but were thought to “comprise […] an ecology or a transaction”.12 
Indeed, early moderns would not have found our views on embodiedness as alien 
as we may first suppose. As Bruce R. Smith puts it:  
 
                                                             
7  Cf. Salovey 1991. For a very good introduction to “emotion studies” relating to jeal-
ousy, see Sanders 2014:13-31. 
8  Nordlund 2002: 148. 
9  The Royal Opera House 2015a. 
10  It must be said that to talk of “humoralism” is to commit a broad, though necessary, 
generalization: there were various strands of medical, theological and philosophical 
discourses that relied on Galenian and Aristotelian writings on the workings of the 
soul and of the humors. However, they were often interrelated in significant ways. See 
Park 2009 and Kessler/id. 2009. 
11  Crooke 1615: 175. 
12  Paster/Rowe/Floyd-Wilson 2004: 18. 
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Instructed by Freud, we think of emotion as an energy that acts on the material body; for 
Donne and his contemporaries, passion was a biochemical state that arises from the mate-
rial body. An emotion is, for us, a response to an act of cognition; for Donne and his 
contemporaries passion was the impetus for an act of cognition.13  
 
Humors were refined as “spirits” and, as such, mediated between different indi-
viduals: Giorgio Agamben has coined the expression “pneumatic culture”.14 For 
instance, one did not fall in love by directly perceiving an external, attractive 
body: instead, “an internal image, that is, the phantasm impressed on the phan-
tastic spirits by the gaze, [was] the origin and the object of falling in love”.15 
One of the most frequent views of playgoing as an activity was that seeing 
and hearing a play could literally transform the spectator. Playwrights inherited 
and explored the classical teachings of Cicero, Horace and Quintilian, for whom 
an actor, just like an orator, needs to be “passionate”, that is, imbued with and 
dominated by an emotion, to move the spectator accordingly. By making himself 
angry, sad, jealous or amorous, he would transmit these angry, sad, jealous or 
amorous humors to the spectator, who would undergo a constitutive change, 
since these humors would alter his or her internal balance. We can apply to 
playacting what Thomas Wright in 1604 wrote of the amazing skills of orators in 
altering their audiences’ passions: 
 
The Christian Orator […] perfectly vnderstanding the natures and properties of mens 
passions, questionlesse may effectuate strange matters in the mindes of his Auditors. I 
remember a Preacher in Italy, who had such power ouer his Auditors affections, that whẽ 
it pleased him he could cause them shedd abundance of teares, yea and with teares drop-
ping downe his cheekes, presently turne their sorrow into laughter: and the reason was, 
because hee himselfe being extremely passionate, knowing moreouer the Art of mouing 
the affections of those auditors […] The same commoditie may be gathered by all other 
Orators, as Ambassadors, Lawyers, Magistrates, Captaines, and whomsoeuer wold 
perswade a multitude, because if they one can stirre a Passion or Affection in their Hear-
ers, then they haue almost halfe perswaded them […].16 
 
Nothing could terrify the antitheatricalists more than such powers of transforma-
tive persuasion. However, it was not only theatrical or oratorical performances 
                                                             
13  Smith 2009: 4. 
14  Agamben 1993: 99. 
15  Ibid.: 23.  
16  Wright 1971: 3-4 (second emphasis E.S.). 
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The most recent studies on early modern playacting primarily focus on the ways 
emotions were expressed through and across the bodies of actors and spectators. 
As Anthony Dawson puts it: “the body of the actor both represents and is what it 
impersonates, since it is that body, as identified with the character’s, that gener-
ates emotions.”17 In these studies, after years of meticulous close readings of the 
texts, less marked attention is paid to the words uttered by the characters. This is 
detrimental since theatrical performances were certainly seen, but also, and for 
some scholars,18 especially, heard, during the Elizabethan age. Moreover, plays 
were read: since the 1590s, the market for playbooks burgeoned substantially.19  
As John Milton put it, books in general “do contain a potency of life in 
them”.20 The contents of such texts were inscribed with emotions, which were 
designed to impress themselves onto the reader. Thus, to quote Thomas Wright 
again,21 “corrupted Bookes […] insinuate their matter vnto the chiefe affection 
and highest part of the Soule”.22 Wright lists among such books the texts pro-
duced by “light and wanton Poets”, comparing them to “Machiauellian poli-
cies”.23 The threat of similar books equals that of “many shewes, stage-plaies, 
and such impure exercises, which tend to the manifest overthrow of tender 
Soules”.24 The only cure Wright can think of is to imbibe different humors, those 
                                                             
17  Dawson/Yachnin 2001: 33. 
18  Cf. Gurr 2004: 102-115. 
19  Cf. Berek 2012; Erne 2013. 
20  Areopagitica (1644), quoted in Craik 2007: ix. 
21  I am aware that scholars have relied far too heavily on Thomas Wright, whose text 
The Passions of the Minde in Generall (1601; 1604) presents many peculiarities that 
should not be generalized for the overarching paradigms of humoralism: he was a Jes-
uit and he often delves into moral and theological discussions (see Sullivan 2015). 
Still, the importance of that treatise cannot be overestimated, also because of the in-
fluence it had in his own time: see Wright 1986: 3-16. 
22  Wright 1971: 333-334.  
23  Ibid.: 333. 
24  Ibid.: 333-334. 
220 | EMANUEL STELZER 
 
 
instilled by a different kind of literature: “thousands of spirituall Volumes, the 
holy Scriptures, sermons, exhortations, homilies, meditations, prayer-bookes”.25  
In a recent article, Claire Labarbe suggestively uses the expression “the dark 
ink of melancholy”,26 and discusses how character-books perpetuated traditional 
beliefs in the symptoms of black bile, but also portrayed a different type of this 
disease. She terms it “poetical melancholy”, a manifestation of inspiration that 
could “be sought after as a remedy against physical or circumstantial melan-
choly”.27 This stance can be strengthened by drawing from the perspectives of 
historical phenomenology: it can be shown that early modern texts were actually 
believed to be “passionate”, imbued with humors that could affect the reader, as 
it were, “biochemically”. 
Words written on the page and/or heard in the theatre do shape cognitive and 
emotional experience. However, the ways in which these processes are concep-
tualized provide important insights into one’s aesthetical appreciation of litera-
ture and drama. In the writing process, early modern authors were deeply aware 
of the phenomenological processes related to humoralism and tried to influence 
and stimulate them. It was even necessary to coin a particular verb: “to passion-
ate”, that is, “to excite or imbue with passion, or with a particular emotion, as 
love, fear, anger, etc.” (OED 1). Thus, according to Thomas Pastell, “Beaumont 
and Fletcher coyn’d a golden way / T’expresse, suspend, and passionate a 
Play”.28 Moreover, this power on the part of authors was perceived as so strong 
that:  
 
It was even claimed, extravagantly enough, that a playwright’s ability to handle the pas-
sions well brought him near to God; he alone could turn his own “quicke passions, and 
witty humors […] into matter and forme as infinite, as Gods pleasure to diversifie man-
kinde” [...] passions were not simply what playwrights depicted; they were what motivated 
the writing in the first place. “Passion” was inceptive.29 
 
In addition to this, the nature/nurture divide in relation to issues of mimetic 
representation of emotions was quite ambiguous. Angela Locatelli has investi-
gated how the English Ramist Abraham Fraunce (1558?-1593?) dealt with the 
manifestation of emotions in rhetoric. Fraunce’s writings on the concept of “ut-
terance” reveal “a paradox inherent in the early modern conception of mimesis: 
                                                             
25  Ibid.: 334. 
26  Labarbe 2015. 
27  Ibid. 
28  Pastell 1652: B6r. 
29  Palfrey/Stern 2007: 316. 
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one prescribes the symptom as gesture in order to effectively represent an emo-
tion”.30 In other words, what is cultural (a symbol) is made to fold itself onto 
what is physiological through prescription: a particular gesture, a particular tone 
of voice are given an appearance of spontaneity when, in fact, their meaning is 
supposed to be recognized by a certain community familiar with these conven-
tions. For instance, to show pity, “the voyce must be full, sobbing, flexible, 
interrupted”.31 
The contemporary spectator or reader may not understand how these emo-
tional patterns were articulated because they speak a different code. Martha 
Nussbaum succinctly explains that: “A person who does not know the emotional 
‘grammar’ of his or her society cannot be assumed to have the same emotional 
life as one who does know this ‘grammar’”.32 It is well known that, in the early 
modern period, the study of rhetoric was not simply the object of antiquarian 
education or the source of flowery embellishments, but the very groundwork for 
social interaction and self-fashioning. Rhetoric structured and shaped the “emo-
tional grammar” of the Renaissance sensu Nussbaum. 
Most noteworthy in this context are the considerations of Bruce R. Smith: we 
may not be able to stand at the centre of the early modern “intersubjective ‘field 
of perception’”, in Edmund Husserl’s terms, but this “should not stop us, howev-
er, from projecting ourselves into the historically reconstructed field of percep-
tion as far as we are able”.33 This attempt opens up new perspectives in judging 
and enjoying early modern texts. 
We have seen that texts were considered very potent instruments to move 
and change the reader’s beliefs, whether to good or to evil. This was so because 
of the perceived permeability of the human body. The spirits that enabled the 
humoral mediation between the author, the text and the reader, as well as be-
tween the actor and the spectator, were part and parcel of Agamben’s “pneumat-
ic culture”. Of course, this ecosystem of intersubjective fields of perception was 
ideologically inflected: women, for instance, were believed to be much more 
vulnerable to humoral perturbations, and melancholy in men was often perceived 
as having an emasculating force. 
This contribution discusses passionate writing in relation to one particular 
emotion: early modern jealousy. Renaissance England seems to have been ob-
sessed with male jealousy: “Extraliterary evidence certainly reinforces the view 
that anxiety about female sexual fidelity ran high in English Renaissance cul-
                                                             
30  Locatelli 1993: 162 (translation E.S.). 
31  Ibid. 
32  Nussbaum 2001: 149. 
33  Smith 2010: 28. 
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ture”.34 Women’s jealousy was more rarely thematized for various reasons, but 
to put it in one word – patriarchalism. Excerpts from different texts will be used 
as examples, paying particular attention to Shakespeare’s Othello and The Win-
ter’s Tale. In this attempt, Allison P. Hobgood’s pioneering study is very useful: 
in her book, she sets out to examine “feeling early modern bodies to uncover the 
ways they forced drama to reckon with and acknowledge their significant role in 




LINES OF JEALOUSY 
 
Jealousy was almost always associated with the melancholy temperament, the 
one dominated by black bile, the cold and dry humor.36 However, the most dan-
gerous type was “melancholy adust”. Choleric men, that is, those whose temper-
ament was dominated by yellow bile, were said to be very easily irritated and 
incensed. When subjected to the great humoral perturbation of jealousy, their 
temperature would increase so much that the yellow bile would burn (it would 
become “adust”) and turn into a form of black bile worse than simple melan-
choly. This dreadful perturbation would not allow them to reason any more. 
The dramatist Philip Massinger visually showed these humoral alterations in 
a tragicomedy, The Picture (1629-30). In the play, a jealous husband is given a 
magic picture which will turn yellow if his bride should be tempted to adultery 
and which will turn black should she yield completely. These changes of colour 
are revealing. The picture may reflect the state of his wife’s chastity given the 
early modern humoral permeability, but it also signals the jealousy in the hus-
band himself, whose passion literally turns from irascible to melancholic. 
How can these changes be expressed through words? How do you write jeal-
ousy?37 Has jealousy a particular sound or noise? In one of his elegies, John 
Donne says that a jealous man “snorts”38 – is this universal? Early seventeenth-
                                                             
34  Maus 1987: 561. Maus’s article has deservedly become a classic for studies on early 
modern jealousy. Concerning Othello, see the concise Allan 2010. 
35  Hobgood 2014: 4-5. 
36  See Babb 1951; Klibansky/Panofsky/Saxl 1964; Trevor 2004.  
37  Monneyron 1997 is an important reading but only concerns literature of the late nine-
teenth and twentieth centuries, and moves from mainly psychoanalytic and Marxist 
perspectives. 
38  Cf. Elegy 3: Jealousy in Carey 1990: 14, l. 22. 
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century musicology saw the emergence of the Affektenlehre, a doctrine which 
aimed at representing human emotions through musical rhetoric, and scholars 
started to codify these emotions in music. So jealousy was alternatively associat-
ed with minor key music, or with discordance and even chromaticism.39 This 
serves to show that the representation of emotions is heavily dependent on cul-
tural bases. Humoralism was perhaps the most important of these cultural bases 
in the early modern period. It was thought that prosody and rhetorical devices 
could both elicit and reveal passions, because “[w]ords represent most exactly 
the very image of the minde and soule”.40 For instance, Wright pointed out how 
to identify a particular temperament: “if they rage with furious words, brawle or 
wrangle, such carie the conscience of cholericke.”41 Humoralism was a frame-
work which enabled early modern individuals to present passions in the emo-
tional and cultural ecology between text and world.42 
Robert Burton’s Anatomy of Melancholy is one of the greatest works on mel-
ancholy ever written. Interestingly, he characterized his writing both as an ency-
clopedia on the effects produced by black bile and as a pre-Freudian talk-
ing/writing cure: “I write of melancholy, by being busy to avoid melancholy.”43 
He portrays himself as a man afflicted by melancholy and he says that by writing 
of it he feels purged of this disease. He devotes a large section to jealousy, a 
malady he perceives as so strong that he denotes it as a separate type of melan-
choly. What is very interesting is how he writes of jealousy. Jealousy is “a fury, 
a continual fever, full of suspicion, fear and sorrow, a martyrdom, a mirth-
marring monster” (vol. 3, 264). Note the alliterations. When in turn he portrays 
the behaviour of the jealous man, he regales us with a passage (vol. 3, 281) that 
cannot be described but as a dramatic piece:  
 
[…] he gloats on him, on her, accurately observing on whom she looks, who looks at her, 
what she saith, doth, at dinner, at supper, sitting, walking, at home, abroad, he is the same, 
still inquiring, maundering, gazing, listening, affrighted with every small object; why did 
she smile, why did she pity him, commend him? why did she drink twice to such a man? 
why did she offer to kiss, to dance? &c., a whore, a whore, an arrant whore. 
 
                                                             
39  Cf. Anonymous 1975: 175. 
40  Wright 1971: 105. 
41  Ibid.: 106. 
42  For a similar view, see the acute Oggiano 2012. 
43  Burton 1977: vol. 1, 20. All subsequent references to this text will be cited parentheti-
cally in the text. 
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The rhetoric of this quotation is exquisite. The repetitions are like bullets, and 
the asyndeton reflects the way this man cannot or refuses to reason. His style 
does not construct articulated independent and subordinate clauses; he proceeds 
in a fury. These sentences are dramatic in every sense of the adjective. One can 
surely compare Burton’s quotation with Leontes’s “affection speech” in The 
Winter’s Tale (I.ii 139-148):44  
 
                                             Can thy dam?—may’t be? –  
Affection, thy intention stabs the centre.  
Thou dost make possible things not so held,  
Communicat’st with dreams – how can this be? –  
With what’s unreal thou co-active art,  
And fellow’st nothing. Then ’tis very credent  
Thou mayst co-join with something, and thou dost – 
And that beyond commission; and I find it –  
And that to the infection of my brains  
And hard’ning of my brows. 
 
This passage has been famously described as the most obscure lines in Shake-
speare.45 But as Alessandro Serpieri has poignantly shown,46 these lines are not 
unintelligible: they manage to mirror exactly the delusional, tortured frenzy of 
Leontes’s passion. Listening to or reading these words, with their pauses, eli-
sions and rhythms which do not permit logical connections, makes us feel this 
passion. This also happens thanks to the various types of repetitio, since “rheto-
ric taught repetition: it provided schemes for organizing language in patterns of 
reiterative sound”47. 
Before coming to Othello, it can be useful to refer to a passage from two po-
etical works which “dramatize”, or “passionate”, jealousy. In both cases, the 
authors employ alliteration and discordant prosody. Spenser, in The Faerie 
Queene, weaves an alliterative triumph (III.v 59) when relating the transfor-
mation of a man, Malbeco, into Jealousy itself:48  
 
Ne euer is he wont on ought to feed, 
But toades and frogs, his pasture poysonous, 
                                                             
44  All quotations from Shakespeare’s plays refer to Taylor/Wells 2005.  
45  Cf. Shakespeare 2010: 38-42. 
46  Serpieri 2001. 
47  De Grazia 2001: 62. 
48  Spenser 1978. 
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Which in his cold complexion do breed 
A filthy bloud, or humour rancorous, 
Matter of doubt and dread suspitious, 
That doth with curelesse care consume the hart, 
Corrupts the stomacke with gall vitious, 
Croscuts the liuer with internall smart, 
And doth transfixe the soule with deathes eternall dart. 
 
Normally, Nicholas Breton was a fine melodious lyricist, but when he writes of 
jealousy, he intentionally writes lines whose prosody is so impervious and hard 
that the reader is bound to be emotionally involved (and compare its similarities 
with the above-mentioned quotation from Burton):49 
 
It workes, and watches, pries, and peeres about, 
Takes counsell, staies; yet goes on with intent, 
Bringes in one humour, puts another out, 
And findes out nothing but all discontent.  
 
How should we evaluate such rhetorical strategies? One could dismiss them as 
merely ornamental devices, but if this use of rhetoric becomes a pattern itself, 
then it is bound to have much more significance. 
 
 
OTHELLO50 AND DESTRUCTIVE RHYTHMS 
 
G. Wilson Knight was the scholar who introduced a seminal idea for criticism on 
Othello: he was the first to speak of “Othello music”.51 There are lines in the 
play which achieve a mesmerizing sublimity, a jewel-like eloquence which is 
                                                             
49  Breton 1600: s.p. See it also discussed in Breitenberg 1996: 177-178. 
50  It may be reasonable to warn in advance that for obvious reasons of space, I will not 
discuss at all the many, many other aspects of Othello’s jealousy, first and foremost, 
the intricate issues of class, race and gender (the last two are of great importance in 
understanding how humoralism is deployed in the play). It is by the grossest and most 
simplifying of conventions that we say that Othello and The Winter’s Tale are Shake-
speare’s “jealousy plays”. For a recent reading of how Othello resonated with Jacobe-
an culture and how the play has been infinitely reappropriated and changed over time, 
see the recent Marzola 2015. 
51  Knight 1993. 
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juxtaposed with the evoked noises of the sea storm and with the rhythms of 
Iago’s fiendish insinuations. Recently, while still very influential, this idea has 
been attacked from many points of view; for example, we evidently risk not 
differentiating between the play and the character. And furthermore, what about 
Desdemona’s own music?52 Still, Shakespeare’s lines in this play have a peculiar 
quality. It cannot be a coincidence that Othello was the source of so many musi-
cal scores, first and foremost, Rossini’s and Verdi’s operas. This led G.B. Shaw 
to scathingly remark: “The truth is that instead of Otello being an Italian opera 
written in the style of Shakespeare, Othello is a play by Shakespeare in the style 
of Italian opera.”53  
Iago’s famous lines in the temptation scene read thus: 
 
                      O, beware, my lord, of jealousy. 
It is the green-eyed monster which doth mock 
The meat it feeds on. That cuckold lives in bliss 
Who, certain of his fate, loves not his wronger. 
But, O, what damnèd minutes tells he o’er 
Who dotes, yet doubts, suspects, yet soundly54 loves! (III.iii 168-73) 
 
Othello will try to justify himself saying that “It is not words that shakes me 
thus” (IV.i 40), but actually it is Iago’s verbal poison that triggers his furious 
jealousy.55 Bruce R. Smith argues that “Iago’s warning enkindles Othello’s jeal-
ousy” precisely because he manages to divert Othello’s and, it could be added, 
possibly our “sense of hearing from its rational work”.56 He comments: 
 
The opening exclamation immediately wrests the imagination away from the regimen of 
words. […] The power of Iago’s speech over Othello’s passions is very much an effect of 
                                                             
52  See especially Hopkins 1994 and Hyde 1994. See also the acute reading in Locatelli 
1988. 
53  Quoted in Kimbell 1994: 607. 
54  I prefer the Folio’s “soundly” to Q’s “strongly” and especially Knight’s emendation 
“fondly” to strengthen the alliterative balance of the line. 
55  The counterpart of all this is of course the visual dimension, the search for the “ocular 
proof”. As we can see in Robbe-Grillet’s astounding novel La Jalousie, jealousy, like 
envy, is an emotion that seems to feed on the creation of visual scenarios and engages 
in perspectival distortion. The spectators of the play are involved in a voyeuristic 
frame while watching the spectacle of jealousy: we are called to collude in Iago’s or-
chestration, and we want to see as much as Othello fatally does. 
56  Smith 2009: 203. 
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assonance and alliteration. Sounds of /o/ insinuate surprise or moaning in ‘lord’, ‘jeal-
ousy’, ‘monster’, ‘doth’, ‘mock’, and ‘on’. […] Stronger still is the keening intimated by 
the /i/ sounds in ‘jealousy’, ‘green’, ‘meat’, and ‘feeds’. The ruminative [m] in ‘monster’, 
‘mock’, and ‘meat’ completes the job of aural seduction. The stops in ‘mock’, ‘meat’, ‘it’, 
and ‘feeds’ give the completed utterance a deadly inevitability.57  
 
Is this an instance of impressionistic criticism? To a certain level, the answer 
could be “yes”. In fact, we now know, for example, that some of the sounds 
italicized by Smith were pronounced differently in the early seventeenth centu-
ry.58 Nevertheless, Reuven Tsur, the prominent exponent of the “cognitive poet-
ics” movement, has discussed in his numerous works how certain sounds seem 
to be better suited to express particular emotions. For instance, “periodic sounds 
are perceived as smooth, soft, tender, whereas a-periodic, abrupt sounds are 
perceived as hard, aggressive, clearly-articulated”.59 The contexts in which these 
sounds are situated realize different emotive potentials of sound symbolism and 
early modern playwrights were keen observers of this.  
Iago may well say that it will be easy to taint Othello’s mind because of his 
“unbookish jealousy” (IV.i 100) (the adjective is a Shakespearean coinage). 
From the previous textual examples, it is by now clear that Othello’s jealousy is 
definitely not uncultured: it is deeply embedded in early modern world-making 
rhetoric. This is in perfect agreement with Frederick Turner: “Iago’s rhythm 
destroys Othello’s.”60 Othello’s thoughts and words are overcome by Iago’s 
eloquence, and Othello’s own rhythms will, quite literally, be nullified by Iago: 
he is silenced through epileptic seizures.  
 
 
CONCLUSION: “RAGE HAS ITS LAWS”?61 
 
What this contribution has tried to show and discuss is the passionate inscribing 
of jealousy in early modern English texts. Now, jealousy has been described by 
                                                             
57  Ibid. 
58  Cf. Crystal 2005. 
59  Tsur 2012: 273. 
60  Turner 1971: 116. See this argument beautifully developed by Wood 2016: 79 et 
passim. 
61  Tolstoy 1890: 134. I would like to thank Ingeborg Jandl (University of Graz) for 
sharing with me her great knowledge of the autobiographical elements of Tolstoy’s 
text and of its connections with modern and contemporary Russian culture. 
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cognitive scientists as well as by anthropologists as a “plastic phenomenon”: 
“something that is universal but also individually, culturally, and situationally 
variable”.62 “Situationally variable”: this is fortunate enough, otherwise anyone 
hearing Beethoven’s Kreutzer Sonata would want to kill their partner as in Tol-
stoy’s novella. Thus, it would be inane to say that the rhythms of Iago’s elo-
quence correspond to the music of Beethoven that triggers the Tolstoyan charac-
ter’s jealousy. However, early modern authors tried to write so that their texts 
could draw the reader or spectator into somebody else’s state of mind. The or-
chestration of the character’s jealousy is rhetorically articulated in texts which 
were thought able to physically as well as psychologically alter the reader, the 
actor and the spectator. The emotional transaction produced would resonate even 
more in Renaissance England, where there was a widespread culture of male 
jealousy. 
It may be objected that too much emphasis has been placed here on form and 
style instead of content. It must be stressed that, if writing was intended to stir 
somebody’s passions, it is evident that form cannot be coarsely disjoined from 
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When the Author Is Not  
the Author of Passions 





In the eyes of the 18th century, physiognomic portraits work in a twofold way: 
They reveal the character and affects of the portrayed, while also shedding a 
light on the soul and passions of the portrayer. Johann Caspar Lavater discussed 
this epistemic problem in his Physiognomische Fragmente, a protoscientific 
bestseller of the 1770s. However talented an artist might be, he is creating a 
person’s portrait in his own very distinctive way, inevitably lending it his own 
characteristic style.1 Lavater showed how differently a portrait, for example of 
Isaac Newton, would be carried out by different artists, providing a list of all the 
spots that would be “zu unbestimmt schattirt” or “verschliffen”.2 Indeed, he 
never tired of mentioning that a silhouette or a drawing might be faulty, “um 
etwas verschnitten” or “etwas verzeichnet”.3 Thus, he warned his readership that 
the various modes of imagination as well as the different aesthetic abilities of 
distinct painters could change the portrait of one and the same man (“wie sehr 
die verschiedenen Vorstellungsarten der Mahler, und ihre verschiedenen 
Fähigkeiten ein und ebendenselben Mann umbilden und verschieben”).4 For 
                                                             
1  Cf. Arburg 2016: 28, 34-35. 
2  “Too indeterminately shaded” or “blurred”. Lavater 1775-1778/vol. 2: XXXIV. 
Fragment, 277. Physiognomische Fragmente was preceded by Von der Physiognomik 
(1772). Translations, if not otherwise indicated, by Y.M. 
3  “Slightly miscut” or “slightly misdrawn”. Lavater 1775-1778/vol. 3: XII. Fragment, 
313; vol. 2: XII. Fragment, 116 i.a. 
4  Lavater 1775-1778/vol. 2: 276. 
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Lavater and his contemporaries, there is no way around the fact that a portrait is 
inevitably showing the soul of the portrayed and of the portrayer. 
This knowledge seems to be shared by literary portraits as well. In the an-
thropological novel Herr Lorenz Stark. Ein Charaktergemälde (1801), Johann 
Jakob Engel shows how portraits of characters can be (involuntarily) corrupted 
by their author’s character and passions. However, an author’s influence on a 
portrait is not only a major topic in the story told in the novel, but is also mir-
rored in the novel’s style itself, as will be elaborated in the course of the essay. 
But let us recall some biographic facts first:5 Johann Jakob Engel, author of 
various theatre plays, held the prestigious post of director of the Royal Theatre in 
Berlin until 1794. When he was sacked by King Frederick William II of Prussia 
over a quarrel about Mozart’s Magic Flute without even being granted a pension, 
he found himself in financial difficulties. Just in time came an offer from Schil-
ler that he contribute to the newly founded literary magazine Die Horen. From 
the very beginning, the aesthetic ambitions of Schiller’s magazine collided with 
economic realities. Like his friend Goethe and many others, Schiller made dis-
paraging remarks about Engel’s literary qualities, but now he was in need of a 
‘popular’ author for his magazine to suit the taste of the general public. It was 
out of economic necessities on both sides, that, beginning in 1795, the first sev-
enteen chapters of Engel’s novel Herr Lorenz Stark started to appear as a series 
in the magazine. The complete novel was eventually published in 1801 – and it 
became a huge success. The novel was staged in 1802 in the Royal Theatre in 
Weimar under the directorship of Goethe and with Iffland as the main actor. 
During the 19th century, sixteen editions of the novel were published in the 
German language alone, not counting translations into English and French and 
so-called “Klassiker-” or “Miniaturbibliotheken”. As early as 1806, the French 
translation became part of the school curriculum, and in 1870 the novel even 
became part of the literary canon of Reclams Universalbibliothek. 
Engel’s novel centres on the merchant and housefather Lorenz Stark. Hold-
ing strong beliefs in economic and moral virtues, Stark misjudges the characters 
of his son and his son’s bride-to-be badly, until the end of the novel brings about 
a kind of characterological anagnorisis. The novel’s subtitle is: Ein Charak-
tergemälde (“a character portrait”).6 The metaphor “character portrait” is not 
only referring to anthropology and physiognomy as the novel’s subjects, but also 
stresses the connection between physiognomy and the visual arts, between phys-
                                                             
5  For the following biographical account as well as the history of publication cf. Koše-
nina/Wehrhahn 1991: 99-105. Cf. furthermore Košenina 2005: 1-26. 
6  The subtitle of the 19th century English translation (cf. Engel 1826) is inaccurate: 
Lorenz Stark, A Characteristic Picture of a German Family. 
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iognomy and pictorial representation. In accordance with the metaphor “charac-
ter portrait”, Stark is depicted both as a judge of customs (“Sittenrichter”7) and 
of art; indeed, when judging a person’s character, he is doing nothing else than 
judging a piece of art, i.e., “strenge […] kunstrichtern”.8 
To a certain extent, drawing a character portrait involves drawing one’s own 
portrait. Engel’s novel exemplifies this by a scene in which Stark’s daughter is 
drawing his portrait for the widow Lyk. Of course, she is not really drawing a 
character portrait but rather evoking one mentally – but it is no coincidence that 
metaphors deriving from the sphere of visual arts are being used. Since it is 
distorted by her own perception as well as by the intention of drawing a favoura-
ble ‘picture’, the validity of such a ‘portrait’ is rather limited:  
 
Und nun fing sie an, ein Gemälde zu entwerfen, das zwar wirklich dem alten Herrn 
[Lorenz Stark, Y.M.] ziemlich ähnlich sah, das aber gleichwohl für ein Bildniß, wofür es 
doch gelten sollte, zu wenig Eignes und Unterscheidendes hatte. Eine zu gerührte kindli-
che Dankbarkeit, und eine zu lebhafte Begeisterung, die immer idealisirt und verschönert, 
hatten die Farben gemischt und den Pinsel geführt. Indessen war eben durch diesen Fehler 
das Gemälde um so geschickter, der Witwe ein unbedingtes Vertrauen einzuflößen, und 
eine lebhafte Begierde nach einer so vortrefflichen Bekanntschaft bei ihr zu wecken. Wäre 
mitten unter den schönen Zügen des verständigen, menschenfreundlichen, großmüthigen 
Mannes, auch die ernste Falte des Sittenrichters und das heimliche Lächeln des Spötters, 
die doch sehr zur Physiognomie des Herrn Stark gehörten, sichtbar geworden: so würde 
freilich jenes Vertrauen sehr geschwächt, und diese Begierde sehr gedämpft worden seyn.9  
 
                                                             
7  Engel 1991: 7 i.a. 
8  Ibid.: 16. The verb “kunstrichtern” (“judging a piece of art”) is a neologism. 
9  Ibid.: 50. “Here she began to sketch a picture, and although it resembled the old 
gentleman tolerably well in the main points, still as a portrait, for which it was in-
tended, it had too little distinctness of feature, too little of the peculiarity of his man-
ner to be perfect. Filial love warmed into fervour, and that too vivid enthusiasm, 
which always embellishes and idealises, had mixed the colours. However, these very 
faults rendered the picture better calculated to inspire the widow with unlimited con-
fidence, and to awake in her bosom a strong desire to form so excellent an acquaint-
ance. Had there also appeared among the finer features of the sage, benevolent, gener-
ous old man, the severe air of the moralizer [Sittenrichter, Y.M.], and the smile of the 
satirist, traits so predominant and characteristic in the physiognomy of Mr. Stark, her 
confidence would undoubtedly have been much weakened, and her desire to see him 
considerably diminished.” (emphasis Y.M.) Engel 1826/vol. 1: 187-188. 
236 | YULIA MARFUTOVA 
 
 
Physiognomy – the art of looking into a person’s soul by analyzing his or her 
facial traits – was one of the virulent ideas of the late 18th century; and, in fact, 
Engel was acquainted with Lavater. However, as an author of various theatre 
plays and former director of the Royal Theatre in Berlin (1787-1794), Engel’s 
professional interest lay in the field of pathognomy rather than physiognomy, i.e. 
in the field of an actor’s changing facial expression rather than his unchangeable 
facial features, in the exhibition of passions rather than firm character traits. 
While some of Engel’s contemporaries used the term ‘physiognomy’ as an um-
brella term, others – most prominently: Lavater – made a more or less sharp 
distinction between physiognomy and pathognomy.10 In the strict sense of the 
word, physiognomy was called the cultural technique of reading a person’s basic 
character traits by his or her outward appearance, while pathognomy was under-
stood as the art of deriving a person’s momentary affects from his outward ap-
pearance. Engel dedicated two volumes and almost 700 pages to the cultural 
technique of pathognomy as an eloquentia corporis in theatre plays when he 
wrote a treatise entitled Ideen zu einer Mimik, published in 1785 and 1786.11 
Here, Engel states: 
 
Ich nenne die Physiognomik eine der Mimik ähnliche Kunst; denn beyde beschäftigen 
sich damit, den Ausdruk der Seele im Körper zu beobachten: nur daß jene die festen 
bleibenden Züge, woraus sich das Allgemeine eines Charakters abnehmen läßt, und diese 
                                                             
10  “Physiognomik, im eingeschränkten Sinne des Wortes, ist Kraftdeutung, oder Wissen-
schaft der Zeichen der Kräfte. / Pathognomik, Leidenschaftsdeutung, oder Wissen-
schaft der Zeichen der Leidenschaften. Jene zeigt den stehenden – diese den bewegten 
Charakter. / Der stehende Charakter liegt in der Form der festen, und in der Ruhe der 
beweglichen Theile. Der leidenschaftliche – in der Bewegung der beweglichen. […] / 
Physiognomik zeigt die Summe der Capitalkraft – Pathognomik das Interesse, das je-
ne abwirft. Jene, was der Mensch überhaupt ist; diese, was er in dem gegenwärtigen 
Moment ist.“ [Emphasis in original.] Lavater 1775-1778/vol. 4: II. Fragment, 39. 
“Physiognomy, opposed to pathognomy, is the knowledge of the signs of the powers 
and inclinations of men. Pathognomy is the knowledge of the signs of the passions. / 
Physiognomy, therefore, teaches the knowledge of character at rest; and pathognomy 
of character in motion. / Character at rest is displayed by the form of the solid and the 
appearance of the moveable parts, while at rest. Character impassioned is manifested 
by the moveable parts, in motion. / Physiognomy may be compared to the sum total of 
the mind; pathognomy to the interest which is the product of this sum total. The for-
mer shows what man is in general; the latter what he becomes at particular moments: 
or, the one what he might be, the other what he is.” Lavater 1804/vol. 1: 20. 
11  Cf. Engel 1785-1786. 
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die vorübergehenden körperlichen Bewegungen untersucht, die einen solchen und solchen 
einzelnen Zustand der Seele ankündigen.12 
 
Overall, Engel’s novel Herr Lorenz Stark pays close attention to the meticulous 
description of facial expressions and gestures that bear pathognomic or affective 
significance. It is no wonder that contemporary critics praised the detailed ob-
servations of facial expression and gestures in the novel that build upon the 
treatise Ideen zu einer Mimik.13 August Wilhelm Schlegel complimented Engel 
on being an experienced observer of mankind.14 In particular, critics praised the 
novel’s dialogues for their ability to add vivacity.15 
Thus, in the case of Engel’s novel Herr Lorenz Stark, ‘writing affects’ means 
finding linguistic descriptions of facial traits that can be interpreted in a pathog-
nomic way. On the other hand, ‘reading affects’ means paying attention to facial 
traits and gestures that disclose affective states. Although the novel aims at de-
picting protagonists as individuals (not as types), their facial expression and 
hence the form of their affective expression is in a paradoxical way far from 
being individual. 
In Ideen zu einer Mimik Engel aimed at systematising all possible facial ex-
pressions; he believed in finding a kind of grammar or morphology of feelings 
that could be taught and learned (by theatre actors):  
 
Es ist mir unwahrscheinlich, daß Sie die Arten der Seelenveränderungen selbst, die sich 
durch den Körper ausdrucken lassen, für so unendlich, so unbestimmbar sollten gehalten 
haben. Der gemischten zusammengesetzten Empfindungen ist ohne Zweifel die größte 
Anzahl; aber wenn man nur die reinern, einfachern, und für jede derselben einen bestimm-
ten Ausdruk angeben könnte, so müßte dadurch, wie es scheint, auch für jene Mischungen 
                                                             
12  Engel 1785-1786/vol. 1: 6-7. “I see physiognomy as an art similar to facial expression 
[Mimik]; both observe the expression of the soul in the body: only that the first exam-
ines the firm, permanent traits that reveal the general character, and the latter exam-
ines the temporary physical movements that announce such and such a single state of 
the soul”. 
13  “[K]leine[] Bemerkungen des Ausdrucks in Minen und Geberden, in denen man den 
Vfs. der Mimik wiederfindet”, were praised by a review in: Allgemeine Literatur-
Zeitung 271 (1801), 657-660, quoted from Košenina/Wehrhahn 1991: 103. The re-
viewer is referring to Engel’s Ideen zu einer Mimik. 
14  “Ein[] geübte[r] Beobachter der Menschen”. Review in: Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung 
6 (1796), quoted from ibid. 
15  “Lebhaftigkeit und anschauliche[] Wirkung”. Review in: Neue allgemeine deutsche 
Bibliothek 87.1 (1804), quoted from ibid. 
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der Ausdruk schon so ziemlich bestimmt seyn. So wie diese selbst Zusammensetzungen 
der einfachen sind; so würde auch vermuthlich ihr Ausdruk mehrere einfache Ausdrücke 
verbinden: und es käme darauf an, ob sich nicht gewisse Regeln, nach welchen diese 
Verbindung geschehen müßte, entdecken ließen.16 
 
In particular, Engel aimed at depicting the ‘nature’, ‘the very essence’ of affects. 
It is quite revealing that he gave actors the advice not to strive for a mimesis of 
real feelings, but rather to aspire to mimic ideal feelings:  
 
Nachahmung, Darstellung der Natur ist, wie man schon so oft erinnert hat und noch im-
mer von neuem zu erinnern Ursache findet, ein Grundsatz, der nirgends hinreicht. Der 
Natur gelingt Manches in einer Vollkommenheit, daß die Kunst nichts weiter thun kann, 
als es sorgfältig aufzufassen und getreu wieder darzustellen; aber manches, auch wo sie 
am besten wirkt, erreicht bey ihr den Grad der Vollkommenheit nicht, den es sollte; man-
ches geräth ihr falsch, manches zu schwach oder zu stark: Und da erfordert denn die 
Pflicht der Kunst, aus einer gesammelten Menge von Beobachtungen, oder nach Grunds-
ätzen, die aus diesen Beobachtungen gezogen sind, die Fehler der Natur zu verbessern 
[…].17 
 
To cut a long story short: Although there is much talk of ‘nature’ and ‘natural-
ness’ (‘Natürlichkeit’) throughout the 18th century, and in Engel’s writing in 
particular, there is nevertheless some rhetoric repertoire of feelings that can be 
taught and learned. Writing affects by describing facial expressions relies on a 
                                                             
16  Engel 1785-1786/vol. 1: 27-28. “It seems unlikely to me that you should have consid-
ered the types of changes of the soul, which can be expressed by the body, as that in-
finite, indeterminate. There is undoubtedly a great number of mixed composite feel-
ings; but if one could characterize the purer, simpler feelings and their characteristic 
expression, one could, as it seems, easily determine the expressions of composite feel-
ings. Composite feelings are mixtures of the simpler ones, and their expressions 
would probably combine several simple expressions; it would depend on discovering 
the rules of their combination”. 
17  Ibid.: vol. 1: 16-17. “Imitation, representation of nature is, as has often been stated and 
finds reason to be repeated anew, a principle that does not suffice. At times, nature 
succeeds in creating things of such perfection that art cannot do anything but faithfully 
imitate these things; but at times, even where it works best, nature does not achieve 
the necessary degree of perfection; some things turn out faulty, some too weak or too 
strong: And in this case the duty of art requires to correct the errors of nature, in ac-
cordance with collected observations or principles that are drawn from these observa-
tions […]”. 
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readership that is able to interpret the applied grammar of feelings. Indeed, it 
involves a rather complex mental operation when affective states are not named 
explicitly or described, but can be traced back mainly by reading facial signs: 
One is then obliged to read symptoms. The protagonists in Engel’s novel Herr 
Lorenz Stark pay very close attention to facial expressions and gestures that are 
of pathognomic meaning – and, in a way, the novel is teaching its readership to 
do the same, it obligates its readers to interpret facial expressions as symptoms of 
affective states. If the author wants his readership to understand these symptoms, 
he has to apply more or less conventional facial and affective expressions in his 
writing process; he has to choose a code of affective signs that is – with some 
probability – known to his readership. In fact, a certain conventionality of a 
‘language of emotions’18 serves as the very basis of interpersonal as well as of 
literary communication. After all, we are talking of a novel, not a riddle. 
In fact, one possible way of reading Herr Lorenz Stark is to read it as a ‘doc-
tor novel’ that combines pathognomic or affective symptoms with medical or 
psychological symptoms. Stark’s son-in-law is a family doctor; his wife (i.e. 
Stark’s daughter) is referred to as “die Doctorinn”.19 Stark’s son-in-law is not 
merely a doctor of the body, but also and most particularly a doctor of the human 
soul. He visits his patients “theils, um sich nach der Gesundheit, theils – oder 
wohl eigentlich und hauptsächlich – um sich nach der Gesinnung […] zu erkun-
digen”.20 The doctor’s semiotics (“Semiotik des Doctors”21) are directed at the 
‘lovesickness’ of his brother-in-law and his bride-to-be and his indication (“Indi-
cation”22) is based on pathognomic symptoms such as averted glances (e.g. 
“Niedersinken ihres bis dahin aufgehobenen Blicks in den Busen”23). Not only 
the doctor but also his wife, “die Doctorinn”, is well versed in the art of reading 
affective symptoms (“Anzeichen”24). Indeed, this art of symptom interpretation 
is not the reserve of male scholars and professional doctors only, but is open to 
everybody, i.e. women. When drawing a parallel between the medical symptoms 
of a facies hippocratica and the affective symptoms of a person in love, the 
doctor’s wife is claiming the latter as a female domain: 
                                                             
18  Languages of Emotion was the name of a Cluster of Excellence at the Free University 
of Berlin (2007-2014). 
19  The female form of “Doctor”. At the time, it was common to address a woman by her 
husband’s title. 
20  Engel 1991: 59. 
21  Ibid.: 17. 
22  Ibid.: 39. 
23  Ibid. 
24  Ibid.: 83. 
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Sage mir doch: wie nanntest Du jüngst ein Gesicht, woran Du gewiß vorher weißt, daß 
Dein Kranker Dir sterben werde? 
Ein hippokratisches etwa? 
So ungefähr. Ja, so klangs. – Nun, die Freiheit der armen Mädchen und Witwen, wenn sie 
im Abfahren begriffen ist, hat eben ein solches hip – hip – wie heißt es? 
Hippokratisches Gesicht. 
Richtig! – Und darauf verstehen nun wir Weiber – wir klugen, mein’ ich – uns eben so 
gut, als Ihr Euch, Ihr gelehrten Herrn Doctoren, auf jenes.25 
 
Scenes like these can be understood as an appeal to the reader to undertake in-
terpretations of affective symptoms on his or her own. 
Like Christian Friedrich von Blanckenburg, who published the first German 
theory of the novel, Versuch über den Roman (1774),26 Engel thought that the 
plot of a novel should focus primarily on the soul and the changing affective 
states of a protagonist, not on mere exterior events. But, let us recall, this paper 
began with the problem that by drawing another person’s portrait, one is invol-
untarily drawing one’s own portrait, that – according to the epistemology of the 
time – character portraits can be (involuntarily) corrupted by their author’s char-
acters and passions. This meant an aesthetic dilemma for Engel, who did not 
plan at all to depict his own affective state in the novel, but wanted to show the 
affective states of his literary protagonists instead. The writer found a technical 
solution to this dilemma. 
In Über Handlung, Gespräch und Erzählung, a poetological text dating back 
to 1774, Engel had given his fellow writers the advice to switch to dramatic 
dialogue for representations of the soul: “Der Erzehler gehe […], sobald es auf 
Schilderungen der Seele ankömmt, ins Dramatische über.”27 To put it more 
simply, Engel proposed the integration of dramatic – that is, dialogic – parts in a 
novel, as he believed that the form of unmediated dialogue would be much more 
                                                             
25  Ibid.: 77-78. “‘[…] Tell me, if you please, the name which you lately gave to that cast 
of face, by which you know before-hand with certainty that your patient will die?’ / 
‘A Hippocratic face. – Was that the name?’ / ‘Something of that kind. Yes, it sounded 
something like it. – Well, the liberty of poor maidens and widows, when on the point 
of expiring has just such a hip – hip – how do you call it?’ / ‘A Hippocratic face.’ / 
‘Exactly so. – And on this point, we women – I mean to say, we sensible ones – un-
derstand these matters just as well as you learned doctors with respect to your patients. 
[…]’” (emphasis in original) Engel 1826/vol. 2: 101-102. 
26  Cf. Blanckenburg 1965. 
27  Engel 1964: 63. Foliation as in the facsimile edition. 
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capable of showing characters than mediated narrative.28 He stated that dialogues 
were a mirror of the soul and he ascribed to dialogues a great ability to show 
characters and their affective states. He elaborated on an idea already put for-
ward by Johann Jakob Sulzer that dialogues were the ideal form for displaying 
anthropological knowledge as well as for gaining psychological insights.29 And, 
indeed, the novel Herr Lorenz Stark contains such an abundance of dialogues 
that it is considered to be a “dialogue novel” (“Dialogroman”).30 
But why dialogues, of all literary forms? 
To get a complete understanding of Engel’s poetics of dialogue one has to 
consult his former essay Über Handlung, Gespräch und Erzählung a bit further. 
Here, Engel differentiates between dialogue and narrative, between – what he 
calls – “Gespräch” and “Erzählung”. Engel states: “[D]er Dichter spricht entwe-
der ganz in seiner eigenen Person, oder legt seine Gedanken andern in den 
Mund, sein Werk ist entweder fortgehende Rede, oder es ist Gespräch […].”31 
Unlike modern literary scholars, Engel does not differentiate between author 
and narrator. And this is of consequence, indeed. For Engel, there is either the 
voice of the author or the voice of a literary character, either the author’s speech 
or the character’s speech. According to Engel, while characters are speaking 
themselves, while they are “selbstredend”, the author is not present, “dann ist er 
nicht mehr Erzehler”.32 As the word already implies, direct speech is direct; it is, 
according to Engel, unchanged and unadulterated by anyone else. This is touch-
ing on a distinction that Henry James would later describe as showing versus 
telling.33 
However, direct speech is not only considered to be a mirror of the soul and 
passions of a literary protagonist because it is attributed to the literary protago-
nist exclusively (not to the author or narrator). The specific style of an utterance 
is also considered to possess physiognomic, or rather pathognomic, qualities. 
While the basic idea of style as the ‘expression’ of character can be traced back 
even to ancient Greece,34 the term physiognomy of style was first coined in the 
                                                             
28  Cf. ibid.: 70. 
29  Cf. Sulzer 1771/vol. 1: 473-476. 
30  Cf. Seidel 2014: 207-225; Winter 1974. Cf. furthermore Tarot 1990: 241-287. 
31  Engel 1964: 5. “The poet either talks entirely in his own person, or he puts his 
thoughts in another person’s mouth, his work is either continuous speech, or it is dia-
logue […]”. 
32  Ibid.: 60. 
33  James’ ideas were popularized by Percy Lubbock (cf. 1921). 
34  Cf. Müller 1981. 
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18th century, (presumably)35 by Lichtenberg. Quite ironically, it is Lichtenberg 
(of all people), the harsh critic of Lavater’s physiognomy, who embraces the 
idea of a physiognomy of style. While Lichtenberg deeply mistrusts the semiot-
ics of the physical body, he advises paying close attention to the ‘body’ of a text: 
 
[W]enn du einen verzerrten Menschen von dir widriger Physiognomie siehst, so halte ihn 
nur um Himmels willen nicht für lasterhaft ohne die genaueste Untersuchung. […] Allein 
einen klaren Satz der Physiognomik will ich dich lehren, es ist Physiognomik des Stils. 
Spricht jemand mit dir in der männlichen Prose Mendelssohns oder Feders oder Meiners 
oder Garves und du stößest auf einen Satz der dir bedenklich scheint, so kannst du ihn 
allemal glauben bis zu weiterer Untersuchung. Hingegen redet jemand mit dir im Wonne-
ton der Seher, plundert und stolpert Dithyramben daher mit konvulsivischem Bemühen 
das Unaussprechliche auszusprechen, so glaube ihm kein Wort, wo du es nicht strenge 
untersucht hast.36 
 
The belief in a physiognomy of style was wide-spread at the time. To list but a 
few names: Sulzer,37 Karl Philipp Moritz38 and Gellert39 claimed to distinguish a 
person’s character by his or her specific style. For these authors, style was char-
acteristic in the very sense of the word. 
But back to Engel. It is no coincidence that Engel is elaborating on the phys-
iognomic and pathognomic qualities of direct speech; he is devising dialogues, 
or rather their style, as the mirror of the soul and passions of their originators. 
Engel writes:  
 
                                                             
35  Cf. Mautner 1968: 150. 
36  Quoted from Müller 1981: 102. “[W]hen you see a distorted human being with a 
repellent physiognomy, for God’s sake, do not consider him to be vicious without the 
closest examination. [...] But one clear rule of physiognomy I will teach you, it is 
physiognomy of style. If anyone speaks to you in the masculine prose of Mendelssohn 
or Feder or Meiner or Garve and one sentence strikes you as questionable, then you 
may believe it without hesitation until further investigation. By contrast, if anyone 
speaks to you with the voice of a seer, puts forth dithyrambs in a convulsive effort to 
express the inexpressible, do not believe him a single word without strict examina-
tion”. 
37  Sulzer 1774/vol. 2: 1047-1045. 
38  Cf. Moritz 1793-1794. 
39  Cf. Gellert 1751. 
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Die Erzehlung […] kann von dem jedesmaligen Zustande einer handelnden Seele; sie 
kann auch von dem ganzen genauesten Zusammenhange aller in ihr vorgehenden Verand-
erungen [sic!] nie eine so specielle, bestimmte, vollständige Idee geben, als das Gespräch. 
Es ist unglaublich, wie sehr sich die Seele den Worten einzudrücken, wie sie die Rede 
gleichsam zu ihrem Spiegel zu machen weiß, worinn sich ihre jedesmalige ganze Gestalt 
bis auf die feinsten und delikatesten Züge darstellt. Der logische Satz, oder der bloße 
allgemeine Sinn, aus den Worten herausgezogen, ist immer das Wenigste; die ganze 
Bildung des Ausdrucks, die uns genau die bestimmte Fassung der Seele bey dem Gedan-
ken zu erkennen giebt, ist alles.40 
 
Interestingly, Engel is using metaphors deriving from the sphere of physiognomy 
and visual representation to make his point. While he compares an author’s or 
narrator’s utterance (“gesagte Idee”) to a mere silhouette, he compares direct 
speech (“ausgedrückte Idee”) to a colourful canvas: “[D]ie schlechthin gesagte 
Idee zeigt uns kaum den Schattenriß, kaum die äußersten Linien von dem Zu-
stande der Seele; die so bestimmt ausgedrückte Idee ist das ausgeführte, lebendi-
ge, colorirte Gemälde selbst.”41 
And Engel pushes the metaphor of style as the mirror of the soul, the meta-
phor of physiognomic or pathognomic visibility even further. With reference to 
dialogues, he uses metaphoric expressions of visualisation and envisioning such 
as “vors Gesicht bring[en]”42 or “vor Augen stellen”.43 For Engel, a dialogue is 
not a mere representation of a person’s soul; rather, it is the very soul itself with 
all its feelings. This turns dialogues into perfect objects for anthropological 
observations, into data (“Fakta”44) that can be assessed and reflected upon by the 
readership. 
                                                             
40  Engel 1964: 57. “The narration […] can never give such a specific, precise, exhaus-
tive idea about the state of an active soul as the conversation; unlike the conversation, 
it can never give a complete and accurate account of the relations of all the changes 
occurring in the soul. / It is incredible how the soul is capable of moulding the words, 
how the soul is able to turn them into a mirror, which represents its entire figure down 
to the finest and most delicate traits. The proposition or the mere general sense, ex-
tracted from the words, is always the least; the whole form of the expression, which 
shows us the exact state of the soul, is everything”. 
41  Ibid.: 58. “The ‘said idea’ [=narrator’s utterance, Y.M.] shows us hardly a silhouette, 
hardly the outermost lines of the state of the soul; the ‘expressed idea’ [=direct 
speech, Y.M.] is the completed, vibrant, coloured painting itself”. 
42  Ibid.: 74. 
43  Ibid.: 75. 
44  Ibid.: 79. 
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In summary, in a practical way, Engel recommends dialogues as a literary 
technique of ‘writing affects’, as a technique of presenting affective states of 
literary protagonists in a very direct and immediate form.45 According to Engel’s 
poetics, dialogues are produced by the literary protagonists ‘themselves’. In 
other words: While dialogues reveal their author’s passions, their author is not 
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How to Study Emotion Effects in Literature  
Written Emotions in Edgar Allan Poe’s  
“The Fall of the House of Usher” 
PIRJO LYYTIKÄINEN 
 
I felt that I breathed an atmosphere of sorrow. 
An air of stern, deep, and irredeemable gloom 
hung over and pervaded all.1 
 
 
Reading how Edgar Allan Poe’s narrator-protagonist feels in the midst of the 
horrifying storyworld, the reader is affected. The emotion words and affective 
language in general have an impact on us and we react emotionally to his emo-
tion, although the appropriate reaction is regulated by the context and the work 
as a whole. We all know from personal experience that the emotions of fictional 
characters or narrators as well as all the emotional contents of literary works 
affect us as readers. We presume that authors, when writing, not only present us 
with the factual or emotional realities of the fictional world but also endeavour to 
move us: they make us feel for, with or against the characters and, all in all, react 
emotionally to the world created by the text. This includes appreciating and 
enjoying the style and language through which the storyworld is presented to us. 
Interaction with the text also involves ways of reacting to the figure of the author 
that we feel in reading; all the choices made by the author create, in a sense, an 
emotional profile of the writer. All in all, the author writes to create an emotional 
response (which does not preclude other communicative intentions) and the 
reader reacts emotionally as well as intellectually. 
Affective communication proceeds from the choices of the author in writing 
to the emotional effects produced in readers, and presupposes a common lan-
                                                             
1  Poe 1952: 128. 
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guage and common cognitive/affective frames.2 Emotion effects are triggered in 
multiple ways by narrative, linguistic and stylistic features and the whole con-
struction of fictional worlds. We may conjecture that any element of the story-
world, narration or the language itself may participate in creating emotion ef-
fects. Furthermore, when we consider a literary text as a whole, we often have 
the feeling, like that of Poe’s narrator in the epigraph above, of breathing an 
emotional atmosphere: while reading, we are immersed in a world coloured by a 
certain mood, be it sadness or joy, horror or just some kind of peaceful delecta-
tion.  
In the following, I first outline my approach to the study of emotion effects. 
Second, I consider the question of emotional triggers, that is, types of textual 
elements that affect us and the way they produce emotion effects. To illustrate 
some of the categories involved, I turn to examples chosen from Poe’s short 
story “The Fall of the House of Usher”. Discussing this concrete, emotionally 
loaded text brings up questions that have pertinence to literary texts in general. 




HOW TO STUDY EMOTION EFFECTS? 
 
In any study of emotions, the first challenge is the terminology.3 This varies 
from one study to another even within one field of study, not to speak of the 
deeper dividing lines between affective science and affect studies.4 Without 
going deeper into this bewildering discussion, I will instead indicate here, how I 
use of the terms ‘emotion’, ‘feeling’ and ‘affect’ or ‘affectivity’ in this text. 
Here, these terms are understood in a very broad sense: affectivity is the most 
general term, referring to our tendency and capacity to be ‘touched’ or affected 
                                                             
2  These frames include intra-literary frames or “literary tradition” and “prefiguration”, 
to use Paul Ricœur’s term from Temps et récit (volume II). Cf. Lyytikäinen 2012: 48 
for a short presentation. 
3  In English, the words ‘emotion’, ‘affect’, ‘feeling’, ‘sentiment’, ‘mood’, and ‘passion’ 
have been variably used to refer to the same or slightly different phenomena. In psy-
chology, ‘affect’ is often the most general term, which contains subcategories such as 
emotions (or emotion episodes), moods, attitudes, interpersonal stances and affect dis-
positions (e.g. Frijda/Scherer 2009). 
4  Vide e.g. Hogan 2016. 
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by phenomena in the world or inside our body or mind.5 ‘Emotions’ or ‘feelings’ 
designate how we react – mentally and physically – to anything that affects us. I 
use these terms alternately although in many theories ‘feelings’ are seen as the 
bodily element of emotions. For the present purposes, however, it is enough to 
bear in mind that the variety of emotions encompasses what seem to be mere 
bodily feelings at one end of the scale and highly complex emotions that arise 
from and are accompanied by or imbued in our thinking (our judgments, beliefs, 
imaginings etc.) at the other.6 These emotions may be short-term episodes or 
enduring processes with narrative structure.7 I also refrain from drawing any 
clear line between subjective emotions and shared and collective emotions. 
Emotions connected to language use and literary communication always have a 
certain shared nature: when we speak we necessarily rely on general meanings 
rather than individually experienced emotions, we use shared frames and fram-
ing or patterns to make our feelings understood. 
This has implications concerning the concept of the reader. We can speak of 
literary texts triggering emotions in individual readers, who may respond in all 
kinds of subjective ways, but it is equally legitimate to emphasize the writing 
and the composition of the text by investigating literary texts themselves, as we 
are confronted with linguistic signs and cognitive/affective frames used by writ-
ers. These signs and frames are the necessary condition for language understand-
ing and it is pertinent to explore a literary text and its emotional impact at the 
level of language and, in the interpretation, focus on the authorial audience ra-
ther than real readers. This concept originates from Peter Rabinowitz and has 
been used by James Phelan, who conceptualizes this as a work’s ability to pull 
                                                             
5  Flatley (2008: 12) sees, in this vein, affect and emotion as two points of view concern-
ing the same phenomena: “Where emotion suggests something that happens inside 
and tends toward outward expression, affect indicates something relational and trans-
formative. One has emotions; one is affected by people or things”. A more fundamen-
tal grounding of affect and emotions as higher-order manifestations of a primordial 
affectivity is suggested in Colombetti (2014). 
6  The complexity of emotions/affects emphasized by, e.g. Ben-Ze’ev (2000: 3-5) makes 
things even messier, not to speak of the relation between aesthetic emotions and real-
life emotions discussed in connection with horror genres by Carroll (1990: 59-87). 
However, the general term ‘emotion’ will do as long as complex nuances are not re-
quired. 
7  Although in psychology the idea of reserving the term emotion to designate only 
short-term episodes is common, this does not correspond to common usage nor is it 
useful when dealing with literature: with narratives, the great literary emotions are 
usually long-term processes (Goldie 2000: 4-5, 11-16). 
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readers into the authorial audience.8 And, as Tero Vanhanen emphasizes, we can 
posit that the authorial audience also reacts to the emotional impact of the work 
in a way designed by the author. I agree with his conclusion:  
 
If we accept that a proper understanding of the work is achieved not through a particular 
emotional response but through the recognition of what is the proper emotional response 
for the authorial audience, we can mitigate the problem of subjectivity when dealing with 
emotional response to literary works.9 
 
This approach can be integrated into cognitive poetics if we accept that we have 
and acquire more or less automatized emotional scripts or frames just as we do 
with (other kinds of) cognitive frames.10 This seems uncontroversial in light of 
the results of recent research on human cognition that show how emotion and 
cognition are entangled even in the human brain.11 The cognitive study of litera-
ture investigates the general resources preconditioning interpreters’ mental states 
and the meanings created by their use rather than those mental states in individu-
als. In experiencing literature, immersion and empathy (in the sense of Einfüh-
lung, which used to be the term in older aesthetics) guided by the frames lead to 
emotion effects, but what we can investigate by studying texts (and their con-
texts) are the intended effects – writerly intentions as manifested in the text – 
and not the experience of real readers. 
                                                             
8   Phelan 1996: 102. The hypothetical audience that the (real or implied) author is 
writing for, in the sense Rabinowitz (1977: 126) understands it, is supposed to be fa-
miliar with relevant everyday, historical, cultural and literary knowledge, like genre 
conventions, or, as I would formulate it, with the cognitive and cultural frames pre-
supposed by the understanding of authorial intention. 
9  Vanhanen 2016: 21-22. 
10  Cognitive poetics as represented by, e.g. Stockwell (2002) and Tsur (2008) have 
themselves different profiles: the issue here is only to claim that insights from differ-
ent areas of cognitive poetics are most certainly fruitful in the study of emotion ef-
fects. 
11  The idea that “emotions and cognition are inextricably intertwined” (O’Rorke/Ortony 
1994: 283) has gained ground in affective science. Cf. Colombetti (2014: xvii) for the 
corresponding idea in enactivist studies. Developments in neuroscience since Damasio 
(e.g. 1995, 2010), who emphasized the role of emotion in the rational functioning of 
humans but still initially held the view that cognition and emotion are implemented in 
separate brain areas, have gone further: recent neuroscientific accounts question this 
separateness. 
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Thus, the emotion effects investigated here belong to the affective sphere, 
which presupposes and is presupposed by our embodied cognition and our lan-
guage, the latter providing the vehicle of shared emotions and cognition in gen-
eral and in literary texts in particular. These are the effects that different ele-
ments of literary texts have on the authorial audience: the emotion-related expe-
riences that the texts offer to a reader who accepts the reader position that the 
text’s rhetoric implies. The elements of the text relevant to producing these 
effects are the triggers. Whether real readers react to the triggers, feel the appro-
priate emotions or want to take the stance required, is another matter. Real read-
ers can react in many kinds of personal ways (although a reaction to the text 
presupposes that the text itself causes or enables these reactions) and they can 
very well understand the stance that the text offers them (as an authorial audi-
ence) but still refuse to take that stance.  
What seems self-evident but still needs to be emphasized is that the ways in 
which a literary text engages with its audience are specific to textual interaction, 
and to quite a special field even within that sphere. Emotion studies often pre-
suppose face-to-face settings and interaction and it is crucial not to forget what 
changes when we study literature. We do not enter into a direct interaction with 
other people by reading. We are dealing with verbal descriptions of emotions or 
other verbal evocation of emotions. This precludes direct reactions to other peo-
ple’s facial expressions, tone of voice, gestures and all the other bodily markers 
of emotion. Everything we encounter in literature is mediated by language. 
The verbalizing process itself may also have its impact on actual experiences 
of emotion: studies on this relationship point out that the verbal expression of 
emotions as such influences and changes the emotions experienced. As William 
Reddy emphasizes, emotion and (linguistic) emotional expression interact in a 
dynamic way and verbalizing emotions permits the formation of emotional hab-
its and even emotional regimes.12 Furthermore, unlike typical non-fiction texts, 
literary texts do not primarily express the emotions of the writer but dramatize 
fictional emotions. Thus, we do not react primarily to the emotions of the writer 
                                                             
12  On emotional regimes, Reddy 2001: xii and 124-128. Reddy maintains that “[a]ny 
enduring political regime must establish as an essential element a normative order for 
emotions, an ‘emotional regime’” (ibid. 124). Rosenwein (2007) has introduced the 
concept of “emotional community” which refers to groupings with shared emotions 
within a society. Cf. also Wetherell 2012: 19-20. This also makes it possible for fic-
tional texts to shape the emotion systems or regimes of their audiences. The result, 
then, not only intensifies the experiencing of emotions but, on the contrary, can 
replace experiencing with expressing. Emotional regimes as well as social rituals re-
quire that emotions are expressed or performed), but not necessarily felt. 
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but to the emotions of fictive beings. What is more, literary texts construct whole 
storyworlds in which various things and objects affect us. All kinds of emotion-
related items come into play. The narrator or literary characters may discuss 
various emotions or emotions as a category and we gain knowledge of emotions 
rather than being asked to feel them. The psychological analysis of emotions in 
literary texts has many functions, and philosophical conceptions of emotions are 
illustrated in literary texts. Tropes, embedded stories and discourses and many 
other elements are brought in. All in all, the possibilities are as varied as in real 
life. As texts, literary texts are unique precisely because they dramatize whole 
worlds and bring in a full gallery of fictional agents with their mindscapes that 
often affect us profoundly. Even in shorter forms and in lyric poetry, the literary 
form imposes an indirect relationship between the text and the writer of the text, 
and mediates the emotions. 
By doing this, literary storyworlds complicate the question of whose emo-
tions we react to if and when we react to the emotions of others while reading. It 
is crucial to reflect upon the subjects of emotions or emotion ascriptions in liter-
ary texts. We may, of course, react emotionally to anything described or to the 
descriptions themselves, but when we react to others’ emotions in the literary 
context, it is usually to the emotions of fictional characters or character-
narrators. It makes a difference that we do not encounter them directly; how we 
react to them is orchestrated by the styles of worldmaking, including all the 
narrative and stylistic choices made by (real) authors. How all this overtly or 
covertly evokes the ‘back-stage’ emotions of the (implied) author and relates to 
the mood of the text is a complex issue. I discuss mood at the end of my text but 
emphasize already here that our emotional reactions to fictional subjects are 
mediated by moods that relate to genres. 
 
 
WHAT TRIGGERS EMOTIONS IN LITERARY TEXTS  
 
As already stated, virtually anything in literary texts can trigger emotion effects. 
In poetry it is easy to point out the affective role of even individual words, asso-
nances and rhymes. In the case of prose narratives, the primary focus is often on 
the fictional characters or narrators and their emotions. But, as in the real world, 
we can react affectively to anything we pay attention to in literary storyworlds. 
What is more, when dealing with texts, we can also react to the text and its tex-
ture and narrative forms themselves. As an authorial audience, we should take all 
this into account. 
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Even before entering the text proper, the audience is guided by the paratexts 
that are attached to the text itself, most importantly the title(s). Poe’s title exem-
plifies this: “The Fall of the House of Usher” contains a key word that helps to 
set the tone and a horizon of expectations affecting the emotional response – “the 
fall” creates suspense and possibly excitement. A story of decay or destruction 
can be assumed: the fall of a house may be understood literally or it may allude 
to the extinction of a whole family line because the family name is mentioned. 
Referring to the popular 1997 film, we could speak of the “Titanic”-effect of 
many stories: the outcome is told beforehand, either by the title, the introduction 
or just by the fact that a myth, event or story familiar to the reader is mentioned. 
The effect of this knowledge on the affective orientation may vary, but it is clear 
that such an effect is intended when the story is structured in such a way as to 
give this orientation from the very start. Texts where the reader has to wait for a 
second reading to know the direction of the plot are structured with a different 
story logic. 
Obvious and ubiquitous categories to be taken into account when dealing 
with the emotion effects of the storyworld are: 1) characters, 2) narrators, 3) plot 
and events and 4) fictional objects and settings. All these broad categories can 
involve us emotionally in any of the ways we encounter them in the real world 
and even in ways that we do not come across in the real world. Characters in 
particular prompt emotion effects in the authorial audience even if we are not 
encouraged to feel the same emotions as they do. We also have emotions to-
wards these figures when they are not feeling, or not described as feeling, any-
thing in particular: their appearance, acts and behaviour are all usually evoked to 
move us in one way or another. Although dealing with the emotions related to 
characters or narrators is often seen as straightforward and unproblematic, com-
plexities arise. Modernist or postmodernist – to say nothing of what has been 
termed “posthumanist” – texts, have provided us with intriguing kinds of charac-
ters. The imaginary access to other people’s or even animal minds, all kinds of 
counter-factual imagining, display of dream-like worlds with personified objects 
and hybrid or downright impossible beings may involve us in experiences that 
go beyond possible real-world experiences.  
Emotional responses to literature are not restricted to how fictional people af-
fect us. One reacts to all kinds of things and events as well as to people. But 
without underestimating the role of plot and events – for Aristotle the most im-
portant element of tragedy and its emotional effect13 – I move on to objects, 
which are of vital concern in Poe’s short story.  
                                                             
13  Poetics, chapter 6; e.g. Halliwell 1987: 37. 
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In real life, any object that somehow attracts our attention is prone to affect 
us – make us feel something.14 As Poe’s narrator affirms about the depressive 
setting in the short story: “there are combinations of very simple natural objects 
which have the power of affecting us.”15 The fact that natural objects and their 
combinations as such affect us emotionally is not only folk-psychology but also 
acknowledged by recent psychological research.16 Moreover, the descriptions of 
objects and natural phenomena in literary texts have similar effects to encounters 
with these natural objects or surroundings in real life. However, a significant 
aspect to bear in mind is the variety of narrative devices by which elements of 
the storyworld are imbued with affective power or denied that power even if they 
are somehow “naturally” prone to have this kind of power. Literary texts build 
on the “natural” frames but also manipulate the audience’s feelings by attaching 
valences or affective values to objects and settings. In literary works, any object 
or phenomenon described tends to function as an emotion-trigger. In stories like 
Poe’s the weather, for example, plays a significant affective role: it is understood 
to be part of the whole and part of the affective atmosphere. 
At another level, we may focus on the discourses of emotion and concepts 
and metaphors connected to emotions that come up in literary works. Literary 
subjects present judgements and ‘information’ relating to emotions and use 
comparisons and metaphors or other tropes (involving conceptual blending and 
including affective trope-worlds). All this serves not only to give the audience 
food for thought or information about the thoughts of fictional subjects, but also 
to provide elements in constructing the affective make-up of the text. 
Furthermore, the authorial audience is, in various ways, induced into affec-
tive states by the lexical choices, linguistic registers and the like. The politics of 
using or not using emotion words produces quite different emotional textscapes. 
Emotions can be named, but the most powerful devices to evoke them do not 
necessarily even include naming emotions. For example, descriptions and narra-
tion attributing emotions to characters encompass psychonarration, narrated 
monologue, interior monologue, and speech expressions by characters that pos-
sibly only imply their emotions (or show them without telling). Style, rhythm, 
points of view, distance as well as many other elements and their combinations 
have affective value without requiring the explicit mention of emotions or the 
use of emotion words. In modernist literature, this absence of explicit emotion 
and emotion words has been the rule rather than the exception, whereas in Poe’s 
short stories emotion words abound. 
                                                             
14  To cite Varela/Thompson/Rosch 1991: 113: “All experience has a feeling tone”. 
15  Poe 1952: 126, emphasis in original. 
16  Cf. e.g. Ben-Ze’ev 2000: 88. 
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Everything related to the so-called material aspects of language and style as 
well as the formal features of narration counts in creating the overall network of 
emotion effects. Although it may be difficult to separate the worlds from the 
words, the shifting focus on one or the other aspect is possible. The double focus 
on words and worlds is also necessary to access the most general affective agen-
cy in the literary work: the mood or tone of the text (also referred to as atmos-
phere, Stimmung and attunement). 
Turning to Poe’s short story, it could be analysed by using any of the catego-
ries or levels mentioned: it is, from the beginning to the end, imbued with emo-
tional expressions and depictions of characters and objects, it personifies the 
house, it contains shocking events, it comments on and intertextually relates the 
dominant emotion felt by the narrator-protagonist, it creates a strong and fasci-
nating emotional atmosphere. In the following I illustrate how items falling into 
some of these categories function in Poe’s text as emotion triggers and reflect 
how these categories are related. I conclude by discussing the role played by the 
last category (tone/mood), which refers to the most general and fundamental 
affective level in all literary texts. 
 
 
THE INSUFFERABLE GLOOM –  
THE SUFFERING AND REFLECTING VISITOR  
 
We may navigate with the emotions of characters and narrators relatively auto-
matically, but spelling out everything involved in fictional situations (or even in 
everyday real-life situations) is not simple. Some complexities come up even in 
seemingly straightforward attributions. Poe’s narrator directly tells us about the 
emotion that is connected to the first perception of the house of the Usher family 
– the gloom that proves to become all-pervading during his stay in the house: “I 
know not how it was – but, with the first glimpse of the building, a sense of 
insufferable gloom pervaded my spirit.”17 Poe’s character-narrator is telling 
(afterwards, “now”) about the emotion (the insufferable gloom) that he experi-
enced at the story time (as a character). Here we already have a complex narra-
tive structure linked with the double role of the character-narrator. In the whole 
story, the often detailed and affect-laden characterizations of emotion purport to 
make the audience feel a similar sense of awe and gloom to that which the char-
acter felt, while the narrative distance and the analytical stance of the narrator, at 
the same time, create a kind of intellectual shield that permits a contemplation of 
                                                             
17  Poe 1952: 125. 
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the emotional turmoil from outside rather than from within the storyworld. The 
audience can, in a way, oscillate between the experience of the character im-
mersed in the scenes remembered and the narrator, safely away from the strange 
world of the House of Usher, reflecting afterwards upon the events that occurred 
there. 
Poe’s narrator, who constantly reflects on his own emotions, also makes 
comparisons with supposedly known and habitual emotions; e.g. he compares 
his insufferable gloom to the “usual” poetic sentiment: “I say insufferable; for 
the feeling was unrelieved by any of that half-pleasurable, because poetic, senti-
ment, with which the mind usually receives even the sternest natural images of 
the desolate or terrible.”18 These judgements and information relating to the felt 
emotions are the result of after-thoughts. They also possibly serve several differ-
ent functions. The quote above emphasizes, by the comparison with a traditional 
poetic feeling, the power and extraordinariness of the gloom suffered by the 
narrator and spreading throughout the atmosphere of the story. Furthermore, it 
functions, if taken as a meta-commentary, as a way of defining or introducing a 
new emotion into the gallery of literary emotions. Instead of an old-style poetic 
sentiment, Poe intends to introduce a new sensation pertaining to the horror 
genre he is creating.19 It is supposed to be fascinating in a new way, to be strong-
er and more mysterious and, supposedly, less “poetic”, whatever Poe means by 
that. 
The same function pertains to another comment where a comparison with the 
romantic feeling of the sublime is made: “There was an iciness, a sinking, a 
sickening of the heart – an unredeemed dreariness of thought which no goading 
of the imagination could torture into aught of the sublime.”20 The reader is sup-
posed to know the sublime implied and to imagine something far more terrible. 
What this terrible feeling is, is determined only by negations: the message is that 
we must imagine something that goes beyond our present categories. The nega-
tive is a strong affective power.21 The negativity is here fortified by adjectives 
like “insufferable”, “unrelieved” and all the expressions which refer to unpleas-
ant things and feelings. The word “unredeemed” also suggests the overcoming of 
the redemptive or cathartic sublime. 
Poe’s narrator, who both mediates his own feelings to the reader and func-
tions as the stand-in for the affected reader, is free to dwell on the affects evoked 
                                                             
18  Ibid. 
19  This is not the horror genre defined by Carroll (1990), and Poe’s genre has not neces-
sarily the same kind of “art-horror” as the overall effect of the genre on the audience. 
20  Poe 1952: 125. 
21  Cf. Karttunen 2015: 32-53 for a sociostylistic perspective on negatives.  
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by the storyworld and keen, at the time of telling, to analyse and generalize upon 
his memories or experiences and feelings felt at the story time. He offers us his 
“theories of emotion”. This is a practice often found in (especially older) literary 
texts like Poe’s: narrators and characters not only present their own emotions or 
those of other fictional figures but make generalizations. And possibly more than 
that: these generalizations, at least in the case of Poe, relate to the genre of the 
text and function as metafictional elements commenting upon the genre. 
 
OBJECTS ASSAILING THE SENSES 
 
Poe’s narrator in his character-role also functions as a proxy for the audience by 
seeing the objects that affect the audience. The audience feels the (vicarious) 
awe and horror mainly via the objects witnessed by the experiencing protagonist. 
What the narrator-protagonist fears and loathes is supposed to have a similar 
effect on the audience.22 This has been an important strategy in horror narratives 
as well as in other genres where a strange or unknown world is opened up to the 
reader via a visitor who is also unfamiliar with this world (this also applies to the 
figure of Dante in Divina Commedia). In Poe’s story, the strategy is prominently 
used in the service of conveying emotions. The very first sentences of the story 
already delineate the strong depressive feeling provoked by the surroundings of 
the house and the weather conditions: 
 
During the whole of a dull, dark, and soundless day in the autumn of the year, when the 
clouds hung oppressively low in the heavens, I had been passing alone, on horseback, 
through a singularly dreary tract of country; and at length found myself, as the shades of 
the evening drew on, within view of the melancholy House of Usher.23 
 
The adjectives and adverbs breathe an overall melancholy gloom that is then 
attributed to the house as well. We know from psychology that the mere men-
tioning of affect-laden words produces a measurable bodily effect and influences 
                                                             
22  Carroll (1990: 17-19) argues that in horror narratives certain characters regularly have 
this function to guide the reader’s response. That this is not always the case is sug-
gested by unreliable narration; e.g. representations of madness in literature can in-
volve a narrator (or character) that feels awe and horror at everyday objects (a poem in 
Finnish literature has coined this “seeing horrors everywhere”). The audience is sup-
posed to understand that the trouble is in the seeing rather than in the fictional world. 
23  Poe 1952: 125. 
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the mental make-up of the person hearing or reading them.24 How much stronger 
then is the effect of this whole array of dreary words and the possibility of imag-
ining the whole setting with the depressing weather.25 We may generalize that 
the functions of nature description, including the weather and the time of the day 
and year, in Poe’s fantasy-stories – as well as in many other literary genres – are 
almost entirely affective: they are intended to provoke emotion effects in read-
ers.  
Although Poe’s narrator hastens to name the emotion, the “gloom”, and 
analyses the emotion in the way indicated above, he also resorts to comparisons 
and personification of the house: 
 
I looked upon the scene before me – upon the mere house, and the simple landscape fea-
tures of the domain – upon the bleak walls – upon the vacant eye-like windows – upon a 
few rank sedges – and upon a few white trunks of decayed trees – with an utter depression 
of soul which I can compare to no earthly sensation more properly than to the after-dream 
of the reveller upon opium – the bitter lapse into every-day life – the hideous dropping off 
of the veil.26  
 
Poe’s story, in many ways, suggests that the house itself, with its “vacant eye-
like windows”, is a living being that in a mysterious way controls and partici-
pates in the feelings of the main characters and forms an uncanny double to the 
master of the house, Roderick Usher: the melancholy house is a mirror-image of 
its owner. Such personifications, in themselves, may have a strong effect on the 
audience, even in the form of local metaphors. We may well ask how our ani-
mistic imagination relates to our emotional life. If we see our emotional life as a 
product and function of our social interaction with other people, it is clear that 
personifying objects makes them affect us more deeply. 
What are, then, the functions of these statements within the emotional make-
up of the text? Poe’s use of significant objects and his reference to the power of 
objects show that he is very much exploring the ways in which he can provoke 
emotion effects by combining and describing natural objects. We must, however, 
add that he does not seem to trust the combinations in themselves, since his 
descriptions are so laden with affective words. Even his objectifying description 
of Roderick Usher abounds with expressions emphasizing the horror. His friend 
                                                             
24  Oatley (cf. 2011: 113) refers to an experiment by Francesco Foroni and Gün Semin. 
25  For imagination as/and simulation, cf. Hogan 2013: 1-26, and the short version Hogan 
2016; Oatley 2011: 2-21. 
26  Poe 1952: 125. 
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is so ghastly, wild and strange that he evokes something beyond humanity, a 
monster: 
 
The now ghastly pallor of the skin, and the now miraculous lustre of the eye, above all 
things startled and even awed me. The silken hair, too, had been suffered to grow all 
unheeded, and as, in its wild gossamer texture, it floated rather than fell about the face, I 
could not, even with effort, connect its Arabesque expression with any idea of simple 
humanity.27 
 
This allusion to monstrosity would delight Noël Carroll, who considers monsters 
to be necessary in the horror genre.28 Here, the reference is to the imminent 
collapse of reason in Usher’s mind. The narrator suspects that Usher is succumb-
ing to madness and Usher himself seems to confirm this assumption by present-
ing the allegorical song/poem about the haunted castle that also functions as a 
mise en abyme of the theme of the story. This, as well as other descriptions in 
Poe’s story, evoke the general mood or tone of the text at the same time as creat-
ing the storyworld and a vivid sense of its unreal reality. Mood effects are con-
spicuous in Poe’s text and direct us towards something that is not an emotion in 
the sense of having a specific object but rather an overall emotional perspective 
which hovers over the fictional world. 
 
 
CREATING AN ATMOSPHERE OF  
GLOOM AND FASCINATION 
 
How can we understand the concept of tone or mood when it refers to the general 
genre-constitutive or genre-dependent emotional atmosphere of the whole text? 
In the case of “The Fall of the House of Usher”, it is strikingly obvious that the 
very first sentences carry a great deal of affective weight and evoke the central 
atmosphere of horror, constitutive of the horror genre which Poe is here inaugu-
rating. Generally speaking, the tone of the text, especially in the case of short 
fiction, is most often clearly set at the very beginning of the text. Of course, it 
also develops along the way and finally encompasses the whole text, creating the 
affective perspective from which the audience sees the storyworld. However, the 
                                                             
27  Ibid.: 129. 
28  Cf. Carroll 1990: 41-42. 
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beginning is essential in awakening the interest in the text and in setting the 
tone.29 
In psychology the term ‘mood’ has been used to refer to (fleeting or medium-
term) states of mind in individuals, and we may ask how this concept relates to 
the mood of a literary text. It has been claimed – with good reason, I think – that 
the way in which the text moods function follows the logic of moods in individ-
uals.30 Poe is helpful himself: he describes this logic and, thus, seems to hint at 
his own poetics in “The Fall“. Poe’s narrator’s description of the constant mood 
of Roderick Usher assumes that the mood determines the attitudes and emotions 
towards everything: “[A] mind from which darkness, as if an inherent positive 
quality, poured forth upon all objects of the moral and physical universe in one 
unceasing radiation of gloom.”31 The gloom that has invaded the mind of Usher 
colours his whole world. This observation, when interpreted on the meta-level, is 
pertinent to the way in which the whole text is constructed. Everything described 
in this story contributes to creating and strengthening the atmosphere of gloomy 
horror. Every phenomenon that the narrator pays attention to is seen through the 
filter of this dark melancholy. This contagious atmosphere seizes the narrator 
immediately on arrival, before he has met his friend. Not only the state of his 
friend but what he himself affirms to be a “superstition” about the house and its 
surroundings being haunted imposes itself on him: 
 
I had so worked upon my imagination as really to believe that about the whole mansion 
and domain there hung an atmosphere peculiar to themselves and their immediate vicinity 
– an atmosphere which had no affinity with the air of heaven, but which had reeked up 
from the decayed trees, and the gray wall, and the silent tarn – a pestilent and mystic 
vapor, dull, sluggish, faintly discernible, and leaden-hued.32 
 
The role of the narrator as a mediator in between the mysterious storyworld and 
the normal world, which includes his rational posture as narrator with hindsight, 
contributes to the overall setting of the tone: however, it is the immersion in the 
gloomy atmosphere of horror that is the main interest of the story and the main 
line which creates mood effects. 
                                                             
29  In his essay “Nathaniel Hawthorne” Poe (1952) has written that “a skillful literary 
artist” constructs his tales around “a certain unique or single effect” and continues: “If 
his very initial sentence tend not to the outbringing of this effect, then he has failed in 
his first step” (I thank Mark Shackleton for bringing this essay to my attention). 
30  E.g. Flatley 2008. 
31  Poe 1952: 131. 
32  Ibid.: 127. 
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Although the logic of literary moods can be compared to the functioning of 
individual moods, it is also clear that there is more to this issue. A mood in this 
sense is not the emotional state of an individual subject and especially not any 
fleeting state of mind. Here we are referring to something that, in a sense, 
grounds the fictional world, and gives it the colouring and light through which it 
is seen, felt and thought. Mood as this kind of structure can be understood in 
terms of what Martin Heidegger called Stimmung. Matthew Ratcliffe emphasizes 
that moods in the Heideggerian sense are variants of a changeable sense of be-
longing to the world that is pre-subjective and pre-objective.33 All states of mind 
and object-related emotions as well as all perceptions and cognitions of ‘exter-
nal’ things presuppose this background of belonging. Moods also determine the 
kinds of possibility we are open to. A change of the ground mood can involve a 
radical alteration in how one finds oneself in the world. This opposes the com-
mon idea of moods as generalized emotion. Instead, mood is here something 
presupposed by the possibility of intentionally directed emotional experiences. 
All such experiences involve finding something significant in one way or anoth-
er and experiencing it as mattering. And moods determine the kind of signifi-
cance things can have for us, the ways in which they are able to matter. 
Ratcliffe has developed the concept of “existential feeling”, relying on 
Heidegger’s ideas but expanding the range of emotional states to encompass a 
greater variety of moods and using the Husserlian concept of the horizon as well 
as adding a bodily dimension. Existential feelings are bodily feelings and experi-
ences of the body as well as the world.34 Ratcliffe is primarily interested in the 
changes in the sense of being of patients suffering from depression, but he brief-
ly analyses a few examples from literature and film, e.g. Lars von Trier’s Melan-
cholia, which can be compared to “The Fall”. As in von Trier’s film, the melan-
cholia in Poe’s story pours out from the person suffering from depression and 
invades the storyworld as a whole. What is important in Ratcliffe’s methodology 
when used in analysing literary texts or other artworks is the holistic approach: 
moods here function as sets of rules of worldmaking that relate to genre-
repertoires. What still remains to be explored is whether his approach also brings 
new insights to the analysis of emotion effects in literature. 
                                                             
33  Ratcliffe 2015: 55-57: Moods as Heidegger understands them are neither subjective 
states of mind nor something in the world (objective); the translation ‘attunement’ 
actually better captures the sense. As modes of attunement, they are presupposed by 
the intelligibility of intentionally directed experiences, thoughts and activities (ibid.: 
55-56). Ratcliffe 2008 uses the term “feelings of being”. 
34  Ibid.: 55. 
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To return to Poe’s story, it is necessary also to question the identification of 
the overall mood with the mood (state of mind) of the narrator. What has so far 
been left out of the discussion is the dual role of the narrator as both the im-
mersed experiencer and the analytical narrator in relation to the mood of the text. 
As the experiencing character, he gradually succumbs to the mystery, supersti-
tion and non-reason in the storyworld: in a word, he is fascinated by the story-
world.35 But, as the narrator, he is also the voice of reason and analysis, and is 
struggling (and failing) to understand the mystery. He represents the common 
sense, which fails in the face of mystery, and the rational world that the reader is 
supposed to leave behind to enjoy the story.36 Curiosity, a (safe) sense of dwell-
ing in the mystery and the forceful language put a spell on the reader, leading the 
way to a kind of dream state of freedom from the constraints of reason while the 
thrill of horror stimulates both the body and the mind. This effect is indicated to 
the authorial audience by exploiting deeply-rooted fears and nightmares about 
madness, illness and death as well as many references to relevant literary tradi-
tions such as Gothic and Dark Romanticism. But all this happens in the context 
of fiction, in which a knowledge of the rules of the game and a feeling of safety 
can be presupposed. In the mid-18th century, Edmund Burke had already spelled 
out the ambivalence of negative and positive emotions in art-horror,37 but Poe’s 
downplaying of the sublime changes the balance and introduces a more troubling 
combination that has come to mark contemporary horror genres in even more 
extreme ways.38 In Poe’s story, one’s sense of reason is left perplexed and impo-
tent, and the art-horror or its overall effect on the audience is troubling and does 





The analysis of emotion effects is complex. Trying to analyse all emotion trig-
gers and their effects even in a relatively short text like “The Fall” is virtually 
impossible. However, studying emotion triggers and their effects by showing a 
                                                             
35  For the complexities involved in literary fascination cf. Baumbach 2015. 
36  Carroll (cf. 1990: 57) notes how the horror genre depends on the Enlightenment 
distinction between nature (as reason) and the violation of nature or unnatural phe-
nomena (as non-reason). 
37  For Burke, the sublime produces “the strongest emotion which the mind is capable of 
feeling” and it transforms the horror into “a delightful horror, a sort of tranquillity 
tinged with terror” (Burke 1990: 36, 123). 
38  Vanhanen 2016 presents a comprehensive analysis of issues relating to this point. 
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variety of them ‘in action’ in Poe’s short story proved to be interesting and intri-
guing and illustrates how the overall attunement of the text works and how the 
individual elements and the overall mood link together. 
Poe’s story is highly explicit and insistent in tone: more than is habitually 
found in most genres. Nevertheless, attuning itself is something that is essential 
to literature: more than the classical unities or any other structural coherence, it 
is the overall unity of tone that matters. As Poe puts it in his essay on 
Hawthorne, referring to his “effect” mentioned in note 29: “In the whole compo-
sition there should be no word written, of which the tendency, direct or indirect, 
is not to the one pre-established design.” Whereas Aristotle maintained that the 
plot in the tragedy should dominate and even the characters remain in a second-
ary place to attain the proper tragic effect of pity and fear, one could claim that it 
is not really the plot but the affective tone or general mood that matters. The 
emotion effects created by the author and experienced by readers who join the 
authorial audience would, thus, provide the text with the coherence which is the 
basis for the overall aesthetic experience, an experience which is a genre-
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Re-Evaluating Human Emotions in Michel Houellebecq’s  





In Michel Houellebecq’s novel La possibilité d’une île (translated as The Possi-
bility of an Island), the reader is confronted with a bleak future for humanity: the 
main characters are posthuman creatures who live in secluded compounds and 
seem incapable of understanding and feeling human emotions. The novel con-
sists of two strands of narrative – the memoir of Daniel1, a comedian living at 
the beginning of the 21st century, and the commentaries by the clones Daniel24 
and Daniel25, his successors in the distant future. Bearing in mind the context of 
Houellebecq’s work as well as the posthuman(ist) discourse, this novel should be 
understood neither as a straightforward prognosis about the future of human 
beings nor as an unambiguous evaluation of human cloning. A consideration of 
certain recurring topics in Houellebecq’s works and his stylistic characteristics 
highlights the specific scenario for the posthuman being developed by Houelle-
becq. Posthuman(ist) theories on the concept of the human being “after human-
ism”, at the beginning of the 21st century, and its possible future developments 
help to position the novel’s scenario within a wider theoretical context. In this 
article following, I discuss these contexts in order to analyse what could be 
called the nostalgic representation of emotions in this novel and the functions of 
writing and narrative connected to it. 
 
Sexuality and love, desire and ageing bodies are recurring themes in Houel-
lebecq’s work. In Extension de la zone de lutte (1994) (translated as Whatever), 
for example, he discussed the significance of DNA decoding and the possibility 
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of making sexuality and sexual reproduction obsolete.1 His novel Les Particules 
élémentaires (1998) (translated as Atomised) also centres on these topics – La 
possibilité d’une île can be seen as a continuation of this discussion: “Beginning 
where Atomised leaves off, Possibility ponders at first the problem of sex but it 
has become clear that it is not sex that is at issue but the difficulty of all human 
affective attachment and, in particular, love.”2 While the ending of Les Parti-
cules élémentaires still points out that “there is hope of love”, “The Possibility of 
an Island is the death of this hope”.3 Together, the two novels suggest a radical 
solution to the disenchanted lives under modern capitalism – “the eradication of 
the hope for affective renewal or regeneration”.4 
But this “eradication” is not obvious at the beginning of La possibilité d’une 
île, as the novel seems to present a continuation of human life through cloning. 
Apart from the opening pages (which introduce further narrative levels that I am 
going to discuss in relation to the functions of writing), La possibilité d’une île 
consists of Daniel1’s life account, which is presented in alternating chapters with 
Daniel24’s commentary on the account, followed by Daniel25’s account – when 
a clone dies, his or her successor is brought to life. Daniel1 recalls his life as a 
misanthropic and racist comedian, his failing relationships and how he became a 
member of the Elohimites, a sect trying to achieve eternal life through cloning. 
In the distant future, the clones Daniel24 and Daniel25 as well as other clones of 
Elohimite members live in secluded compounds. The main purpose of the life of 
each clone is to produce a commentary on their original’s account. Towards the 
end of the narrative, Daniel25 leaves the compound in the vague hope of meet-
ing other clones and finding a community. Discouraged after encounters with a 
horde of homo sapiens sapiens and the death of his dog, he prepares to live out 
his days and die alone. 
Even though the novel seems to present cloning as a solution for the future of 
mankind, this solution “must be read with some question as to whether it is 
endorsement or condemnation”.5 Houellebecq’s style of writing conveys, as 
King stresses, a “Swiftian ambiguity”.6 Furthermore, his treatment of philosoph-
ical ideas in his novels remains ambiguous: in an article discussing Houelle-
becq’s treatment of Nietzschean philosophy in La possibilité d’une île, Moore 
notes that it is impossible to discern a certain stance towards Nietzsche’s theory 
                                                             
1  Cf. Moraru 2008: 268. 
2  Sweeney 2015: 152. 
3  Ibid. 
4  Ibid.: 153. 
5  Ibid.: 163. 
6  Cf. King 2006: 63. 
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of “eternal return”, as Houellebecq is “caught between irony and earnest senti-
mentality”.7 Therefore, this bleak scenario and the theories and reflections about 
the future of humanity connected to it should not be understood as unambiguous 
representations of opinions.8 
This complex ambiguity is also notable in the novel’s treatment of human 
emotions, especially the discourse about love. Even though Daniel1 is portrayed 
as a cynic, towards the end of his story it becomes obvious that he mourns the 
impossibility of finding fulfilling love and nostalgically reflects upon the prob-
lem that his concept of love – especially in regard to monogamous relationships 
– “has become hopelessly outmoded”.9 In the character’s opinion, only pets such 
as his dog Fox are capable of selfless love.10 
In contrast to Daniel1’s nostalgic reflections about love, the clones seem to 
be unable to understand and feel emotions. Daniel24 and Daniel25 write about 
their puzzlement concerning human emotions and the role they play for human 
beings. They are unable to grasp the meaning of emotions and their impact on 
humans’ lives. Daniel25 mentions that he would never know boredom, desire or 
fear to the same extent as a human being: “Je ne connaîtrais jamais l’ennui, le 
désir ni la crainte au même degré qu’un être humain.”11 It could even be doubted 
that these three states all denominate emotions, but as the character puts them in 
the same enumeration, they appear to belong to the same category for him. 
Both clones mostly ascribe emotions to other beings – humans and animals – 
distancing themselves further from these terms. What is more, “love” appears to 
be the most enigmatic emotion for the clones, because it contains contradictory 
meanings, as Daniel25 mentions: “Malgré ma lecture attentive de la narration de 
Daniel1 je n’avais toujours pas totalement compris ce que les hommes enten-
daient par l’amour [emphasis in original, S.S.], je nʼavais pas saisi l’intégralité 
de sens multiples, contradictoires qu’ils donnaient à ce terme.”12 He can merely 
categorize it as a terrifying state and sees it as an important factor in the genetic 
economy of the species: “Naturellement, je ne pus m’empêcher de méditer une 
fois de plus sur la passion amoureuse chez les humains, sa terrifiante violence, 
                                                             
7  Moore 2011: 47. 
8  Cf. ibid.: 162-163. 
9  Sweeney 2015: 180. 
10  Cf. ibid. 
11  Houellebecq 2012: 440. “I would never know boredom, desire or fear to the same 
extent as a human being.” Translations, if not otherwise indicated, by S.S. 
12  Ibid.: 414. “Even though I read Daniel1’s narration attentively, I had never completely 
understood what humans meant by love, I had never fully grasped the multiple and 
contradictory meanings they connected with this word”. 
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son importance dans lʼéconomie génétique de l’espèce.”13 The clones, who call 
themselves “néo-humains”, see this state of puzzlement as an intermediate phase 
of posthuman development – a full understanding of human beings and their 
emotions will lead to the arrival of the so-called “Futurs”: “Si nous voulions 
préparer l’avènement des Futurs nous devions au préalable suivre l’humanité 
dans ses faiblesses, ses névroses, ses doutes; nous devions les faire entièrement 
nôtres, afin de les dépasser.”14 The only emotion that they see themselves capa-
ble of is sadness, but Daniel24 emphasizes that he experiences only “a slight 
sadness”.15 In contrast, Daniel25 even differentiates between “desire” and “sen-
timent” and expresses his doubt that posthuman beings could feel the former, 
stronger feeling for other beings, when he thinks about a female clone: “Sans 
aller jusqu’à éprouver pour elle ce que les humains qualifiaient du nom de désir, 
j’ai pu parfois me laisser brièvement entraîner sur la pente du sentiment [empha-
sis in original, S.S.].”16 This denial of emotions displayed by the clones lessens 
towards the end of the narrative, when Daniel25 concludes that he has experi-
enced love: “Je savais maintenant avec certitude que j’avais connu l’amour, 
puisque je connaissais la souffrance.”17 The narrative seems to suggest that the 
aseptic life in the compounds leaves the clones in an unemotional state, dis-
tanced from human experience, and only by leaving their environment do they 
become capable of experiencing and feeling. Nevertheless, their confined lives 
are dominated by the obsessive discussion of human emotions, as their reflec-
tions and their writings centre on their human predecessors. 
 
How can these characters and the nostalgic reverence to love be interpreted in 
the posthuman(ist) context? Posthumanism offers theoretical concepts for the 
possible future of the human being. It positions itself after humanism in the 
sense that certain premises of humanism are reconsidered, especially the anthro-
pocentric focus and the idea of a human essence. This theory “emerges from a 
                                                             
13  Ibid.: 435-436. “Naturally, I could not stop myself from meditating once more about 
the passion of love amongst human beings, its terrible violence, its importance in the 
genetic economy of the species”.  
14  Ibid.: 170. “If we wanted to prepare the advent of the Futures, we first had to follow 
humanity in its weaknesses, its neuroses, its doubts; we had to make them entirely our 
own in order to surpass them”. 
15  Ibid.: 157. “Je ne ressens rien d’autre qu’une très légère tristesse”.  
16  Ibid.: 156. “I would not go so far as to feel for her what the human beings denominat-
ed as desire, but I could sometimes let myself be driven to the edge of sentiment”.  
17  Ibid.: 432. “Now I knew for certain that I had known love, because I knew suffering”.  
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recognition that ‘Man’ is not the privileged and protected center”18 and its pro-
ponents discuss the boundaries between human beings and animals as well as the 
‘natural’ and ‘cultural’ aspects of human beings, and they consider the possible 
changes of human beings through biotechnological developments such as nano-
technology and cloning.19 In La possibilité d’une île, two aspects can be analysed 
from a posthumanist perspective: firstly, the depiction of cloning in relation to 
individuality and the clone as a copy, and secondly, the theoretical connections 
to affect theories. 
In Houellebecq’s novel, cloning leads to the abolishment of the individual 
and posthuman beings are presented as mere copies.20 Moraru interprets this as 
the “horrific fate of cloning” as described by Baudrillard, as this development 
does not lead to the desired immortality of the individual, but erases the individ-
ual and makes the human being obsolete.21 In this solipsistic existence, emotions 
have ceased to exist, “affection and affects at large are irrelevant because the 
neohuman cannot be ‘affected’ by anything other than his genome”.22 Sweeney 
even describes this state of being as a bodiless existence: “In such a bio-
technically managed totality defined by genetic similitude and asexual reproduc-
tion, there is no longer any need for the somatic presence of the body or any 
encounter with other bodies.”23 The idea of overcoming corporeal restraints and 
extending human existence into cyberspace is precisely what posthumanist theo-
rists – e.g. Hayles in her seminal text How We Became Posthuman – criticise as 
transhumanist dreams about the future. These neglect the centrality of corporeal 
existence for the human self-image and the human connectedness to other beings 
such as animals – considerations are central for a multiple, diverse concept of the 
human being that posthumanists aim at.24 Therefore, Sweeney criticises Houelle-
becq’s treatment of posthumanism as superficial, since he merely “uses the con-
cept of posthumanism and the science underpinning it as a theoretical strategy 
with which to probe contemporary society” and “shows, at best, an inconsistent 
philosophical and ethical engagement with many contemporary theories of 
posthumanism”.25 The depiction of cloning is centred on the trope of the clone as 
                                                             
18  Badmington 2011: 374. 
19  Cf. Wolfe 2011: xv, Herbrechter 2012: 7-8. 
20  Cf. Moraru 2008: 270. 
21  Cf. ibid.: 289. 
22  Ibid.: 276-277. 
23  Sweeney 2015: 154. 
24  Cf. Hayles 2008: 2-3. 
25  Sweeney 2015: 161. 
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a copy – a well-researched and discussed literary topic26 – and does not offer a 
new perspective. This lack of a new perspective is also evident in the discussion 
of affect in the novel, which only seems to present a state of “posthuman affect”. 
Another aspect of the novel that can be considered from a posthumanist per-
spective is affect. In his essay on “posthuman affect”, Vermeulen notes that 
affect theory can be understood as a posthumanist theoretical approach, since it 
focuses on impersonal dynamic principles (in contrast to the subjective, personal 
qualities of emotions), going beyond human experience.27 According to 
Vermeulen, affect theorists position themselves institutionally as coming after 
humanism and in their research, they centre on what precedes human life and 
experience – characteristics that are shared by posthumanism in general.28 This 
development leads to a new emotional scenario that is postulated by affect theo-
ry: “[…] the demise [emphasis in the original, S.S.] of feeling that posthumanist 
thought seeks to enact generates second-order feelings that are less easily cap-
tured, defined, understood or reterritorialized onto the subject.”29 This, in 
Vermeulen’s view, is connected to the experience of the sublime – but it produc-
es an experience that cannot be reintegrated into human experience.30 This state 
of being overwhelmed by emotions and leaving behind the emotional sphere of 
human beings is postulated at the outset of the novel. But the clones desperately 
trace human emotions and the final clone, Daniel25, tries to reintegrate and 
describe feelings in the sphere of human emotions. From the perspective of 
posthumanist theory, therefore, the novel does not develop a new scenario, but 
displays a nostalgic reverence to human emotions. 
 
Even though the representation and discussion of emotions does reaffirm the 
human(ist) paradigm, the ending of the narrative seems to depict the disappear-
ance of mankind, echoing Foucault’s famous dictum of mankind disappearing 
like “a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea”.31 Furthermore, it also seems to 
suggest that humankind’s achievements in art and creativity are irrevocably lost 
and that all further endeavours in these domains are fruitless. But the functions 
of writing reflected upon in the structure of the novel and towards the end of the 
                                                             
26  The clone as a copy and doppelgänger has, e.g. been discussed in: Caduff 2004, Aline 
2005. 
27  Cf. Vermeulen 2014: 122. 
28  Cf. ibid. 
29  Ibid.: 123. 
30  Cf. ibid.: 123-124. 
31  Foucault 1994: 387. 
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narrative can be interpreted as counterarguments to this death of mankind and its 
achievements. 
Firstly, the importance of writing and written texts and readers are highlight-
ed in the structure of the novel: the text begins with two introductory passages. 
In the first passage, which is about half a page long, a fictional author is intro-
duced. He explains that a journalist once told him a fable about a man standing 
in a telephone box after the world has ended. The man is talking incessantly into 
the receiver, but it remains unclear if he is actually talking to someone else or 
rambling to himself. The journalist described this as the author’s own mode of 
writing, which prompted the author to address her and other readers directly: 
“Soyez les bienvenus dans la vie éternelle, mes amis.”32 The second passage 
cannot be clearly attributed to a specific narrative voice (it could be interpreted 
as the last utterings of Daniel23, as the voice describes its failing consciousness 
and oncoming death). In this passage, too, readers are openly addressed, seem-
ingly not specifically normal human beings, as they are addressed as “dead or 
alive” – which might mean “virtual or real”.33 These metaphorical hints at the 
ambiguous state of the text’s addressees only appear at the beginning of the text 
and they are not commented on within the text. While explicitly invited into the 
text, the readers are also warned about the content, as the sentence “fear my 
words” appears twice within this introductory passage.34 This confusion of narra-
tive voices and the direct address of the readers foreground the fictional charac-
ter of the text. 
Secondly, towards the end of the novel, there are two metatextual passages 
about emotions in literature. In the first, Daniel25 is prompted to leave his com-
pound after he has read the last poem of Daniel1 and dreamt about an island 
where love, not only sexuality, is possible – King interprets this scene as a clear 
sign of Houellebecq’s “humanistic nostalgia for what society is losing”.35 But the 
scene also points to the influence of literature as an emotional trigger that 
prompts a reaction in the posthuman character. The second passage happens on 
his journey, when Daniel25 finds a message in a bottle from another clone with a 
page from a paperback attached to it. He recognizes it as an excerpt from Plato’s 
Symposium. In the short passage, Aristophanes explains his concept of love. 
There is no explanation as to why this excerpt was chosen as an uncommented 
message or why Daniel25 would recognize it. Inserting this passage in the narra-
                                                             
32  Houellebecq 2012: 9. “Welcome to eternal life, my friends”.  
33  Ibid.: 19. “Je ne souhaite pas vous tenir en dehors de ce livre; vous êtes, vivants ou 
morts, des lecteurs”. 
34  Ibid.: 17, 20. “Craignez ma parole”.  
35  King 2006: 63. 
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tive seems to hint at literature’s valence for preserving and conveying human 
emotions across centuries and beyond the existence of the human being, even 
though Daniel25 leaves the message behind and comments on its outdatedness. 
But it can also be understood as a critique of the philosophical tradition that 
understands love as a transcending movement beyond the longing for the materi-
al object. Daniel25 sees this movement as the central fallacy in the development 
of human culture in the 20th century, as King points out: “Tied into this fallacy 
was the trans- and postsomatic character of the culture humans fostered in their 
attempt to ‘get over’ the body in philosophy, the arts, social arrangements and so 
forth.”36  
 
All in all, the discussion and representation of emotions within La possibilité 
d’une île is paradoxical: leaving behind the human sphere of emotion and mov-
ing into the sphere of posthuman affect seems to be impossible for the posthu-
man characters. This is highlighted through the depiction of the clones as copies 
and through their use of human techniques, since they continue to use writing as 
a tool for observation and reflection and retrace their predecessors’ thoughts in 
their own writing. In their nostalgic longing to return to human emotions they 
condemn humans for their movement towards a posthuman development. There-
fore, on the one hand, on the content level the representation of emotion in litera-
ture and the arts is criticised as a fatal idealization of transcending the human 
body and mindset. On the other hand, the novel contains several signals that 
highlight the fictional character of the text, making the reader aware that he or 
she is reading a critique about the possibilities of novels in the form of a novel – 
without being offered an alternative. The nostalgic insistence on human emo-
tions within the narrative does not offer alternative scenarios for the (posthuman) 
future, but emphasizes that even though certain aspects of human life such as 
emotions might vanish, they continue to play an important role in the reflection 








                                                             
36  Ibid. 
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Writing Disgust, Writing Realities  





The writings of literary realism and naturalism1 are generally known as an epis-
temological project in pursuit of knowledge and truth. The positivist vocabulary 
of interpreting reality through empirical facts, reason, and logic reverberated in 
the nineteenth-century realist programme and inspired authors such as Honoré de 
Balzac and Émile Zola to combine literature with the natural sciences, in order to 
document social species and even conduct experimental research within the 
frames of fiction.2 Zola’s provocative theory of the novel, Le Roman expéri-
mental (1880), proposed an aesthetics of disinterested observation and objective 
truth, which resists romantic sentimentality and avoids an author’s own emotion-
al intervention in the narrative.3 The emphasis on rationally oriented elements in 
                                                             
1  Realism is understood here as a transhistorical style of representation, aimed at pro-
ducing an effect of reality in fiction. In this sense realism could be combined with var-
ious historical genres, including the naturalist novel with its techniques of realistic 
style but which is thematically embedded in the nineteenth-century scientific 
worldview and problems of modernity. As implied in Auerbach’s (2002) analysis of 
Zola, critical naturalism features important elements of modern realism.  
2  See the preface of La Comédie humaine (1842): Balzac explains his project of study-
ing “social species” in the way a biologist would analyse “zoological species” and re-
fers to specific biologists. Zola’s Le Roman expérimental (1880) was inspired by 
Claude Bernard’s experimental medicine. 
3  As Zola argues in an essay on Flaubert, a naturalist author is distinctively “disinterest-
ed”, invisible and avoids open intervention in the narrative. As Zola stated, an author 
should not show his own emotions, “one does not hear him laugh or cry with his char-
acters.” Translator R.R. unless stated otherwise. Zola 1881: 129. 
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writing realities has extended to theories of realism, which illustrate how realist 
texts use practices of detailed description, doxa, and authority to create the 
effects of reality while holding a pedagogical desire to transmit information,4 and 
which demonstrate how realist fiction renders individual experience that cogni-
tively and epistemically relies on real-world knowledge.5 Realism, in this view, 
features an epistemological project framed and staged in aesthetic terms.6 
Yet recent studies on emotions provide new insights that stimulate a recon-
sideration of realism’s epistemological project in terms of affectivity. Linguists 
have shown that affect is a fundamental and all-encompassing element of lan-
guage: the affective function overlaps even the referential function that is charac-
teristic of realist literature.7 Proponents of the philosophy of emotion have 
demonstrated the great intuitive power of emotions, which tend to influence 
people’s views of the world, as well as their values and goals.8 Emotions thus 
add plausibility, and even enhance the effect of the truth at which realism aims. 
The overlapping of the epistemological and the emotional is consistent with the 
enactivist approaches that emphasise the intersecting of the affective and the 
cognitive in human thought. As Giovanna Colombetti argues, what is cognitive 
is fundamentally affective: the mind, as embodied, is intrinsically or constitu-
tively affective.9 
These views resonate in the background of this chapter, which reflects on the 
complex question of writing emotions and writing realities in nineteenth-century 
literature by means of a case study exploring the poetics of disgust in Émile 
Zola’s novel Nana (1880). By outlining the various aspects of disgust – natural, 
aesthetic and moral – and their overlapping categories in Zola’s novel, I illustrate 
how emotion effects10 contribute to the ideological and epistemological aspects 
in the Zolian project, which aimed at transforming reality by depicting “life as it 
is”.11 Through reading Zola’s Nana I consider the ways in which evoking and 
triggering disgust pertains to strategies of creating reality effects, and how the 
effects of disgust stimulate the moral imagination of readers and solicit critical 
                                                             
4  Cf. for instance Barthes 1982, 2000, Hamon 1982. 
5  Cf. Fludernik 1996: 28.  
6  Jameson 2013: 5-6. However, in The Antinomies of Realism (2013) Jameson considers 
affect to be an important narrative impulse for realism, related to its visually rich de-
scriptions that engender sensory experiences. 
7  Besnier 1990: 420; cf. also Wetherell 2012. 
8  Cf. for instance Damasio 1996, Nussbaum 2001. 
9  Colombetti 2014: xvii. 
10  On the concept of the emotion effect, cf. Lyytikäinen’s article in this volume. 
11  On these aspects see Zola 1880: 24, 208. 
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views on the reality under discussion. By building on previous research on 
Zola’s Les Rougon-Macquart as “crowd fiction”,12 I illuminate how Zola’s Nana 
invites its authorial audience13 to join the story-world community and to feel the 
complexity of emotion effects depicted and produced in this novel, from the 
ambivalent allure of disgust and the nauseating effects of excess to feelings of 
collective responsibility that open up the story-world’s transformative potential.  
In this chapter, the “writing of emotions” is used as a metaphor of style 
which refers to the poetic practices of producing emotion effects in texts. Yet 
this view is not limited to generic features or questions of structure alone but 
expands to concern the text-based emotional communication as a whole, in a 
specific historical context. The investigation of emotion effects targeted to the 
novel’s hypothetical audience invites reflection on the authorial point of view, 
including the aesthetic and ideological premises of writing emotions.  
 
 
NANA OR THE ALLURE OF DISGUST 
 
Un rire avait couru. Les messieurs très bien répétèrent: “Nana, ohé! Nana!” On s’écrasait, 
une querelle éclairait au contrôle, une clameur grandissait, faite du bourdonnement des 
voix appelant Nana, exigeant Nana, dans un des coups d’esprit bête et brutale sensualité 
qui passent sur les foules.14 
 
                                                             
12  Cf. Naomi Schor 1978. 
13  I use the notion of authorial audience with reference to a concept deriving from the 
rhetorical tradition: the hypothetical audience or the hypothetical reader for whom the 
text is written and composed (cf. Rabinowitz 1977). The authorial audience differs 
from the actual audience, although the study of empirical readers’ reactions may be 
helpful in reconstructing and analysing a novel’s hypothetical audience – for instance, 
in Zola’s case, the contemporary actual audience overlaps with the hypothetical audi-
ence of the novel. The concept of authorial audience, as used in this article, creates a 
position the empirical reader can adopt in order to understand the writing of emotions 
from the authorial point of view, in a specific historical context. What kind of emo-
tional effects were meant to be triggered and why? What kinds of emotional messages 
were sent? 
14  Zola 1996: 11. “People laughed, and several well-dressed gentlemen repeated, “Nana! 
Oh, my! Nana!” The crush was tremendous. A quarrel broke out at the box-office, the 
cries for Nana increased; one of those stupid fits of brutal excitement common to 
crowds had taken possession of this mass of people.” Zola 1922: 7-8. 
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Despite the alleged rationality and dispassionate objectivity of realist discourse, 
realist works frequently witness strong emotional responses from reading audi-
ences, often with negative valence. Starting with Flaubert’s Madame Bovary 
(1857), a novel that led to a real-life trial for obscenity, blasphemy and indecen-
cy, the history of realism has been fraught with a series of scandals, polemics, 
censorship and aggression. As Erich Auerbach remarks, many of the century’s 
significant authors encountered vexation and even hostility from the public, and 
achieved general recognition only at the price of violent struggle.15 The naturalist 
novel in particular attacked bourgeois culture and its favourite genre, using the 
novel form to shock, disturb and defy the bourgeois myths of order, decency and 
permanence.16 Zolian aesthetics generated a scandalous, importunate kind of 
writing rather than objective documentation, which nevertheless stimulated the 
reading public’s curiosity and fascination with the disgusting ravages of life.  
The publication of Zola’s Nana is emblematic of this allure of disgust. The 
novel evoked public outrage all over Europe, with accusations of immorality and 
pornography. Zola’s programme became the object of mockery and moral indig-
nation, inciting accusations of writing “ordurous” and “putrid” literature and 
provoking a series of caricatures in the 1880s: Zola the scavenger; Zola the 
director of a theatre of disgust; Zola cooking a soup of disgusting waste.17 How-
ever, despite the vexation of conservative critics, Nana proved to be an immedi-
ate success. Le Voltaire, the French newspaper that first published the novel as a 
serial, launched a gigantic advertising campaign, raising the curiosity of the 
reading public. When Charpentier finally published Nana in book form in Feb-
ruary 1880, the first edition of 55,000 copies sold out in one day. 
Interestingly, the ambivalent combination of rejection and attraction featur-
ing real-life responses to Zola’s Nana extend to the novel’s poetics of collective 
repulsion and desire. Nana is, of course, a novel about fatal sexuality and prosti-
tution, incarnating a familiar fin de siècle stereotype, La femme fatale, the em-
bodiment of male fantasies and fears over the female body. However, although 
depicting sexual obsession and illustrating contemporary fears of catastrophic 
sexuality, Nana is also a novel about fascination in terms of public interest and 
curiosity. Like the majority of novels in the Les Rougon-Macquart series, Nana 
pertains to Zola’s crowd fictions, which depict communities and represent indi-
viduals by combining features of collectives. From the very beginning, Nana 
focuses on the crowd’s collective perspective, capturing its voyeuristic fascina-
                                                             
15  Cf. Auerbach 2002: 500. 
16  On the scandal of naturalism, cf. Baguley 1990. 
17  On the reception of Nana cf., for instance, Mitterand 2001: 510-513 and Reverzy 
2008: 190-193.  
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tion with the woman who has driven Paris into a frenzy. The crowd, la foule, 
with its changing fears and attractions forms a collective protagonist of a kind, 
the social mind of the novel,18 depicting strata of urban society in the process of 
modernization, from the working-class to the rising bourgeoisie and aristocratic 
old power.  
The crowd view is highly visible in the opening and closing scenes of the 
novel, for instance, which frame the story-world and map Nana’s ambivalent 
power of persuasion and rejection. The opening focuses on her spectator audi-
ence, gathered in the Théâtre des Variétés, feverishly waiting for her appearance.  
 
Paris était là, le Paris des lettres, de la finance et du plaisir, beaucoup de journalistes, 
quelques écrivains, des hommes de Bourse, plus de filles que de femmes honnêtes; monde 
singulièrement mêlé, fait de tous les génies, gâté par tous les vices, où la même fatigue et 
la même fièvre passaient sur les visages.19  
 
The opening has been featured as a prolonged narrative of striptease, gradually 
approaching Nana’s figure, unveiling her body piece by piece.20 Nana’s entrance 
triggers a set of mixed emotions, however. Charismatic and powerful but singing 
off-key and acting badly, she evokes simultaneous feelings of curiosity, excite-
ment and embarrassment. The allure of the female body finally converges into 
effects of shock and rejection: Nana uncovered silences the audience, even im-
bues a sense of terror: “Il n’y eut pas d’applaudissements. Personne ne riait plus, 
les faces des hommes, sérieuses, se tendaient, avec le nez aminci, la bouche 
irritée et sans salive. Un vent semblait avoir passé, très doux, chargé d’une 
sourde menace.”21 If the feeling of eroticism depends on detachment and delayed 
vision, the sudden proximity of Nana’s naked body interrupts distanced seduc-
tion and solicits a shock effect.22 In a sense, the opening exemplifies the natural-
                                                             
18  On the concept of the social mind, cf. Palmer 2010.  
19  Zola 1996: 13. “All Paris was there – the Paris of letters, of finance, and of pleasure, 
many journalists, some few authors, and several speculators, more kept girls than re-
spectable women – a company, in short, that was a most singular mixture, composed 
of every kind of genius, tainted with every description of vice, where the same weari-
ness and the same fever seemed inscribed on every face.” Zola 1922: 9.  
20  Cf. Reverzy 2008: 104-111.  
21  “There was no applause. No one laughed now. The grave faces of the men were bent 
forward, their nostrils contracted, their mouths parched and irritated. A gentle breath, 
laden with an unknown menace, seemed to have passed over all.” Zola 1922: 25. 
22  On the erotic and pornographic in Nana, cf. Gural-Migdal 2012: 199-219. 
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ist unveiling of the uncomfortable truth: what triggers curiosity turns out to be 
disgusting.  
The opening focus on the audience’s emotional responses is illustrative of 
the novel’s overall emotional disposition, which keeps a certain distance from 
Nana as a protagonist and draws the crowd’s collective mind to the foreground. 
In some respects, the external view feeds the novel’s topic of female objectifica-
tion. Moreover, the emotion effects created at the beginning modify and adjust 
the reader’s premises of interpretation by shaping perception and the organiza-
tion of information in the text continuum. The beginning orients the reader to be 
aware of the collective’s emotions and reactions, the morals and manners of the 
crowds concerned.  
Nana’s famous ending, depicting a decomposing prostitute, concludes the 
novel’s ambiguous allure of disgust. This closing scene and the beginning scene 
are symmetrical, the former rendering again the crowd’s feverish curiosity about 
Nana. It describes her lovers and friends gathered around the Grand Hôtel and 
her mortuary chamber. It illustrates the crowd’s mixed fears and attractions: 
despite the risk of infection, Nana’s comrades and rivals desire to see her dead 
body, disfigured by smallpox.23 The novel ends with an eyewitness view project-
ed by the narrator: 
 
Nana restait seule, la face en l’air, dans la clarté de la bougie. C’était un charnier, un tas 
d’humeur et de sang, une pelletée de chair corrompue, jetée là, sur un coussin. Les pus-
tules avaient envahi la figure entière, un bouton touchant l’autre; et, flétries, affaissées, 
d’un aspect grisâtre de boue, elles semblaient déjà une moisissure de la terre, sur cette 
bouillie informe, où l’on ne retrouvait plus les traits. Un œil, celui de gauche, avait com-
plètement sombré dans le bouillonnement de la purulence; l’autre, à demi ouvert, 
s’enfonçait, comme un trou noir et gâté. Le nez suppurait encore. Toute une croûte rou-
geâtre partait d’une joue, envahissait la bouche, qu'elle tirait dans un rire abominable. Et, 
sur ce masque horrible et grotesque du néant, les cheveux, les beaux cheveux, gardant leur 
flambée de soleil, coulaient en un ruissellement d’or. Vénus se décomposait. Il semblait 
que le virus pris par elle dans les ruisseaux, sur les charognes tolérées, ce ferment dont elle 
avait empoisonné un peuple, venait de lui remonter au visage et l’avait pourri. 
La chambre était vide. Un grand souffle désespéré monta du boulevard et gonfla le rideau. 
– A Berlin! à Berlin! à Berlin!24 
                                                             
23  “Smallpox” has been described as syphilis in disguise, alluding to the fin-de-siècle 
fear of venereal diseases. Cf. Reverzy 2008, 56. 
24  Zola 1996: 411-412. “She went off and closed the door. Nana was left alone, her face 
turned upwards in the candle-light. It was a charnel-house, a mass of matter and 
blood, a shovelful of putrid flesh, thrown there on the cushion. The pustules had in-
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Nana’s features, deformed by infection, evoke the risk of pollution and disease 
contamination. This accurate portrayal of lethal illness is meant to generate an 
unpleasant mood of rejection in the reader. However, as has been shown in pre-
vious readings, the ending scene is highly allegorical. Nana, born in 1851 and 
dead in 1870, lives with the Empire. The female body serves as a metaphor for 
the nation, embodying the end game of the Second Empire, thereby anticipating 
the collapse of the nation: France on its way to the Franco-Prussian war, to a war 
to be lost.25 Focusing on the dead body of a prostitute, the scene is pregnant with 
the collective gaze fixed on her, mirroring the allure of disgust amongst the 
crowd and their own state of corruption. The effect of disgust thus unveils moral 
judgement of Nana’s sexual behaviour, and illustrates contemporary fears of the 
female body, the ambient society’s hypocrisy, misogyny and contempt for the 
lower classes.  
 
 
POETICS OF DISGUST: EXCESS AND REJECTION 
 
The ambivalent poetics of rejection and attraction inscribed in Zola’s Nana is 
consistent with the very nature of the disgusting, which as an emotional state is 
productive of multiple meanings, contradictory valorizations and reactions.26 
Artistic representations employ the disgusting not only to trigger revulsion and 
rejection but also to elicit curiosity and suspense in audiences. The cultural histo-
ry of disgust, extending from Antiquity to Kafka and contemporary horror films, 
                                                                                                                                  
vaded the entire face, one touching the other; and, faded, sunk in, with the greyish as-
pect of mud, they already seemed like a mouldiness of the earth on that shapeless 
pulp, in which the features were no longer recognisable. One of the eyes, the left one, 
had completely disappeared amidst the eruption of the purulence; the other, half open, 
looked like a black and tainted hole. The nose still continued to suppurate. A reddish 
crust starting from one of the cheeks, invaded the mouth, which it distorted in an 
abominable laugh; and on this horrible and grotesque mask of nothingness, the hair, 
that beautiful hair, retaining its sun-like fire, fell in a stream of gold. Venus was de-
composing. It seemed as if the virus gathered by her in the gutters, from the tolerated 
carrion – that ferment with which she had poisoned a people – had ascended to her 
face and rotted it. The room was deserted. A strong breath of despair mounted from 
the Boulevard, and swelled the curtain. ‘To Berlin! to Berlin! to Berlin!’” Zola 1922: 
408. 
25  Cf. Reverzy 2008: 112. 
26  On the history and theory of disgust, cf. Menninghaus 2003. 
284 | RIIKKA ROSSI 
 
 
demonstrates the ambiguous nature of this forceful emotion. Yet the naturalist 
poetics of ordure, with its decadent attraction to the macabre, foregrounds dis-
gust, using and elaborating the different aspects of the disgusting, thus making 
disgust a central part of itself. Inspiration from the natural sciences brought a 
new kind of disgusting world under scrutiny. The naturalist focus on the instinc-
tive and the primitive in us benefits from the natural and biological basis of the 
disgusting, fostering and favouring themes of sickness, decay and entropic de-
generation that remind us of our own mortality and vulnerability.27 Disgust per-
tains to the ways in which naturalist literature channels the readers’ attention to 
the harsh realities represented, enhancing their effects through the disgusting’s 
powerful emotional charge. Most people experience disgust as particularly and 
categorically real, often relating to concrete and organic things and accompanied 
by sharp physiological colouring.28  
The central metaphor of Zola’s Nana, the golden blowfly (“la mouche d’or”) 
illustrates the multiple aspects of the disgusting. A bitter lampoon written by 
Fauchery, a journalist fallen for Nana, compares the prostitute to a golden blow-
fly, which flies in from the outskirts of Paris to contaminate high society. The 
metaphor builds on universal disgust triggered by references to animals, which 
are seen as contaminants due to their contact with rotten bodies.29 However, 
while the blowfly affiliates with “natural” aspects of disgust and solicits effects 
of reality, the metaphoric blending with the prostitute expands into a series of 
abstract meanings. They project contemporary thought such as preoccupation 
with hygiene, disease control and connections between moral and physical clean-
liness, parallels between the female body and social order.30 
On the other hand, whereas naturalism leans on the disgusting’s biological 
basis to trigger the effects of shock and confusion, its provocative poetics of 
ordure challenge existing conceptions of taste and beauty, defying the classical 
ideals of harmony and beauty and testing the very limits of the aesthetic.31 As 
                                                             
27  Cf. Rozin et al. 1993: 576. 
28  Psychological research has featured disgust as an especially visceral emotion, which 
involves strong bodily reactions to stimuli that tend to have marked bodily character-
istics. The classic stimulants are waste products, vile odours, offensive contaminants 
and other objects whose very appearance seems loathsome, nauseating and causes re-
vulsion. Cf., for instance, ibid. 
29  Cf. ibid.: 582. 
30  On the theme of hygiene in Zola, cf. Gogröf 2013. 
31  Naturalism’s transgressions against the classical ideals of style include a stylistic 
transgression in terms of language: the naturalness of naturalist writing “contami-
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discussed by Winfried Menninghaus, disgust has occupied a central role in aes-
thetics since the emergence of the discipline. It has served to articulate the dif-
ference between the aesthetic and the non-aesthetic; the “aesthetic” is the field of 
a particular “pleasure” whose absolute other is disgust.32 What is more, in this 
view the domain of the disgusting is not limited to contamination alone, in that 
pure sweetness and pure beauty can also prevent pleasure and solicit rejection: 
what is merely pleasant and beautiful becomes vomitive, Ekel. The “no” of the 
disgusting thus embraces the outer limits of human life in terms of both corrup-
tion and exaggeration. 
The varied layers of the disgusting in Zola’s Nana extend to satiation-
induced distaste and an aesthetics of excess which turns into bad taste and nau-
sea. The novel’s motifs of sexual desire for and obsession with Nana are coupled 
with her obsession with objects and materiality. Nana is driven by her desire for 
luxury, a desire that turns into a decadent adoration of artificiality and kitsch. 
Her apartment is filled with sugary scents and perfumes; she loves sweets, imita-
tion jewels and cheap bric-a-brac, which end up as waste.33 As Nana achieves 
fame and fortune, the material obsession evolves into blind wastage. What is 
new, chic and delicate becomes repulsive. It is as if her life was contaminated by 
the overwhelming presence of objects: the wastage and food leftovers disgust her 
servants, sugar “poisons” the glasses, and jewels are lost.34 Rampant living turns 
                                                                                                                                  
nates” classic, elevated style by incorporating vernacular expressions and l’argot into 
literary language. Cf. Dubois 1993, Reverzy 2008: 35. 
32  As Menninghaus (cf. 2003: 26) points out, the eighteenth century’s foundation of 
modern aesthetics can be described negatively as a foundation based on the prohibi-
tion of what is disgusting.  
33  The objects of “bibelot” inspire her even though she could afford more than junk: she 
feels nostalgic for the kitsch that represented luxury in her childhood, adoring vulgar 
objects behind the display windows: “les bijoux faux, le zinc doré”; “les sucreries 
d’un chocolatier, écoutant jouer de l’orgue dans une boutique voisine, prise surtout 
par le goût criard des bibelots à bon marché, des nécessaires dans des coquilles de 
noix, des hottes de chiffonnier pour les cure-dents, des colonnes Vendôme et des obé-
lisques portant des thermomètres”. Cf. Zola 1996: 182-183; Zola 1922: 178-179. 
34  “Mais ce qu’on perdait était pis encore, la nourriture de la veille jetée à la borne, un 
encombrement de provisions dont les domestiques se dégoûtaient, le sucre empoissant 
les verres, le gaz brûlant à pleins becs, jusqu’à faire sauter les murs; et des négli-
gences, et des méchancetés, et des accidents, tout ce qui peut hâter la ruine, dans une 
maison dévorée par tant de bouches.” Zola 1996: 359. “But what was wasted was still 
worse – the food of the previous day thrown in the gutter, an incumbrance of victuals 
at which the servants turned up their noses, the glasses all sticky with sugar, gas-jets 
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into the sickening experience of nausea. The wastage saturates Nana’s apartment 
on Rue Villiers, with its grotesquely decorated bedroom. Her “temple”, with its 
handcrafted bed of gold and silver and a byzantine imitation altar, provocatively 
mixes objects of sexuality and religion, triggering effects of fear in her lovers.  
The excess of life then results in overheating. Zola’s crowds, living the 
splendour of Paris, succumb to feelings of dullness and stupor, experiencing a 
lethargic disgust-type of resignation and weariness, an existential nausea and 
disgust for life. Continuous satisfaction solicits feelings of boredom: “Ennui” 
and “s’ennuyer” are frequently used in Nana, referring to feelings of apathy and 
even invoking the disease of the century, mal-du-siècle. Nana herself achieves 
everything she desires but the constant satisfaction results in feelings of empti-
ness:  
 
Cependant, dans son luxe, au milieu de cette cour, Nana s’ennuyait à crever. Elle avait des 
hommes pour toutes les minutes de la nuit, et de l’argent jusque dans les tiroirs de sa 
toilette, mêlé aux peignes et aux brosses; mais ça ne la contentait plus, elle sentait comme 
un vide quelque part, un trou qui la faisait bâiller.35  
 
Zola thus discovers the protagonist’s moods of tiredness: “la monotonie bruyante 
de son existence”; “la solitude”, “le vide” and “l’ennui”. 
The disgust-triggering aesthetics of excess illustrates the tendency towards 
amplification that characterizes Zola’s oeuvre in general and is particularly sali-
ent in Nana, the work David Baguley (1993) termed a baroque novel. Baroque 
grandeur and décor inspire Nana’s frenetic story-world, building a metonymic 
continuity between life, theatre and the theatricality of life.36 Stylistic choices 
further foster the themes of excess and extravagance. The narrative favours 
hyperbole and asyndeton as rhetorical devices, comprising repeated catalogue-
                                                                                                                                  
blazing away, turned on recklessly, sufficient to blow up the place, and negligences, 
and spitefulness, and accidents, all that can hasten ruin in an establishment devoured 
by so many mouths.” Zola 1922: 355. 
35  Zola 1996: 280. “Yet, in the midst of her luxury, in the midst of that court, Nana was 
bored to death. She had men with every minute of the night, and money everywhere, 
even in the drawers of her dressing-table amongst her combs and brushes; but that no 
longer satisfied her, she felt a void somewhere, a vacancy that made her yawn. Her 
life rolled on unoccupied, bringing each day the same monotonous hours.” Zola 1922: 
276. 
36  “Life as theatre” has been considered a central metaphor of the baroque period. Cf. 
Baguley 1993: 70. 
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like descriptive sections and lists.37 In contrast, expansion of the descriptive 
elicits bewilderment in the reader, as revealed in Flaubert’s letter to Zola written 
in February 1880: Flaubert, struck by “stupor”, praised Nana’s “Michelangelo-
like” and “Babylonian”38 character.  
 
 
DISGUST AND MORALITY 
 
Le sujet philosophique est celui-ci; Toute une société se ruant sur le cul. Une meute der-
rière une chienne, qui n’est pas en chaleur et qui se moque des chiens qui la suivent. Le 
poème des désirs du mâle, le grand levier qui remue le monde. Il n’y a que le cul et la 
religion.39  
 
The poetics of repugnance in Zola’s novel ranges from contamination to overin-
dulgence and excessive beauty, thus exemplifying the multiple layers of disgust, 
including natural and aesthetic categories of aversion. Nana circulates around 
disgust-related bodily topics from sexuality to degeneration, lethal illness and 
death, which have frequently been considered cross-cultural disgust elicitors.40 
However, although their biological basis can hardly be denied, emotions are also 
social and cultural, and the line between these categories is blurred and porous. 
Although disgust is humanizing, both natural and human, and is often manifested 
as an automatized reaction of rejection with regard to objects considered un-
pleasant, contaminated or distasteful, even spontaneous disgust has a complex 
                                                             
37  Ibid. 
38  Cf. Flaubert’s letter to Zola, 15 February 1880. “J’ai passé hier toute la journée jus-
qu'à 11 heures et demie du soir à lire Nana. Je n'en ai pas dormi cette nuit et ‘j'en de-
meure stupide’. […] Nana est Michelangelesque! […] Nana tourne au mythe, sans 
cesser d'être réelle. Cette création est babylonienne. Dixi!”. “Yesterday I spent all the 
day until half past eleven in the evening by reading Nana. I didn’t sleep that night and 
I am stupid with it. […] Nana is Michelangelo-like! […] Nana turns into a myth, 
without ceasing to be real. This creation is Babylonian. Dixi!” Cf. Flaubert (1926-
1939). 
39  Zola on Nana in his preparatory notes, quoted in Reverzy 2008: 165. “The philosoph-
ical issue is as follows; a whole society chasing arse; a pack after a she-dog, who is 
not in heat and who makes fun of the dogs who pursue her. A poem of male desires, 
the great lever which keeps the world moving on. There is only arse and religion.” 
40  Rozin et al. 1993: 584. 
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cognitive content involving learned habits and values.41 In a sense, disgust al-
ways prompts moral appraisal in that it evaluates negatively what it touches, and 
thus proclaims the inferiority of its object. Everything disgusting, from crawling 
worms to rotten bodies, implies “no”, thereby turning the objects of disgust away 
from our presence.42 As Martha Nussbaum (2006) argues, disgust is an emotion 
that has been used throughout history to exclude vulnerable people who embody 
the dominant group’s fears.43 As the feeling of disgust moves easily from con-
crete objects to abstract entities, it easily leads to psychological contamination, 
meaning that pollution starts to circulate and transmit to neutral and harmless 
entities as well.44 
For these reasons, disgust has been considered an ugly feeling – or as a mor-
ally suspect emotion per se – which blocks compassion and other ethical feel-
ings.45 On the contrary, if disgust intrinsically solicits moral judgement, it has 
the power to acknowledge injustice by eliciting the rejection of unacceptable 
actions and behaviour. The evocation and representation of disgust in literary 
contexts tend to reveal morally problematic attitudes, strategies of discrimination 
and structures of power. This partly explains how its evocation contributes to the 
ideological objectives of realism, even enhancing its critical and emancipatory 
politics of transforming and reforming reality.46 Nana, for instance, is indicative 
of society’s complex emotional disposition, which combines disgust and attrac-
tion with regard to female sexuality, prostitution and the lower classes. The 
novel’s authorial audience is invited to recognize the disgust evoked and to 
acknowledge the moral dilemma the emotion indicates. Given that “transparent” 
realist discourse tends to avoid open intervention and moral judgements by an 
external narrator, the construal of morals is delegated to the reader.  
The transformative power of disgust stimulates reflection on the shock ef-
fects of naturalism and realism in general, and reactions of aggression and indig-
nation among reading audiences. As much as the scandal of naturalism affiliates 
with topics considered vulgar or indecent, such as sexuality and prostitution, the 
novelistic portrait of the bourgeoisie and upper classes forms an integral part of 
                                                             
41  As discussed by Miller (1997: 15): “It is culture, not nature that draws the lines be-
tween defilement and purity, clean and filthy”.  
42  Menninghaus 2003: 2. 
43  Cf. Nussbaum 2006: 14. 
44  On psychological contamination, cf. Rozin 1993: 582-583. 
45  Cf. Nussbaum 2001: 453-454; Ngai 2005: 340. 
46  Zola, for instance, refuted accusations concerning the immorality of naturalism, insist-
ing on its moral purpose: the somewhat oxymoronic blending of the harsh realities of 
pessimism and optimism. 
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literary shock effects intended to “épater les bourgeois”. The upper-class corrup-
tion and male weakness featuring in novels about adultery and prostitution seem 
to scandalize the contemporary readers as much as the female sexual transgres-
sion depicted. The case against Flaubert’s Madame Bovary, for instance, unveils 
the irritation caused by the novel’s violation of patriarchal masculinity. “The 
ridiculous” and “grotesque” portrayal of male persons who, in addition, are 
dominated by a woman, Emma Bovary, was listed among the novel’s transgres-
sions against decent manners.47  
The shaming of the powerful also contributes to the shock strategies in 
Zola’s Nana, which is essentially a novel of a society driven by sex, “la société 
se ruant sur le cul”, to quote Zola, mocking the male characters in particular. 
Male humiliation is encapsulated in the figure of Count Muffat: the Emperor’s 
chamberlain represents the highest stratum of society among Nana’s lovers, yet 
he is prepared to descend lower than anyone else to retain his dignity, fortune 
and aristocratic values. Nonetheless, while Muffat is torn by his obsessions and 
Nana’s capriciousness, he is also a victim of his own class, ruined by the hypoc-
risy of aristocracy and the austerity of a repressive religious culture. He becomes 
a nuisance at Court, even ending up as the object of the Empress’s disgust: “Il 
est trop dégoûtant.” Disgust circulates, and Nana, imitating the upper classes, 
adopts the Empress’s contempt for Muffat: “Tiens! tu me dégoûtes!” As a 
scapegoat for society’s failures, Muffat, in a sense, becomes Nana’s double, 
whose degeneration is symptomatic of the corruption and hollow values of the 
Empire.  
Zola nevertheless avoids tendentiousness and simple juxtaposition in his ac-
count of gender, and ideological and moral views. His narrative generally fa-
vours ambivalence in characterization, mobility and the blending of positive and 
negative valorizations that result in complex characters. The figure of Nana is a 
prime example of this blurring of positions.48 From the point of view of her 
lovers, she is a man-eater, even a devil in disguise as Muffat sees her; she is 
comparable with Rabelais’ gluttonous giant, Gargantua, and devours materials, 
men, everything she confronts. Standard readings of Nana frequently share this 
perspective, although to quote Zola: Nana, “une bonne fille”, “ne faisant jamais 
mal pour le mal”, is a poor girl who grew up on the outskirts of Paris, shaped by 
                                                             
47  In listing the weaknesses of Flaubert’s novel, M. Ernest Pinard’s summons refers to 
the ways in which male characters are humiliated; Charles is cheated by Emma, Ho-
mais and the priest are described as “grotesque figures”, and all of them are dominated 
by Emma. “Le seul personnage qui y domine, c’est Mme Bovary”, Cit. in Flaubert 
1998: 427-430. 
48  On Nana’s instability and ambiguity, cf. Reverzy 2008, 78-79 and Gural-Migdal 2003. 
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the society in which she lived, the wretched environments, her future determined 
by the fatality of the félûre, the hereditary degeneration of the Rougon-Macquart 
family.  
While the figure of Nana lacks the self-reflection typical of tragic heroes, Zo-
la’s novel features tragic power in the sense that it unveils cathartic potential.49 
Nana’s transgressions against the alleged decency of bourgeois society turn into 
purgative actions, paving the way for a sense of collective responsibility and 
self-reflection that could even offer tools for promoting social change. Just as the 
blowfly can contaminate, spread disease or be used as a cure for infections, 
Nana-the-blowfly becomes a “Nana-pharmakos”, capable of both poisoning and 
curing society.50 The transformative power of Nana is also illustrated by the 
emotional resistance of the figure. She refuses to accept the shame and contempt 
that the ambient society attempts to impose on her; rather than feeling ashamed, 
she is flattered by Fauchery’s lampoon, considering it as a mark of distinction. In 
the final scene Nana seems to be laughing at the society that is gazing at her, 
drawing attention to the allure of disgust amongst the crowd. The terrible bitter-
ness of the deformed grimace on her dead face, “le rire abominable”, is illustra-
tive of the power of Nana, which is, to quote Roland Barthes, despite all its 
vulgarity, a civic book.51 
 
 
WRITING EMOTIONS, WRITING REALITY 
 
Zola equated naturalist writing with experimental science in Le Roman expéri-
mental. Nevertheless, the aesthetics of documentation should be understood as a 
gesture of provocation, a quintessential element of the naturalist programme. Far 
from simplistically mirroring reality in Les Rougon-Macquart, Zola generates 
complex and multi-layered story-worlds, blending narrative registers, styles, 
genres and intertextualities.52 On the other hand, analogies with the work of 
scientists expand to include the poetics of representing and evoking emotions: 
                                                             
49  On the tragic scheme in naturalism, see Baguley 1990. Barthes (1982: 90-91) consid-
ers Nana as an epic rather than a tragic novel, since the figure of Nana has no power 
of understanding like tragic heroes, remaining a pure instrument of decay. 
50  On the ”homeopathic” aspect of disgust, see Menninghaus 2003: 9. 
51  Barthes 1982: 93.  
52  Zolian texture even anticipates modernist aesthetics by producing a blurring of posi-
tions, a merging of perspectives, and forms of dissolution, ellipsis and abstraction. Cf. 
Harrow 2010: 61. 
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from the Goncourt brothers to Zola, metaphors such as “clinic of love” or “anat-
omy of passions” are deployed to illustrate the scientific study of emotions. 
Instead of renouncing emotions, realist and naturalist writing strives to move 
beyond romantic sentimentality and passion in terms of humoral composition to 
embrace the emerging understanding of emotions as complex neuropsychologi-
cal conditions.53 
As shown in the above reading of Zola’s Nana, naturalist writing generates 
an ambivalent poetics of negative emotions that deploys strategies of shock and 
disgust to enhance its critical potential. The great emotional amplitude of disgust 
effects contributes to the novel’s reality effect by drawing attention to and dis-
rupting the banality of everyday experience; the effects of thrill, on the other 
hand, add to the reader’s engagement with and immersion in the story-world in 
question. The evocation and representation of disgust are further used to orient 
the reader’s moral judgement concerning the problems of the society depicted. 
However, instead of offering simplistic solutions to these social and moral di-
lemmas, realist and naturalist narratives tend to create contradictory story-worlds 
with changing ideological facets and ambivalent characters, evoking mixed 
emotional reactions and producing overlapping moral valorizations. This, on the 
other hand, is consistent with the poetics of representing realities: if reality as we 
experience it is multi-layered, rich and contradictory, artistic representations of it 
tend to be the same. In fact, the very complexity and ambivalence activate the 
reader to consider the world represented, thus enhancing the power of the text. It 
also seems that the critical potential of realism stems from its disturbing legacy 
and the impact of negative emotions rather than from a cathartic release or puri-
fication, as in Aristotle’s theory of tragedy. The authorial audience is challenged 
to encounter feelings of collective responsibility for the shared reality depicted. 
Zolian crowd fictions illustrate the way in which the community-building func-
tions of fiction become entangled with emotions. Literature is communication. It 
uses affectivity to influence and transform reality, shaping our cultural imagina-





                                                             
53  However, although contemporary emotion theories promoted by Ribot and Charcot 
evidently influenced Zola, he was simultaneously fascinated with the old theory of 
passions, as shown in the preface to Thérèse Raquin (1867). Balzac also hovered be-
tween realism and romanticism. Cf. also Hamon 2015: 95-96. 
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Breaking the Ice, Freezing the Laughter 
Authorial Empathy, Reader Response, and the  





This article explores the process of writing emotions through the lens of rhetori-
cal approaches to narrative. It specifically focuses on one aspect of authorial 
empathy that so far has gained relatively little attention, namely, the process of 
writing negative emotions such as guilt and shame.1 The concept of “authorial 
empathy” is used in this article to refer to the narrative imagination that guides 
an author’s writing practices, i.e. the choices of narrative techniques intended to 
evoke certain emotional responses in readers. The first part of the article outlines 
a theoretical and methodological approach that takes into account all three as-
pects of narrative empathizing: not only the author’s emotions but also the read-
ers’ emotions and the rhetorical, textual strategies the author uses (more or less 
consciously) to evoke emotional responses in the reading audience.2 In examin-
ing the rhetorical triangle that involves authorial empathy, this article discusses 
narrative progression, aesthetic distance and other elements that influence the 
artistic production of emotions and emotion effects.  
After this short introduction to the theoretical framework, Franz Kafka’s 
short stories will be used to illustrate the ambivalent uses of authorial empathy. 
Kafka’s purpose – to generate a disturbed reaction in his readers – is manifested 
in a famous letter to Oskar Pollak, written in January 1904: 
 
                                                             
1  Cf. Hogan 2011, Tenenbaum 2009, Friedländer 2013. 
2  Cf. Phelan 2005. 
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I think we ought to read only the kind of books that wound and stab us. If the book we are 
reading doesn’t wake us up with a blow on the head, what are we reading it for? [...] we 
need the books that affect us like a disaster, that grieve us deeply, like the death of some-
one we loved more than ourselves, like being banished into forests far from everyone, like 
a suicide. A book must be the axe for the frozen sea inside us.3 
 
This article examines how certain of the rhetorical devices Kafka used travel 
from text to text, and how these devices are connected to the process of writing 
the emotions of guilt and shame. Kafka’s “Brief an den Vater” (“Letter to his 
Father”, 1919) is used as a starting point for analysing his story “Das Urteil” 
(“The Judgement”, 1912). The article also offers some ideas as to how these 
same rhetorical and affective strategies are at work in the narrative design of 
“Die Verwandlung” (“The Metamorphosis”, 1915) and in the novel Der Prozess 
(The Trial, 1925). Each of these “punitive fantasies”4 ends with a scene of the 
protagonist’s death, either through suicide or execution. All of these stories also 
guide and manipulate the audience’s emotional responses in ways that are very 
similar to the affective strategies Kafka used in his “Letter to his Father”. In 
Kafka’s aesthetic game, artistic deception leads to the strategy of “freezing the 
laughter”5 by abruptly ending the reader’s detachment or by fooling readers into 
feeling pity and fear for his self-deceiving characters. The theoretical concepts 
underlying the analysis of Kafka’s texts are introduced before investigating his 
use of rhetorical strategies in greater detail. 
 
 
THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS: AUTHORIAL EMPATHY, 
TEXTUAL STRATEGIES, READER RESPONSE 
 
In a rhetorical approach to writing and reading emotions, form and affective 
impact are perceived as interconnected. Following James Phelan’s model (2005 
                                                             
3  Kafka 1977: 16; “Ich glaube, man sollte überhaupt nur solche Bücher lesen, die einen 
beißen und stechen. Wenn das Buch, das wir lesen, uns nicht mit einem Faustschlag 
auf den Schädel weckt, wozu lesen wir dann das Buch? […] Wir brauchen aber die 
Bücher, die auf uns wirken wie ein Unglück, das uns sehr schmerzt, wie der Tod 
eines, den wir lieber hatten als uns, wie wenn wir in Wälder verstoßen würden, von 
allen Menschen weg, wie ein Selbstmord, ein Buch muß die Axt sein für das 
gefrorene Meer in uns.” Kafka 1999: 36. 
4  Sokel 2002: 41. 
5  Ibid.: 12. 
BREAKING THE ICE, FREEZING THE LAUGHTER | 297 
 
& 2007), storytelling can be seen as a rhetorical act in which the narrative strate-
gies designed by the author have consequences for the reader’s emotional en-
gagement with the narrative. Thus, the focus has to be on the feedback loop of 
emotions negotiated among aspects of authorial agency, textual strategies for 
evoking empathy (or empathic aversion) and reader response. Among the con-
cepts used in this article is the term “authorial audience”, which was introduced 
and developed by Peter Rabinowitz (1976 and 1987) and James Phelan (2005) in 
their rhetorical approaches to narrative. This concept refers to a hypothetical 
audience that responds to the text as designed by its (implied) author. In practice, 
real-life readers can become members of the authorial audience to whom the 
text’s rhetorical purposes are communicated. The recursive relationship between 
authorial agency, textual phenomena and reader response also entails the possi-
bility of shared readings among different flesh-and-blood readers, even though 
individual readers might find some authorial audiences easier to join than oth-
ers.6  
Rhetorical approaches to narrative have also acknowledged the effects that 
narrative progression has on readers’ emotional involvement in reading narra-
tives. Two different aspects of narrative progression are important from the 
perspective of this article. Firstly, the judgements readers make about characters 
and storytellers (narrators and authors) have consequences for how we experi-
ence and understand narrative form. Here, “narrative form” is understood to 
mean the elements, techniques and structures of narratives that elicit particular 
emotion effects.7 Secondly, narrative form can be experienced only through the 
temporal process of reading and responding (emotionally, cognitively and ethi-
cally) to narrative. Narrative progression involves both textual dynamic, that is, 
the movement of narrative from a beginning through the middle to an end, and 
reader dynamics, meaning the reader’s engagement with this movement, which 
both follows and influences textual dynamics.8 Readers make (emotional) 
judgements about characters and narrators, and they continuously construct and 
reconstruct these judgements.  
The rhetorical triangle of authorial agency, textual phenomena and reader re-
sponse also determines the process of narrative empathizing.9 Patrick Colm 
                                                             
6  Cf. Phelan 2005: 18-19. 
7  Cf. Phelan 2007: 3. 
8  Cf. ibid. 
9  According to The Living Handbook of Narratology, for instance, “[n]arrative empathy 
plays a role in the aesthetics of production when authors experience it […], in mental 
simulation during reading, in the aesthetics of reception when readers experience it, 
and in the narrative poetics of texts when formal strategies invite it” (Keen 2013: s.p.). 
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Hogan’s (2011) two-fold model, which separates the arousal level of empathy 
from the evaluation level of an empathizing response, explains this question 
further. Whereas the former type of empathy is triggered spontaneously by a 
perception, the imagination or an emotional memory, elaborative empathy “in-
volves a self-conscious attempt to imagine the condition of the other person”.10 
Both types relate to our immersion in fictional storyworlds. In other words, we 
become spontaneously open to parallel emotional experiences by mirroring 
responses to the fictional other or we attend to simulating, categorizing, model-
ling or otherwise understanding the character’s emotional experience. According 
to Hogan, literature involves the possibility of cultivating openness to empathic 
experience in a setting that is devoid of the egoistic conditions of real-life emo-
tions and situations.11 However, the uses and consequences of narrative empathy 
can be more unruly than has thus far been acknowledged by scholars, ranging 
from positive to negative and neutral effects.12 Narrative empathy may also be 
strategically employed by authors for purposes of emotional – and ideological – 
manipulation.  
Narrative empathy involves an author’s empathy, but rhetorically it emerges 
through a text’s design. The complexity of the issue stands out, first of all, when 
we begin to investigate the formal aspects of narrative empathy. Previous studies 
on narrative empathy have often focused on listing certain techniques (e.g. a 
first-person narrative situation and narrative perspective) that might lead to an 
empathy-generating effect, including character identification. Yet, already more 
than half a century ago, Booth (1961) argued against the idea that there could be 
any single narrative technique that would inevitably result in particular rhetorical 
or emotional effects. Rather, the successfulness of every narrative technique is 
related to how well it serves the rhetorical, aesthetic or ethical purposes of an 
individual narrative. Thus, in discussing strategic empathy, we need to pay atten-
tion to the combination of techniques used. The approach laid out here draws on 
the idea that the analysis of empathy-generating effects always calls for interpre-
                                                             
10  Hogan 2011: 65. 
11  Cf. ibid.: 68-69. 
12  In recent narrative studies, there has been discussion on the potential of literature to 
enhance readers’ social awareness. Some scholars have even talked about the moral 
growth of citizens through the development of moral sentiments such as empathy and 
sympathy. Cf. e.g. Nussbaum 1990 and 2001. As Suzanne Keen (2007) and other lit-
erary scholars have already argued, the widely celebrated “empathy–altruism” hy-
pothesis, the idea of fiction reading as leading to altruistic real-life action, needs more 
evidence. Cf. Keen 2007: 65, 130. 
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tative inquiry from all points of the rhetorical triangle.13 Rhetorical and emotion 
effects are a product of multilevel narrative communication designed by the 
author, and this communication involves both textual and reader dynamics.  
A second aspect of narrative empathy that has been the subject of lively de-
bate is the degree of aesthetic distance involved in the process of both writing 
and reading. The process of writing emotions, which is the focus of this article, 
is related to the extent to which a given story is derived from an author’s person-
al experience.14 From a literary scholar’s point of view, however, the main inter-
est in examining authorial empathy lies in the process of writing and in the rep-
resentation of the emotion rather than in the actual emotion. As Hogan15 defines 
this distinction, “[t]he crucial point here is that the depictive validity of a literary 
work does not derive from its source in some prior [author’s] experience. It 
derives from its production of such an experience” (emphasis his). In studying 
the practices of writing, our main concern is to examine how an author’s real-life 
experiences are transformed into aesthetic form. Next, this question is explored 
in the context of Kafka’s practices of writing emotions.  
 
 
THE REWARD FOR SERVING THE DEVIL: LAUGHTER AND 
THE KAFKAESQUE POETICS OF GUILT AND SHAME 
  
Kafka’s authorship serves as an example of the ways in which authorial empathy 
can be used to manipulate an audience’s tendency to feel with fictional others in 
order to evoke powerful effects of aesthetic shock, confusion and estrangement. 
In other words, this article shows how Kafka strategically uses empathy for 
rhetorical and aesthetical purposes and how the very process of writing emotions 
reveals certain aspects of this strategy. Thus, the focus is on the so-called “aes-
thetic emotions” (e.g. estrangement, wonder, disgust, pity or sadness, or sympa-
thy) that do not necessarily motivate practical behaviours in the way that real-life 
emotions do. Yet they influence the ways in which readers make emotional and 
cognitive judgements of characters and events at the moment of first reading 
                                                             
13  Cf. Phelan 2005: 5. 
14  A text’s genre (ranging from nonfictional autobiography, memoirs and history to 
fictional fantasy novels) of course influences the ways in which we evaluate the repre-
sentations of emotions in the text. Also, the choice of narrative voice or situation 
(first-person narration vs. third-person narration) and of narrative perspective plays an 
important role in this respect.  
15  Hogan 2011: 22. 
300 | ELISE NYKÄNEN 
 
 
(and potentially during the second reading). Instead of character identification, it 
is more accurate to talk about emotional projection: the reader’s tendency to 
adopt the fictional Other’s position temporarily during the reading process. 
The analysis of authorial empathy in Kafka’s work begins with a discussion 
of a letter that Kafka wrote to his father in 1919. This document and its affective 
and rhetorical elements deserve special attention because all reveal something 
important about Kafka’s methods of perspectival role-taking in transforming his 
emotions into aesthetic form. After exploring the affective and rhetorical ele-
ments of the letter, the second part of the analysis will examine how the same 
narrative strategies are at play in “Das Urteil”. The focus is on the role of the 
author’s empathic role-taking, that is, his projection of the self onto a fictive 
being. What does the author’s experience of losing the boundaries of the self 
during the writing process mean from the authorial audience’s perspective? How 
is this experience transformed into a narrative design?  
In his letter, Kafka confesses that his father was always his primary audi-
ence. His main goal in writing was to make a true connection with his father 
while simultaneously breaking free of the parental influence. He freed and 
healed himself through his work, even though the father’s presence still haunted 
him, even on paper: “My writing was all about you; all I did there, after all, was 
to bemoan what I could not bemoan upon your breast.”16 According to Max 
Brod, Kafka’s father never received the letter.17 Kafka gave it to his mother to 
hand on, but she never delivered it to the father. The first part of Kafka’s letter 
gives voice to the son. Through his eyes, Hermann Kafka is portrayed as an 
insensitive and self-satisfied tyrant who was only occasionally able to give the 
tenderness and care his son needed. The most frequently mentioned emotions in 
the letter are fear, guilt and shame. Capable of analysing the emotional dynamics 
of the relationship and family life from a more distanced position, the adult 
Kafka writes about the differences in the temperaments of father and son. Not 
having “the Kafka will”, the worldly dominance, self-confidence or physical 
strength, the son is destined to appear as weak, ungrateful and cold in his father’s 
eyes. This estrangement caused permanent damage to the son’s mental health.18 
After analysing the relationship with his father in a calm but affecting man-
ner, Kafka then gives his father a voice. The father’s hypothetical response in the 
second part of the letter points out the son’s potential hypocrisy and self-denial 
in expressing his emotions. In his hypothetical answer, the father claims that his 
                                                             
16  Kafka 1976: 576; “Mein Schreiben handelte von Dir, ich klagte dort ja nur, was ich an 
Deiner Brust nicht klagen konnte.” Kafka 1965: 43. 
17  Gray et al. 2005: 49. 
18  Cf. Kafka 1965: 7-9. 
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son has been playing with words in his address to his parent, “at the same time 
trying to be ‘too clever’ and ‘too affectionate’”.19 By repudiating both his and his 
father’s guilt, the son wants to free himself of all responsibility. In Kafka’s letter 
the father’s judgement of his son is related to the recognition of the young man’s 
self-deception. The son is unwilling to take part in the social obligations of fami-
ly life, including getting married (Kafka and his fiancée Julie Wohryzek had just 
called off their wedding; Kafka had also twice broken off an engagement with 
Felice Bauer). In order to avoid the emotion of shame, the son blamed his father 
for his failed engagements. The third part of Kafka’s letter, its very ending, 
shows the son’s attempt to set the record straight so that both he and his father 
could live together and die peacefully: “[I]n my opinion something has yet been 
achieved that is so closely approximate to the truth that it may be able to reassure 
us both a little and make our living and our dying easier.”20  
The very ambivalence in Kafka’s use of authorial empathy – both its tender 
and its dark potential – emerges in the design of his letter in a way that is compa-
rable to his fictional stories. Sokel, among other Kafka scholars, has described 
Kafka’s narrative “jokes” as a deliberate, sadomasochist play on the audience’s 
emotional responses.21 This interpretation is supported by the ideas Kafka ex-
pressed in his letter to Pollak in August of 1902. At times Kafka felt an urge to 
give in to “the wicked criticaster” living inside him: 
 
And here comes a joke, a marvelous one, that makes God in His heaven weep bitterly and 
sends hell into hellish convulsions of laughter. It’s this: We can never have another per-
son’s holy of holies, only our own – that’s a joke, a marvelous one. […] You neither wept 
nor laughed. That’s how it is – you’re neither God in heaven nor the wicked devil. 
Only the wicked criticaster […] inhabits you, and he is a subordinate devil whom, howev-
er, you should shake off. And so, for the good of your soul, I shall tell you the strange tale 
of how once upon a time…, may God bless him, was overcome by Franz Kafka.22 
                                                             
19  Kafka 1976: 584; “[…] gleichzeitig ‘übergescheit’ und ‘überzärtlich’ […].” Kafka 
1965: 61. 
20  Kafka 1976: 585; “[I]st meiner Meinung nach doch etwas der Wahrheit so sehr Ange-
nähertes erreicht, daß es uns beide ein wenig beruhigen und Leben und Sterben leich-
ter machen kann.” Kafka 1965: 63. 
21  Cf. Sokel 2002: 76. 
22  Kafka 1977: 4; “Und nun kommt ein Witz, ein ganz vortrefflicher, bei dem der liebe 
Herrgott bitterlich weint und die Hölle ganz höllische Lachkrämpfe bekommt – das 
Allerheiligste eines Fremden können wir niemals haben, nur das eigene – das ist ein 
Witz, ein ganz vortrefflicher. […] Du hast weder geweint noch gelacht, Du bist eben 
weder der liebe Herrgott noch der böse Teufel. 
302 | ELISE NYKÄNEN 
 
 
Kafka himself laughed uncontrollably whenever he read his stories aloud to his 
friends. Yet in his textual game, the “hellish convulsions of laughter” were al-
ways accompanied by feelings of tender sadness – the presence of an inner, 
bitterly weeping god. An awareness that “[w]e can never have another person’s 
holy of holies, only our own” is also cause for existential despair. Yet this 
awareness brings relief and the possibility of liberation. For Kafka, his protago-
nists’ dying scenes, for instance, were a source of intense pleasure, comparable 
to the experience of writing: “[…] such dying scenes are a secret game, in fact, I 
am happy to be in my dying protagonist”,23 he claimed. Readers too are invited 
to take part in his aesthetical game of losing the self in the fictional Other, of 
transgressing and escaping the boundaries of the self. In this respect the method 
of writing emotions resembles Kafka’s ruthless honesty in viewing the short-
comings of his own character, including his tendencies of narcissistic self-
absorption. As Kafka wrote in his letter, we truly need the “books that affect us 
[…] like a suicide”.24 
One of Kafka’s punitive fantasies is the story “Das Urteil”, which he wrote 
in a trance-like state in a single eight-hour session one night in September of 
1912. In his diary, Kafka describes his writing experience as an ecstatic self-
abandonment that led to an “absolute opening of body and soul”.25 According to 
Max Brod, Kafka once told him that he had a strong ejaculation in his mind 
when he wrote the story’s last sentence.26 The feelings of self-transcendence and 
sexual pleasure were accompanied by the sensation of omnipotence, of being in 
control. What is especially interesting with regard to this process is its connec-
tion to the narrative innovation Kafka himself considered to be his breakthrough 
in writing “Das Urteil”. This story (which is dedicated to “Felice B.”) introduces 
the technique Kafka used in the other works of his mature period. In the tale, 
there is an utterly objective narrator. The third-person narrator’s perspective 
almost melds into that of the main character. By diminishing the distance be-
tween the third-person narrator and the main character, the stories eliminate the 
                                                                                                                                  
 Nur der böse Kritikus [...] lebt in Dir und das ist ein untergeordneter Teufel, den man 
aber doch loswerden sollte. Und so will ich Dir zu Nutz und Frommen die 
absonderliche Geschichte erzählen, wie weyland…, den Gott selig habe, von Franz 
Kafka überwunden wurde.” Kafka 1999: 13-14. 
23  Translation Sokel 2002: 210; “[…] sind solche Schilderungen im geheimen ein Spiel, 
ich freue mich ja in dem Sterbenden zu sterben.” Kafka 1951: 320-321.  
24  Kafka 1977: 16, emphasis E.N. 
25  Translation Sokel 2002: 71; “vollständigen Öffnung des Leibes und der Seele” Kafka 
1951: 294.  
26  Brod 1960: 158. 
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distance between the protagonist and the reader. Since the narrator’s perspective 
becomes almost identical with that of the character, the authorial audience too is 
forced to share the protagonist’s condition of being a prisoner of his brain. “Das 
Urteil” is also a text which has striking resemblances to Kafka’s letter to his 
father written seven years later.  
Let’s examine for a moment the narrative progression of “Das Urteil” before 
analysing the story in the context of the letter. At the beginning of the tale, we 
encounter a young merchant, Georg Bendemann, who has just finished writing a 
letter to a friend who has immigrated to Russia. Georg is about to marry “a 
young woman from a well-to-do-family”, and he is uncertain whether it is ap-
propriate to write about his happiness to this childhood friend. The authorial 
audience is invited to consider and reconsider the sincerity of Georg’s guilt and 
his concern for his friend. At first, the audience’s emotional and ethical judge-
ments of the protagonist are affected by his seemingly sympathetic attitude to-
wards his friend. As the first stage of the story approaches its end, however, 
readers tend to recognize more clearly Georg’s use of his friend’s situation as a 
narcissistic boost for his own self-esteem. The protagonist keeps making com-
parisons between his and his friend’s situations in business and in personal life. 
All these comparisons seem to be very flattering to Georg. 
The middle part of the tale consists of Georg’s conversation with his father. 
Georg is convinced that he is genuinely concerned with his father’s well-being: 
he undresses him and carries him to bed and covers him up. At the same time, 
however, readers are once again guided to see the protagonist’s self-serving 
attitude. The more tender feelings are mixed with the son’s condescending 
thoughts about his new role in the father’s business. The suppressed emotions of 
guilt and shame emerge the moment the father accuses his son of not telling him 
the whole truth about his departed friend. At first, the father denies the friend’s 
existence altogether. Then he makes strong accusations about the ways in which 
Georg has treated his friend. He blames his son for betraying the friend because 
his fiancée, Frieda, has lifted up her skirts. Paralyzed by this sudden blow, Georg 
loses control of his mind. The discussion between father and son culminates in 
the father’s condemning his son to death by drowning. Even more surprising is 
Georg’s instant acceptance of his father’s judgement at the close of the story. 
Declaring his love for his father and his late mother, Georg rushes to his death 
by falling into an “endless stream of traffic”.27 
Owing to the unexplained, irrational nature of Georg’s guilt and shame, the 
authorial audience’s primary responses to the story are surprise and confusion. 
The effect of confusion derives partly from the audience’s inability to make firm 
                                                             
27  Kafka 2000: 72; “ein geradezu unendlicher Verkehr” Kafka 1954: 22. 
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emotional and ethical judgements about the characters.28 The protagonist’s sud-
den loss of his sense of self guides the reader to reconsider the accuracy of the 
protagonist’s previous judgements as well as the reader’s own judgements of the 
character. The father’s self-contradictions appear equally problematic. He is 
revealed to be a jealous and vengeful parent. Georg’s self-surrender potentially 
restores some of the readers’ sympathies, but the narrative tension of the story 
never resolves. Like Kafka’s other stories, this tale lacks a resolution that would 
bring the reader relief and enlightenment at its close.  
 The emotional effect of “Das Urteil” stems from a narrative design which is 
astonishingly similar to the design of Kafka’s letter. Kafka’s rhetorical strategies 
in his writing seem to be very close to the strategies Kafka describes in his letter 
as his father’s methods of bringing him up:  
 
Your extremely effective rhetorical methods in bringing me up, which never failed to 
work with me anyway, were: abuse, threats, irony, spiteful laughter, and – oddly enough – 
self-pity. I can’t recall your ever having abused me directly and in downright abusive 
terms. Nor was that necessary; you had so many other methods […].29  
 
Kafka uses similar, indirect means of “abuse” in tricking his readers into adopt-
ing the characters’ perspective and then destabilizing the basis for this sympa-
thizing projection. In Kafka’s stories we often meet self-deceiving characters 
whose rejected wishes and desires are revealed only after readers have been 
invited to feel pity and fear for the suffering Other. 
From this perspective, the second part of Kafka’s letter – the father’s hypo-
thetical answer to his son – is the most interesting. As in “Das Urteil”, in Kafka’s 
letter the father’s judgement of his son is related to the recognition of the son’s 
self-deception. The conflict between the two selves in “Das Urteil” is rendered 
through the use of the two male characters in the story, Georg and his more 
ascetic friend. Through the father’s condemnation, the son is able to avoid re-
solving his conflicting desires: for Kafka himself, his desire to gain independ-
ence through marriage, on the one hand, and his desire to maintain the bachelor’s 
(and the writer’s) freedom, on the other. The father’s hypothetical condemnation 
                                                             
28  Cf. Phelan 2011. 
29  Kafka 1976: 563, emphasis E.N. “Deine äußerst wirkungsvollen, wenigstens mir 
gegenüber niemals versagenden rednerischen Mittel bei der Erziehung waren: 
Schimpfen, Drohen, Ironie, böses Lachen und ‒ merkwürdigerweise ‒ Selbst-
beklagung. Daß Du mich direkt und mit ausdrücklichen Schimpfwörtern beschimpft 
hättest, kann ich mich nicht erinnern. Es war auch nicht nötig, Du hattest so viele an-
dere Mittel […].” Kafka 1965: 18. 
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of his son in the letter brings to mind the sudden exposure and unmasking mani-
fested in Georg’s cry to his father: “And so you’ve been lying in ambush for 
me!”30 In the final part of Kafka’s letter, which shows the son’s attempts at rec-
onciliation, corresponds to Georg’s confession of love for his parents at the end 
of “Das Urteil”. The pleasure of dying is manifested in the close of “Das Urteil” 
as Georg stumbles into the stream of traffic (the German word Verkehr, “traffic”, 
also means intercourse). 
Existential feelings of guilt and shame are manifested in the all-
encompassing threat of some invisible authority, which emerges in almost every 
story Kafka wrote.31 Guilt and shame, which Kafka describes in his letter as the 
main elements of his emotional life, are transformed into an organizing tone or 
mood in his stories. In the Kafkaesque poetics of shame and guilt, aestheticized 
emotions haunt the authorial audience as an atmosphere of the uncanny in the 
storyworld, which elicits both cognitive and emotional confusion in the audi-
ence. In the allegorical readings of Kafka’s stories, the presence of a (paternal) 
authoritative power has been approached from multiple perspectives: juridical 
and social, religious and spiritual, existential and psychological. The psychologi-
cal interpretations, of course, have been inspired by Kafka’s letter to his father in 
which Kafka himself refers to the themes he used in his writing. 
One of these references is a quotation from Der Prozess, which Kafka pro-
vides in describing his father’s effect on the development of his nervous temper-
ament: “I had lost my self-confidence where you were concerned, and in its 
place had developed a boundless sense of guilt. (In recollection of this bound-
lessness I once wrote of someone, accurately: ‘He is afraid the shame will out-
live him.’).”32 We can find these words at the end of Der Prozess where Joseph 
K. is finally executed; helpless, “[l]ike a dog”.33 To make the network of refer-
ences even more complex, Kafka uses this same expression in writing about the 
end of his life in his letter to Max Brod: “My future is not rosy and I will surely 
                                                             
30  Kafka 2000: 71; “Du hast mir also aufgelauert!” Kafka 1954: 21. 
31  According to Tenenbaum, existential shame and guilt in Kafka’s work derive not from 
actual wrongdoings but from internalized self-doubt and insecurities. Kafka’s charac-
ters are all afraid of facing some aspects of themselves, which influences their abilities 
to make choices. Cf. Tenenbaum 2009: 120. 
32  Kafka 1976: 572; “Ich hatte vor Dir das Selbstvertrauen verloren, dafür ein grenzenlo-
ses Schuldbewußtsein eingetauscht. (In Erinnerung an diese Grenzenlosigkeit schrieb 
ich von jemandem einmal richtig: ‘Er fürchtet, die Scham werde ihn noch überle-
ben.’).” Kafka 1965: 37. 
33  Kafka 1998: 231; “[w]ie ein Hund” Kafka 1990: 312. 
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– this much I can see – die like a dog”.34 Shameful death, which simultaneously 
provides strange pleasures of self-sacrifice, defines the essence of the emotional 
components of both the author’s self-analyses and his work.  
Kafka uses a similar metaphorical struggle in the narrative design of the alle-
gory “Die Verwandlung”. Here, family relations become a trial that ends with 
the death of the unfit son. Likewise, in Kafka’s letter, the father–son relationship 
is described as a combat between a human being and a parasite, a vermin, who 
sucks the blood of others in order to continue living: 
  
I admit that we fight with each other, but there are two kinds of fighting. There is chival-
rous fighting, in which the forces of independent opponents are measured against each 
other, each one remaining alone, losing alone, winning alone. And there is the fighting of 
vermin, which not only sting but, at the same time, suck the blood, too, to sustain their 
own life. That is after all what the professional soldier really is, and that is what you are. 
You are unfit for life; but in order to settle down in it comfortably, without worries and 
without self-reproaches, you prove that I have deprived you of all your fitness for life and 
put it in my pockets. What does it matter to you now if you are unfit for life, now it is my 
responsibility, but you calmly lie down and let yourself be hauled along life, physically 
and mentally, by me.35 
 
Even though the parallels between the structure of the letter and “Die Verwand-
lung” are not as explicit as in the case of “Das Urteil”, the allegory shows similar 
rhetorical strategies. In “Die Verwandlung”, the effectiveness of the allegory is 
based on using the protagonist, Gregor Samsa, as a metaphor that becomes flesh 
during the narrative. The narrative progression of the allegory – and the readers’ 
emotional reactions along the narrative path – follows Gregor’s estrangement 
and his shock as he gradually becomes more conscious of the limitations of his 
                                                             
34  Kafka 1977: 24; “Mein Weg ist gar nicht gut und ich muß – soviel Übersicht habe ich 
– wie ein Hund zugrunde gehen.” Kafka 1999: 51. 
35  Kafka 1976: 585; “Ich gebe zu, daß wir miteinander kämpfen, aber es gibt zweierlei 
Kampf. Den ritterlichen Kampf, wo sich die Kräfte selbständiger Gegner messen, je-
der bleibt für sich, verliert für sich, siegt für sich. Und den Kampf des Ungeziefers, 
welches nicht nur sticht, sondern gleich auch zu seiner Lebenserhaltung das Blut 
saugt. Das ist ja der eigentliche Berufssoldat, und das bist Du. Lebensuntüchtig bist 
Du; um es Dir aber darin bequem, sorgenlos und ohne Selbstvorwürfe einrichten zu 
können, beweist Du, daß ich alle Deine Lebenstüchtigkeit Dir genommen und in mei-
ne Tasche gesteckt habe. Was kümmert es Dich jetzt, wenn Du lebensuntüchtig bist, 
ich habe ja die Verantwortung, Du aber streckst Dich ruhig aus und läßt Dich, körper-
lich und geistig, von mir durchs Leben schleifen.” Kafka 1965: 61. 
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new condition. At the beginning of the narrative, Gregor wakes up one morning 
trapped in the body of a vermin. However, he is still able to feel and think like a 
human being: 
 
When Gregor Samsa woke up one morning from unsettling dreams, he found himself 
changed in his bed into a monstrous vermin. He was lying on his back as hard as armor 
plate, and when he lifted his head a little, he saw his vaulted brown belly, sectioned by 
arch-shaped ribs, to whose dome the cover, about to slide off completely, could barely 
cling. His many legs, pitifully thin compared with the size of the rest of him, were waving 
helplessly before his eyes.36 
 
Through mental projection, the authorial audience is invited to share the protag-
onist’s state of not-knowing, of not understanding what is happening to him. 
However, the scenes in the tale also invite the audience to feel disgust and em-
pathic aversion as they encounter the protagonist. These effects are intensified 
by representing the protagonist’s physical sensations, which reinforce the audi-
ence’s emotional response. The portrayal of Gregor’s discomfort is aimed at 
generating a similar embodied response of unease in the audience. The story’s 
estranging effect is also created by portraying Gregor’s self-alienation as he 
hears his peculiar voice and observes the awkward movements of his body as if 
he were a prisoner of his foreign body (“[he heard] his own voice answering, 
unmistakably his own voice”;37 “[…] white dots which he had no idea what to 
make of”38). Such details as the white spots on Gregor’s belly and the brown 
fluid coming out of his mouth are highly repulsive. What was Kafka’s purpose in 
describing these details?  
It is true that Kafka’s use of authorial empathy can be seen as having ethical 
dimensions. The horror and isolation of Gregor’s situation may be seen as serv-
ing Kafka’s rhetorical purpose of enlarging empathic solidarity beyond the hu-
                                                             
36  Kafka 1996: 3; “Als Gregor Samsa eines Morgens aus unruhigen Träumen erwachte, 
fand er sich in seinem Bett zu einem ungeheuren Ungeziefer verwandelt. Er lag auf 
seinem panzerartig harten Rücken und sah, wenn er den Kopf ein wenig hob, seinen 
gewölbten, braunen, von bogenförmigen Versteifungen geteilten Bauch, auf dessen 
Höhe sich die Bettdecke, zum gänzlichen Niedergleiten bereit, kaum noch erhalten 
konnte. Seine vielen, im Vergleich zu seinem sonstigen Umfang kläglich dünnen Bei-
ne flimmerten ihm hilflos vor den Augen.” Kafka 1960: 1. 
37 Kafka 1996: 5; “[E]r seine antwortende Stimme hörte, die wohl unverkennbar seine 
[…].” Kafka 1960: 4. 
38  Kafka 1996: 4; “[Er] fand die juckende Stelle, die mit lauter kleinen weiβen Pünkt-
chen besetzt war, die er nicht zu beurteilen verstand […]”. Kafka 1960: 2. 
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man species to all sentient beings. Even vermin can be sensitive creatures with 
feelings. The estranging effect, generated by the introduction of the fantastic and 
the supernatural into the mimetic storyworld, thus may work as a pathway, lead-
ing us to see reality anew through the Other. Be that as it may, the reader’s pro-
jection also “traps” him or her in the character’s consciousness. The authorial 
audience is invited to feel Gregor’s agony, isolation and helpless suffering as, 
little by little, he loses his human qualities. 
Yet in a sense Kafka’s authorial audience is fooled into feeling pity and fear 
for the character.39 As in many of Kafka’s stories, in “Die Verwandlung” the 
audience’s hermeneutic task is to recognize the disguise of the protagonist’s self-
delusions, even the comical aspects of his self-loathing. Previous studies on 
Kafka’s story have pointed out the resemblances between Gregor’s metamorpho-
sis and the fantasy of the protagonist Raban in another of Kafka’s tales, 
“Hochzeitsvorbereitungen auf dem Lande” (“Wedding Preparations in the Coun-
try”, 1907/1908).40 Raban imagines sending his human body into a social situa-
tion so that he might stay in bed. He thinks of transforming into a giant beetle. 
Similarly, Gregor’s struggles in his new condition serve as an expression of his 
desire to escape his responsibilities as a travelling salesman and the provider for 
his family. This analogy is emphasized in Gregor’s thought after he has attempt-
ed to rise from bed: “‘Oh God’, he thought, ‘what a grueling job I’ve picked!’”41 
This weird leap from the realm of the fantastic to the mimetic storyworld reveals 
the function of the transformation as a metaphor that brings Gregor’s secret 
desire to life and enables him to escape his situation and gain freedom without 






Kafka’s writing is deeply troubling. He employs authorial empathy in order to 
manipulate the audience’s feelings by calling upon readers’ human tendency to 
feel with others, then leaves them without a stable basis to analyse intellectually 
what has happened. As Emily Troscianko (2013) has pointed out, Kafka’s work 
is among those fictional texts which are fundamentally enactive and cognitively 
                                                             
39  Cf. Sokel 2002: 76. 
40  Cf. e.g. Greve 2011: 52. 
41  Kafka 1996: 3. “‘Ah Gott’, dachte er, ‘was für einen anstrengenden Beruf habe ich 
gewählt!’” Kafka 1960: 2. 
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realistic: they contain evocations of visual perception (narrative perspective) and 
emotion that establish a compellingly direct connection with the reader’s imagi-
nation. Yet these texts also leave the reader baffled by their violation of our folk-
psychological assumptions. Kafka himself often expressed not only his amuse-
ment, but also his confusion in reading his own stories, asking someone else to 
tell him what they really meant. The tales seemed to lie beyond his control, just 
as his characters were forced to adjust to an irresistible restlessness and the de-
struction of his storyworlds.  
In Kafka’s existential, modernist allegories, the art of indirect communica-
tion from the author to the authorial audience is affected by the tendency of 
allegory to insist on a search for meaning, but at the same time this strategy 
frustrates the readers’ attempts to obtain certain knowledge. Despite their dark 
undertones, Kafka’s tales often have a liberating function, which is revealed 
through the reader’s encounter with the uncanny. In Kafka’s stories the triangle 
between authorial agency, reader response and textual phenomena comes back to 
aspects of self-loss, immersion and the ethics of strategic empathizing. Kafka’s 
authorial purpose seems to be rooted in his deliberately difficult communication 
itself, inviting the audience to join him in the quest for human knowledge. By 
refusing to give definite answers, Kafka forces the readers of his narratives to 
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Hiding One’s Feelings 
‘Emotionless’ Rhetoric in Raul Hilberg’s The Destruction of 





In his analysis of Peter Weiss’s Die Ermittlung (The Investigation), Christopher 
Bigsby claims that Weiss intended to write a “dry and emotionless” text, and that 
he wished to avoid a “purely emotional response”.1 Similarly, Mark Anderson, in 
his overview of documentary tendencies in German literature during the 1960s 
and 1970s, claims that Die Ermittlung, despite its “clear political motivations”2 
uses a “rigorously unemotional, highly formalized […] language”.3 Moreover, he 
implies that this text, as well as Alexander Kluge’s Der Luftangriff auf Halber-
stadt am 8. April 1945 (The Air Raid on Halberstandt on 8 April 1945) and 
Günter Grass’s Aus dem Tagebuch einer Schnecke (From the Diary of a Snail), 
is “objective [and] cold”.4 Contradicting this view, Stefanie Harris argues that 
although Kluge’s texts may be accurately described as a “cold medium”, they do 
not per se take an unempathetic stance towards victims of extreme violence.5 In a 
similar vein, I attempt to explain why Die Ermittlung has been considered “une-
motional”, and suggest reconsidering this notion. I suggest that Weiss’s use of 
modernist techniques renders the question of emotionality in Die Ermittlung 
complex, and that a seeming lack thereof does not imply an emotionally neutral 
attitude on behalf of its author. Another author whose prose has been described 
                                                             
1  Bigsby 2006: 161; 167. He offers no sources to substantiate these claims, though. 
2  Anderson 2008: 132. 
3  Ibid. 
4  Ibid.: 140. 
5  Harris 2010: 304. The idea of “hot” and “cold” media is Marshall McLuhan’s. 
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as “detached”, or “cold”, is Raul Hilberg.6 Like Peter Weiss, he was a German-
speaking Jew7 and able to flee the anti-Jewish legislation and persecution in his 
home country before the outbreak of the Second World War. As such, both 
authors have a similar perspective on the Shoah from a cognitive point of view: 
partly informed by semantic, partly by episodic knowledge.8 Admittedly, the 
discrepancy in age (Hilberg was 13 when his family fled in 1939, Weiss 19 in 
1935) constitutes an important cognitive difference at the times of the events but 
may be less relevant when looking for traces of emotionality in their texts, which 
were both written during the 1950s and published in the early 1960s:9 The 
Destruction of the European Jews is Hilberg’s repeatedly revised doctoral thesis 
and magnum opus.  
Peter Weiss’s Die Ermittlung (The Investigation) is a ‘hybrid’ text: it is 
based on the proceedings of the 1963-65 Frankfurt Auschwitz trial and its media 
coverage (to the extent that Weiss has been accused of plagiarism) but also in-
cludes fictional elements. It is, however, possible to examine the function of this 
fictionalisation – the literary establishment of an emotional code – by taking two 
(contemporary) autobiographical texts, Abschied von den Eltern (Leavetaking) 
and Meine Ortschaft (My Place) into account. 
The benefits of this selection is that one looks at texts whose authors may 
have had a similar perspective on the Shoah but who published in entirely differ-
ent contexts. Moreover, Weiss’s texts may have strong factual claims but show 
obvious signs of fictionalisation. The same cannot be said of Hilberg’s magnum 
opus and autobiography. These crucial differences compel us to consider issues 
like authorial self-staging and corresponding emotional codes. Why should one 
be looking at “emotionless” strategies in order to dig for personal feelings, when 
other texts offer us direct and unambiguous clues as to those feelings? Ultimate-
ly, a comparison of the emotional codes in different genres (documentary thea-
tre, monographs, autobiographies) may shed light on questions of poetics: who is 
‘entitled’ to certain rhetorical strategies (sarcasm, polemics, “coolness”) in order 
                                                             
6  Bolkosky: 2003: 22. 
7  Weiss was born in the German Empire but never held German citizenship; Hilberg 
was born in Vienna. Both came from secular backgrounds. 
8  Semantic knowledge is, according to Winko, propositional knowledge of the world 
(i.e. knowledge gained by education, reading, the media), whereas episodic 
knowledge sprouts from first-hand experiences. Thus, both Hilberg and Weiss hover 
between both modi: their survival is due to their exile (but both have lost several fami-
ly members to the genocide). Cf. Winko 2003: 79. 
9  In the case of Hilberg, this was the period during which he conducted his doctoral 
research; for Weiss see Spielmann 1982: 40. 
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to depict the Shoah? And what does this indicate about the cultural significance 
of this event in different cultures of memory? 
The starting point, however, is a theoretical perspective on the difference be-
tween emotion and feeling in order to develop a hermeneutic methodology. 
 
Theoretical background: differentiating feeling and emotion 
 
In her extensive overview of the several research paradigms in emotion studies, 
Simone Winko paraphrases the insights from the psychology of emotions, claim-
ing that emotion is a holistic notion containing subjective experience, a corporeal 
state, and an expression of the experienced. By contrast, feeling is a constituent 
of emotion: the subjective (personal, biographic) experience.10 Eric Shouse’s 
trichotomy consists of affect, feeling and emotion, corresponding respectively 
with pre-personal (i.e. biochemical neurological processes), personal and social 
levels.11 As such, he writes: “We broadcast emotion to the world; sometimes that 
broadcast is an expression of our internal state and other times it is contrived in 
order to fulfil social expectations. […] Unlike feelings, the display of emotion 
can be either genuine or feigned.”12 Winko and Shouse seem to be in accord as 
to the concept of feeling, but not entirely on the concept of emotion. Notwith-
standing, they agree on the fact that there is a clear distinction between the per-
sonal experience of an emotion and its communication. Therefore, there is poten-
tially a strong distinction between the actual feeling at the moment of writing 
and the emotion perceived by the audience.13 “Emotionlessness” does not equate 
to “feelinglessness”.14  
The question is: how do we find out whether a text is veiling its author’s 
feelings? Several disciplines (within linguistics and history) suggest looking at 
the connection between metaphor and emotion: either a metonymical relation15 
                                                             
10  Cf. Winko: 2003: 73. 
11  Cf. Shouse 2005: s.p. 
12  Ibid. 
13  The perception of the texts cannot be discussed here; suffice it to point out that the 
reception of Die Ermittlung in 1965 was highly politicised (denounced and heralded 
as anticapitalistic) but did not analyse the play in the broader context of Weiss’s liter-
ary oeuvre. Cf. Weiß 1998: 53-68. 
14  This translation is admittedly not the most elegant. “Gefühllosigkeit” would be trans-
lated as numbness, but the difference between feeling and emotion gets lost in this 
translation. 
15  Cf. Scheer 2012: 218: metaphors “merging […] the body and mind”. 
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or one with a tertium comparationis.16 In the texts under scrutiny, bodily meta-
phors are lacking, however, which may explain why Destruction in particular 
has been described as “cool” or “distanced”. Nonetheless, an implicit-lexical 
reading method takes both co- and context – i.e. the texts under scrutiny and 
autobiographical paratexts – into account.17 Including such paratexts, and the 
authors’ biographical backgrounds, is hermeneutically valid in this case, since 
the texts under scrutiny have strong factual claims – it would be notoriously 
more problematic to read fictional texts with these backgrounds in mind, even in 
the case of concentration camp survivors, as the reception of Tadeusz 
Borowski’s prose has shown.18 
 
 
1. RAUL HILBERG 
 
Hilberg’s text describes the proliferation of anti-Judaic legislation and rule-by-
decree leading up to the mass shootings and gas chambers in Eastern Europe in a 
sarcastic fashion, using various – admittedly isolated – rhetorical figures that 
seem to disguise deeper feelings. These figures include, but are not limited to, 
litotes, antiphrasis, blunt statement, and depersonalising similes and tropes. 
Consider the following examples:19 “The Slavs had no particular liking for their 
Jewish neighbors, and they felt no overpowering urge to help the Jews in their 
hour of need.”20 “A few weeks later, Wöhler organized a forced labor system for 
the Moldavian Jews – the German army’s parting gift to the Rumanian Jews.”21 
“Lohse was a little late [in forbidding members of civil administrations in East-
ern Europe to take part in the shooting of Jews].”22 In these cases, the litotes 
resp. antiphrasis can easily be read as accusatory descriptions of mindsets, atti-
tudes and (in)actions, without resorting to a polemic discourse. Note that in the 
                                                             
16  Cf. Winko 2003: 105-106. 
17  In Hilberg’s case, one could also consider his appearance in Claude Lanzmann’s 
Shoah, but I cannot dwell on this matter in the present paper. The apparatus for estab-
lishing the interview’s emotionality would need to be established – body language and 
prosody would presumably offer good keys.  
18  Cf. Franklin 2011: 27-28. 
19  The emphasis in every example to follow is mine, unless explicitly mentioned other-
wise. 
20  Hilberg 1985: 307. 
21  Ibid.: 794-795. 
22  Ibid.: 379. 
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first example, the sarcasm lies particularly in the inclusion of modifiers – with-
out these, the phrases may or may not be read as litotes. This is also true for the 
third example, where Lohse is seemingly depicted as benign but failing to save 
the Jews. 
However, in certain instances the text demands from the reader a slightly 
bigger interpretative effort, similar to the one the historian confronted with the 
obscuring language of the Nazi documents has to undertake: “For the deportees 
one-way fare was payable; for the guards a round-trip ticket had to be pur-
chased.”23 Not only do such petty descriptions in both Nazi documents and 
Destruction indicate the genocide’s bureaucratic nature, they also disguise the 
victims’ fate – which is obviously known to the reader of Destruction and to the 
historian, but which the perpetrators wished to obscure. Both in the ironic figures 
of speech (litotes and antiphrasis) and in these petty details, Destruction mirrors 
– sarcastically – the language of Nazi bureaucracy.24  
Given the fact that Destruction was Hilberg’s life project,25 one should take 
several editions in several languages into consideration, all the more because the 
focalisation implied in certain tropes becomes inverted in translation. Comparing 
the table of contents of the English versions (1961 and 1985) with the German 
versions (1982 and 1990), one notices that the actions of Einsatzgruppen are 
described with the metaphor of a sweep. This means that the perpetrators’ per-
spective is (unwittingly?) adopted, because the tertium comparationis is the 
supposed stain that Jews form on a society and that needs to be cleaned. In short, 
it dehumanises the victims and implies the fulfilment of a goal on the part of the 
perpetrators. However, the German editions describe the same actions as 
Tötungswelle, i.e. “a wave of killing”. This translation embraces (again, unwit-
tingly?) the Jewish perspective, since the tertium comparationis is the inevitabil-
ity of the German onslaught. It also implies a passive undergoing rather than the 
activity implied in the sweep metaphor, and dehumanises the perpetrators by 
using a metaphor usually associated with natural catastrophes. 
Apart from subtle rhetorical differences due to translation, the time gaps be-
tween versions allow probing into the evolution of the emotional code of “cool-
                                                             
23  Ibid.: 410. 
24  Think of terms such as “Endlösung der Judenfrage”, “Sonderbehandlung”, “Umsied-
lung nach Osten” etc. Obviously, use of such terms had strategic reasons – secrecy – 
but also expressed the desire to rid Germany/Europe of a perceived problem. Our very 
labelling of expressions as antiphrasis (in this context at least) is rooted in a political 
and ethical perspective. 
25  Cf. Hilberg’s preface to his autobiography The Politics of Memory. Cf. Van Den 
Berghe 1990: 110. 
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ness”. It should perhaps not surprise that the tendency is to retain these figures, 
and to stick to a similar “coolness” in the updated sections. For example, the 
1982 and 1985 editions contain considerable elaborations in Hilberg’s conclu-
sions about the Jewish reactions to German violence. In this way, a few meta-
phors and similes depersonalise the German perpetrators, either by depicting 
them as a machine-like force (“the all-consuming destruction process”26) or as 
ravenous predators: “The Jews attempted to tame the Germans as one would 
attempt to tame a wild beast.”27 Similarly, in the expanded section on the Nether-
lands, the 1985 edition sarcastically describes the Jews transported to There-
sienstadt instead of Auschwitz as “beneficiaries of German generosity”28 – the 
sarcasm lies in the contrast with Hilberg’s description of Theresienstadt not at 
all being as mild a place as common perception would have it, and in the fact 
that a considerable number of those Jews were ultimately transported to Ausch-
witz anyway.29 
Overall, the tone becomes more accusatory throughout the years: with regard 
to the Slavs (cf. supra), Hilberg initially wrote that they “perhaps felt no over-
powering urge to help the Jews in their hour of need”.30 This “perhaps” is no 
longer found in the 1985 edition.31  
The increase of such sarcastic and accusatory rhetoric in subsequent editions 
suggests deeper-lying feelings, particularly since a similar discourse is found in 
Hilberg’s autobiography, especially when describing the fate of his family mem-
bers who remained in Europe.32 Moreover, the fact that Hilberg ends his autobi-
ography with a quote by H.G. Adler, authorises Adler’s perception of Hilberg’s 
drive and failure to definitively come to terms with the Shoah:  
 
What moves me in this book [Destruction, T.V.] is the hopelessness of the author. […] He 
already has the viewpoint of a generation, which does not feel itself affected directly, but 
which looked at these events from afar, bewildered, bitter and embittered, accusing and 
critical, not only vis-à-vis the Germans. […] At the end nothing remains but despair and 
                                                             
26  Hilberg 1985: 1038. 
27  Ibid. 
28  Ibid.: 594. 
29  Cf. ibid. 
30  Hilberg 1961: 201. 
31  Remarkably, the 1990 German translation does not take this into account, and retains 
the “vermutlich” from the 1982 edition.  
32  Cf. Hilberg 1996: 24-25. 
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doubt about everything, because for Hilberg there is only recognition, perhaps also a 
grasp, but certainly not understanding…33 
 
 
2. PETER WEISS 
 
As mentioned above, the hybrid nature of Die Ermittlung complicates the ques-
tion of emotionality even more than ‘standard’ factual or fictional texts. After 
all, its composition of largely non-fictional testimonies by Auschwitz survivors 
in a court room – inherently emotional speech acts34 – renders the traditional 
notion of authorship problematic. This means that one cannot analyse its rhetori-
cal build-up in an attempt to unveil any feelings the play’s author may have 
experienced – rather, it seems that the latter’s selection of testimonies and (para-
doxically!) the instances of fictionalisation offer better cues. Yet here as well 
ambiguity prevails: the lack of punctuation and omnipresence of enjambments – 
which cannot be entirely preserved on stage – may be associated with the 
Brechtian epic theatre and its aims to frustrate any emphatic identification with 
the characters on stage, but may also remind the reader of the song verse in 
ancient Greek drama, which was used for personal expression.35 
Consequently, the reader is confronted with a strong contrast between the in-
herently emotional survivors’ testimonies and the literary practice of alienation. 
Anderson is correct in asserting that Weiss “required audiences to do a double 
take, reconciling monstrous crimes with mundane personal details”.36 The dou-
ble take, however, also applies to the text’s emotionality. 
It seems that other criteria may be more relevant for Die Ermittlung: particu-
larly, I would suggest taking two interpolations into account. The first is a refer-
ence to the Sermon on the Mount (as found in Matthew) and is fictive, i.e. it 
cannot be traced to any testimony before court:37 
 
                                                             
33  Ibid.: 202-203. Van Den Berghe offers a similar interpretation, albeit for different 
reasons. Cf. Van Den Berghe 1990: 120. 
34 Cf. Bigsby 2006: 167-168: “it is precisely the unemotional recitation of fact that 
generates the emotion”. 
35  I thank Ingeborg Jandl for this insight. The argument is strengthened by Devin Pen-
das’s correct remark that Die Ermittlung is modelled on ancient Greek drama; cf. 
Pendas 2006: 4 
36  Anderson 2008: 132. 
37  Cf. Meyer 2000: 123-140; Weiss 2005: 258-259. 
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Only the cunning survived  
only those who every day  
with unrelentless alertness  
took and held their bit of ground  
The unfit  
the slow-witted  
the gentle  
the bewildered and the impractical  
the ones who mourned and the ones  
who pitied themselves  
were crushed38 
 
Clearly this is an inversion of the Beatitudes, which offer hope. The fact that it is 
fictive does not mean it is fictional. Rather, it must be read as an interpolation by 
Peter Weiss, which offers his perspective on the hopeless situation of the con-
centration camp inmates – according to Weiss, it took a cynical attitude to stand 
the barest chance of survival. The text thematises emotions as much as it repre-
sents or evokes them, but the relation is not (nor can it be) a one-to-one corre-
spondence. 
The second interpolation is the play’s Dantesque structure, which reinforces 
the notion of an infernal and hopeless situation of the inmates in Auschwitz.39 
There is absolutely no Paradiso to be found in Die Ermittlung; at best the trial 
might be considered a secular Purgatorio. Also telling is the fictional ending of 
the trial, which ends with a rhetorical victory for the defendants – not with a 
conviction. These poetic liberties may just as well have articulated Weiss’s (part-
ly politicised) feelings.  
The complexity of the hybrid nature of Die Ermittlung compels us to look for 
other traces in Weiss’s oeuvre. These may be found in two autobiographical 
texts, Abschied von den Eltern and Meine Ortschaft, assuming that these are 
factual texts. There is a dispute within literary studies as to whether or not auto-
biographies ought to be labelled as factual or not. Philippe Lejeune speaks of an 
autobiographical pact between author and reader, since it is impossible to distin-
guish the autobiography on formal (narratological, rhetorical, discursive) terms 
                                                             
38  Weiss 2006: 146; for the original German excerpt, cf. Weiss 2005: 42. 
39  Cf. Lindner 1990. References to Dante are also found in contemporary Allied news-
papers, (cf. Chéroux 2001), in Hannah Arendt’s The Concentration Camp (1948), and 
in Primo Levi’s prose. The trope of Auschwitz – or the concentration camp in general 
– as Hell was already well-established by the time of Die Ermittlung’s premiere.  
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from fictional texts with first-person narrators.40 On the other hand, there is a 
widespread practice of interpolation and poetic liberty in autobiographical writ-
ing.41 Again, however, these instances of interpolation are fictive, not fictional. 
There need not be a logical disruption between fictive instances and a factual 
pact with the reader – provided the author relies on the reader’s hermeneutic 
capacities to distinguish these fictive from the (assumingly) predominant non-
fictive elements. For this reason, Die Ästhetik des Widerstands cannot be used as 
a factual counterpart to Die Ermittlung as, in accordance with Holdenried, this 
novel is a “Wunschautobio-graphie”,42 i.e. a wished-for autobiography, in which 
the fictive elements outweigh the factual references to Weiss’s life. For the same 
reason, it seems that using Abschied von den Eltern as a counterpart is justifia-
ble, even though Robert Cohen demonstrates Weiss’s extensive use of fictionali-
sation strategies.43 There are, however, various passages which had already 
featured in Weiss’s earlier prose and which are deemed autobiographic.44 
 
Abschied von den Eltern 
 
The centrality of the Shoah for Weiss’s self-perception can already be found, 
albeit ex negativo and between the lines, in his autobiographical Abschied von 
den Eltern. The text depicts a narrator, supposedly identical with Peter Weiss, 
who is isolated in three regards. 
Firstly, there are lacunae within his own memory, which are admitted with 
regard to his earliest memories.45 Contrary to the common practice of interpola-
tion,46 the author/narrator admits that his memory shows lacunae – which in turn 
ought to strengthen the text’s authenticity. 
Secondly, the narrator’s family is depicted as fragmented, falling completely 
apart after the death of both parents.47 However, the narrator also explains how 
his childhood had been marked by the distance to his parents, apparently origi-
nating in their lack of autobiographic narration.48 The young narrator makes up 
                                                             
40  Cf. Lejeune 1975. 
41  Cf. Holdenried 2000: 31. 
42  Cf. ibid.: 249. 
43  Cf. Cohen 1993: 41-44. 
44  Ibid.: 44. 
45  Cf. Weiss 2014b: 21. For the original German text, cf. Weiss 2014a. 
46  Cf. Holdenried 2000: 31. 
47  Cf. Weiss 2014b: 37. 
48  The exception to the rule is his mother’s eager telling about how she met the narra-
tor’s father, but even this story is “impenetrable”. Cf. ibid. 
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for this silence by looking for clues but ultimately imagining their lives before 
his birth: “From the fragments I found in the attic, I was able to piece together a 
family history.”49 The most salient instance concerns his father’s experiences in 
the First World War: “The battlefield. The shots of the machine gun. […] My 
father with a bleeding stomach, moaning among others in the field hospital. And 
then my mother appearing. […] In the picture world of my mythology she holds 
him in her arms.”50 Whether the young narrator imagines his parents in this 
fashion due to overnight eavesdropping or to already predominant mediatised 
war imageries (or a combination of both) remains unclear, but the boy extrapo-
lates these images into a fantasy where he takes the role of a senior officer: 
 
When I lowered my face to the edge of the countryside it was if I were there myself. […] 
With cold passion I marked off the countryside, arranged the positions of the troops. […] 
After the great battles when the mangled corpses had been buried and the wounded had 
been brought to the hospitals, I made little expeditions.51 
 
The discussion of whether or not this passage is to be read in a Freudian fashion 
(more specifically, the son’s killing of his father52), or rather as the combination 
of childish play and juvenile fascination with war, is not central to the argument. 
What is essential is that the narrator, although having no first-hand experience – 
which in the German original is expressed in the conjunctive II – simulates 
knowledge of this experience, casting himself in a role which is simultaneously 
active and distanced, namely as a commander overlooking and directing the 
battle. Note that this also translates in an ambivalent description of his feelings, 
i.e. “cold passion” – passion, at least in Western cultures, traditionally being 
described with metaphors of heat or fire. 
Finally, the narrator depicts his isolation within society, particularly when 
describing his childhood and youth. Without explicitly thematising Weiss’s 
“Jewishness”53 or foreign nationality, its rhetoric depicts an authoritarian, mili-
tarily inspired society and subtly anticipates the genocide – which arguably 
                                                             
49  Ibid. 
50  Ibid.: 38. 
51  Ibid.: 39. 
52  Weiss did show a profound interest in psychoanalysis; cf. Holdenried 1991: 272 and 
2000: 40, 248. Evers offers an interesting variant on this scheme: only after the death 
of Weiss’s father is the author (not per se the narrator) able to replace this silent veter-
an/father with a heroic soldier. Cf. Evers 2008: 220. 
53  The only exception is being told that he cannot join the Nazis due to his being Jewish. 
Cf. Weiss 2014b: 58. 
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originated in that authoritarian society54 – and Weiss’s exile during the war 
years. 
Friederle, a schoolboy whose father is the Weiss family’s landlord, is de-
scribed as behaving “imperiously”55 towards the narrator; he is a bully whose 
violent and humiliating actions towards the narrator56 can be read as a prelude to 
German (Nazi) violence and the humiliation of Europe’s Jewish populations.57 
This interpretation seems to be strengthened when one reads that from the land-
lord’s family only one son, a former highly decorated officer, is still alive.58 
When we accept this interpretation, the narrator’s heavy stomach in retrospect is 
not only explained by his personal experience (i.e. the childhood bullying) but 
also by his knowledge of the fate he escaped.59 This leads him to avoid meeting 
Friedrich/Friederle, even though he has been given his address, claiming to know 
“what he was like”.60 Notice that this claimed knowledge is similar to that articu-
lated in his war games as a child: second-hand at best; only this time the mass 
killing is merely implied, and the narrator does not cast himself in a participatory 
role. Both the subtext (the bully as future Nazi; the Nazi as grown-up bully) and 
the narrator’s supposed superior knowledge of Friedrich’s character implies that 
Friedrich was involved in acts of genocide or war crimes, but the narrator’s 
                                                             
54  Jones offers a critical analysis of the role of socialisation in pre-war Germany (which, 
he argues, is sometimes invoked as exculpatory in current lay assessments). Cf. Jones 
1999: 117. Nonetheless a more recent (fictional) artwork which draws an unspoken 
line between the authoritarian, pre-1914 German society and totalitarianism is Mi-
chael Haneke’s Das weiße Band – eine deutsche Kindergeschichte (2009), although 
the director insists the link between authoritarian, religiously strict education and to-
talitarian ideology is not limited to the German context. Cf. (the TV interview with) 
Kluge 2009. 
55  Weiss 2014b: 29. 
56  Cf. Ibid.: 29-30, 31, 32, 33. 
57  I realise that my interpretation of the Nazi-as-bully paradigm might be anachronistic, 
however: although Paul mentions the demonization and pathologising of the Gestapo 
and SS before the Eichmann trial, I have not found any indication that the bully para-
digm (which has certainly been present in educational approaches during the last dec-
ades) had already found articulation. Cf. Paul 2002: 20. It might only have been hinted 
at in literary criticism, e.g. in Berghahn’s interpretation of Robert Musil’s Die Ver-
wirrungen des Zöglings Törleß (1906). Cf. Berghahn 1963: 28-29. 
58  Cf. Weiss 2014b: 29.  
59  Cf. ibid.: 25-26. 
60  Ibid.: 29. 
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refusal to meet Friedrich, which is based on this assumption, paradoxically ren-
ders any settling of the matter impossible. 
Yet the anticipations of Nazism and genocide are not restricted to biographic 
instances, they are also present on a more structural level: school is described as 
a place of natural and social violence, with storks attacking each other; and man 
inflicting damage upon pigs and butterflies – lethal in the first case, seemingly 
sadistic in the latter.61 This violence is also reflected in the school’s militarily 
inspired architecture.62 Such peripheral descriptions of violence prelude the 
punitive measures handed out by the teacher, which the pupil (more reflexively 
than consciously, it seems) tries to evade:  
 
I was hauled up by the ear onto the podium and placed in front of the blackboard, and 
what I had to demonstrate to the teacher and class was how one kept one’s palm out under 
the raised cane. It was a difficult exercise, for my hand would not stay still under the cane, 
it always jerked back.63 
 
If we accept the premise that the narration anticipates – between the lines – the 
fate of the Jews in Germany, the narrator’s attempt at withdrawing from German 
violence can be symbolically read as the precursor of his emigration. Yet his 
attempt is, in the end, futile: the hand does get whipped.64 The symbolical mean-
ing of this being-hit cannot be the subject’s destruction – for Weiss survived – 
and must therefore indicate another pain. This pain is probably that of being 





Whereas the writing of Abschied von den Eltern took place several years before 
that of Die Ermittlung, and the two texts – at least theoretically – may therefore 
contain traces of different feelings, Meine Ortschaft was written after a visit to 
Auschwitz-Birkenau and in the larger context of the Frankfurt trial.65 The the-
matic and temporal proximity to Die Ermittlung, therefore, indicates a bigger 
correspondence as to Weiss’s feelings during the writing processes of both texts. 
Moreover, there are – to my knowledge – no indications that this text contains 
                                                             
61  Cf. ibid.: 32. 
62  Cf. ibid.: 30-31. 
63  Ibid.: 33. 
64  Cf. ibid.: 33. 
65  Cf. Bigsby 2006: 160. 
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any elements of fictionalisation, and hence offers a more direct access to Weiss’s 
feelings.  
 
One place alone, where I spent just one day, remains. […] It is a place for which I was 
destined and which I evaded. I myself learned nothing in this place. I have no other con-
nection to it beyond the fact that my name stood on the list of those meant to be relocated 
there forever.66 
 
The entire account is marked by similar contrasts. Firstly, there is the explicit 
juxtaposition of past and present. In analeptic excerpts, Auschwitz is described 
as the “end of the world”,67 only to be contrasted with descriptions as a place of 
learning (the presence of a school class68), but also as a touristic destination, 
including commercial practices.69 
Secondly, the vicinity of said commercial enterprise stands in clear contrast 
with the remnants of genocide: “Immediately behind the barracks [where post-
cards are sold, T.V.] low walls of concrete, above them a slope overgrown by 
grass, rising to the flat roof with the short, squat, square chimney. The map of 
the camp tells me that I am already standing in front of the crematorium.”70 
Thirdly, there is a rather subtle contrast between a purported lack of feelings 
and an implicit-lexical code which suggests the opposite, not unlike the emo-
tional code in Die Ermittlung. It should be noted that all three types of contrasts 
are not isolated phenomena but overlap with and even reinforce each other. The 
following excerpt combines the first and the third contrasts: “I have come here of 
my own free will. I was not unloaded from any train. I was not driven into this 
terrain with truncheons. I come here twenty years late.”71 Here, the idea of doom 
escaped (cf. supra) is resumed and shaped in a kyklos: the first sentence high-
lights Weiss’s situation in the 1960s, the second and third the fate of the German 
Jews, while the final sentence can be read as the synthesis of past and present: an 
                                                             
66  Weiss 2008: 4-5. The page numeration is only relevant within the article, since – at 
least in the online version of the journal – page numerations are not percurrent. For 
the original German text, cf. Weiss 2005. 
67  Ibid.: 5. 
68  Cf. ibid. 
69  Cf. ibid. 
70  Ibid.: 5-6. 
71  Ibid.: 6. 
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expression of survivor’s guilt.72 This reflection, however, finds its pendant upon 
the narrator’s entering of the crematorium: “Without thoughts. Without any 
impressions beyond the fact that I am standing here alone, it is cold, the ovens 
are cold, the wagons are stiff and rusted.”73 Similarly, the anaphora finds a rhe-
torical pendant in the ellipsis used in the gas chamber’s description: “I walk 
slowly through this grave. Feel nothing. See only this floor, these walls. Regis-
ter.”74 Upon leaving the building: “At the end of the room a cast iron door with a 
peephole, behind it a narrow staircase, leading into the open air. Into the open.”75 
In his introduction Hillman justly remarks that the German original “ins Freie” 
has a double meaning: ‘into the open’, but also ‘towards freedom’.76 The emo-
tionality is again explained by the contrast between past and present, yet with a 
cynical conclusion: “There stands a gallows.”77 Even though the narrator can 
leave the gas chamber alive, the text relentlessly evokes violent death. 
The fourth contrast is that between knowing, i.e. how the deportees were un-
loaded, killed and burnt, and not-knowing, i.e. not being able to imagine their 
agony. Compare “had read and heard a lot about it”78 with “A living person 
came, and what happened is closed off from this living person”.79 This trope is a 
widespread one, and it is due to both philosophical analyses80 and survivors’ 
testimonies, which highlight the problem of putting the events to words. 
The (non-)experience of the Shoah is, in short, the pendant for the (non-)ex-
perience of the First World War – at least from Weiss’s/his narrators’ point of 
view. In both cases, the big outlines of the events are known (reduced to cli-
chés?), but whereas to Weiss the First World War seems imaginable to a certain 
degree, the Shoah remains aloof: “Ashes remain in the earth, from those who 
died for nothing, who were torn away from their home.”81 Despite our vast sci-
entific and cultural knowledge, it defies understanding. 
                                                             
72  Moreover, it seems to me that Winko overlooks repetition (here in the form of the 
anaphora) when listing the rhetorical devices particularly prone to expressing emotion. 
Cf. Winko 2003: 135-136. 
73  Weiss 2005: 6. 
74  Ibid. 
75  Ibid. 
76  Ibid.: 3.  
77  Ibid.: 7. 
78  Ibid.: 8. 
79  Ibid.: 13. 
80  Cf. Horkheimer/Adorno 2010; Arendt 1948. 
81  Weiss 2008: 13. Evers notices that the paradigm of the “un-tellability” of WWI does 
not stand the test of empirical research, and that this paradigm may be instrumental-
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Comparisons and conclusions 
 
Apart from these text-internal contrasts, Meine Ortschaft shows similarities to 
Die Ermittlung, The Destruction of the European Jews, and The Politics of 
Memory. Meine Ortschaft has political implications similar to those of Die 
Ermittlung, namely that the Shoah was not only a matter of the SS or NSDAP, 
but also implemented by bureaucrats, judges, and capitalists: “the death sentenc-
es were pronounced, by men who today live an honest existence and enjoy their 
bourgeois honors.”82 The narrative’s conclusion may be more understated, but no 
less condemning: “Now he is just standing in a world that has perished. Here he 
can do no more. For a while total silence prevails. Then he knows it is not over 
yet.”83 The implication is that the political system that enabled genocide has not 
vanished after the military defeat, and that it has gladly rehabilitated the war 
criminals it had produced. 
The main similarity with Hilberg’s writings is the (infrequent) use of cynical 
antiphrasis, as in the following example: “Those men who were allowed to live a 
while longer went to the right.”84 The choice of the modal verb “durften” consti-
tutes an antiphrasis in two senses: firstly, it (sarcastically) connotes life as a 
privilege bestowed, rather than a basic right – reinforced by the arbitrariness and 
temporariness of this privilege; secondly, it implies that this short period in the 
camp is a better fate than being gassed upon arrival.85 
Obviously, the crucial difference between Hilberg’s and Weiss’s texts is the 
amount of fictional content: Destruction and Memory show no signs of fiction; 
Die Ermittlung does so very clearly. As a consequence, the implicit-lexical anal-
ysis of Destruction has more explanatory power about Hilberg’s feelings than 
Die Ermittlung has about Weiss’s, for the simple reason that narrators in factual 
texts – if one assumes factual texts have narrators in the first place – coincide 
                                                                                                                                  
ised to discredit certain forms of testimony in the case of the Shoah. These remarks, 
however, are not echoed in Weiss’s texts under scrutiny here: the question of how 
these experiences reach collective and cultural memory is not thematised. Cf. Evers 
2008: 221-222. 
82  Weiss 2008: 9. 
83  Ibid.: 14. 
84  Ibid.: 11. 
85  The second implication can be read as antiphrasis, or not. Reading it as antiphrasis 
would correspond with the rhetorical question Miklós Nyiszli poses: “Who then – of 
our parents, brothers, children – was more fortunate, he who went to the left or he who 
went to the right?” Nyiszli 1993: 57. As outlined before, certain political and ethical 
opinions underlie our labelling of certain tropes, especially in this sensitive context. 
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with the author of said texts.86 This also explains why the section on The Politics 
of Memory is remarkably shorter than that on Abschied and Meine Ortschaft: 
Hilberg’s autobiography recuperates the emotional code of Destruction, and 
ends by motivating it. Weiss’s autobiographical texts are rife with paradoxes and 
contrasts, and his emotional codes build upon a pre-existing discourse of trauma 
and non-representation. 
In concluding, so-called “emotionless” rhetoric clearly does not indicate 
“feelinglessness”. In general, however, it is easier to plausibly demonstrate that 
an author experiences strong feelings at the time of writing, even if he supposed-
ly tries to hide them. Defining and qualifying these feelings is a different matter. 
The stimulus-response schema offers one explanation for this problem. Accord-
ing to this behaviouristic interpretation of feeling, the same stimulus may evoke 
different responses.87 The simultaneous experiencing of distinct (but not contra-
dictory) feelings further defies any definite attempt at qualifying feelings. 
Equally, this does not necessarily mean that Hilberg wished to mask his feel-
ings completely: it may simply indicate an adhering to his professional disci-
pline’s standards vis-à-vis objectivity and emotional communication, even if he 
probed at the limits of these standards. Ultimately, however, whether or not his 
“emotionless” rhetoric was an attempt at concealing his feelings remains uncer-
tain, but this need not be problematic. It ought to be seen as an emotional code, 
to be found in certain registers, and which may have influenced other authors. It 
would be more fruitful to look for instances of this emotional code synchronical-
ly and diachronically, i.e. in contemporary discourses, but also in the historiog-
raphy of the last decades. 
By contrast, Weiss builds on an already-existing emotional code to depict 
and articulate the hopelessness of Auschwitz. Judging by his autobiographical 
writings (especially Meine Ortschaft) it seems safe to assume that these were not 
just politicised emotions but very personal feelings as well. Hilberg and Weiss 
seem to share a certain cynical outlook on both the possibility of the Shoah and 
the post-war politics of silence; an outlook which primarily points to a sense of 





                                                             
86  The argument pro or contra cannot be developed here; I recommend the reader consult 
the following texts: Genette 1991; Cohn 1999, especially Chapter 7; Fludernik 2013. 
87  For a concise overview of stimulus-response theories, cf. Mellmann 2006, especially 
Chapter 1. 
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In a letter to poet Edwin Muir, Djuna Barnes (1892–1982) declares: “[…] I’m 
not a ‘writer’; once in every twenty years or so, the wound bleeds, that’s all.”1 
This statement is one of her many striking one-liners, which have amused read-
ers and intrigued researchers. As Julie Taylor points out, it portrays writing as 
“an intensely personal endeavor” for Barnes, which becomes puzzling when 
combined with her resistance to biographically oriented readings of her work, as 
well as the way her texts seem to share a high modernist aspiration toward an 
impersonal universality.2 Taylor’s work with this metaphor is inspiring and 
accurate, but a few things yet remain to be said about Barnes, wounds, writing 
and feelings. 
In the light of writing and emotions, how should a literary researcher consid-
er herself informed by such a statement? Of course, it is only one sentence, albeit 
a dramatic one. Scholars writing after the heyday of biographism are also accus-
tomed not to put too much weight on what an author has to say about her writ-
ing. However, in this case it is quite tempting to literally take the author at her 
word, which quite a number of researchers of Barnes’s fiction have done. Here 
the word in question would be “wound”. It evokes immediate bodily pain, but 
also, etymologically considered, the returning pain of the past: trauma derives 
from the classical Greek τραῦμα, wound. There is biographical evidence that 
Barnes suffered some kind of sexual violation as a child, although the details 
remain unclear.3 She grew up in a polygamous family with controversial atti-
                                                             
1  Letter from 26 October 1957; quoted in Taylor 2012: 1. 
2  Ibid.: 5-6. Barnes especially rejected the labels of “lesbian writer” or “woman writer”. 
3  Cf. Ibid.: 7; Herring 1995: 55-58, 268. 
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tudes towards sexuality, married and separated very young and had a problemat-
ic, physically close relationship with her grandmother. Later in life, Barnes had 
many unhappy love affairs, the most famous of these with artist Thelma Wood, 
unavoidably present in her novel Nightwood (1936). She sometimes refers to her 
writing as a claim for justice for the wrongs committed by others, and as a way 
to process trauma.4 All this biographical information, as well as comments such 
as the one above, build an image of Barnes’s writing as permeated by trauma and 
pain. In addition, however, we have her stories, novels, plays and poetry, which 
slightly complicate the case. As Taylor has shown, they resist biographical and 
“deep psychological explanation”, and their relation to trauma is not one of 
simple covert repetition, but of creative and performative rewriting and possible 
reparation.5 
Some have tried to yoke the life and the fiction together, however. 
Biographer Philip Herring is grasping for some kind of truth behind the fictional 
works, as he cites another letter of Barnes’s: “I can’t imagine spending years 
writing fiction, things made up entirely out of thin air, and without a foundation 
in some emotion.”6 This he follows with his own interpretation: “Invention was 
not a priority because in remembering her past she found no end of emotional 
subjects. She simply couldn’t have invented fiction more compelling or bizarre 
than her life had been.”7 Barnes, in her comment, contrasts fictionality and 
made-upness with something she calls “a foundation in some emotion”. It is 
Herring who draws the parallel between emotion and life: according to him, the 
emotions that grant the text a factual foundation are ones found in the writer’s 
biography.  
Such interpretation seems inescapably narrow – yet Barnes, as a readerly 
feeling of some sort of agency behind the text, remains present in the event of 
reading. When reading her work from the perspective of “writing emotions”, it is 
this affective presence that needs to be dealt with; but how to do this without 
hastening to draw a parallel between the writer’s life and her work? This essay 
discusses the readerly construction of Barnes’s writerly agency. The logic of 
hidden-but-discoverable authorial emotions does not do justice to Barnes’s work, 
but neither is it possible to completely disregard the author as an agent. We need 
to admit that the author as an imaginary, affective agent is present in the event of 
reading, but that we do not have access to her original, inner emotions, and that 
guessing at them is not necessary to be affected by a work of fiction. This is why 
                                                             
4  Cf. Herring 1995: 168, 281. 
5  Taylor 2012: 18, 8-9. 
6  Barnes to Emily Coleman 14 December 1935, quoted in Herring 1995: xvi. 
7  Ibid. 
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the title of this essay says “reading Djuna Barnes’s writership”: I claim that to 
approach Barnes’s “emotional foundations”, we simply need to read, both her 
writing and her extraliterary statements.8 In the following, I will first clarify 
some conceptual and theoretical starting points related to reading, affect, and 
agency, then discuss two examples from Barnes’s short fiction, and finish by 
returning to the introductory quotations, on which I hope the reading of fiction 
will shed new light. 
 
 
HOW TO READ THE WRITER AS AN AFFECTIVE AGENT 
 
As the focus of this essay is on how the sense of the writer emerges in reading, a 
brief look is needed into how this kind of reading is conceptualized. Combining 
Monika Fludernik’s concept of ‘figuralization’ with enactivist phenomenology9 
and psychological text-processing studies, Marco Caracciolo suggests that it is 
not so much the reader’s consciousness but a fictionalized, virtual version of the 
reader’s body that can be projected into the fictional world. This phenomenon he 
calls “the fictionalization of the reader’s virtual body”.10 The virtual body is 
rooted in the experiences of the reader’s actual body: the embodied experiences 
of moving, perceiving and being in the world enable readers to enact the experi-
ences attributed to fictional characters.11 Caracciolo limits his discussion to the 
enactment of characters’ movements in space and does not, for instance, sepa-
rately discuss affective experience. However, the same idea could extend to that 
direction as well, since affective experience is also embodied experience, and it 
is often through the described gestures, movements and bodily feelings that a 
character’s affective state is conveyed in an immersive way (more so than 
through naming it, as for instance “excitement”, “joy”, “sadness” and so on). 
                                                             
8  I will also prefer the term ‘writer’ to ‘author’, to highlight both the process-like, 
materially inclined aspect of doing involved, as well as to be able to think of this ac-
tion as paired with that of reading. 
9  The enactivist branches of phenomenology and cognitive science entail a view of the 
organism enacting its cognition in a dynamic relationship to its lifeworld, instead of 
passively receiving and processing information from a separate outer world. Views of 
this kind usually also imply, as opposed to Cartesian dualism, that cognitive functions 
are essentially embodied. See for instance Varela et al. 1991; Noë 2004; Colombetti 
2014. 
10  Caracciolo 2014: 160. 
11  Cf. Ibid. 
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To go one step further, the aim here is to experiment with the proposal that 
there is a similar process involved in the way readers imagine a writerly agent 
beyond the text. The writer’s body could be seen as one of the fictionally con-
structed bodies inviting the reader’s enactment, besides characters and narrators. 
Even though this body is not described in the text, and in that sense is not expe-
riential, it is there in flashes of a sense of an agency making choices of words 
and events, moving characters, giving and withholding information and so forth. 
It might – but it need not – come close to the narrator of the text. This model 
differs from the ‘implied author’ introduced by Wayne C. Booth12 in that it un-
derlines the readers’ capacity to imagine the author as a lived and affective mate-
rial body that we can grasp through our own livedness and materiality, in addi-
tion to construing a purely textual projection. Readers will also undoubtedly 
make assumptions and deductions on the basis of what they know about the 
writer’s life, which may lead to deliberation of authorial intentions, and further 
into biographically oriented interpretations. The intention here, however, is not 
to go down this path, but to focus on the kind of affective presence the text in-
vites its reader to enact. As Yanna Popova has written, “what matters in literary 
reading is not a recovery of the intention of a real person (the author) but the 
reader’s projection of one: the fact that a reader engages in a hypothetical at-
tribution of meaning to an agency in the text”.13 
The claim that this presence of the writer is affective also requires some ex-
planation. I am using the concept of ‘affect’ in the sense of a not-so-clearly de-
finable feeling, a tone, often to refer not to any particular kind of affect but to the 
general domain and activity of feeling, moving and being moved. As such, it is 
distinct from what is usually referred to as an emotion, even though there is also 
considerable overlap in the definitions – and even though ‘emotion’ is the term 
used by Barnes in the quotation above. One way to think of the difference would 
be the following generalization: affects occur somewhere in between bodies, 
whereas emotion is usually seen as arising from an individual subject, as a result 
of a cognitive process, which is often an appraisal of a given situation.14 Jona-
than Flatley puts the difference in the following words: “Where emotion suggests 
something that happens inside and tends toward outward expression, affect indi-
                                                             
12  Cf. Booth 1961. 
13  Popova 2015: 64. Popova does not, however, emphasize the embodied or affective 
aspects of this projection. 
14  There are, also, exceptions to this, as for instance, in the study of “collective emo-
tions”. However, the concept of affect allows for even wider scope of in-betweenness, 
reaching beyond intersubjectivity, in that it is also capable of encompassing nonhu-
man ‘bodies’. 
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cates something relational and transformative. One has emotions; one is affected 
by people or things.”15 
Using ‘affect’ like this binds this discussion to a certain theoretical tradition. 
The definitions that I follow stem mostly from the Spinozist-Deleuzean account 
of affectivity. For Deleuze, affect is “any mode of thought which doesn’t repre-
sent anything”.16 Brian Massumi’s preface to Deleuze and Guattari’s A Thou-
sand Plateaus offers a more precise but concise definition of affect as a “preper-
sonal intensity corresponding to the passage from one experiential state of the 
body to another and implying an augmentation or diminution in that body’s 
capacity to act”.17 Massumi and Flatley convey two significant sides of the con-
cept of affect in this account: its connection with agency and a shift of location 
away from the individual and towards relationality. When studying Barnes’s 
writing, this means both encounters and movements between bodies in the fic-
tional world and relations between author, text and reader as affective bodies – 
not, for instance, the study of the representation of certain emotions. 
Finally, the account of affect described above points toward the definitions 
of ‘agency’ put into use here. Marco Bernini has successfully drawn attention to 
writerly agency as “distributed”, extending from the individual into multiple 
agencies in the material world (including the “materiality of words”).18 However, 
his focus is on theorizing authorial intention, and does not encompass affectivity. 
To reach toward the affectivity of writing and its presence in reading, I turn to 
theories of agency that take one step further from the notion of “material agen-
cy”19 employed by Bernini, namely, the posthumanist and/or new materialist 
views presented by Karen Barad and Jane Bennett. The two have a lot of com-
mon ground but also some differences; however, this does not necessarily imply 
that they would be in conflict with one another. 
Barad constructs her account of distributive agency on the basis of quantum 
physics. In this case, its distribution means that agency always happens in con-
stellations involving more than one agent. However, the agents interacting in 
these constellations, which she calls “phenomena”, actually emerge in and 
through them and do not pre-exist their “mutual entanglement”20 as distinct from 
one another. Consider the writer, the text and the reader, and all of the other 
agencies involved in reading a story, for instance: the materialities of language, 
                                                             
15  Flatley 2008: 12, emphasis in original. 
16  Deleuze 1978. 
17  Massumi 2013: xv. 
18  Bernini 2014: 350.  
19  Bernini 2014; cf. Malafouris 2008. 
20  Barad 2007: 32-33. 
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the book, the context and so on. A written story needs the printed or otherwise 
materially present form to be read, and a reader to read it; the reader becomes a 
reader only in the act of reading; and the reader’s sense of writerly agency 
emerges in the phenomenon of reading. 
Barad does not refer to affect, but it does make sense to view these kinds of 
phenomena as affective. In Jane Bennett’s thinking on the agency of the nonhu-
man, affect has a central role. Bennett conceives of agency in assemblages, 
“confederation[s] of human and nonhuman elements”, in which the force of the 
confederation is more than the sum of its parts, and which results in the capacity 
to affect.21 Thus, in Bennett’s account, it is rather the effects, not the agencies 
involved, which emerge as a result of the constellation.  
The following discussion of Barnes’s writership draws on Barad in suggest-
ing that even the agents themselves are emergent properties of a phenomenon, in 
this case the phenomena of reading passages of Barnes’s fiction and her extralit-
erary comments. However, Bennett’s account makes it possible to focus on such 
processes as affective. There is considerable overlap in the concepts of ‘phe-
nomenon’ and ‘assemblage’, although they are not identical. For the sake of 
clarity, I will use ‘phenomenon’ to refer to the broader activities of reading in-
volving the performative construction of writership, whereas by ‘assemblage’ I 
mostly denote constellations of characters and things in the fictional world, with 
whose help I discuss the affective dynamics and the sense of writerly agency 
involved. In the following, I wish to pin down some singular occurrences of a 
rather murky, ambiguous and momentary sense of writerly agency that a text, in 
this case Barnes’s short stories, invites its readers to enact – while keeping the 




MOVING THINGS: WRITERLY AGENCY IN THE  
TABLEAUX VIVANTS OF BARNES’S SHORT STORIES 
 
This essay focuses on two stories rich with descriptive passages displaying mate-
rial abundance characteristic for Barnes’s work. There are a few reasons for 
selecting just such passages for closer analysis. For one thing, descriptive pas-
sages seem to be as close as we get to affects and emotions in Barnes’s prose. 
Usually narrated in third person, her stories do not tend to use forms of psycho-
narration or other modes of reporting characters’ emotions. Some of her work 
                                                             
21  Bennett 2010: 21, 23. 
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does feature the presentation of affective experience in free indirect discourse, 
but more often even this device is left out and replaced by mere diegetic descrip-
tion of a character’s actions and scarce instances of dialogue. Furthermore, there 
seems to be a preference for the stillness of a tableau over dynamic action, 
which is a striking feature especially in short fiction, as it likens whole stories to 
still lifes, arrangements of objects.22 These arrangements are never completely 
static, however. In the manner of assemblages, they are an arena for emerging 
affect and agency – like a tableau particularly vivant. Both the descriptions of 
action and the descriptive tableaux do indeed get their form in assemblages 
consisting of human characters and the things surrounding them, which high-
lights the nonhuman, thing-like and impenetrable elements in them. This does 
not, however, diminish the affective intensity of the stories.23 In such a context, 
the authorial agency emerges as a skillful arranger comparable to a visual artist, 
which Barnes also was. 
Another reason for a focus on abundant descriptions is that they express the 
style of grandeur and dramatic exaggeration that also characterizes Barnes’s 
extraliterary comments and appearance, which have been discussed as a kind of 
performance comparable to her art – she even wrote journalism under the pseu-
donym “Pen Performer”.24 This style of expression can also be read in the more 
mimetic instances of witty and enigmatic dialogue in her fiction, but limiting the 
discussion to them would not admit a similar focus on distributed agency.  
The first story discussed falls somewhere in the middle of the scale from tab-
leau to action. “A Boy asks a Question” (originally “A Boy Asks a Question of a 
Lady”, 1923; revised version 1929) is a brief account of a meeting between 
Carmen la Tosca, an actress spending her holiday in a village, and a local boy, 
who approaches her with a vague but troubled question related to the general 
nature of love. The narrative proceeds in third person from a description of the 
character of Carmen and her setting towards a brief dialogue and an abrupt end-
ing typical of the stories: “And that very afternoon, Carmen la Tosca rode off, 
                                                             
22  Barnes’s earliest short stories, such as “The Jest of Jests” and “A Sprinkle of Come-
dy” (1917) display a different preference as regards action: they emphasize the ele-
ment of plot and especially plots of intrigue, and even parody them. Cf. Plumb 1986: 
52. They usually feature a very surprising turn of events and elements of slapstick 
comedy. However, the early stories, too, have a preference for opaque characters and 
a tendency to highlight the story as skillful arrangement (thereby highlighting an au-
thorial presence as well), in which they resemble the tableaux of the later stories. 
23  Cf. Oulanne 2016. 
24  Cf. Taylor 2012: 1, 12; Caselli 2009: 1, 21, 27. 
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with her entire entourage.”25 The narrator is quite intrusive, for instance in 
commenting on the introduction of Carmen in parentheses: “with a name like 
that, what could she be but an actress?”26 The sudden ending and its wording 
invite a heightened sense of the agency of the writer: the character is taken away 
and the story ended by someone with the power to do it. Looking simply at one 
story, that someone could be said to be the narrator; but especially the context of 
the whole volume and its succession of comparable, drastic endings introduces 
also the sense of a continuing, writerly agency beyond different narrators. 
At the heart of the story, there is a description of Carmen’s breakfast: 
 
Carmen la Tosca breakfasted in bed, and late. Having caught herself out of sleep in a net 
of bobbin-lace, she broke fast with both food and scent, lazily dusting her neck and arms 
with perfumed talc, lolling on the bed (which stood between two ovals of pear-wood, 
framing versions of Leda and the swan), ripping through the wrappers of Puerto Rican 
journals and French gazettes with the blade of a murderous paper-cutter, and finally, in the 
total vacancy of complete indulgence, her hand sprawling across a screaming headline, 
would stare out into the harsh economy of russet boughs, pranked out in fruit.27 
 
The description features slow characterly action, but it is almost of a metaphori-
cal kind: Carmen is “catching herself out of sleep”, lazily “lolling”, and her hand 
is “sprawling across” a headline – we do not know if she reads it at all. The flood 
of things appeals to all (five) senses: there is the feel of bobbin-lace and dusting 
the neck, the rather abstract food and scent along with perfumed talc, the aurally 
striking onomatopoeia of “ripping through the wrappers of Puerto Rican journals 
and French Gazettes with the […] murderous paper-cutter”, and with all this, the 
visual stimulus of both the whole assemblage and the specific reference to visual 
arts, the oval paintings. Together they form an entangled mixture of multisensory 
experiences in which the senses themselves are not clearly separable but come 
together in the haptic harshness of the boughs, the smell of food, the sound of 
ripping open a wrapper. 
Both the presentation of things in this assemblage and the slight actions in-
volved invite the reader’s sensory and affective engagement. Carmen, like the 
majority of Barnes’s characters, is opaque as to her thoughts and feelings (“no 
one knew her”28), but she still undeniably functions in the narrative as a feeling 
body into which the reader’s virtual body can be projected. As I claim elsewhere, 
                                                             
25  Barnes 1997: 350. 
26  Ibid.: 344. 
27  Ibid.: 346-347. 
28  Ibid.: 345. 
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the projection might spill over the borders of the human character and into the 
sensuously appealing things taking part in the assemblage, the surfaces touching 
one another.29 As we are able to share the sensory experience of such things, it is 
enough to evoke them to make us enact an imaginary experience of sensory 
pleasure in the character. 
Where, then, is the writerly agency lurking in a passage like this? The feel-
ings evoked by the passage and the whole story seem to be mixed, dominated by 
a general ambiance of leisurely pleasure. However, the boy’s question (what it is 
that has made his elder brother cry, and whether he will end up crying also) and 
the subsequent interaction add some darkness and tension. The combination of 
an older woman in bed, a child and the theme of love and suffering gestures 
toward the Oedipal scheme, especially if the reader is aware of the frequency of 
these motifs in Barnes’s fiction; and access to biographical information might 
bring forth further associations with incest. In light of such considerations, it 
would be easy to see the multisensory pleasures of breakfast as both secondary 
and superficial, as covering for the actual, darker affective content of the story. 
However, to do justice to what actually happens in the fictional assemblage, we 
cannot disregard the pleasure, either. The clue really seems to be on the surface 
or between the surfaces, in the constellation in which the feelings, darker and 
lighter, emerge.30 In the readerly experience, it is likely that pain and suffering 
become incorporated as parts of a plentiful, pleasurable whole; and we cannot 
say which feeling is the truer one: they are profoundly entangled in their material 
expressions. 
Such entangled assemblages invite us to imagine and enact a version of an 
embodied Barnes-like agent moving the words as if they were objects like paper-
cutters and laces, playing with feelings, characters and story structures: making 
gestures. Gesturing is a fitting analogy here, in the case of the virtual Barnes 
both as the extraliterary performer making comments about writing and as the 
writerly agency present in her fiction, as it evokes the dimensions of action and 
embodiment. Furthermore, there is no law as to how much one can gesture in 
one direction or another. An expression of luxury and pleasure as a gesture need 
not necessarily be balanced by a dark underside, and similarly there may be an 
abundance of suffering. The feelings evoked are only grounded in the materiali-
                                                             
29  Cf. Oulanne 2016. 
30  This kind of mixture might evoke the notion of jouissance. Cf. Barthes 1973. Howev-
er, Taylor has convincingly demonstrated the necessity of not conflating pleasure and 
happiness with the more difficult and dark tones of jouissance in Barnes’s Ladies’ Al-
manack (1928). Cf. Taylor 2012: 147-148. The term may indeed carry unfortunate 
theoretical baggage, and will not be adopted here, either.  
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ties of the fictional assemblages, as well as the materialities involved in the 
phenomenon of reading, and these allow for both pleasure and pain. 
The ability of writerly gestures to accommodate excess also becomes clear in 
another story, with descriptions of two fictional rooms: 
 
Everything was disorderly, and expensive and melancholy. Everything was massive and 
tall, or broad and wide. A chest of drawers rose above my head. The china stove was 
enormous and white, enameled in blue flowers. The bed was so high that you could only 
think of it as something that might be overcome. The walls were all bookshelves, and all 
the books were bound in red morocco […]. 
It was a beautiful room, Madame, ‘traurig’ as she said. Everything was important and old 
and gloomy. The curtains about the bed were red velvet, Italian you know, and fringed in 
gold bullion. The bed cover was a deep red velvet with the same gold fringe: on the floor, 
beside the bed, a stand on which was a tasselled red cushion, on the cushion a Bible in 
Italian, lying open.31 
 
These assemblages are encountered in two separate bedrooms, in the story “Cas-
sation” (originally published as “A Little Girl Tells a Story to a Lady”, 1925, 
revised version 1929). It is one of a cycle of three stories all focalized and nar-
rated by Katya, a young woman of Russian origin leading a cosmopolitan life. In 
Berlin, she meets a mysterious older lady, Gaya, who invites her to stay with her 
in a luxurious house, and later, after a year, to take care of her disabled child and 
stay “forever” in the house without going out. This Katya refuses, leaving and 
returning only once, to find Gaya succumbed to some kind of madness beyond 
language, comparable to the inert state of the child. The ending is once again 
also a departure: Gaya says “go away”, Katya goes and concludes: “Things are 
like that, when one travels, nicht wahr, Madame?”32  
As we can see, in addition to the similarity of the original titles, “Cassation” 
also shares several thematic and structural features with “A Boy Asks a Ques-
tion”: encounters that seem meaningful, but whose meaning is not completely 
disclosed to the reader (denying the moment of epiphany typical of short sto-
ries); a sense of stagnation as opposed to action (while the actions of “telling” 
and “asking” are present in the original titles), with the exception of the endings; 
a preference for foreign-sounding, specialized or archaic words (entourage, nicht 
wahr, cassation, gazette…); a bed, a character on a bed, and the whole surround-
ed by an array of things with the air of luxury. In “Cassation”, however, the role 
of the character as agent is perhaps smaller than in “A Boy Asks a Question”, 
                                                             
31  Barnes 1997: 384-386. 
32  Ibid.: 392. 
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and the human component in the assemblages comes mainly in the form of 
Katya’s focalization. And as Katya is also the narrator, the writerly agency does 
not seem to identify with this fictional position as clearly as in the previous 
story. In any case, this amount of repetition on different levels prompts the sense 
of shared writerly agency behind the texts. 
The excerpts from “Cassation” are teeming with mixed feelings, even more 
explicitly than in the first story. “Melancholy”, “gloomy” and “traurig” are 
direct references to emotions, which participate in the affective coloring of the 
whole assemblage. However, not everything in this assemblage is reducible to 
the gloomy ambiance. Red velvet and morocco, blue-and-white china, gold 
bullion and fringe, the cushion and the bible bring forth both sensuous and cul-
turally defined qualities with affective potential of their own. The evocation of 
the soft feel of velvet bed covers and morocco book covers is combined with the 
associations of fine materials in red and gold to both status and pleasure: royal or 
papal interiors and garments as well as the lush privacy of boudoirs or even 
brothels of the 19th century and beyond. When reading onward from the 
“gloom” evoked in the first sentence, it is plausible that a reader will experience 
affective shifting towards something again governed by sensuous pleasure, 
through an embodied projection of the reader’s virtual body into the narrator’s 
experience of the space. Yet the darker tones do not completely disappear either. 
The most frequent word in the passages is “everything”, and the predominant 
feeling might be that of excess and abundance, extending in every direction: 
things are either “massive and tall” or “broad and wide”, never small or middle-
sized, as if Goldilocks had entered a cabin with only the large bear present, or 
Alice had just drunk the shrinking potion. 
In this story, the luxurious coverings do indeed hide something: a disabled 
child is kept in the house, lying on the first high bed, like a dark secret or a black 
hole into which Gaya later is sucked. However, Barnes does not leave it at that. 
Once again, the image of a bed is combined with an older woman, this time also 
associated with mother (earth) by her name, and a younger woman (in the title, a 
“little girl”).33 There is also a “declining”34 husband looming about in the house, 
although no one seems to be particularly interested in him. The potential Oedipal 
drama between these players is never realized, however. In “Cassation”, it is 
descriptions of very slight movements, of hands touching fabrics, taking off and 
putting on clothes, touching the pages of the bible, that remain most poignant, 
like an intimate ritual, or like a dream (Katya herself describes having become a 
                                                             
33  Or two older women, if we also consider “Madame”, the narratee. 
34  Ibid.: 386. 
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“religieuse” in the house).35 There is no sense of narrative suspense related to 
discovering the “secret”, and no tragic culmination in the revelation: in the end, 
Katya enters and leaves what was to become her prison “quite easily by the door, 
for all the doors and windows were open”36 and finds the mother and child on 
the bed. The writer seems to be showing everything: and that “everything” is 
indeed golden and gloomy, red and soft and traurig, all at the same time, and 
there is actually nothing to discover because there is nothing to hide. 
Some of the subject matter of both “Cassation” and “A Boy Asks a Ques-
tion”, is undoubtedly made of the stuff of Barnes’s biography. There are motifs 
she keeps repeating in all her writing: mother and son/daughter figures engaged 
in love, seduction and power, weak and peripheral men, beds and bibles, fine 
fabrics and decadent pleasures. However, our understanding of the affective 
content of the stories and of the writer’s agency, from a readerly perspective, is 
to remain thwarted if we limit ourselves to explaining it in light of what we 
know of Barnes’s past, the wounds we imagine her to have carried. Barnes as a 
virtual, enacted, gesturing agent behind the story gives us both pleasure and pain 
in abundance. 
We have experimented with a readerly position that brackets suspicion and 
conceives of the writer’s agency as an embodied presence making gestures. The 
meaning of the work itself becomes something of an affective gesture, and the 
text an affective body moving readerly bodies, with the writer’s virtual body as a 
prime mover. This does not mean that symbolic meanings would not exist in 
Barnes’s work – they most definitely do, and are present in this reading as well. 
An attention to symbolic meaning is necessary to make sense of the stories, and, 
as we will see, also of Barnes’s commentary. However, what has been avoided 
here is the conflation of the “deeper meaning” with the author’s intention and 
agency, and the search for the original emotion. In the following, it remains to 
show that this is the readerly position from which we can also provide a more 
encompassing reading of Barnes’s metaphor of the wound. 
 
 
RECLAIMING THE WOUND 
 
Read in the context of the totality of Barnes’s oeuvre, the wound need not point 
merely toward pain experienced by the writer’s actual body. Rather, the word 
could be seen as an affective agent like the paper-cutter, Carmen la Tosca, the 
                                                             
35  Cf. ibid.: 387. 
36  Ibid.: 392. 
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velvet bed cover, the china stove or the bible, which need not be separate from 
considering its symbolic meanings. Symbols and metaphors, being assemblages 
of their own kind, also need some materiality for their meaning to emerge: the 
materialities of the pictorial or linguistic form they take, the materialities in-
volved in the phenomenon of their interpretation, as well as the way metaphori-
cal thinking in general draws on our embodied experience.37 In the context of the 
quotation about writing, the word choice comes across as a dramatic and accen-
tuated gesture. It is capable of evoking some kind of embodied enactment of 
pain. Taylor compares the wound in the comment to the image of a bleeding tree 
in Tasso’s Gerusalemme liberata, which in turn is used in Cathy Caruth’s influ-
ential study as a metaphor for the repetition inherent in trauma.38 However, in 
the context of affective abundance created by Barnes’s fiction, the sensation of 
pain is accompanied by a bundle of other feelings and meanings. 
Barnes often uses Christian, more specifically Roman Catholic, iconography, 
which can also be seen in the excerpts from “Cassation”.39 A wound that some-
times bleeds also resonates with statues and paintings that are found miraculous-
ly weeping blood, as well as the phenomenon of stigmata, and the image of the 
“Sacred” or “Bleeding Heart”, a symbol for Christ’s love for humanity, which is 
explicitly evoked in another story.40 The wound thus comes to embody a type of 
animism and its bleeding to signify the coming to life of something inanimate. 
An occasionally bleeding wound also evokes menstruation and female genitals, 
and thus is likened to reproduction and creation.41 The association between 
wound and life need not suppress the sense of pain involved, or to cause us to 
rush into an abstract celebration of life and creativity. For instance, Suzanne 
Bost has shown how pain and illness are mingled with understandings of life and 
creation in Catholic traditions.42 This has potential to change the reading of the 
                                                             
37  Cf. Lakoff/Johnson 2003. 
38  Cf. Taylor 2012: 10; Caruth 1996, 2. 
39  In another letter, Barnes discusses her secrecy as an attempt to let a wound heal, and 
jumps to mention “The wound in the side of Christ” and, as interpreted by Caselli, 
ends up arguing that the wound, whatever it is, needs to stay open as public testimony 
of a wrongdoing. Barnes to Emily Coleman, 30 November 1937; cf. Caselli 2009: 
195-196. 
40  “Aller et Retour” (1924); Barnes 1997: 363, 366. 
41  Wounds and femininity also come together in Naomi Schor’s influential essay on 
“female fetishism” Schor 1995; elsewhere, I show how Barnes’s version of fetishism 
is also defined by the logic of “everything” instead of lack and recompensation. (Cf. 
Oulanne Forthcoming). 
42  Cf. Bost 2010: 60–76. 
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whole quotation to something along the lines of “I am not a writer, but every 
once in a while I come painfully to life – and writing happens.”  
This way, the comment becomes a simultaneous renunciation and claiming 
of agency, in which the meaning of agency itself undergoes a change. Barnes 
commits a performative gesture of handing writership over to “the wound”. 
However, in light of Barad’s thinking, we can see her as emerging as an agent 
and an author only in the event of the enunciation of her words. If we follow this 
line further, it is not at all far-fetched to say that a wound could be involved as 
an agent in the phenomenon of writing. In the other quotation, Barnes renounces 
“writing fiction” and claims emotional foundation for her writership. In a sense, 
we could “take her at her word” – and understand the foundations to involve, but 
not to be limited to, her imaginary body as a feeling agent. This body would 
become performatively moulded in such utterances, as well as in the fiction. 
When complemented with some cultural understanding surrounding wounds and 
put in the context of Barnes’s fiction, we get a vision of writing profoundly 
connected to trauma, but in a relation that constantly makes something new and 





Daniela Caselli notes how Barnes’s body, clad in an impressive black cape she 
was usually seen wearing, “haunts the criticism”.43 It does seem like we cannot 
get rid of the writer-as-a-body, but letting her be part of the reading does not 
need to mean speculation about the experience of a biographical body. The 
agency behind Barnes’s stories seems to create a play with meanings and feel-
ings, which is not left floating in a relativist void but remains grounded in actual 
and virtual materialities. The writerly body is the one moving things, but the 
things move the readers, and readers need to enact these movements to make 
sense of them. Not all agencies should be set on the same plane: the author and 
reader are different in kind from book and pen and paper, as characters are dif-
ferent from paper-cutters and tassels – although there is also a difference be-
tween paper-cutters and tassels. Yet the human agents become not only affected 
by these things but constituted as writers and readers in contact with them. 
Barnes’s gesture of renouncing writership and attributing it to a wound has 
potential to move readers in many ways, inviting a multitude of images, mean-
ings and sensations that tend toward the abundance of her fiction. “A foundation 
                                                             
43  Caselli 2009: 15. 
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in some emotion” cannot be read simply as an invitation to discover the original, 
conceptualizable emotion, be it sadness, bitterness or happiness, in the writer’s 
actual life. Barnes’s writing opens its doors and windows and presents us with 
assemblages that say, “this is all there is.” Such gestures might make an educated 
reader suspicious: surely something must remain hidden, too? This is quite true, 
in the sense that all the elements cannot be exhaustively explained and made 
sense of. However, were we to understand literary sense-making as a process of 
going through an experience with the story, being moved by its materiality and 
its symbolism, as we should here, we could say that Barnes does really show 
“everything”. While doing this, the writer performatively creates herself as the 
provider and organizer of this abundance. Through her commentary, she shows 
that all of it emerges, as it were, from a wound. In the act of writing, pain and 
pleasure are intertwined, and trauma becomes also a creative force. Another 
flashy statement attributed to Barnes shows a lighter take on the subject, while 
keeping agency and writing close to materiality: “Keep on writing. It’s a wom-
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Love under Threat 
The Emotional Valences of the Twilight Saga  




In Stephenie Meyer’s Twilight, the first of the four volumes of the Twilight saga, 
the heroine Bella Swann muses on the effect her mysterious classmate Edward 
Cullen has on her: “His fingers were ice-cold […] But that wasn’t why I jerked 
my hand away so quickly. When he touched me, it stung my hand as if an elec-
tric current had passed through us”.1 These electrifying effects clearly are emo-
tional. They call forth a physiological response in Bella that is based on changes 
in bodily expressions and action tendencies. These effects occur very fast and 
uncontrollably. Moreover, they make Bella aware that this meeting is significant 
to her life and wellbeing.  
Bella’s infatuation with Edward is both exhilarating and perilous: she is ob-
sessed with a man who may kill her any minute. She is enchanted and spell-
bound by Edward: his looks, voice, smell, touch as well as his mind and talents. 
Sibylle Baumbach defines such a response as fascination consisting of a mixture 
of wonder and admiration as well as terror and trepidation.2 She argues that 
fascination is an emotion because it triggers physical effects in the body and 
immobilizes it. It also suspends rational decision-making. In combining attrac-
tion and danger, fascination is a seductive pleasure.  
Given that the Twilight saga is a vampire romance, its every page is infused 
with emotion. In the romance novel genre, fascination provides the grounds for 
the romantic choice of a partner, a process involving a number of stable elements 
of the generic plot structure. Choice is slowly consolidated through these stages 
and turned into commitment. The generic conventions of romance shape, steer, 
                                                             
1  Meyer 2006a: 38. 
2  Cf. Baumbach 2015: 11. 
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and even dictate the emotions of characters. Lauren Berlant argues that all genres 
are distinguished by the affective contract they promise.3 Such a contract ad-
dresses both characters in the fictional world as well as implied and real-life 
readers. As its name indicates, the romance novel’s generic contract centers on 
delivering an optimistic and reassuring experience of love. Typically, it pro-
motes an idealizing script of the good life that combines intimate relationships 
with morals and economics. It advances enduring affection and emotionally 
fulfilling intimacy in couples and families; moreover, it rewards such commit-
ment with economic security. In placing my examination in the context of genre, 
I rely on Pamela Regis’ formulation of the plot elements that shape the treatment 
of relationships in the romance novel.  
The Twilight saga has an audience exceeding over a hundred million readers. 
As John Cawelti argues, bestsellers are typically viewed as fantasies shaped by 
the specific cultural and historical contexts of their production and consumption. 
According to this view, such cultural fantasies simultaneously express and evade 
components of readers’ social and collective reality. They voice anxiety-
provoking issues while at the same time providing fantasy resolutions to them.4 
Eva Illouz has coined the term “emotional style” to describe various linguistic, 
scientific, and interactional techniques to apprehend and manage the emotions 
these fantasies call forth. Such techniques address the ways in which we organ-
ize our emotions concerning the self and its relation to others as well as imagin-
ing the self’s potentialities.5 They play a key role in structuring the fantasies 
bestsellers convey.  
Berlant specifies that cultural fantasies in general strive to express conven-
tional scripts for the “good life”. They promote persistence in pursuing the activ-
ities spelled out in the scripts of these fantasies as a means of achieving the good 
life. It is in this sense that they are infused with optimism. These fantasies prom-
ise to enable readers to attain the “satisfying something” needed to establish a 
meaningful relationship to the world that they cannot generate on their own. This 
nebulous “something” – for example, an emotion, a thing, a circumstance or a 
characteristic – provides the fantasizer with the missing piece that would allow 
her to achieve the fullness of the good life script. Berlant argues, however, that 
many of our cherished cultural fantasies have become self-defeating in that they 
no longer feed a genuine sense of optimism. That is, they cannot inscribe and 
sustain a hopeful view of personal and collective transformation toward which 
subjects strive. Instead, they are infused with cruel optimism: what we desire 
                                                             
3  Cf. Berlant 2011: 66. 
4  Cf. Cawelti 1976: 35-36, see also Illouz 2014: 21-22. 
5  Cf. Illouz 2007: 6-7. 
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actually turns into an obstacle to our flourishing. The objects that incited our 
attachment actively impede the aims that brought us to them initially.6 
In this essay I examine how the Twilight saga’s notion of love is linked with 
its emotional style. I treat emotional style as primarily addressing the various 
ways in which romance-novel conventions manage emotions. I analyse this style 
from three different perspectives. First, I examine the characters’ moments of 
fascination as gateways to the concept of love on which the saga relies. Second, I 
pay attention to the most typical motifs of romance in order to demonstrate how 
they organize and shape the representation of emotions. I ponder the degree to 
which these motifs still are capable of sustaining the genre’s optimism about 
intimate relationships. Finally, I consider how these representations are linked 
with our contemporary understanding of love. Throughout, I draw on romance-
genre research and analyses of the changing historical and sociocultural contexts 
of love.  
 
 
LOVE AS THRILLING MAGNETISM  
 
The eight indispensable elements of the romance novel are in place in the Twi-
light saga: “the initial state of the society”, “the meeting of hero and heroine”, 
“the attraction between them”, “the declaration of love”, “the barrier(s) to their 
union”, “the point of ritual death” when the union seems impossible, “the recog-
nition” of the means to overcome the barrier(s) and “the betrothal”. These scenes 
may take place in any order; they may be multiplied, repeated, merged together 
or reduced.7 Moreover, as the genre favours passionate heroines,8 readers are 
expected to experience vicariously what the seventeen-year-old protagonist-
narrator Bella is going through.  
Three elements often employed in the beginning of the romance novel – “the 
initial state of society”, “the meeting”, and “the attraction” – demonstrate how 
fascination shapes Bella’s relationship with Edward. At the start, both the com-
munity and characters desire change, and this is the stage that first inscribes the 
optimistic stance of the romance genre. The coveted change is associated with 
culturally scripted fantasies of the good life. Bella’s family is dysfunctional; her 
divorced parents are incapable of supporting her emotionally or financially. 
Given the Swann family’s modest finances, whatever future Bella wants to have, 
                                                             
6  Cf. Berlant 2011: 24-25. 
7  Cf. Regis 2003: 30-38. 
8  Cf. Radway 1984: 55. 
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she must carve it out for herself. As for Edward Cullen, he believes that being a 
vampire equals being damned. He is convinced that life no longer holds happi-
ness for him. From the communal perspective, there is an ancient violent conflict 
between vampires and the local Quileute tribe who metamorphose into were-
wolves. This strife is revived when the Cullen family of vampires settles perma-
nently in Forks. Consequently, the saga’s opening describes a setting in which 
change is needed. This situation turns “the meeting” of the primary couple into 
an intense experience, as is seen in the following excerpts: “I was consumed by 
the mystery Edward presented. And more than a little obsessed by Edward him-
self.”9 “About three things I was absolutely positive. First, Edward was a vam-
pire. Second, there was a part of him – and I didn’t know how potent that part 
might be – that thirsted for my blood. And third, I was unconditionally and ir-
revocably in love with him.”10 
Typically, this stage opens up possibilities for the primary couple. Because 
the Cullens have a good social standing and are cultured and rich, dating Edward 
promises personal growth, a supporting familial context and upward mobility for 
Bella. Although Bella repeatedly protests that she is not interested in the accou-
trements of the Cullen life style, nevertheless, the emotions Edward calls forth in 
her are inextricably linked with these prospects. No wonder then that a physical 
and mental magnetism keeps Bella riveted with Edward. In particular, Edward’s 
charisma draws Bella to him. Baumbach explains that charisma is a personal 
magnetism, an exceptional quality of an individual personality, suggesting that 
he or she is gifted with supernatural, superhuman, or extraordinary powers or 
qualities.11 This description is literal in Edward’s case because he is a supernatu-
ral and superhuman creature.12 This specific characteristic is tied up with the 
optimistic fantasy script of the romance novel, because when the charismatic 
person evokes fascination, the experience changes the admirer. This person 
“feels magically transformed and elevated, [her] imagination aroused. [She] sees 
visions of gods, supernatural creatures, mythic events”.13 Again, this feature is 
literal, as Edward opens up a supernatural world for Bella. Therefore, we need to 
consider what role the promise of a supernatural metamorphosis plays in the 
optimistic fantasy of the Twilight saga.  
                                                             
9  Meyer 2006a: 57. 
10  Ibid.: 170-171. 
11  Cf. Baumbach 2015: 58. 
12  A charismatic person is thought to be able to read the mind and moods of every per-
son he meets (ibid.), another feature characterizing Edward, for his vampire talent is 
mindreading. The only mind he cannot read, however, is Bella’s. 
13  Ibid. 
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The real possibility of being killed by Edward entices Bella. He could acci-
dentally destroy her simply by hugging her. This feature ties in with fascination 
in that it is a borderline experience. Fascination “arises from the combination of 
two opposing forces and marks the concurrent awakening of deep attraction and 
intense repulsion”.14 Danger keeps the grander scale of things in Bella’s view. 
This element of deathly danger accounts for Bella’s intensive emotional en-
gagement. Edward resembles the Byronic hero in that his threatening nature 
makes him much more interesting and enticing than any conventional suitor.  
The Twilight saga illustrates practices and values of courtship and marriage 
that are intimately linked with concepts of love. It is worth noticing that Bella 
denies that love in any way involves a choice: “Love didn’t work that way, I 
decided. Once you cared about a person, it was impossible to be logical about 
them anymore”.15 At another point she muses that “[l]ove is irrational […] The 
more you loved someone, the less sense anything made”.16 Portraying falling in 
love as overwhelming and irrational fascination subscribes to an age-old model 
of so-called “enchanted love”, that, according to Illouz, consists of the following 
features: enchanted love is experienced as a unique event, which erupts brutally 
and unexpectedly in one’s life; it is inexplicable and irrational; and it operates as 
a deep commotion of the soul. This type of love is also felt to be fateful in the 
sense that you cannot choose it: it chooses you even against your will.17 
Fascination and enchanted love are not the same, but they are united by the 
intensity of the subject’s emotional experience. Such an emotion is part and 
parcel of the romance novel’s optimism, for intensity guarantees its genuineness. 
This encounter takes over the body as well as stymying the senses and reason. 
The love object is unique and definitely beyond comparison. The force of the 
emotions calls forth a willingness in the lover to sacrifice oneself for the love 
object. Fascination differs from enchanted love in that the dangers it evokes are 
always real. This danger rivets the fascinated subject, making him or her deter-
mined to face the threats the object embeds. In the Twilight saga, this face-off 
with the deadly menace of fascination potentially transports Bella into another 
ontological realm, for she would remain “alive” as a vampire. Thus, her death 
would include loss, but also the possibility of a new beginning, another feature 
that fits the optimism of the generic script.  
                                                             
14  Ibid.: 3. 
15  Meyer 2006b: 304. 
16  Ibid.: 340. 
17  Cf. Illouz 2007: 89-90. 
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In the romance genre, fascination leads to the “declaration of love” stage, the 
placement of which varies.18 Given that the Twilight saga relies on “the love at 
first sight” model, this stage takes place early on. No matter where it is placed, 
this stage centers on the act of choosing, even despite what the protagonists may 
claim. As was already stated, Bella thinks her infatuation lies outside rationality 
and choice. Yet Illouz stresses that attraction, passion and love cannot but be 
culturally and socially shaped, because our context always affects these emotions 
in multiple ways. She explains that what she calls the “architecture of romantic 
choice” is a cultural mechanics that steers us in our evaluation of the love object. 
The ways in which we draw on our emotions, knowledge and reasoning in per-
ceiving a potential love object as well as in decision making are organized by 
this architecture. Such consultation shows that the socio-cultural environment 
systematizes even our most intimate choices. The architecture of romantic choice 
is framed by the “ecology of romantic choice”, that is, the social environment 
that steers us to make certain kinds of choices.19 Today, this ecology emphasizes 
choice as a category of an individual’s cognition and (self-)reflexion because we 
hold that we realize our individuality in the act of choosing a love object. This 
act is proof of our freedom, rationality and autonomy: it is a right and a form of 
competence.20 
Fascination places the fascinated subject in between conceptual categories.21 
It makes him or her waver between categories, making the act of choosing diffi-
cult. Such a state feeds into the “barrier” stage of the romance novel. As a gener-
ic element, “the barrier” refers to a series of scenes at different points providing 
either internal or external reasons – or both – why the protagonists cannot estab-
lish a permanent relationship.22 As regards the ecology and architecture of ro-
mantic choice, these difficulties are revealing of the socio-cultural room for 
maneuver of choice. They are especially tangible whenever the heroine has more 
than one suitor to select from. Making a choice plays a weighty role in romance 
novels because the heroine must distinguish the “right” suitor from the “wrong” 
one. So it is in the Twilight saga, too, for besides the vampire Edward, also the 
werewolf Jacob woos Bella.  
 
                                                             
18  Cf. Regis 2003: 34. 
19  Illouz 2012: 19. 
20  Cf. ibid.: 18-19. 
21  Cf. Baumbach 2015: 22. 
22  Cf. Regis 2003: 32. 
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BARRIERS TURN INTO IMPASSES  
 
The obstacles of the romance plot place intimate relationships in a context sur-
passing the individual. They may deal with any psychological problem or any 
economic, social, cultural, familial or geographic circumstance.23 The conven-
tions of the romance novel favor pitting two men as rivals for the same woman 
and vice versa. These male and female foils of hero and heroine illustrate reject-
ed character traits as well as negative relationship models.24 Hence a typical 
feature of the “barrier” is the heroine’s challenge to distinguish among the suit-
ors the “right” one. The character foils, however, do not always provide genuine 
triangular relationships, because the rival is often an obviously weaker alterna-
tive.25 In the Twilight saga, Edward meets his match in the werewolf Jacob. They 
are true rivals, as the division of the audience into “Team Edward” and “Team 
Jacob” as the “right” decision for Bella illustrates. Unlike Edward, Jacob is of a 
sunny disposition, friendly, and easy-going. By being kind, loyal and attentive, 
Jacob kindles Bella’s feelings, making her ponder whether she should choose 
him. Significantly, Jacob also evokes fascination, for in his werewolf form he is 
gorgeous, strong and fast, but also unpredictable and quick-tempered. His wolf 
brother, Sam, exemplifies what a werewolf may do once his emotions fuel up: 
Sam has badly disfigured his beloved’s face in the heat of the moment.  
In the saga, the “barrier” is grounded in ontological difference, requiring that 
Bella negotiate between such categories as human/inhuman, human/animal, 
mortal/immortal, spirit/flesh, and salvation/damnation. These combinations of 
allure and danger affect Bella’s choice making. Fascination’s element of danger 
implies that she may be fatally mistaken about the character of the love object. 
Both suitors might unintentionally kill Bella. If she chooses Jacob, she will have 
to live with that threat for the rest of her life, for werewolves are impulsively 
violent. If she chooses Edward, and if Edward bites her with the intention of 
changing her into a vampire, there is nothing to guarantee the success of this 
measure. With both men, Bella will have to keep secret the real character of her 
partner, hiding large sections of her life from ordinary humans. What Bella 
makes clear, however, is that no ordinary guy will do for her. While the romance 
novel conventions invariably paint the romantic hero in idealizing colors, it is 
nevertheless significant that the Twilight saga rejects a human male as a potential 
partner. To be sure, this preference is in keeping with the genre of fantasy, but it 
                                                             
23  Cf. Regis 2003: 32. 
24  Cf. Radway 1984: 122, 131-133. 
25  Cf. ibid.: 122-123. 
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nevertheless raises the question of whether only supernatural creatures are able 
to sustain the optimism of romance.  
Because Edward holds that vampirism means the loss of one’s soul and 
damnation, he forsakes Bella in New Moon. He wants to save her from himself. 
Obviously, terminating the relationship forms an insurmountable “barrier”, one 
that leads to the element of “ritual death”. Regis defines the latter as the point 
when there seems to be no means to lift the obstacles and, hence, the union of 
the couple appears impossible.26 The Twilight saga combines the “barrier” and 
“ritual death” elements together. After Edward forsakes Bella, she slides into a 
catatonic state, as is evidenced by the four “chapters” running from October to 
January with no text of any kind.27 Significantly, the “barrier” stage acquires 
tones of what Berlant calls “an impasse”, deriving from a profound crisis that 
entails bearing an extended vulnerability for an undetermined duration.28 As 
there seems to be no way out, the crisis situation slowly changes into a daily 
routine.  
In the romance novel, the obliteration of the “barrier” is linked with “recog-
nition,” that is, new information making the desired union possible. This element 
includes any number of things that the heroine recognizes, ranging from changed 
external circumstances to growth as a person.29 In New Moon the abandoned 
Bella hears Edward’s voice in her head whenever she is in danger. In order to 
make him speak to her, she jumps off a cliff, only to be saved by Jacob. Bella’s 
suicidal jump makes Edward consult the Volturi, a law-instituting group of vam-
pires, about killing him. Bella, however, saves Edward’s life at the last minute. 
These multiple brushes with death lead to the “recognition” element that she 
experiences as “an epiphany”.30 It is Bella’s manipulation of the internalized 
image of Edward that eventually leads to the events enabling this realization. 
Thus, the love relationship would not develop if it were not for her provocation. 
 
Edward loved me. The bond forged between us was not one that could be broken by 
absence, distance, or time. […] As I would always belong to him, so would he always be 
mine […] 
                                                             
26  Cf. Regis 2003: 35. 
27  This section is located between the pages 84 and 93. It neither has page numbers nor 
is mentioned in the Contents of New Moon. It only records the names of the months.  
28  Cf. Berlant 2011: 62. 
29  Cf. Regis 2003: 36. 
30  Cf. Meyer 2006b: 526. 
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“You love me,” I marvelled. The sense of conviction and rightness washed through me 
again.31 
 
Bella’s epiphany defuses her sense of inferiority that formed a key internal ob-
stacle. She understands that fascination and enchanted love surpass the individu-
al, enabling her to rise above whatever personal shortcomings she has. In ac-
cordance with the optimistic script of the romance genre, the goal of love is 
elevation and transcendence. Yet in spite of this newfound conviction, the “bar-
rier” between the couple is not lifted. Bella’s father is strongly against Edward. 
The Volturi now form a dangerous threat as do also the werewolves. But most 
importantly, the ongoing bickering and disputes between Edward and Bella 
poses “a barrier.” Not only do these remaining “barrier” elements anchor the 
saga in the contemporary ecology and architecture of romantic choice but also 
they imply that “barriers” are on the point of permanently turning into “im-
passes”. While the notion of a barrier implies a temporally finite state, an im-
passe presents an unsurmountable dead-end. In an impasse, agents must come up 
with new means of dealing with the confounding situation. What characterizes 
this situation is that there is no going back to what was before, but neither is 
there the possibility of overcoming the impasse. What do characters do in situa-




NEGOTIATING LOVE AND MAKING COMPROMISES 
 
Bella’s epiphany about mutual commitment takes place early in the saga, in its 
second volume. Even so, their relationship continues to be plagued by discord 
and insecurity. That the couple continues to have “issues” suggests that things 
have not reached a generically satisfactory point. Instead, the crisis situation 
persists. The following example provides a typical illustration of moments of 
disharmony between Bella and Edward. This scene takes place in Eclipse and 
thus comes much later than Bella’s epiphany:  
 
[Edward’s] face was hard and his posture tense. He glared at me wordlessly. […] 
“Bella,” he whispered. “Do you have any idea how close I came to crossing the line to-
day? […] Do you know what that would have meant? […]” 
                                                             
31  Ibid.: 527. 
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He ground his teeth together. His hands were balled up in fists at his sides. He was still 
standing against the wall, and I hated the space between us.32 
 
The couple’s quarrels repeatedly address the same subjects, such as the the vam-
pires’ strife with the werewolves, the danger posed by the Volturi, the presence 
of Jacob in Bella’s life and the ontological difference between the lovers. Ed-
ward acts patronizingly and coercively, insisting that his actions stem from pro-
tectiveness. Bella repeatedly defies the rules Edward imposes, even escaping 
from his home to meet Jacob. When Edward left her, she learned to love Jacob, 
and in Eclipse she begs him to kiss her even after she has committed herself to 
Edward.33 Today, two independent emotional selves must repeatedly renew the 
reasons and the emotional conditions defining why they started their relation-
ship.34 The discord requires that Bella and Edward continually revisit these rea-
sons. Their arguments also concern the reciprocity and symmetry of the relation-
ship because of the discrepancy between them, not only in economic and social 
standing – as well as age, for Edward’s life as a vampire has lasted over a hun-
dred years – but also in ontological status. Bella is adamant that only becoming a 
vampire will create equality and emotional equity. Until then, Edward always 
has the upper hand. Moreover, Bella interprets Edward’s refusal to transform her 
as his unwillingness to commit fully to the relationship. Illouz explains that 
especially women worry about achieving a stable, intimate relationship, because 
they find men emotionally elusive and routinely resisting long-term commit-
ment.35 
These negotiations, arguments and compromises between Bella and Edward 
turn love into an object of endless investigation and self-scrutiny. Berlant identi-
fies “the conversation”36 as a narrative motif designed to handle moments during 
which characters search for means of adjustment and look for modes of living 
on. This motif is thus one means of dealing with “the impasse”. Bella and 
Edward have ongoing discussions about desires, needs and goals. Although 
Illouz does not consider her findings within the same theoretical frameworks as 
Berlant, it is significant that she, too, names conversations, negotiations and 
making compromises as the vehicles through which men and women manage 
intimacy and love relationships. While love relationships still in the nineteenth 
century stressed the spouses’ ability to play their marital roles successfully, 
                                                             
32  Meyer 2007: 140-141. 
33  Cf. ibid.: 525. 
34  Cf. Illouz 2012: 39. 
35  Cf. ibid.: 66. 
36  Cf. Berlant 2011: 57. 
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feeling and expressing the emotions attached to these roles, Illouz claims that 
expectations have changed considerably in our day. The negotiations exhibit the 
contemporary ideal that intimacy include verbal disclosures of emotions and the 
act of sharing these emotions with a partner. These disclosures reveal and lay 
bare the lovers’ emotional selves so that they get support and recognition, while 
simultaneously safeguarding their individuality and freedom.37 Such negotiations 
show self-awareness, ability to identify and name feelings, talk about them and 
empathize with each other’s position. These listed features – fitting the desires 
and goals of two separate individuals, achieving reciprocity and symmetry, en-
gaging in self-reflection and negotiating how to meet each subject’s needs – 
figure as hallmarks of the contemporary architecture of choice. It is through such 
measures that individuals arrive at a decision about who fits them as partner the 
best.38 They are indications of what Illouz calls emotional intelligence,39 which 
plays a key role in romantic choice. In pinpointing the same narrative motif of 
“conversation”, both Berlant and Illouz highlight the large amount of emotional 
work that goes into sustaining intimacy. As this motif does not address talk 
where one settles things once and for all, but an ongoing, constant series of dis-
cussions, it suggests that romantic relationships are repeatedly threatened by 
“barriers” and even “impasses”. Therefore, they need steady vigilance in order to 
stay intact. Together, these features imply that the capacity of the romance novel 
to sustain optimism is currently weakening.  
The Twilight saga resorts to extreme means in order to salvage the optimism 
of the romance genre. What is notable is that the generic structures and conven-
tions of romance alone are not enough to provide a means out of the impasse. 
The saga employs both fantasy and vampire Gothic genres in order to rescue the 
romantic relationship. Consequently, the terms in which the impasse between 
Bella and Edward is reworked into an obstacle that can be overcome recontextu-
alize the love relationship by making it address the binary of human/inhuman. 
Only by opting for vampirism and superhumanity can Bella put the anxieties 





                                                             
37  Cf. Illouz 2012: 38. 
38  Cf. ibid.: 241-246. 
39  Cf. ibid.: 64. 
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SAVING THE ROMANTIC RELATIONSHIP 
 
Many romance novels conclude with nuptials. From a generic perspective, Bella 
and Edward’s marriage ought to mark the pinnacle of their love. In the Twilight 
saga, however, this conventional crowning element of commitment supplies a 
new barrier. Bella insists that the couple have sex during their honeymoon while 
she still is in her human form. Edward manages not to kill her, but his passionate 
love making leaves Bella badly bruised. Consequently, he wants no more sex, at 
least not until they both are vampires. Things deteriorate between the couple 
when it transpires that the newly-wed Bella is pregnant with a half-human, half-
vampire child. Edward wants her to abort it, because the fetus threatens her life. 
Hence, even this event that consolidates the relationship in the romance novel 
turns into a further obstacle. By refusing abortion, Bella is ready to die for the 
child; also, she continues to hope that giving birth will compel Edward to meta-
morphose her in spite of the risks. Edward performs an emergency Caesarean 
section, but Bella’s heart stops beating. In order not to lose her, Edward stabs her 
heart with his venom and bites her all over her body:  
 
It was like he was kissing her, brushing his lips at her throat, at her wrists, into the crease 
at the inside of her arm. But I could hear the lush tearing of her skin as his teeth bit 
through, again and again, forcing venom into her system at as many points as possible. I 
saw his pale tongue sweep along the bleeding gashes […].40 
 
Edward finally fully commits himself to Bella by transforming her when she is 
no more than a horridly mangled corpse. What is remarkable in this scene is its 
gruesomeness, which moves the narrative into the realm of the vampire Gothic. 
The child breaks Bella’s spine, her stomach is slashed open, she is bathed in 
blood, and bit all over by a vampire. With narratives of fascination, remarks 
Baumbach, readers are usually granted a “shelter of safe spectatorship”, enabling 
them to immerse themselves in the allure of fascination and to stay insulated 
from its dangers.41 Because Jacob narrates this scene, readers are provided with 
some distance to its violent nature, as Rachel DuBois observes. The uncertainty 
about Bella’s fate is resolved when she finally wakes up. A painful transfor-
mation process has turned her into a vampire: “As a human, I’d never been best 
at anything. […] After eighteen years of mediocrity, I was pretty used to being 
average. […] I was amazing now – to them and to myself. It was like I had been 
                                                             
40  Meyer 2008: 326. 
41  Cf. Baumbach 2015: 61. 
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born to be a vampire. […] I had found my true place in the world, the place I fit, 
the place I shined.”42 
Bella’s reference to “shining” reveals that she now has the personality, looks 
and sexiness with which to impress others. Her new gorgeous body is made for 
evoking desire as well as giving and receiving pleasure, qualities that play a 
greater role in securing a relationship than before.43 Significantly, once the lov-
ers are ontologically the same, all tensions vanish, and they need neither to nego-
tiate anything nor make compromises. Instead, from the moment of Bella’s 
metamorphosis, the couple is seamlessly united into one. The couple’s concord 
is crowned when Bella finally lets Edward read her mind as proof of her love.  
DuBois observes that Bella’s metamorphosis marks a breach with readers, 
for after it Bella no longer functions as a site of narrative and physical possibility 
for them: she becomes alien, an other.44 I have argued elsewhere that what this 
means for the romance script is that the end vaporizes fascination. The Twilight 
saga unties the knot between danger and death and thus empties out its strongest 
emotional source. With the shared ontological status of the lovers, the enticing 
danger vanishes, and is replaced by vapid, soft-pornographic allusions to contin-
ual great sex.45 The dissolution of the fascinating tension becomes apparent in 
the manner the saga changes track after Bella’s transformation. The latter part of 
the expansive fourth volume, Breaking Dawn, deals with the strife between the 
vampires called the Volturi and the Cullen clan supported by the werewolf allies 
of Jacob’s Quileute tribe. It moves into the terrain of the family saga. While 
establishing a benevolent communal context for Bella’s vampire family moti-
vates this shift, the fact remains, nevertheless, that it pushes the saga’s primary 
romance relationship into the background.  
While a “happily-ever-after” conclusion is part and parcel of the romance 
novel denouement, the Twilight couple’s union will literally last forever. Here 
the saga departs from its conventional counterparts. Consider, for example, Jane 
Austen, whom Regis characterizes as “the master of the romance novel”.46 Aus-
ten invariably places her romantic couples in a larger communal context, draw-
ing attention to an array of various types of marriages. In Pride and Prejudice, 
the happy unions of Elizabeth and Darcy and Jane and Bingley are contrasted 
with the quarrelsome marriages of Lydia and Wickham as well as Elizabeth’s 
parents. The rational marriage of Charlotte Lucas to the intolerable Mr Collins 
                                                             
42  Meyer 2008: 484-5. 
43  Cf. Illouz 2012: 44-45. 
44  Cf. DuBois 2012: 141. 
45  Cf. Pyrhönen Forthcoming. 
46  Regis 2003: 75. 
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provides a further reminder of the realities of adult life. By marrying Bella off to 
a supernatural creature, however, the Twilight saga rejects the human dimension 
of intimate relationships. It is as if the long-term crises and the various impasses 
Bella and Edward encounter could not be resolved in any other than a superhu-
man way. If we regard genres as affective contracts as Berlant does,47 then the 
Twilight saga suggests that the romance genre alone no longer provides as satis-
fying a vehicle of desire as before. The genre’s ability to provide continuity in 
the readers’ belief in the possibilities and promises of life has become defective.  
Interestingly, even the scant descriptions of vampire married life suggest that 
this ending opens the door to boredom. Only Carlisle, the patriarch of the Cullen 
family, has a meaningful occupation as a doctor. Edward and his siblings study 
indifferently, lounge around, have great sex, as well as shopping and consuming 
high fashion and gadgets. Thanks to Alice Cullen’s ability to look into the future, 
the family’s investments secure great wealth. The consumer society’s script of 
the good life is roundly fulfilled. Furthermore, the saga turns the ideal of com-
mitment into eternal love; consequently, stability turns into stasis and immova-
bility. There is no need for any kind of growth. Brendan Shea observes that 
romantic love is not capable of providing meaning over unending repetition and 
time stretching to near infinity because our capacity to love arises from our 
vulnerability and mortality. It is the limited character of our lives that makes our 
desires and purposes meaningful.48 
Let us now put our finger on the main features of the Twilight saga’s emo-
tional style. Doing so enables us to be more precise about its fantasy nature. I 
have argued that in its reliance on the generic stages of the romance novel, the 
saga constructs a “double emotional structure”. It expresses a longing for love 
and sexuality that do not produce anxiety, negotiation and uncertainty. It pro-
motes the notion that readers should tenaciously believe in love in order to 
achieve it in their lives. In so doing, it insists that love still is a worthy cause.49 
On the one hand, fascination allows characters and readers to express longing for 
enchanted love that is based on self-sacrifice, fusion and affirmation of abso-
lutes. Enchanted love speaks to us because it implies transcendence of the mun-
dane human condition. Its appeal is tinged with nostalgia, for, as Illouz remarks, 
we no longer can sustain belief in this type of love; neither can we feel the emo-
tions appropriate to it. Instead, the rationalisation of our approach to love has 
spred deep-seated disappointment. Yet we still yearn for a sense of the sacred 
and the capacity to believe because disenchantment has meant that the mystery 
                                                             
47  Cf. Berlant 2011: 6. 
48  Cf. Shea 2009: 91. 
49  Cf. Pyrhönen Forthcoming. 
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of love has become disparaged and meaningless.50 On the other hand, fascination 
based on the dangers of dating a vampire unleashes just those anxieties that are 
familiar from contemporary life. Today, the criteria for mate selection are more 
diverse than ever and they have become integrated into the private dynamics of 
individual taste. Like us, Bella can only rely on herself in choosing a partner, and 
this choice results from a complex process of emotional and cognitive evalua-
tion.51 Consequently, the Twilight saga enables readers to experience contradic-
tory emotional valences: longing for and belief in an outdated mode of love 
together with contemporary insecurities and anxieties about the challenges of 
romantic choice.  
That the saga’s emotional style enables contradictory emotional valences 
arises from its nature as a cultural fantasy. Illouz remarks that such a fantasy 
presents and distorts reality. It incorporates reality, defends the self against reali-
ty, and yet helps one live with it. Fantasy affirms and denies the emotions and 
concepts on which it rests. This double emotional structure is of such a nature 
that it embeds both explicit and hidden instructions readers can take away from 
the reading experience.52 Perhaps luckily, becoming a vampire is not among the 
suggested options. Yet the protagonist Bella does function as key to what is 
offered as a useful carry-over for readers. The character of Bella could perhaps 
best be described as a “manager of emotions”: she is capable of using language 
in order to express her inner self. It is in this sense that she has a great deal of 
emotional intelligence. What this means is that, for her, language provides a tool 
for making sense of difficult emotions which she can then communicate to 
Edward. As Illouz remarks, contemporary culture prizes language because it 
enables couples to construct a narrative of verbal intimacy that they can share 
and use to enhance this intimacy further. In fact, this advice is in line with pre-
sent-day therapeutic self-help manuals that emphasize the injunction to share 
needs and feelings as a significant factor in sustaining and fostering love in a 
relationship. It is notable that this ideal of communication, aimed at managing 
emotions and instituting emotional control, privileges woman’s selfhood and 
perspective. It empowers women readers by attributing to them the capacity to 
carry on relationships according to fair procedures of speech but also burdens 
them heavily with the responsibility for doing so.53 
Finally, the saga’s double emotional structure allows for two ways of read-
ing. It enables readers’ hold on the optimism of the romance novel. Hence, it 
                                                             
50  Cf. Illouz 2012: 158. 
51  Cf. ibid.: 50, 54. 
52  Cf. Illouz 2014: 22-24. 
53  Illouz 2008: 226-227, 236. 
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provides what Berlant calls “a cluster of promises” that sustain hope in enduring 
intimate relationships. Yet, because only a supernatural transformation finally 
saves the romantic relationship, readers may also see the saga as heralding a 
situation of cruel optimism: the notion of love it promotes no longer provides 
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Evoking and Conveying Affects and  





I am sad 
I feel that the future is hopeless and that things cannot improve 
I am bored and dissatisfied with everything 
I am a complete failure as a person 
I am guilty, I am being punished 
I would like to kill myself 
I used to be able to cry but now I am beyond tears 
I have lost interest in other people 
I can’t make decisions 
I can’t eat 
I can’t sleep 
I can’t think 
I cannot overcome my loneliness, my fear, my disgust 
I am fat 
I cannot write 
I cannot love1 
 
The passage is a list of symptoms written down by Sarah Kane for her play text 
4.48 Psychosis. It is also a list that is directly borrowed from Beck’s Depression 
Inventory (BDI), a test used by medical professionals to assess the severity of a 
                                                             
1  Kane 2001: 206-207. 
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patient’s depression.2 Yet, in the context of Kane’s work of art, the words be-
come distanced from the medical discourse. They are meant to be read (and 
likely are read) as an expression of someone’s inner experiences – of deep feel-
ings of distress and pain. A voice names the sadness, the hopelessness and the 
loss of capabilities that characterize depression. Behind the words, we imagine a 
person whose experiential world is altered. Through the act of reading and empa-
thizing with the speaking I, the words of medical discourse turn into an evoca-
tive expression of a depressed mind. 
This article focuses on affects and emotions that are constructed and con-
veyed to readers in depression writing. How can fictional texts evoke the experi-
ential world of depression? How are the often distressing and unsettling experi-
ences of depression mediated through writing? Phenomenologists and theorists 
of embodied cognition have in recent years emphasized the interaffective, inter-
personal and embodied nature of depression.3 In these views, depression is un-
derstood as a disorder of “intercorporeality and interaffectivity” and as “a ‘de-
tunement’ of the resonant body that mediates our participation in a shared affec-
tive space”.4 The aim of this text is to show how this new understanding can help 
us to see why depression writing is able to evoke such powerful corporeal and 
emotional responses in its readers, and also how depression writing may point to 
the embodied and interaffective nature of the human mind, thus opening up new 
possibilities for understanding mental experiences. 
The first section introduces two particularly affective texts which employ 
different narrative and poetic strategies in order to evoke and convey experiences 
of mental illness to their audiences: British playwright Sarah Kane’s perfor-
mance text 4.48 Psychosis (2001) and Finnish writer Maria Vaara’s autobio-
graphical novel Likaiset legendat (The Dirty Legends [1974]). Both works of art 
challenge the common cultural and clinical view of depression as a “mental” 
disorder that is “inside the head”. Instead, they pay attention to the affective and 
bodily experiences of depression and portray depression as a mode of being in 
                                                             
2  In the questionnaire first developed by Aaron T. Beck in the 1960’s, a patient chooses 
the experience closest to theirs from a list of choices such as the following: “(0) I do 
not feel sad. (1) I feel sad. (2) I am sad all the time and I can’t snap out of it. (3) I am 
so sad or unhappy that I can’t stand it”. On the multiple citations, allusions and inter-
texts used in 4.48 Psychosis, cf. Diedrich 2013, also Ovaska 2016. Kane’s monologist 
hints about the references for example by speaking about being the “last in a long line 
of literary kleptomaniacs”, as if pointing to the method of writing the text (Kane 2001: 
213).  
3  Cf. Fuchs 2013a, Ratcliffe 2015. 
4  Fuchs 2013a: 219. 
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which the basic structures of experience and being in the world (and being with 
others) have changed. In their work, depression is not understood as a “patholo-
gy of the mind”, but rather as a reaction of the embodied and social mind to 
extreme experiences or circumstances.  
The second section demonstrates how Kane’s and Vaara’s descriptions of 
depression resonate with the embodied cognitive view according to which af-
fects and emotions are not something “interior” (or “inside the head”), but rather 
structures that frame our bodily being in the world and our attunement to other 
people. The section outlines how affectivity – ranging from simple bodily feel-
ings and intensities to more complex moods and emotions – connects us to the 
world and to others, and how in depression these affective structures have been 
altered, resulting in a self that is “detuned”. The discussion draws from the work 
of phenomenologists such as Thomas Fuchs and Matthew Ratcliffe and philoso-
phers of embodied cognition such as Giovanna Colombetti and Michelle Maiese 
who have in recent years focused their attention on the role of affects and emo-
tion in human experience in general, and more specifically, in psychiatric disor-
ders. 
Finally, the theoretical understanding of the role of embodiment and affectiv-
ity in depression is put to use in the analysis of Kane’s and Vaara’s writing. The 
last section shows how language and narration evoke affects, emotions and bodi-
ly feelings, and how fictional texts can invite readers to enact the alterations of 
affectivity that characterize depression. 
 
 
DEPRESSION IN SARAH KANE’S AND  
MARIA VAARA’S WRITING 
 
If being healthy means that I understand even more clearly the borders between people 
and myself, I think it is easier to be ill. 
Then I want to be ill.5 
 
British playwright Sarah Kane (1971-1999) and Finnish writer and autobiog-
rapher Maria Vaara (1931-1992) were very familiar with depression through 
their own experiences, and these experiences are also reflected in their writing. 
Both authors paint a striking picture of severe depression, Kane in her famous 
                                                             
5  Vaara 1974: 58: “Jos terveenä oleminen on tällaista, että tajuan entistä selvemmin 
rajan ihmisten ja itseni välillä, on kai helpompaa olla sairas. / Silloin haluan olla 
sairas”. All translations by A.O. unless indicated otherwise. 
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play 4.48 Psychosis and Vaara in her less-known autobiographical novel Likaiset 
legendat. Both writers employ their readers’ sociocultural understanding of the 
illness by referring to clinical and folk psychiatric accounts of depression and by 
utilizing generic conventions of illness narratives and patient–therapist conversa-
tions.6 But most importantly, both bring forth distressing bodily, affective and 
intersubjective experiences, and show how depression is connected to a person’s 
relationship to the world and to other people. 
Sarah Kane’s 4.48 Psychosis is a performance text which depicts severe de-
pression on the brink of psychosis.7 In a fragmented monologue, Kane’s name-
less protagonist describes some of the most painful symptoms of depression, for 
example the heightened feelings of guilt and shame which debilitate her/his 
social being. The monologue is filled with repetitive voices which take the form 
of self-accusations: “Shame shame shame. / Drown in your fucking shame”.8 
The narrating I also outlines the most extreme symptoms of depression, like the 
loss of the sense of self, and the loss of interest in being alive: “I cannot touch 
my essential self”;9 “I have been dead for a long time”,10 the narrator complains. 
In addition, s/he describes changes in her/his bodily experiences. There is a 
sense that one’s body is something separate, either a barrier between the self and 
the world, or something that is separated from oneself: 
 
Here am I 
and there is my body 
   dancing on glass11 
 
                                                             
6  Vaara uses psychoanalytical terminology and refers to psychoanalytical notions like 
transference love, repression and loss. Kane quotes new diagnostic tools like the BDI, 
but refers also to the psychoanalytical understanding of depression (cf. Ovaska 2016). 
7  4.48 Psychosis was written in 1998-99 and first performed posthumously in 2000 at 
the Royal Court Jerwood Theatre Upstairs in London. Kane referred to her plays as 
“texts for performance”, and 4.48 Psychosis, too, is meant to be performed on stage. It 
however lacks all the usual stage directions and consists of a collection of short mono-
logues and dialogical fragments (cf. Ovaska 2016). In this article, Kane’s play is ap-
proached as a text and attention is paid to its narrative and poetic techniques. For an 
analysis of affects and emotions in the performances of 4.48 Psychosis, cf. Campbell 
2005.  
8  Kane 2001: 209. 
9  Ibid.: 229. 
10  Ibid.: 214. 
11  Ibid.: 230. 
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Maria Vaara’s autobiographical novel Likaiset legendat deals with similar 
themes, images and techniques.12 The narrating I (Maria; “the librarian”) de-
scribes feelings of guilt and shame, and experiences of estrangement and loss of 
sense of agency: 
 
And no one knows that the librarian is not a part of this reality, because she does not exist. 
Now I sit at home, I listen to records and I cry. I don’t know really what I am crying about 
and who is crying. I should probably call the town doctor, he is the closest there is. 
I would still like to live this week and the next.13 
 
Like Kane’s protagonist, she describes experiences of social alienation and feel-
ings of separation from herself. She is not a “part of this reality”, she “does not 
exist”. The narrating I is also constantly observing herself (“Maria”) from the 
outside. In their most extreme manifestation, the self-reproaches take the form of 
hallucinatory voices: “– Maria, it would be better if you were dead, one of the 
Scattered said.”14 The monologue of the narrating I is constantly interrupted by 
voices, like “the Scattered”, which thematize the loss of a unified self and offer a 
vivid description of the experiences of worthlessness and failing in social rela-
tionships that are common in depression.15 
Both Kane and Vaara depict experiences which slowly lead their protago-
nists to a psychotic breakdown.16 The narrator-protagonists lose their sense of a 
                                                             
12  Likaiset legendat was the first novel in Vaara’s autobiographical trilogy published in 
Finland between 1974 and 1978. In her autobiographical novels, Vaara describes her 
experiences as a schizophrenia patient in 1970’s Finland. It is, however, unclear 
whether she was actually suffering from schizophrenia, or only from severe depres-
sion and psychotic episodes which were misdiagnosed as schizophrenia (cf. also 
Vaara 1980). 
13  “Eikä kukaan tiedä, että kirjastonhoitaja ei ole todellisuudessa mukana, koska häntä ei 
ole olemassa. Nyt istun kotona, kuuntelen levyjä ja itken. En oikein tiedä, mitä itken 
ja kuka itkee. Minun kai pitäisi soittaa kunnanlääkärille, hän on lähimpänä. Tahtoisin 
elää vielä tämän viikon ja ensi viikon” (Vaara 1974: 60). 
14  Ibid.: 57: “– Maria, sinun olisi parasta olla kuollut, irrallinen sanoi”. 
15  On the problems in interpersonal experiences in depression, cf. Ratcliffe 2015: 218-
226. 
16  Thematically, the breakdowns in both texts are tied to a loss experienced during 
psychiatric treatment: Kane’s protagonist is mourning (or rather failing in mourning, 
as psychoanalysts would put it) the ending of therapy. In her/his dialogic fragments, 
s/he goes through the (past) therapeutic encounters and problems of the therapy (cf. 
Ovaska 2016). Vaara’s narrator likewise suffers from a feeling of being abandoned by 
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unified self and become unable to make distinctions between reality and halluci-
nation, the outside world and their inner worlds. In addition, both texts are 
framed as stories of failed therapeutic relationships, which worsen the situation: 
both protagonists cling on to their therapists as a last source of hope, and end up 
planning suicide as they feel abandoned by their therapists. 
Kane’s and Vaara’s portrayals of severe depression engage in a dialogue 
with common clinical accounts of depression (though, as we will see, they do not 
fit neatly into any specific diagnostic categories). Diagnostic manual DSM-5, for 
example, defines major depressive disorder as a combination of depressed mood, 
heightened feelings of shame and guilt, and diminished interest in being alive.17 
In general, depression is understood on the one hand as an affective disorder 
characterized by the depressive mood, and on the other hand through its cogni-
tive disturbances, such as delusions of being judged or despised by other people, 
memory alterations (negative or painful memories are often heightened in de-
pression) and difficulties of expression.18 
The cognitive problems inherent in depression are often seen to have conse-
quences also for writing about depression. It is difficult for individuals to express 
these experiences, and linguistic problems and negatively embellished memories 
also distort autobiographical writing.19 Both Vaara and Kane reflect these diffi-
culties in the structure of their works: both texts are constructed out of monolog-
ical fragments, and the linearity of the stories is disrupted by flashbacks. The text 
is often gappy, and the perspectives change: in both texts the monologue of the 
narrator-protagonists is interrupted by dialogical elements (patient–therapist 
conversations) which may either be interpreted as hallucinatory or imaginary 
inner dialogues, reports of past conversations, or scenes in the actual world of 
the text. 
Depression researchers have been quite sceptical about whether it is possible 
to gain knowledge about the illness through first-person accounts such as mem-
oirs or self-narratives because of the memory problems and linguistic prob-
lems.20 It is true that we need to be cautious of not drawing too far-reaching 
                                                                                                                                  
her therapist and falls into psychosis. Both texts implicitly refer to the well-known 
psychoanalytical view of depression as an inability to mourn a lost object: what is lost, 
is incorporated into one’s bodily ego as an object of eternal sorrow. Like Freud’s theo-
ry (Freud 1985), both Kane and Vaara emphasize the bodily aspects of depression ex-
perience and connect their experiences to a painful loss. 
17  Cf. DSM-5 2013.  
18  Cf. Fuchs 2013a. 
19  Cf. Radden/Varga 2013; also Ratcliffe 2015: 25. 
20  Cf. Radden/Varga 2013. 
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conclusions from depression narratives, but I also suggest that there is a different 
kind of value in the autofictional depression writing produced by both Kane and 
Vaara. Neither of the writers seeks to create clinical knowledge of depression. 
Rather, they use fiction and experimental writing as means to express these 
experiences and to convey them to their readers in ways that break the distinc-
tions between the mind and the body, and the self and the world. In addition, 
both writers emphasize the universality of these experiences. The experiences 
are not something impossible to understand: even though they are often extreme, 
they are still tied to the ways we all – whether suffering from depression or not – 
experience our bodies, feel emotions and relate to other people. 
Despite the connections to common understanding of depression, both 
Kane’s and Vaara’s writings thus pay attention to experiences that are often 
disregarded in clinical and folk psychiatric accounts. The experiences they de-
scribe are not just affective problems or cognitive problems that are somehow 
separate from one another and unrelated to other people and to the shared world. 
Especially bodily experiences and affectivity have a significant role in their 
representations. Much like the embodied cognitive and phenomenological ac-
counts of depression, Kane’s and Vaara’s written, artistic descriptions show that 
we need a different kind of understanding of the relations between embodiment, 
affectivity and cognition in order to understand these experiences. Most im-
portantly, Kane’s and Vaara’s texts invite us to pay attention to the ways the 
mind, affectivity and relations to the world and to other people are intertwined. 
 
 
ALTERATIONS IN AFFECTIVITY 
 
In recent views of the mind as embodied, affectivity is seen as the basis for our 
being in the world and our being with others. Affectivity or ‘affective framing’ is 
understood as a way in which bodily agents engage with their surroundings.21 To 
be affective means to be cognitive, and changes in affectivity have a deep impact 
on the ways one makes sense of the world. As Michelle Maiese puts it: “A shift 
in affective framing changes not just how one perceives the world, but what 
someone remembers, how one engages in practical reasoning, how one relates to 
other people, and even which object-directed emotions one experiences.”22 In 
other words, affectivity is a mode of being bodily attuned to and engaging with 
the world. Affects are ways of making sense of and caring about one’s surround-
                                                             
21  Cf. Colombetti 2014; Maiese 2014, 2016. 
22  Maiese 2014: 525. 
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ings: they influence the ways we perceive, remember, feel and reason.23 Affec-
tivity also connects us to other people, creating intersubjective and interaffective 
spaces, as Thomas Fuchs and Sabine Koch suggest: “Our body is affected by the 
other’s expression, and we experience the kinetics and intensity of his emotions 
through our own bodily kinaesthesia and sensation.”24 Ever since early infancy, 
we are tied to others through bodily resonance, and this forms the basis for inter-
subjective relations.  
The view of affectivity as a mode of “making sense” of the world and being 
with other people has consequences also for our understanding of depression. In 
this account, depression is understood as an alteration in the ability to affectively 
engage with the world and with others. According to Fuchs: “our participation in 
interaffective space is mediated by a fundamental bodily resonance. In depres-
sion, this attunement fails, and the lived body, as it were, shrinks to the bounda-
ries of the material body.”25 Rather than as a “mental” problem in some interior 
sense, depression is thus understood as a problem of interaffectivity and bodily 
resonance.26 
                                                             
23  Cf. also Fuchs 2013b: 613. In the background is the idea that a living organism always 
“cares” for its surroundings and its existence. Giovanna Colombetti defines affectivity 
as “lack of indifference”: as sensibility for or interest in one’s existence (cf. Co-
lombetti 2014a: 1-2). On this very primitive level, affectivity is a mode of making 
sense of the world: a mode of evaluating one’s environment and navigating this envi-
ronment (cf. Maiese 2014, Colombetti 2014a). There are different kinds of affective 
states, ranging from the more simple to the more complex or enriched: the primordial 
affectivity just described is in the background of everything that is alive (cf. Co-
lombetti 2014a). In addition, there are background feelings or what Matthew Ratcliffe 
has called existential feelings or Stimmung (for instance, the feeling of being alive, the 
sense of belonging to the world, or the feeling of being dead or alienated) – and these 
form the background of experience (cf. Ratcliffe 2009, 2015, Fuchs 2013b). Further-
more, there are longer lasting moods and atmospheres (like the depressed mood, or the 
feeling of uncanniness). And finally, there are shorter lasting and more complex emo-
tional episodes that are usually intentional, i.e. oriented towards objects in the world 
or other people (like experiences of shame or guilt). Cf. Fuchs 2013b for a discussion 
on the phenomenological distinctions between different forms of affects and emotions. 
24  Fuchs/Koch 2014: 5. 
25  Fuchs 2013a: 234. 
26  Fuchs (2009) and Colombetti (2013) have combined enactivist (embodied cognitive) 
theories and phenomenological insights in their analysis of mental disorders. For simi-
lar ideas on the basis of phenomenological theories, cf. Ratcliffe 2009, 2015. 
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The detunement, or loss of bodily resonance, which happens in depression 
helps in understanding the different symptoms of depression, like the feelings of 
bodily alienation and social estrangement. In addition to the loss of connected-
ness to oneself, the loss of bodily resonance diminishes the ability to connect 
with other people, which in turn results in the experiences of having failed so-
cially or being judged by others. It explains one of the central paradoxes of the 
illness: how there can be at the same time symptoms like the loss of caring for 
one’s existence and loss of will to live, and heightened social emotions like 
shame and guilt.27 Clinical manuals like the DSM acknowledge the multitude of 
different kinds of bodily, affective and intersubjective alterations in their symp-
tom listings, but focus on separate symptoms without paying much attention to 
the ways they are connected in the actual experiences of depression: in the ways 
the changes in how one perceives oneself, the world and others, remembers 
one’s past, engages with the world and others, and experiences one’s body are 
linked to each other. 
This complex network of different kinds of experiences and changes in the 
experiential world is also what Kane and Vaara describe in their texts, focusing 
especially on the bodily experiences and on problems in intersubjective relations. 
As Kane’s narrating I states: 
 
I have reached the end of this dreary and repugnant tale of a sense interned in an alien 
carcass and lumpen by the malignant spirit of the moral majority 
 
I have been dead for a long time28 
 
Kane’s poetic writing brings forth the experiences of alienation and the loss of 
will to live – and the heightened, painful experiences of hopelessness that result 
as the world seems to offer no more possibilities: “No hope No hope No hope 
No hope No hope No hope No hope”.29 The narrating I also describes cutting 
her/himself and pays attention to the ways depression medication changes 
her/his body. The general experience of depression is closely tied to changes in 
bodily being – and articulated for example in the image of the body as an “alien 
carcass”. 
Vaara, on the other hand, portrays how corporeal experiences are connected 
to the efforts of staying alive. The narrator tries to control her life by controlling 
her body: “I am tired, but I have to go skiing. / Maria says: –You have to ski, 
                                                             
27  Cf. Fuchs 2013a. 
28  Kane 2001: 214. 
29  Ibid.: 218. 
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you have to fast, you have to lose weight.”30 The ability to control one’s body is 
depicted as a chance for hope (in this sense depression comes close to eating 
disorders). Yet, on the other side of these efforts of control is the loss of all 
meaning: “– It does not matter, nothing matters, I do not care.”31 
The embodied cognitive view of the human mind offers a clearer understand-
ing of these kinds of experiences and of the ways one’s body, mind and the 
social world are intertwined. In addition, it helps us to understand how these 
experiences can be conveyed to other people. When we listen to others, we are 
moved by them, and we may even bodily imitate what is being told. We are also 
moved by absent or imagined others through texts: writing, especially the emo-
tional writing of depression narratives, becomes expressive of others’ experienc-
es. This is particularly clear in texts like Kane’s and Vaara’s, which deal with 
phenomena such as changes in bodily experiences and heightened negative emo-
tions, and use different poetic and narrative strategies to evoke affective reso-





Humans have a tendency to attribute experiences to other people and other ani-
mate and inanimate creatures.33 We also quite easily find expressions of feelings, 
affects and emotions in written texts. As anthropologist Niko Besnier aptly puts 
it, “affect permeates all levels of linguistic and communicative structures, all 
utterances, and all communicative contexts”.34 Narrative texts are able to tap into 
                                                             
30  Vaara 1974: 44: “Maria sanoo: –Sinun on pakko hiihtää, pakko paastota, pakko 
laihtua”. 
31  Ibid: 62: “–Se on yhdentekevää, kaikki on yhdentekevää, minä en välitä”. 
32  Also neurocognitive research suggests that language is connected to bodily experienc-
es: listening to stories activates some of the same neurological processes as telling 
them (cf. Hydén 2013: 235). 
33  Cf. Colombetti 2014a: 178. 
34  Besnier 1990: 437. Developmental psychologists suggest that language is grounded in 
early embodied interactions between the infant and the caregiver: in affect attunement, 
or in the “cross-modal matching of vocalizations and bodily movements in terms of 
rhythm and intensity”. Cf. Stern 1985; Colombetti 2014b. Prelinguistic processes also 
appear in language, in phenomena like rhythm and melody. This is most visible in 
face-to-face encounters, in speech prosody and gestures. It is perhaps less visible in 
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readers’ bodily and affective background by soliciting our tendency to attribute 
and simulate experiences, as proposed by cognitive narratologists.35 Depression 
writing may invite us to re-enact affective states which are a part of our past 
bodily, perceptual and emotional experiences, and writing can also point to 
experiences that are perhaps unfamiliar to readers. In the following, I will look at 
the ways Kane and Vaara evoke experiences of depression in their writing by 
manipulating the temporal and spatial structure and perspectives of their narra-
tives, and by using emotive words, bodily metaphors and images, as well as 
different para- and extralinguistic means to create affective resonance in their 
readers. 
The verbalization of emotions like shame and guilt is one powerful way to 
evoke experiences of distress. We can for example recall Kane’s repetitive 
“Shame shame shame. / Drown in your fucking shame”36 or Vaara’s “–Maria, it 
would be better if you were dead, one of the Scattered said.”37 In both texts, the 
emotive words and the second person is used to create vivid accounts of self-
accusations. At the same time, the “you” also addresses the readers – inviting 
them to take the other’s perspective and perhaps evoking similar experiences in 
them. 
The invitations for the readers to interact with the texts are visible also in the 
descriptions of experiences of loss and pain. Kane shows this in a particularly 
vivid manner in an early scene where the narrating I seems to be recollecting a 
past event:  
 
It wasn’t for long, I wasn’t there long. But drinking bitter black coffee I catch that medici-
nal smell in a cloud of ancient tobacco and something touches me in that still sobbing 
place and a wound from two years ago opens like a cadaver and a long buried shame roars 
its foul decaying grief.  
[…] 
I trusted you, I loved you and it’s not losing you that hurts me, but your bare-faced fuck-
ing falsehoods that masquerade as medical notes.38 
 
The memory is induced by a sensory experience (smelling coffee), and the pow-
erful bodily similes and metaphors (“like a cadaver”; “long buried shame roars 
                                                                                                                                  
non-poetic or non-narrative written texts, but again, extremely visible in poems and 
stories.  
35  Cf. Caracciolo 2014. 
36  Kane 2001: 209. 
37  “–Maria, sinun olisi parasta olla kuollut, irrallinen sanoi” (Vaara 1974: 57). 
38  Kane 2001: 208-210. 
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its foul decaying grief”) capture the physical experiences of shame, grief and 
loss. The text portrays how the smell transports the narrating I to the past experi-
ence, and the bodily images and the curses evoke the experience of distress. The 
unsettling effect is also strengthened by the syntax – by Kane’s long, exhausting 
sentences. Even though the main aim of Kane’s text is to portray deep depres-
sion, these words depicting pain and grief are likely to resonate with anyone who 
has experienced love and loss, whether they have experiences of depression or 
not.39 
Another dominating feature in Kane’s and Vaara’s texts is their fragmenta-
tion, which leaves a lot of room for readers to fill in the gaps with their own 
experiences and emotional reactions. Fragmentation is visible on the story-level 
(it is often difficult for the reader to make distinctions between what happens in 
the actual world of the text, and what is remembered, imagined or perhaps hallu-
cinated), but also on the material, textual level in both texts. Vaara, for example, 
uses typographical changes and spaces in a scene just before the narrating I falls 
into psychosis. As in the previous example from Kane, in Vaara’s novel this 
climactic scene reveals how the feelings of deep loss and pain are connected to 
the loss of another person, the therapist Johannes: 
 
It is dark. 
–Could someone please help me? 
 
Maria has gone away, I have gone away. The others have come. 
 
JOHANNES HAS GONE SOMEWHERE FAR AWAY40 
 
Vaara’s narrating I suggests repeatedly during the novel that her life is tied to 
Johannes, who now seems to have abandoned her.41 After this scene, the actual 
world of the text disappears and the second part of the novel consists of short 
hallucinatory stories and is mostly controlled by the solipsistic view-point of the 
hallucinating, narrating I. In the end, however, there is at least some hope of 
                                                             
39  Cf. Ovaska 2016: 5; Greig 2001: xvii. Kane’s narrator-protagonist also repeatedly 
challenges diagnostic categories and binary distinctions like the “ill” and the 
“healthy”: “I am not ill. I am depressed. Depression is anger” (Kane 2001: 212). 
40  “Pimeää. / –Eikö joku voisi vielä auttaa minua? // Maria on mennyt pois, minä olen 
mennyt pois. Ne toiset ovat tulleet. // JOHANNES ON MENNYT JONNEKIN 
KAUAS POIS” (Vaara 1974: 63). 
41  This is the narrating I’s interpretation of the situation, but it becomes clear to the 
readers that Johannes is actually only on vacation. 
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recovery, as the narrating I finally breaks out of psychosis. She has “gone 
through” her “dirty legends”,42 and the novel ends with a scene where Maria is 
shown to reach Johannes again: “I hear Johannes’ voice on the phone”.43 
 Kane’s performance text, on the other hand, ends with a scene that can be 
interpreted as suicide.44 The narrating I has – like Vaara’s Maria – gone through 
her/his story with the therapist, and although we do not get a reliable picture of 
what has happened between them, it seems that there is no hope of recovery – 
not even though s/he states that “I have no desire for death / no suicide ever 
had.”45 Directly following these words, in the final lines of the text, Kane creates 
an effect of movement through typography and repetition. The “falling” words 
express the disappearing subjectivity: 
 
watch me vanish   








          watch46 
 
As suggested, gaps and fragmentariness invite readers to interact with the text, 
and para- and extralinguistic elements like typography and prosody evoke emo-
tional intensity and movement. The repetition of the “falling” words on the page 
casts a calm, melancholic tone. The reader of the text (or the performance audi-
ence) is once again directly addressed and invited to witness the disappearance 
of the narrating I, and a connection between the protagonist and the audience is 
created.  




                                                             
42  As suggested in another part of the autobiographical trilogy (cf. Vaara 1980). 
43  “Puhelimesta kuuluu Johanneksen ääni” (Vaara 1974: 272). 
44  Cf. Ovaska 2016. 
45  Kane 2001: 244. 
46  Ibid. 
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I do not know if this is the final chapter. 
Maria does not know either. 
Johannes does not know. 
None of us knows at the moment. 
At the very least none of you.47 
 
In Vaara’s ending, the narrating I reminds her readers of the impossibility of 
experiencing another person’s experiences: it is not possible to feel what another 
is feeling. Yet, this does not mean that we would be unable to empathize with 
others: we can connect with others through our shared world and through our 
own bodily and affective experiences and histories.48 Kane’s narrating I makes 
the same point, emphasizing the ultimate blessing in the difference between the 
self and the other:  
 
Despair propels me to suicide 
Anguish for which doctors can find no cure 
Nor care to understand  
I hope you never understand 
Because I like you.49 
 
 
CONCLUSION: MAKING SENSE 
 
As mentioned, there are problems in the autobiographical testimonies of depres-
sion due to the distortion of memories and the ineffable nature of the experienc-
es. However, both Kane’s and Vaara’s (auto)fictional writing actually uses these 
problems for its own ends. The problems are thematized, as we have seen, and 
there are different techniques and literary devices through which Kane and Vaara 
invite their readers to enact these experiences. 
The descriptions, verbalizations and images discussed earlier solicit readers’ 
experiences and memories of loss and pain. Different discursive and structural 
choices trigger readers’ experiences of perceiving, imagining and remembering, 
as well as their experiences of the ways the borders between perceiving, imagin-
                                                             
47  “Minä en tiedä, onko tämä viimeinen luku. / Mariakaan ei tiedä. / Johannes ei tiedä. / 
Kukaan meistä ei sitä tällä hetkellä tiedä. / Kaikkein vähimmin joku teistä” (Vaara 
1974: 266). 
48  On empathy, cf. Gallagher/Zahavi 2012; Ratcliffe 2015. 
49  Kane 2001: 239. 
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ing and remembering are sometimes blurred. Emotive words, unsettling images 
and bodily metaphors evoke spontaneous corporeal reactions. In addition, non-
verbal elements, such as typographical changes, gaps (extralinguistic features) 
and word repetition, alliteration, and prosody (paralinguistic features), solicit 
readers’ kinesthetic experiences. Both Kane and Vaara use bodily and affective 
metaphors and images as well as structural and typographical changes to evoke 
the physical and kinesthetic character of affective experiences: to create tension 
and movement.  
These kinds of affective and bodily phenomena are familiar to everybody 
and they are at work in different kinds of narrative and poetic texts, but they 
often become highlighted in depression writing. Vaara’s and Kane’s texts tap 
into our most basic affective experiences and forms of sense making, evoking 
experiences of alterations in affectivity, and thus creating unsettling experiential 
worlds – but also meaning. Depression may be a state where the meaning of life 





American Psychiatric Association (2013): Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders, 5th Edition: DSM-5, Washington, DC. 
Besnier, Niko (1990): “Language and Affectivity”, in: Annual Review of An-
thropology 19, 419-451. 
Caracciolo, Marco (2014): The Experientiality of Narrative. An Enactivist Ap-
proach, Berlin/New York. 
Campbell, Alyson (2005): “Experiencing Kane. An Affective Analysis of Sarah 
Kane’s ‘Experiential’ Theatre in Performance”, in: Australasian Drama 
Studies 1, 80-97. 
Colombetti, Giovanna (2014a): The Feeling Body, Cambridge, MA. 
Colombetti, Giovanna (2014b): “Why Call Bodily Sense Making ‘Languag-
ing’?”, in: Frontiers in Psychology 5, s.p. 
Colombetti, Giovanna (2013): “Psychopathology and the Enactive Mind”, in: 
Fulford, K.W.M. et al. (eds.): The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Psy-
chiatry, Oxford, 1083-1102. 
Diedrich, Antje (2013): “‘Last in a Long Line of Literary Kleptomaniacs’. Inter-
textuality in Sarah Kane’s 4.48 Psychosis”, in: Modern Drama 3, 374-398 
Freud, Sigmund (1985) [1915]: “Mourning and Melancholia”, in: On Metapsy-
chology. The Theory of Psychoanalysis. Transl. James Strachey. Harmonds-
worth, 245-268. 
378 | ANNA OVASKA 
 
 
Fuchs, Thomas (2013a): “Depression, Intercorporeality, and Interaffectivity”, in: 
The Journal of Consciousness Studies 7/8, 219-238. 
Fuchs, Thomas (2013b): “The Phenomenology of Affectivity”, in Fulford, 
K.W.M. et al. (eds.): The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Psychiatry, Ox-
ford, 612-631. 
Fuchs, Thomas (2009): “Embodied Cognitive Neuroscience and Its Consequenc-
es for Psychiatry”, in: Poiesis & Praxis 6, 219-233. 
Fuchs, Thomas/Koch, Sabine (2014): “Embodied Affectivity. On Moving and 
Being Moved”, in: Frontiers in Psychology 5, s. p. 
Gallagher, Shaun/Zahavi, Dan (2012): The Phenomenological Mind, New 
York/London.  
Greig, David (2001): “Introduction”, in: Kane, Sarah, Complete Plays, London, 
ix-xviii. 
Hydén, Lars-Christer (2013): “Towards an Embodied Theory of Narrative and 
Storytelling”, in: Hyvärinen, Matti et al. (eds.): Travelling Concepts of Nar-
rative, Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 227-244. 
Kane, Sarah (2001): 4.48 Psychosis, in: Complete Plays, London, 203-245. 
Maiese, Michelle (2016): Embodied Selves and Divided Minds, Oxford. 
Maiese, Michelle (2014): “How Can Emotions Be both Cognitive and Bodily?”, 
in: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13, 513-531. 
Ovaska, Anna (2016): “Sarah Kane’s World of Depression. The Emergence and 
Experience of Mental Illness in 4.48 Psychosis”, in: On_Culture: The Open 
Journal for the Study of Culture 1, in: http://geb.uni-giessen.de/geb/volltexte/ 
2016/12057/ (31.10.2016). 
Radden, Jennifer/Varga, Somogy (2013): “The Epistemological Value of De-
pression Memoirs”, in: Fulford, K.W.M. et al. (eds.): The Oxford Handbook 
of Philosophy of Psychiatry, Oxford, 99-115. 
Ratcliffe, Matthew (2015): Experiences of Depression. A Study in Phenomenol-
ogy, Oxford. 
Ratcliffe, Matthew (2009): “Existential Feeling and Psychopathology”, in: Phi-
losophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 16/2, 179-194. 
Stern, Daniel (1985): The Interpersonal World of the Infant, New York. 
Vaara, Maria (1980): Myrkkyseitikki, Jyväskylä. 








Nora Berning is General Manager of the Graduate School of Economic and 
Social Sciences (GESS) at the University of Mannheim. She was Program Co-
ordinator and Postdoc at the GCSC (University of Giessen) between 2013 and 
2017. Her research focuses on English and American Literature and Culture, 
Media Theory and Travel Writing Studies. 
 
Marie Dücker is a PhD student at the Department of American Studies at the 
University of Graz. Her PhD project is concerned with the interplay between 
intermediality and affect within representations of suicide in contemporary 
American young adult fiction. Her research interests include YA fiction, inter-
mediality, affect theory, and the role of adolescent neoliberal exhaustion in 
popular culture. 
 
Julia Grillmayr works at the department of Comparative Literature at the Uni-
versity of Vienna. Her doctoral thesis on the spatial dimension of “ambient” 
technologies analysed through the lens of contemporary literature and philoso-
phy is embedded in a DOCteam project funded by the Austrian Academy of 
Sciences. Recent: “Extremely Small and Incredibly Everywhere” (with Louise 
Beltzung Horvath and Tanja Traxler, 2013). 
 
Ingeborg Jandl is a research fellow for Russian Literature and Culture at the 
Institute of Slavic Studies at the University of Graz. She has been awarded a 
DOC Fellowship of the Austrian Academy of Sciences and examines narrato-
logical aspects of perception in literature working towards her PhD in Russian 
and Comparative Literature. She is the author of a monograph on Rhythm and 
Phonetic Structures in Marina Tsveteva’s verse tragedies and of several articles 
on cultural and linguistic phenomena in literature and theatrical productions. 
 
380 | WRITING EMOTIONS 
 
 
Silke Jandl is a Teaching and Research Assistant at the Centre for Intermediali-
ty Studies at the University of Graz. She received her BA and MA in English 
and American Studies from the University of Graz. During the 2013/14 academ-
ic year, she served as a Teaching Assistant at the University of Minnesota. 
 
Susanne Knaller is Professor of Romance and Comparative Literature at the 
University of Graz. She is the speaker of the Research Department for General 
and Comparative Literature and director of the Centre for Cultural Studies. 
Recent: Ein Wort aus der Fremde. Geschichte und Theorie des Begriffs Authen-
tizität (2007); Die Realität der Kunst. Programme und Theorien zu Literatur, 
Kunst und Fotografie seit 1700 (2015); Ästhetische Emotion. Formen und Figu-
rationen zur Zeit des Umbruchs der Medien und Gattungen (1880-1939) (ed. 
with Rita Rieger, 2016). 
 
Angela Locatelli is Professor of English Literature at the University of Berga-
mo She is also Adjunct Professor in the Department of Religious Studies at the 
University of Pennsylvania. She has written extensively on Shakespeare and 
Early modern Culture and Literature, including the first modern edition of Hen-
ry Peacham’s A Merry Discourse of Meum and Tuum (1639) (Il Doppio e il 
Picaresco, 1998). Her publications include ten volumes on literary epistemolo-
gy (ed., The Knowledge of Literature/La conoscenza della Letteratura, 2002-
2011), Una coscienza non tutta per sé (1983), and many articles on Modernist 
and Postmodern fiction.  
 
Pirjo Lyytikäinen is Professor of Finnish literature at the University of Helsin-
ki and director of the Finnish Academy research project “Literature and Emo-
tions”. Areas of specialization: literary theory, genre theory and Fin de siècle 
and Early modernist Finnish literature. Her current research focuses on emo-
tions and the cognitive study of emotion effects in literature. Anthologies in 
English: Values in Literature (2015); Imagining Spaces and Places (2013); 
Rethinking Mimesis (2012); Genre and Interpretation (2010); The Angel of 
History. Literature, History and Culture (2009); Changing Scenes. Encounters 
between European and Finnish Fin de Siècle (2003). 
 
Yulia Marfutova is a PhD student at the Research Training Group Literary 
Form. History and Culture of Aesthetic Modeling, University of Münster. Re-
search interests: 18th century poetics and history of knowledge; epistolary nov-
els and letter culture; poetics of dialogue; physiognomy. 
 
AUTHORS | 381 
 
 
Vera Nünning is Professor of English Philology at Heidelberg University. She 
published several books on 18th, 19th and 20th century British literature, and 
(co-)edited many volumes on contemporary literature and narrative theory. Her 
articles deal with narrative theory, gender studies, cultural history from the 16th 
to the 19th century, and British literature from the 18th to the 21st century. Re-
cent: New Approaches to Narrative. Cognition – Culture – History (ed., 2013); 
Ritual and Narrative (co-edited with Jan Rupp and Gregor Ahn, 2013); Reading 
Fictions, Changing Minds (2014); Unreliable Narration and Trustworthiness. 
Intermedial and Interdisciplinary Perspectives (ed., 2015). 
 
Elise Nykänen is a member of the Academy of Finland Consortium project The 
Literary in Life. Exploring the Boundaries between Literature and the Every-
day. She is an expert in the study of fictional minds, cognitive and affective 
narratology, and fictional dialogue. Recent: Dialogi kaunokirjallisuudessa (Dia-
logue in Fiction, co-ed. 2013); special issue “Approaches to Fictional Dialogue” 
of Journal of Literary Linguistics (ed. with Aino Koivisto, 2016); Worlds With-
in and Without. Presenting Fictional Minds in Marja-Liisa Vartio’s Narrative 
Prose (2014).  
 
Laura Oulanne is a doctoral researcher at the University of Helsinki and the 
Justus Liebig University of Giessen. She is working on material things in Djuna 
Barnes’s and Jean Rhys’s short fiction. Her research interests include modernist 
literature, new materialisms, theories of affect and emotion, and embodied 
cognitive literary studies. 
 
Anna Ovaska is a doctoral researcher at the University of Helsinki and Justus 
Liebig University Giessen. She is also a Fulbright research scholar at the Pro-
gram in Narrative Medicine at Columbia University. Her research interests 
include modernist literature, cognitive narratology, affects studies, embodied 
cognition, and philosophy of psychiatry. Recent: “Sarah Kane’s World of De-
pression: The Emergence and Experience of Mental Illness in 4.48 Psychosis” 
(2016). 
 
Heta Pyrhönen is Professor of Comparative Literature at the University of 
Helsinki. Her research interests include British and American fiction from the 
18th century to the present (including popular fiction), narratology, psychoanaly-
sis, and feminism. She has published Murder from an Academic Angle. An 
Introduction to the Study of the Detective Narrative (1994); Mayhem and Mur-
der. Narrative and Moral Problems in the Detective Story (1999); Bluebeard 
Gothic. Jane Eyre and Its Progeny (2010); Jane Austen aikalaisemme (2014). 
382 | WRITING EMOTIONS 
 
 
Riikka Rossi is Adjunct Professor of Finnish literature at the University of 
Helsinki. Her current research centers on the affective aspects of literary realism 
and naturalism and negative emotions in literature. Recent: Le naturalisme 
finlandais. Une conception entropique du quotidien (2007); Rethinking Mime-
sis. Concepts and Practices of Literary Representation (co-ed. 2012); Re-read-
ing Zola and Worldwide Naturalism (2013).  
 
Gesine Lenore Schiewer is Professor and Chair of Intercultural German Stud-
ies (University of Bayreuth, Germany), President of the “Gesellschaft für inter-
kulturelle Germanistik” (GiG) (Association of Intercultural German Studies), 
Director of the International Research Center Chamisso IFC, Honorary Profes-
sorship at University of Berne (Switzerland). Recdent: Studienbuch Emo-
tionsforschung. Theorien, Anwendungsfelder, Perspektiven (2014). 
 
Sabine Schönfellner is a PhD student at the University of Graz and the Justus 
Liebig University Giessen in Comparative Literature and German Studies. She 
is a member of the “European PhD Net Literary und Cultural Studies”. Main 
research interests: biopolitics, posthumanism, science fiction and dystopia in 
recent German, English and Scandinavian literature. 
 
Emanuel Stelzer is a PhD student at Bergamo University in cotutelle with 
Justus Liebig University Giessen. His main research areas are early modern 
English literature and drama, and visual/material culture studies. His current 
project consists of an analysis of staged portraits in English Renaissance drama. 
Articles of his have appeared in Critical Survey and Notes and Queries. 
 
Gudrun Tockner is a doctoral researcher at the University of Graz, working on 
the depiction of magic on the early modern English stage and its performative 
implications. Her research interests include early modern drama and theatre, 
adaptation theory, gothic fiction, and ghost stories. 
 
Tom Vanassche is a PhD researcher at the Graduiertenkolleg “Faktuales und 
Fiktionales Erzählen” (University of Freiburg). Main research interests: the 
depiction of the Shoah in literature, the History of Emotions, documentary 
literature, and cognitive narratology. Recent: “Theatre as Courtroom. The NSU 
protocols in Freiburg” (with Martin Hinze, 2016). 
Leseproben, weitere Informationen und Bestellmöglichkeiten 
finden Sie unter www.transcript-verlag.de
Literaturwissenschaft
Uta Fenske, Gregor Schuhen (Hg.)
Geschichte(n) von Macht und Ohnmacht
Narrative von Männlichkeit und Gewalt
September 2016, 318 S., kart., 34,99 € (DE), 
ISBN 978-3-8376-3266-8




Ein ästhetisches Phänomen 
der frühen Goethezeit
Juli 2016, 516 S., kart., 44,99 € (DE), 
ISBN 978-3-8376-3433-4
E-Book: 44,99 € (DE), ISBN 978-3-8394-3433-8
 
Carsten Gansel, Werner Nell (Hg.)
Vom kritischen Denker zur Medienprominenz?
Zur Rolle von Intellektuellen in Literatur 
und Gesellschaft vor und nach 1989
2015, 406 S., kart., 39,99 € (DE), 
ISBN 978-3-8376-3078-7
E-Book: 39,99 € (DE), ISBN 978-3-8394-3078-1
 
Leseproben, weitere Informationen und Bestellmöglichkeiten 
finden Sie unter www.transcript-verlag.de
Literaturwissenschaft
Tanja Pröbstl
Zerstörte Sprache – gebrochenes Schweigen
Über die (Un-)Möglichkeit, 
von Folter zu erzählen
2015, 300 S., kart., 29,99 € (DE), 
ISBN 978-3-8376-3179-1
E-Book: 26,99 € (DE), ISBN 978-3-8394-3179-5
Heinz Sieburg (Hg.)
›Geschlecht‹ in Literatur und Geschichte
Bilder – Identitäten – Konstruktionen
2014, 262 S., kart., 32,99 € (DE), 
ISBN 978-3-8376-2502-8
E-Book: 32,99 € (DE), ISBN 978-3-8394-2502-2
Dieter Heimböckel, Georg Mein, 
Gesine Lenore Schiewer, Heinz Sieburg (Hg.)
Zeitschrift für interkulturelle Germanistik
7. Jahrgang, 2016, Heft 1
Juli 2016, 216 S., kart., 12,80 € (DE), 
ISBN 978-3-8376-3415-0
E-Book: 12,80 € (DE), ISBN 978-3-8394-3415-4
